# EVOLUTION OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA CATEGORIOLOGY

VOLUME I

## EARLY NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA CATEGORIOLOGY

HARSH NARAIN



Here is a study of the most ambitious categorial scheme of Indian philosophy in its general aspects, in the historical as well as philosophical perspectives, on a comprehensive scale. It is the first systematic attempt at exploiting Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as well as extra-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika sources, philosophical as well as extra-philosophical—such as Vedic texts, the *Nirukta*, grammar, Mīmāṁsā, Jainism, Buddhism, medical classics—in tracing the evolution of and analyzing the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories and categorial concepts. This genetic approach to Indian philosophy is a veritable experiment in importing historical sense into discussions of Indian philosophical issues.

A pioneering work in the field, restoring order to the welter of categorial concepts characteristic of the Nyāya school and setting out the first systematic, thorough, and constructive account of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories.

Rs. 55/-

To Dr. Navajeevan Rastogi
with best compliments & regards
Harsh Narain
28/8/76

EVOLUTION OF THE

NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA CATEGORIOLOGY

Volume I

EARLY NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA CATEGORIOLOGY

By the same author

*EVOLUTION OF DIALECTIC IN WESTERN THOUGHT*

*SIRR-I AKBAR SAHITA UPANIṢAT-SAMUCCAYA*, Vol. I

# EVOLUTION OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA CATEGORIOLOGY

BY

**Harsh Narain**

*M. A., Ph. D.*

Department of Philosophy

Banaras Hindu University

**VOLUME I**

## EARLY NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA CATEGORIOLOGY

BHARATI PRAKASHAN

VARANASI

1976

First Published 1976

*By* Sri Prakash Pandey

**Bharati Prakashan**

B 27/97, Durga Kund, Varanasi-5



Printed in India :

*By* Shankar Bhattacharya

**The Asian Printing Works**

B. 13/24, Sonarpura, Varanasi-1

To

my late lamented mother

## PREFACE

This is the first volume of the author's doctoral dissertation. With certain additions and alterations here and there, this volume is a veritable replica of part of the original draft. When it was decided to publish it, the author was not in a position to spare time enough to revise it or even check the proofs properly. Hence it contains certain flaws which have to wait to be removed in the next edition. Part of the contents of Chapter IV belongs elsewhere, and an error has crept into the numbering of its sections. The opening chapter has to be hurried through the press without proper review, otherwise its tone would have been a little different. Certain other errors of proof are also visible in the work. Some of these have been corrected at the end. Greater care will be taken in the publication of the second volume.

The author owes a deep debt of gratitude to Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Gopi Nath Kaviraj, Professor Daniel H. H. Ingalls, and the late Professor D. M. Datta, who extended to him the favour of going through the synopsis of this work at the initial stage, encouraging him, and offering him valuable suggestions.

Special thanks are due to Professor N. K. Devaraja and Professor Lallanji Gopal, without whose kind exhortations the work would not have seen the light of day for long.

The author cannot fail to record his thanks to Professor K. Shivaraman, Professor S. V. Singh, Dr. Rama Shankar Sharma, Dr. Ashok Kumar Kalia, Dr. Navajeevan Rastogi, Mr. Lakshmi Kant Awasthi, Dr. R.R. Pandey, and Mr. Gulab Lal Srivastava for taking active interest in this work in various ways.

Thanks are also due to my students Mr. Rakesh Kumar Mishra and Mrs. Vimala Singh, research scholars in the Department, the former for reading some proofs and checking part of the bibliography, and both for preparing a part of the index.

The author has also to acknowledg gratefully that Chapter III of the work was published in the *Bhārati*, bulletin of the College of Indology, Banaras Hindu University, long ago.

B. H. U.

November 30, 1975 Harsh Narain

## CONTENTS

PART III

BEGINNINGS OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA CATEGORIOLOGY

ABBREVIATIONS-cum-BIBLIOGRAPHY

# PART I

# INTRODUCTION

# CHAPTER I

## A CONSPECTUS OF THE CHIEF CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS INQUIRY

The *Evolution of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Categoriology* is a refurbished version of the author's doctoral dissertation bearing the same title. It is being published in two volumes, under the titles *Early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Categoriology* and *Development of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Categoriology* respectively.

The salient features of the inquiry vouching for its originality, the chief contributions to the credit of the author in this inquiry, are indicated below for a proper appreciation of his attempt.

1. To the best of the author's knowledge, there has been no attempt, at home or abroad, at a study of categoriology either in general or vis-*à*-vis any particular school of philosophy. Ours is the first attempt of its kind at exploiting, and on a rather extensive scale, even extra-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika sources, philosophical as well as extra-philosophical—such as Vedic texts, the *Nirukta,* grammar, Mīmāṁsā, Jainism, Buddhism, medical classics—in tracing the evolution of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories and categorial concepts. Yes, some of these sources have been a closed book for the students of Indian philosophy, and the wealth of material available therein, of so much significance to the study of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, has lain under a cloud.

2. The treatment of the subject in this work is quite uptodate, inasmuch as it takes notice of even the modern developments known to the author, so that Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra, Kailāśacandra Śiromaṇi, Rākhaladāsa Vandyopādhyāya, and Madhusūdana Vidyāvācaspati find due place in it. The last-named author has been introduced to the students of Indian philosophy as an exponent of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system perhaps for the first time.

3. The dissertation in Chapter III on the concept of category in the Nyāya tradition proper, based on a logical classification of the categorial concepts, is rather the first attempt to restore order to the welter of categorial concepts characteristic of this school.

4. The attempt in Chapter IV at a reconstruction and delimitation of the Vaiśeṣika concept of category with particular reference to the principle of categorization is one of the most interesting features of the author's approach.

5. The significance of Chapter V consists in a neat, handy, and logical classification of the theses concerning the origins of categoriology in general and investigation of the origins of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categoriology in its light by reference to nearly all possible extra-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika sources and traditions pertinent to the inquiry.

6. After analyzing the strata discernible in the text of the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*, it has been sought to be established in Chapter VI that the text has undergone three redactions and that the Sūtra listing the six categories from substance to inherence ( *VS*, BI/KSS, 1.1.4 ) is a post-Śrīdhara-Udayana interpolation.

7. Criticism in Chapter VI. 2.2 of Prof. Karl H. Potter's new-fangled notion of 'dravya' as different from 'substance' of Western philosophy.

8. Criticism in Chapter VI.2.3-4, of Prof. Karl H. Potter's notion of 'guṇa' as 'trope' and tracing the repeatability theory of guṇa in *PVM* and other grammatical works.

9. In Chapter VI. 2.5, the unrepeatability theory of motion has been discovered and discussed.

10. The finding, in Chapter VII, that existence (sattā) was the first to attain the status of a full-fledged category after substance, attribute, and motion.

11. Chapters VII. 5 and VIII. 5 put forth the first systematic and constructive enough accounts of the genesis of the categories existence and universal respectively.

12. In Chapter VII.5, new light has been obtained from grammatical sources and thrown on the question whether existence is a predicate.

13. Chapter IX.1 contains a thorough discussion of the concept of 'buddhyapekṣa' and from a comparatively new angle, thereby helping settle the meaning of the most controversial Sūtra of the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra.*

14. In Chapter IX.1, while giving a systematic account of the genesis of the category differential (viśeṣa), it has been shown that the category is a sequel to the category universal.

15. In Chapter IX.2, while giving an account of the genesis of the category inherence, it has been shown that the concepts of aggregation and causation are at the root of the category.

16. New light has been sought to be thrown on the concepts of existence (sattā), being (bhāva), essence, isness (astitva), and own-being (svātma-sattva) in Chapter XIII.

17. One of the conspicuous contributions of this work is the treatment of the concept of imposed property (upādhi) in Chapter XIV. Much new material has been brought to bear on the hitherto undiscussed question of the genesis of the concept. It has been indicated that even certain Western protagonists of the concept of universal sometimes find it difficult to do without a concept like imposed property.

18. In Chapters III.2 and XVII.5, it has been suggested that Vātsyāyana's conception of reality (tattva) as comprehending both being and non-being helped develop non-being as a category at a later stage.

19. Lastly, the inquiry is a veritable experiment in importing historical sense into discussions of Indian philosophical concepts and in the genetic study of such concepts.

---

*CHAPTER II*

# GENERAL FEATURES OF THE INQUIRY

## 1. THE TITLE OF THE INQUIRY

**1) The Meaning of 'Categoriology'** : The words 'Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika' and 'categoriology' occurring in the title of the inquiry need some explanation. To take the second term first, by categoriology we mean the theory or critique of categories. The term was originally coined by us on the analogy of 'historiology', and, soon after, we found it already used in a learned journal.[1]

**2) The Meaning of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika** : The term 'Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika' usually signifies the syncretism[2] of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems. The syncretic tendency is in evidence in the very Sūtras of the two schools.[3] It was continued by the commentator of *NS*, Vātsyāyana, completed by the latter's commentator, Uddyotakara, and reciprocated from the Vaiśeṣika side by Śivāditya, who set an example for

---

1. See Maurice Natansan, 'H. B. Alexander's Projection of a Categoriology', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (December, 1949). We have not been able to lay our hands on the writings of H. B. Alexander, so we are not in a position to say whether the term has been used by him, too. His works referred to by Natansan are : *Problems of Metaphysics* (1902), *Truth and the Faith* (1929), *God and Man's Destiny* (1936), all published at New York.

2. 'Syncretism, in its strict sense, means the tendency to reconcile and blend two opposing and irreconcilable systems, by minimizing differences. In this sense, it would be correct to speak about syncretism in Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya only with reference to their condition before their redaction into Sūtras, and even then, with due reservation.' *PIL*, introduction, pp. xxiii-xxiv. This limiting of syncretism to the pre-Sūtra period is, we confess, simply unintelligible to us.

3. For details, see *VPDS*, p. 16; *SPG*, Introduction, pp. xxix-xxxiv; and *ILES*, pp. 6-8.

later writers to follow.[1] Syncretism has been the ruling tendency of Vaiśeṣika writing as it has all along been of Nyāya writing. But the almost established practice is to term syncretic only those manuals which set themselves the task of synthetizing the two systems by rearranging and regrouping their categories.[2] Navya-Nyāya represents the same tendency. It is, however, designated by a distinctive name, thanks to its striking individuality. Thus, in common parlance, the term Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has come to characterize the intermediate phase of the history of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems between the earliest times to the latest ones.

This is not the sense, however, in which the term has been used in this work. By it we mean simply the sister (samānatantra)[3] schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, not excluding Navya-Nyāya, conceived of as subscribing in the last analysis to a common categoriology.[4]

## 2. THE NOMENCLATURE OE THE NYĀYA AND VAIŚEṢIKA SYSTEMS

The term 'Nyāya' means logic and epistemology, broadly speaking.[5] The term 'Vaiśeṣika', however, is an intriguing one. According to the Indian tradition, the Vaiśeṣika system derives its name from its doctrine of viśeṣa (differential) which is a speciality of the system. Except for the Madhva school of the Vedānta, which accepts the doctrine in a radically different form,[6] no other Indian school shares it. But this explanation of the nomenclature of the system does not sound very plausible. As will be shown in due course, viśeṣa was not recognized as a category, or, at any rate, did

1. For details of the syncretic tendency, see *VSF*, pp. 16-17 and 48-49; *PIL*, Introduction, section V; *IP*, II, pp. 31-32 ; *ILA*, ch. II; *VPDS*, pp. 16, 53-63, and 89-91.
2. See *SPG*, Introduction, p. xxx.
3. *NVT* 1.1.29, p. 263; *LM*, p. 48 ; *NL*, p. 35; etc.
4. One must not carry away the impression that the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems do not disagree on any point whatever. Their points of difference are summed up in *CMNV*, pp. 38-50, and *VSF*, pp. 48-49.
5. प्रमाणैरर्थपरीक्षणं न्यायः । *NBh*. 1.1.1, p. 3.
6. The Madhvaite's 'viśeṣa' translates as 'individuality.'

not play an important role, even when *VS* came to be finally redacted. The Buddhist tradition as preserved in the ancient Chinese records has it that the system is called Vaiśeṣika for the simple reason that it has special features as compared with the Sāṅkhya system or that it has excelled other works.[1] Some maintain that the Vaiśeṣika system is so called owing to its concern for accurate distinctions. 'The Vaiśeṣika school is characteristically "the school of distinctions,"'[2] says Randle. Faddegon expresses a similar opinion : 'The name Vaiśeṣika does not refer to the "ultimate qualities of atoms", but denotates the system as a doctrine of characterization.'[3]

The name 'Vaiśeṣika' seems to have something to do with the pluralistic outlook of the system. In contradistinction to the monism of the Upaniṣads, the Vaiśeṣika system posits a plurality of real particulars. The Absolute or Brahman of the Upaniṣads is a universal, a sāmānya, while the atoms and souls of the Vaiśeṣika are particulars, viśeṣa-s.[4] Even the mediaeval Sāṅkhya system is pluralist, but not so pluralist as the Vaiśeṣika. For the former, the physical world is essentially a unity; for the latter, it is a plurality of innumerable atoms, etc. Besides, the ancient Sāṅkhya systen was essentially monistic. Thus the Vaiśeṣika system is a system of viśeṣa-s or particulars par excellence, in which respect it claims to excel even the Sāṅkhya system. Hence the name Vaiśeṣika (particularist or pluralist). So, the Vaiśeṣika system owes its peculiar nomenclature to its pluralistic temper. Though it is difficult to say what must have been the case actually, there appears to be much force in this view.

As a matter of fact, the atomistic, pluralistic, and particularistic temper of the Vaiśeṣika system is not in very much accord with the doctrine of universals, which is one of the reasons why we consider this doctrine as a later growth.[5] If the Vedānta is a system of thoroughgoing universalism, and

1. See *VPDS*, pp. 3-5.
2. *ILES*, p. 136, f.n.
3. *VSF*, p. 18.
4. *VS* 3.2. 15-17 contains a refutation of spiritual monism.
5. See Ch. VIII, below.

Jainism a system of universalism-cum-particularism, the Vaiśeṣika system is a system of thoroughgoing particularism. Considered in this light, the aforesaid view would sound rather more plausible than the other views referred to above.

## 3. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY

**1) The subject-matter of the inquiry** : The inquiry seeks to trace the evolution of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Categoriology right from the birth of the systems down to the modern times and present it in a systematic form. As indicated above, its scope is not confined to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika syncretism. Its aim is to cover the whole gamut of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika categoriological thought from the earliest times to the latest ones.

**2) The ontological character of the inquiry** : There are many varieties of categorial[1] schemes : some are ontological, some others epistemological, still others axiological, and so on and so forth. The present inquiry is confined to ontological categories which, and which alone, were formulated by the Vaiśeṣika school and adopted by the composite, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. A chapter will be devoted, however, to the categoriology founded by the Nyāya school proper, which is a conglomeration of dialectical and logical, epistemological and axiological, physical and psychological categories.

**3) Exclusion of Vaiśeṣika physics, chemistry, and psychology** : The inquiry will be concerned with truly philosophical issues to the exclusion of non-philosophical. Accordingly, theories regarding physical and psychical elements, transformation of earthy bodies, and other matters constituting the Vaiśeṣika physics, chemistry, or psychology

1. W. T. Stace claims to have used the word 'categorial' for the first time, vide his *Theory of Knowledge and Existence*, p. 289, f. n. The word is found already used, however, in two series of Gifford Lectures—one on *Space, Time, and Deity* delivered by S. Alexander in 1916-18 and the other on *Process and Reality* delivered by A. N. Whitehead in 1929, the latter spelling the word as 'categoreal'. An alternative word is 'categorical', which is, however, rarely used now.

will be entirely excluded. Even though the Vaiśeṣika system is at once philosophy as well as physics, its physics[1] is by no means inextricably bound up with its categoriology proper.

4) **Utilization of other systems**: Our plan will be to trace the evolution of the categoriology in and through the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writings themselves, as the result of self-criticism and criticism by other Indian schools. We shall freely draw upon the other systems of Indian philosophy in our appraisals of the categoriology. It will, of course, involve occasional comparisons and contrasts of the latter with the former, which will not be resisted.

We shall also not resist the temptation of occasionally comparing Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theses with those of Western philosophers where it lies within our competence to do so, with a view to putting into clearer relief the outstanding features of the categoriology. We are not among those who regard comparisons of Indian philosophy with the Western as untouchables. We are fully convinced of the truth of the dictum that discovering similarities and dissimilarities is of the very essence of true knowledge.[2]

However, such comparisons are bound to be only occasional and few and far between.

## 4. IMPORTANCE OF THE INQUIRY

1) **Importance of Categoriology** : Categoriology is the very soul of philosophy, which is essentially a study in, or search for, first principles and the true method of which is categorization. No philosophizing worth the name is possible without some categoriological commitment, express or implied. No system of philosophy can afford to neglect categoriology without running the risk of ending in confusion and chaos. It is gratifying to note that Indian philosophers have always shown the sagacity of either evolving or owing allegiance

1. The best books on Vaiśeṣika physics, known to us, are : *PSAH*, *CMNV*, SNVM, and *VSF*.
2. *VS* (BI/KSS) 1.1.4.

to some scheme of categories or other. It is a pity that categories and categorial schemes have of late fallen into disrepute in the West, thanks to the contemporary abhorrence of system-builing in all its forms. The contemporary Westerner is oblivious of the fact that system-building is at once a temptation and test of a philosopher—temptation for unbridled speculation and test of the veracity and flawlessness of his otherwise unconnected, uncoordinated, and incoherent theses. He does not refrain from passing piecemeal categorial judgements without the least concern to order them into a coherent whole or system. Chaos is the result. The present inquiry will reveal the wisdom of Indian philosophers in attaching so much importance to categoriology.

**2) Importance of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categoriology**: The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categoriology (padārtha-śāstra ) under inquiry is a key to the understanding of all Indian ontology, even as the Nyāya logic-cum-epistemology (pramāṇa-śāstra) is a key to the understanding of all Indian logic and epistemology.[1]

We take it that the categoriologies propounded by the grammatical, Jaina, medical, and Vaiśeṣika schools can be reckoned as the oldest of the extant Indian categoriologies. The Sāṅkhya system can of course claim to be as old as the original Sāṅkhya even older than, these ; but it is by and large a system of cosmology and philosophy of nature rather than categoriology. Its burden is to explain the origin and structure of the world-process and to investigate the laws of processes and things around us rather than to investigate the nature of being *qua* being and its modes—the most general features of reality.

Thus, the importance of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categoriology lies, inter alia, in its being one of the afore-mentioned four oldest of Indian categoriologies. This being so, it, along with the other three, promises to throw a flood of light on the origin, nature, and problems of categoriological speculation, especially in India.

---

1. काणादं पाणिनीयं च सर्वशास्त्रोपकारकम् ।

We have no doubt that the role of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categoriology is not yet played out. As will transpire in due course, a good many of the issues raised by it retain their lustre even today.

## 5. THE PLAN OF THE INQUIRY

This work is divided into six parts subdivided into twenty-two chapters. Part I entitled 'Introduction' consists of Chapter I entitled 'A Conspectus of the Chief Contributions of This Inquiry' and the present chapter. Part II entitled 'The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Concept of Category' consists of Chapters III and IV. The subject-matter of Chapter III is 'The Concept of Category in the Nyāya Tradition Proper'. It seeks to analyze the notion of category implicit in the Nyāya schemes of (1) sixteen padārtha-s, (2) twelve prameya-s, (3) four arthapada-s, and (4) four varga-s, by piecing together the few stray suggestions on the notion of category to be met with in the Nyāya literature proper. Chapter IV on 'The Vaiśeṣika Concept of Category' seeks to analyze the concept of category in the Vaiśeṣika tradition. Since, however, the categoriology evolved by this tradition came to be adopted by the composite, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school in course of time, this chapter can well be said to have as its subject-matter the analysis of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of category. In both Chapters III and IV, an inquiry has also been attempted, on the basis of the very few suggestions found in the literature on the subject, into the principle of categorization in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categoriology.

Part III entitled 'Beginnings of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Categoriology' deals with the systematization of categories in *VS*. It consists of Chapters V to X. Chapter V entitled 'The Sources of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Categoriology' contains a brief discussion of possible theories about the origins of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categoriology preceded by a reference to the problem of the origins of categoriology in general, by considering the question of Greek influence and verdicts of the Mīmāṁsā tradition and the categoriologies evolved or fostered by the ancient medical schools, Jaina canonical works, and

grammatical schools. Chapter VI deals with 'The Original Systematization of Categories' and seeks to show that the original Vaiśeṣika table of categories comprised only three categories, viz. substance (dravya), attribute (guṇa), and motion (karman), to treat of these as set out in *VS*, and to discuss their genesis by a detailed examination of Jaina and grammatical sources, coupled with an examination of Vedic sources besides. Chapter VII entitled 'Recognition of Existence As a Category' seeks to show, on the basis of not only Vaiśeṣika but also Buddhist sources, that existence (sattā or bhāva) was the fourth category to be evolved by the Vaiśeṣika school. It also contains a brief statement of the category as found in *VS* and discusses the question of its genesis on the basis of the very meagre data available in the Vedic literature including the *Nirukta* and grammatical works. Chapter VIII treats of the 'Evolution of the Category Universal' and seeks to show that universal (sāmānya) is a later category than existence, to treat of the category as set out in *VS*, and to study the genesis of the category on the basis of data culled from the ancient Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā, grammatical, and Buddhist sources. Chapter IX entitled 'Evolution of Differential and Inherence As Categories' seeks to trace the evolution of the categories differential (viśeṣa) and inherence (samavāya), to treat of them as found in *VS*, and after a discussion of their genesis to show that they are the youngest of the categories found in *VS*. This completes the discussion of the categories as in *VS*. Chapter X discusses the 'Finalization of the Table of Six Categories' ascribed to *VS* and examines certain attempts to reinterpret *VS* on Vedāntic lines.

Part IV has as its subject-matter 'Expansion of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Categoriology' after the present redaction of *VS*. It consists of Chapters XI to XVIII. Chapter XI is devoted to a discussion of the restatement of the concepts of substance, attribute, and motion by Praśpstapāda and his successors, with a reference to the main points of criticism urged against the categories by Śaṅkarites and Buddhists. In keeping with the general policy pursued throughout this work, we have concentrated upon general aspects of the categories

avoiding involvement in a detailed discussion of their divisions and subdivisions. Chapter XII deals with 'Development of the Category Universal' in general and discusses the definition, division, proof, and criticisms of the category universal. The detailed discussion, however, of the highest universal, viz. existence, is undertaken in a separate chapter, Chapter XIII entitled 'Existence, Being, and Isness', in which the concept of existence has been discussed vis-*à*-vis the concepts of being and isness evolved in Praśastapāda and his successors. A full chapter, Chapter XIV, entitled 'Evolution of the Concept of Imposed Property', is devoted to the treatment of the allied concept of imposed property (upādhi). This chapter sets out an original thesis as regards the genesis of the concept of imposed property. Chapters XV and XVI deal with important developments as regards the categories differential and inherence respectively, with a brief reference to important criticisms of the caregories. Chapter XVII seeks to give a systematic account of the 'Evolution of Non-being As a Seventh Category'. This part closes with Chapter XVIII on 'Candra's Table of Ten Categories'.

Part V deals with the 'Rise of Heterodoxy' in the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categoriology. It consists of Chapters XIX to XXI. Chapter XIX treats of the 'Heterodoxy of the Bhāsarvajña School'. Chapter XX is devoted to a discussion of 'Raghunātha's Revolt from Traditional Categoriology' on the basis, in the main, of *PTN*, with indications here and there of the influences on Raghunātha resulting in several innovations on his part. Chapter XXI deals with the 'Impact of Raghunātha' and notices the innovations of Veṇīdatta and Rākhāladāsa.

Part VI entitled 'Conclusion' comprises only Chapter XXII devoted to 'A Critical Estimate of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Categoriology'. It refers to the popularity of the table of seven categories despite vicissitudes, discusses the importance of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categoriology, points out some glaring limitations of it, and considers what is dead and what is living in it.

---

PART II

# THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA CONCEPT OF CATEGORY

## CHAPTER III

# THE CONCEPT OF CATEGORY IN THE NYĀYA TRADITION PROPER

## 1. PRELIMINARY REMARKS

By Nyāya tradition we mean the tradition owing its origin to the *Nyāya-Sūtra* ascribed to Gautama.

The Indian philosopher seldom feels called upon to define and delimit his concept of category with the seriousness the task so richly deserves. It is true that he generally starts with a what may be called categoriological commitment by expressing allegiance to a current table of categories or notifying his own, but he maintains complete reticence as to the all too fundamental question of the notion of category itself. It is rather surprising that Indian categoriologists, who are second to none in their solicitude for neatly classifying categorial concepts taking full account of their minutest details, take scant pains to analyze and state their concept of category, which has, for the same reason, had little history and less variety in contradistinction to its Western counterpart. This is as true of the Nyāya system as of any other system of Indian philosophy, the Vaiśeṣika system not excepted. In what follows, we shall try to piece together the stray suggestions on the notion of category found in the Nyāya literature for what they are worth.

In the Nyāya tradition, we come across three different but related concepts of category, which are :

a) Category as padārtha, having sixteen subdivisions;
b) Category as prameya, having twelve subdivisions;
c) Category as arthapada, having four subdivisions; and
d) Category as an epistemological ordering of experience, having four subdivisions (catur-varga).

We devote one section to each of these four concepts.

## 2. CATEGORY AS PADĀRTHA

**1) Gautama's list of sixteen categories :** The *Nyāya-Sūtra* opens with an enumeration of sixteen items[1] the true knowledge of which is said to be the sine qua non of the attainment of the summum bonum (mokṣa) and under which the whole subject-matter of the treatise is arranged. The Sūtra listing them reads thus : 'The summum bonum is attained by means of true knowledge of the means of *true* knowledge (pramāṇa), objects of true knowledge or knowables (prameya), doubt (saṁśaya), purpose (prayojana), illustration (dṛṣṭānta), theory (siddhānta), syllogism (avayava), reasoning (tarka), decision (nirṇaya), discussion (vāda), disputation (jalpa), wrangling (vitaṇḍā), fallacy (hetvābhāsa), quibbling (chala), pseudo-rejoinder (jāti), and clincher (nigrahasthāna).'[2]

**2) 'Padārtha', 'Vidyamānārtha', and 'Sadvidha' :** It has been the usual practice since the time of Vātsyāyana to call the sixteen items padārtha-s, though the Sūtras themselves do not give them any common name. Vātsyāyana calls them 'padārtha'[3] as well as 'vidyamānārtha'.[4] 'Padārtha' means, literally speaking, the denotation or signification of a word or term (padasya arthaḥ)[5] and, generally speaking, what is expressed in or through language. This, however, does not seem to be the sense in which Vātsyāyana

---

1. The word 'item' has been used here quite provisionally. What the appropriate word should be will be clear as we proceed.

2. प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशयप्रयोजनदृष्टान्तसिद्धान्तावयवतर्कनिर्णयवादजल्पवितण्डाहेत्वाभासच्छल-जातिनिग्रहस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञानान् निःश्रेयसाधिगमः । *NS* 1.1.1.

3. संशयादयः पदार्थाः । *NBh.* 1.1.1, p. 3.

4. त एतावन्तो विद्यमानार्था येषामविपरीतज्ञानार्थमिहोपदेशः । *Ibid.*, p. 2.

5. The word 'artha', like its English counterpart 'meaning', means both sense and denotation. (See Chapter V) We are not concerned with the meaning of the term as a sensible quality given in *NS* 1. 1. 14 (गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दाः पृथिव्यादिगुणास् तदर्थाः) and *CS*, Śarīra-Sthāna 1.31, p. 609 (अर्थाः शब्दादयो ज्ञेया गोचरा विषया गुणाः).

has used the term in the present context. In common parlance, padārtha means a thing, entity, or real. Usually, it is also regarded as the nearest Sanskrit equivalent for 'category' in its general sense of mode or way of being. These meanings are obviously derived from the radical meaning. It is in these derivative senses that Vātsyāyana seems to have used the term, so far, of course, as the present context is concerned. This interpretation is fully borne out by the following facts. To the sixteen items under discussion, he gives the epithet 'existential' (sadvidha).[1] Of them, as indicated above, he also uses the expression 'vidyamānārtha'. The meaning of this expression is very simple—'things in being or existence' or simply 'existents' or 'entities.' Besides, while introducing the Sūtra under reference, he has unequivocally remarked, 'Now, being (or existence) is going to be described in sixteenfold division.'[2] In his gloss on this remark, Uddyotakara holds that these are the divisions (or categories) of being (or existence).[3] Thus, the sixteen items can well be said to be categories in the sense of ways of being.

These facts leave no doubt that by padārtha or vidyamānārtha Vātsyāyana simply means an existent, an entity, or a real on one hand and a category or a way of being on the other. Let us, therefore, call the sixteen items categories.

The Sūtras, too, use the word padārtha once, not however, for the sixteen categories but for the individual ( vyakti ), the form ( ākṛti ), and the species ( jāti ). 'The individual, the form, and the species are the padārtha',[4] reads the Sūtra. It is significant that the word here means 'the denotation or signification of a word or term' and occurs in the section dealing with the denotation of words. The question is raised whether it is the individual, the form, or

1. तासां खल्वासां सद्विधानां प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशय० *NBh.* 1. 1. 1, p 2.
2. सत्त्व च खलु षोडशधा व्यूढमुपदेक्ष्यते । *Loc. cit.*
3. त एते सद्भेदा इति सूत्रम् । *NV* 1. 1. 1, p. 10.
4. व्यक्त्याकृतिजातयस्तु पदार्थः । *NS* 2. 2. 66.

the species that is the denotation of words and replied that all the three constitute the denotation together. It will be appreciated that the denotation of words sought to be determined here has little categoriological implication. The Sūtras do not seem to be concerned with the determination of the denotation of all kinds of words. Viśvanātha's contention that the denotation of roots etc. being undisputed they have not been considered,[1] is no explanation. It sppears that Gautama has before his mind a cow and sets out to consider whether its individuality, its form, or the species to which it belongs is signified by the word 'cow.' Thus the discussion is purely of empirical importance. No logical or ontological significance need be attached to it.

So, Vātsyāyana is right in invoking the aforesaid meaning of the word 'padārtha' while commenting on the Sūtra dealing with the sixteen categories.

**3) The question of negative category :** We have seen that the sixteen categories are the categories of existence ( ṣoḍaśadhā vyūḍhaṁ sat ), existential ( sadvidha ) categories, ways of being ( sadbhedāḥ ),—in short, positive categories. What about negative categories, if any ? This is an interesting question for which the Naiyāyikas have shown much solicitude. We should like to deal with it at some length.

As already pointed out, the Sūtras have it that the summum bonum is attained by means of the true knowledge of the sixteen categories under discussion. For 'true knowledge' the S·tras have 'tattva-jñāna', literally knowledge ( jñāna ) of reality ( tattva ). The word most commonly used in Indian philosophy for what is signified by the word 'reality' in Western philosophy is 'tattva', which means, literally speaking, that-ness or, in more intelligible terms, the being of an entity.[2] Vātsyāyana adheres to this meaning when he defines

---

1. तत्रापि धात्वाद्यर्थस्य निर्विवादत्वाद् गवादिपदार्थं निरूपयितुमाह—व्यक्तिर् गवादिः । *NSV* 2.2.58 (according to *NBh.* edition, 59).
2. तस्य भावस् तत्त्वम् । *PVM*, I, p. 21 ; *Ibid.*, IV, p. 298 (here the reading is slightly different—तद्भावस्तत्त्वम्; *NV.*, p.9; *NVTP* 1.1.1, p. 103; *NKu.*, II, p. 67 ; यस्त वस्तुनो यो भावस् तत् तस्य तत्त्वम् । *NK*, p. 6.

tattva as 'the being of a thing as it is, non-delusion, or objectivity.'[1] Now, this term, tattva, is inclusive of both being ( sat ) and non-being ( asat ). Uddyotakara defines it like this : 'Well, what is tat ?[2] Being and non-being are tat, the being of which ( tat ) is tattva.'[3] A more elaborate definition given by Vātsyāyana as inclusive of being as well as non-being is : 'Well, what is tattva ? The being of what is and the non-being of what is not. Tattva is that which, objective and non-delusive, is apprehended as "is" and that which, objective and non-delusive, is apprehended as "is not".'[4] Jayanta Bhaṭṭa endorses the definition and formulates it in these words : 'Of the thing that is or is not the character which is determined by means of true knowledge and which is the cause of the employment of words, is called "tat", and the being of tat is tattva.'[5]

There are many more definitions of tattva or reality scattered here and there in the Nyāya literature. Here we are concerned only to shew that the Nyāya conception of reality comprehends within its compass the conceptions of both being and non-being.[6]

Now, as hinted above, the following questions crop up on this view of reality :

1 ) Are there any negative categories ?

2 ) If so,

---

1. यथा सोऽर्थो भवति तस्य तथाभावस् तत्त्वमविपर्ययो, याथातथ्यम् । *NBh.* I.I.40, p. 54.
2. 'Tat' means 'that' and is the first member of the two-member compound 'tat-tva' meaning 'that-ness'.
3. किं पुनस् तत् ? सदसती तत्, तस्य भावस् तत्त्वम् । *NV*, p. 9.
4. किं पुनस् तत्त्वम् ? सतश् च सद्भावोऽसतश् चासद्भावः । सत्सदिति गृह्यमाणं यथाभूतमविपरीतं तत्त्वं भवति । असच् चासदिति गृह्यमाणं यथाभूतमविपरीतं तत्त्वं भवति । *NBh.* I.1.1, p. 1.
5. सतोऽसती वा वस्तुनः प्रमाणपरिनिश्चितस्वरूपं शब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं तदित्युच्यते । तस्य भावस् तत्त्वम् ... । *NM*, I, p. 8.
6. This conception of reality seems to have been one of the factors responsible for the recognition of non-being (abhāva) as a category in the Vaiśeṣika system. We shall consider this point at its proper place.

a) what are they ? and

b) why are the Sūtras silent about them ?

From the above account, it would be evident that the Naiyāyikas' answer to question ( 1 ) is in the affirmative. Question ( 2 ) (a) does not seem to have interested them much. Vātsyāyana does not even touch upon it beyond stating, what is only indirectly ralevant here, that the means of knowledge that reveal being reveal non-being, too.[1] Uddyotakara dismisses it in a highly cavalier fashion : 'The means of knowledge that reveal being reveal non-being as well. Of course, categories of non-being do not reveal themselves independently.... [ Therefore, ] like the categories of being, the categories of non-being, too, should be taken to have been described [ by implication ].'[2] Vācaspati Miśra goes a step further and by means of one or two examples tries to show how categories of non-being stand described by the description of categories of being. He takes the first category of being, means of knowledge, and says that it is of two kinds : means of knowledge of being and means of knowledge of non-being. In this connexton he refers to the second Sūtra of *NS* which, in effect, has it that the non-being of the cause proves the non-being of the effect.[3] In elucidation of this, Udayana remarks : 'By the non-cognition ( or non-being ) of cause, all the categories of non-cognition ( or non-being ) stand illustrated.'[4] Vācaspati next takes the summum bonum

---

1. सतः प्रकाशकं प्रमाणमसदपि प्रकाशयतीति । *NBh.* 1.1.1, p. 2.

2. सतः प्रकाशकं प्रमाणमसदपि प्रकाशयति । तत्र स्वातन्त्र्येणासद्भेदा न प्रकाशन्ते...। भावप्रपञ्चवदभावप्रपञ्चोऽप्युद्दिष्टो वेदितव्य इति भावोपदेशादभावप्रपञ्च उद्दिष्टो भवति...। *NV* 1.1.1, p, 10.

3. द्विविधं प्रमाणम्—भावोऽभावश् च। यथा कारणाभावेन कार्याभावज्ञानम्, यतो द्वितीयसूत्रसमुत्थानम् । *NVT* 1.1.1,, p. 35. The second Sūtra referred to here runs thus : दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः, which, rendered into English, would be, 'The summum bonum supervenes upon the cessation of suffering, birth, activity, impurity, and false knowledge one after another, the cessation of that which follows bringing about the cessation of that which precedes it.'

4. कारणानुपलब्ध्या सर्व एवानुपलब्धिभेदा उपलक्षिताः । *NVTP* 1.1.1, p. 219.

( apavarga ) and says that it is the crest-jewel of the objects of knowledge or knowables ( prameya-s ).[1] Udayana does not help us in unravelling the import of this remark. However, it seems to imply that even the highest of the knowables has non-existential implications, is of the nature of non-being.[2] He concludes the topic saying that the same logic should be followed in respect of purpose and other categories as well.[3]

Udayana takes up the thread provided by Vācaspati and proceeds to bring out the non-existential implication of further categories and sub-categories. There are in all twelve knowables (prameya-s)—soul (ātman), body (śarīra) sense-organs (indriya), objects (artha), understanding (buddhi), monad (manas), activity (pravṛtti), impurities (doṣa), rebirth (pretayabhāva), consequence (phala), suffering (duḥkha), and summum bonum (apavarga).[4] These will be discussed at their proper place. Udayana considers only objects, activity, rebirth, consequence, and the summum bonum. He says : 'An object like the absence of the foe, the son, etc; an activity like non-violence etc.; rebirth as the casting off of the previous body ; a consequence like the elimination of a caused disease ;—these should be treated as the categories of non-being.'[5] Of the summum bonum, he says that it is agreed on all hands that it is the non-being of suffering.[6] Udayana also takes up the categories of being and knowledge like purpose, illustration, and theory and remarks: 'The very elimination of the baneful through prayer and adoration and atonement constitutes purpose. Some illustrations, too, are of the

1. प्रमेयेष्वपवर्ग एव मूर्द्धाभिषिक्तः । *NVT* 1.1.1, p. 35.
2. That the Naiyāyika's summum bonum is of the nature of non-being or cessation of all suffering without the least positive happiness characterizing it, is discussed at length by Vātsyāyana while commenting on *NS* I. 1.2 and 22.
3. एवं प्रयोजनादिष्वपीति तत्र तत्रोहनीयमिति । *NVT* 1.1.1, p. 35.
4. आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थबुद्धिमनःप्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गास्तु प्रमेयम् । *NS* 1.1.9.
5. अर्थोऽपि शत्रुपुत्राद्यभावादिः, प्रवृत्तिरप्यहिंसादिः, प्रेत्यभावोऽपि पूर्वशरीरपरित्यागादिः, फलमप्युत्पन्नरोगप्रध्वंसाद्यसद्भेद इति मन्तव्यम् । *NVTP* 1.1.1, p. 220.
6. सर्वेषामपवर्गो दुःखाभाव इति । *Loc. cit.*

nature of non-being, as the summum bonum will be illustrated by slumber. Others' theories like soul-less-ness etc. and ours like that of darkness being the non-being of light etc. [ are also of the nature of non-being ]....Fallacies are of two kinds, [ negative and positive, ] such as that sound is non-eternal on account of its being (1) non-existent and (2) visible. Among the clinchers, those exemplifying false knowledge are subdivisions of being and those exemplifying ignorance are subdivisions of non-being'.[1]

In this connexion, Udayana makes it clear that there are also categories which have no non-existential character. 'Being of the nature of knowledge, doubt cannot be of the nature of non-being. That is why [ Vācaspati ] passes over it [ to purpose ].[2]...Syllogism, reasoning, decision, discussion, disputation, and wrangling are categories of being alone.... Quibbling and pseudo-rejoinder are categories of being alone.'[3]

Udayana next raises the question whether in the commentay on the Sūtras there is not the merest mention of the categories of non-being[4] and in reply refers his student to Vācaspati's embellishment of Vātsyāyana's observation, 'Now, being will be described in sixteen divisions'.[5] Vācaspati has given two alternative interpretations of Vātsyāyana's observation : 'In the first alternative,...[ the observation means, ] being alone will be described in sixteen divisions, not non-being, which is revealed through being. In the se-

---

1. सन्ध्यावन्दनप्रायश्चित्तादावहितनिवृत्तिरेव प्रयोजनम् । दृष्टान्तोऽपि कश्चिदभावरूपः, यथा सुषुप्तावस्थानमपवर्गे दृष्टान्तयिष्यति । सिद्धान्तोऽपि नैरात्म्यादिः परेषाम्, अस्माकं यथा भा(ऽ)भावास् तम इत्येवमादिः । ... हेत्वाभासा द्विविधाः—यथा नित्यः शब्दः सत्तारहितत्वाच् चाक्षुषत्वादित्येवमादिः ।... निग्रहस्थानेषु विप्रतिपत्तिविधाः सद्भेदाः, अप्रतिपत्तिविधा असद्भेदाः । *Ibid.*, pp. 220-222.

2. The reference is to Vācaspati's pasage, एवं प्रयोजनादिष्वपीति तत्र तत्रोहनीयमिति । *NVT* 1.1.1, p. 35.

3. संशयस्य ज्ञानरूपत्वादसद्रूपता न सम्भवतीति तमुल्लङ्घ्यातिदिशति । ... अवयव-तर्क-निर्णय-वाद-जल्प-वितण्डास् तु सद्भेदा एव । ... छले जातयः सद्भेदा एव । *NVTP* 1.1.1, p. 220.

4. ननु भाष्ये असद्भेदकथनवार्ताऽपि नास्तीत्यत आह—अत्रे ति । *Ibid.*, p. 221.

5. सच् च खलु षोडशधा व्यूढमुपदेक्ष्यते । *NBh.* 1.1.1, p. 2.

cond alternative,...[ the passage means, ] by the description of being in sixteen divisions, non-being, too, will stand described. This is the meaning.'[1]

The upshot of the foregoing considerations is that, as the categories of non-being are implied in the categories of being, the Sūtras have not cared to describe the former as they do the latter.

Vācaspati gives yet another interesting reason why the categories of non-being are not mentioned separately. This we should like to explain with referencc to Udayana's gloss on the relevant passage of Vācaspati. Udayana poses the question : 'If the categories of non-being are not relevant to our purpose, then say that they are not described on account of their irrelevancy. If, on the other hand, they are relevant, they must needs be described. What is the good of contending that they are not described on account of the dependent nature of their revelation ?'[2] For reply to this objection, he refers his student to Vācaspati's passage beginning with 'niṣedhya',[3] which reads thus : 'The categories of non-being are dependent on those of being for their revelation, for they are subject to description by reference to the locus of negation. Therefore, by the very description of the categories of being, those of non-being, too, stand revealed. Hence no mention of the latter.'[4] Udayana adds : 'They (the categories of non-being) could be mentioned only for treatment's sake, and that has duly been achieved by the treat-

---

1. अत्र प्रथमे कल्पे च-शब्दोऽवधारणे, खलुशब्दः स्पष्टावधारणे; सद्धि षोडशधा व्यूढमुपदेक्ष्यते, नासत्, तस्य सदधीनप्रकाशत्वादिति । द्वितीये तु कल्पे पारमार्थिके चः समुच्चये, खलुरवधारणे, सति षोडशधैवोपदेक्ष्यमाणे सदप्युपदेक्ष्यत इत्यर्थः । *NVT* 1.1.1, p. 35.

2. ननु यद्यसद्भेदाः प्रकृतानुपयोगिनस्, तदाऽनुपयोगादेव नोच्यन्त इत्युच्यताम्; अथोपयोगिनस्, तदाऽवश्यं वक्तव्या एव, पारतंत्र्येण प्रतिभासान् नोच्यन्त इति क्वोपयुज्यते ? *NVTP* 1.1.1, pp. 217-218.

3. इत्यत आह—निषेध्येति । *Loc. cit.*

4. निषेध्यनिषेधाधिकरणाधीननिरूपणत्वादसद्भेदानां भावभेदतंत्रं प्रकाशनमिति भावभेदकथनेनाभावभेदा अपि गम्यन्त इति नोक्ता इत्यर्थः । *NVT* 1.1.1, p. 34.

ment of the locus of [their] opposites [that is, the categories of being].'[1]

Next, Udayana raises another interesting question. He puts the following words in the mouth of an imaginary objector : 'If [ the categories of non-being] stand described by the treatment of the media [of their revelation] and hence are not described, then the objects of knowledge or knowables, etc., too, stand described by the very description of the means of knowledge; so, why describe them even ? If [you contend that the objects of knowledge or knowables,] so apprehended as they are, are described solicitously for a particular purpose, then why not describe the categories of non-being, which, too, serve some purpose ?'[2] For reply Udayana refers his reader to Vācaspati who, by way of adducing an alternative argument justifying the non-mention of non-existential categories, remarks : 'Or described are such categories the true knowledge of which is conducive to the attainment of the summum bonum. Those which are not so, ought not to be described in detail, like [many undescribed] categories of being having no such utility.'[3] These words have been said by Vācaspati in elucidation of Uddyotakara's laconic but significant observation that one of the reasons why the categories of non-being have not been mentioned in the relevant Sūtra is that they are not subsumable under any of the four axiological categories[4]—what must be discarded (suffering and its causes), what does discard it (true knowledge), the means of its destruction (scriptures), and the goal to be attained (the summum bonum)—which will be dealt with in the sequel. Here we seek to show that,

---

1. प्रतिपादनाय हि ते वक्तव्यास्, तच् च प्रतियोग्यधिकरणप्रतिपादनादेवार्थतो भूतम् । *NVTP* 1.1.1, p. 218.
2. ननु यद्युपायप्रतिपादनेनैव प्रतिपादिता इति नोक्तास्, तर्हि प्रमेयादयोऽपि प्रमाणव्युत्पादनेनैव प्रतिपादिता इति किं तत्कथनेनापि ? अथ प्रतीता अपि प्रयोजनविशेषादभ्यर्हिततया प्रतिपाद्यन्ते, हन्तासद्भेदा अपि उपयुक्तास् तथा किं न ? *Loc. cit.*
3. अथ वा कथिता एव येषां तत्त्वज्ञानं निःश्रेयसपयोगि ; ये तु न तथा तेषां प्रपञ्चोऽनुपयुक्तभावप्रपञ्च इव वक्तव्यः । *NVT* 1.1.1, p. 34.
4. चतुर्वर्गानन्तर्भावाद् वा । *NV* 1.1.1, p. 10.

according to Uddyotakara, what does not fall under any of these four categories has little utility so far as the attainment of the summum bonum is concerned and hence has not been taken seriously by the Sūtras.

Vāçaspati here raises the question, how can one know which category has no utility for the attainment of the summum bonum ?,[1] and disposes of it simply by referring the reader to Uddyotakara's observation, 'By the description of the categories of being, those of non-being stand described',[2] as if it constituted a satisfactory reply. We confess this logic is far from clear to us. Even Udayana does not help clarify the point sought to be made by Vācaspati.

**4) Incompleteness and haphazard character of the list of sixteen categories :** We should like our reader to pay special attention to Vācaspati's suggestion that the list of the sixteen categories need not be taken to be a complete list of reals and that the Sūtras have cared to list only those categories of being explicity and of non-being implicity which are conducive to the attainment of the summum bonum. Elsewhere, he throws his position into clearer relief saying that the sands of the river Gaṅgā, existent as they are, have not been discussed for the simple reason that they are useless so far as the summum bonum is concerned.[3] Let us discuss the point at some length.

The Sūtras are silent on the point whether the list of sixteen categories is a complete one. Of these, as we have seen, Vātsyāyana has remarked, 'Such are the entities for the true knowledge of which this (*NS*) has been propounded.'[4] This statement is far from categorical so far as the issue in

---

1. अथ निःश्रेयसोपयोगाभावः कुतोऽवगन्तव्यः ? *NVT* 1.1.1, p. 34.
2. इत्यत आह—भावोपदेशादभावप्रपञ्च उद्दिष्टो भवतीत्यतश् च नोच्यन्त इति। *NV* 1.1.1, p. 10.
3. त एते प्रमाणादयः सद्भेदा निःश्रेयसोपयोगिनः, न गङ्गावालुकादयः ; तस्मात् सन्तः प्रमाणादयः षोडशधा लक्षिताः परीक्षिताश् च, न गङ्गावालुकादयः, सन्तोऽपि निःश्रेयसानुपयोगादिति भावः। *NVT* 1.1.1, p. 35.
4. त एतावन्तो विद्यमानार्था येषामविपरीतज्ञानार्थमिहोपदेशः। *NBh.* 1.1.1, p. 2.

hand is concerned. Equally non-committal seems to be his statement: 'Now, being is going to be described in sixteen divisions.'[1] However, as we have just observed, Uddyotakara suggests, and Vācaspati is definitely of the opinion, that the list by no means exhausts the categories of reals. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is also of the same opinion. He says : 'There are also other categories which have not been listed for the simple reason that they have little relevancc (or utility) so far as the way to the summum bonum is concerned.'[2]

The primary interest of Indian philosophy is not ontological but axiological. The Indian philosopher is concerned not with reality and its problems as such but with the summum bonum and its problems. The former come in for treatment at his hands only as subsidiary to the latter. We have noticed the expression of this tendency in Uddotakara, Vācaspati, and Jayanta. We shall find it in evidence in Vātsyāyana and Varadarāja when we come to consider the list of the objects of knowledge or knowables. It finds its expression in Navya-Nyāya as well.[3]

It would be pertinent to point out that the tendency in question characterizes the non-Hindu current of Indian thought no less than it does the Hindu one. The great Buddhist philosopher Dharmkīrti is rather much more categorical on this point. According to him, only that knowledge matters which has a bearing on practice. What is the good of the knowledge of the number of bacteria ?[4] 'It matters little whether one has a long sight ( or a long range of knowledge ) or not; what matters is whether one perceives the valued reality. If the far-sighted are to be the authority, why not venerate vultures ?'[5]

---

1. सच् च खलु षोडशधा व्यूढमुपदेक्ष्यते । *Loc. cit.*
2. अन्यस् तु सन् नपि पदार्थगणोऽपवर्गमार्गोपयोगविरहादिह नोपदिष्टः । *NM*, I, p. 11.
3. See *Dinakarī* 1.2, pp. 61-62.
4. तस्मादनुष्ठेयगतं ज्ञानमस्य विचार्यताम् । कीटसंख्यापरिज्ञानं तस्य नः क्वोपयुज्यते ? *PV* 1.33.
5. दूरं पश्यतु वा मा वा तत्त्वमिष्टं तु पश्यतु । प्रमाणं दूरदर्शी चेद्, एत, गृध्रानुपास्महे ।। *PV* 1.35.

Indeed, this tendency is writ large on the whole gamut of Indian philosophy in one form or another, be it Hindu or non-Hindu. Here, ontology, or any other discipline for that matter, is fully subordinated to what may be called soteriology or transcendental axiology centring round the idea of the summun bonum. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Naiyāyikas have not shown much concern about the so-called incompleteness of the list of the sixteen categories.

But, then, a very serious difficulty presents itself in this connexion. Granted that it is not incumbent upon the Naiyāika to offer a complete list of categories; nevertheless, it is difficult to see how, be it ever so ill drawn up, the list of sixteen categories can be said to be incomplete at all. Before, however, we state the difficulty, we had better deal with one point which, in our opinion, forms the background against which the issue should be raised.

Are the sixteen categories arranged on any principle? Are they so many separate, mutually exclusive entities? This is the problem which should be discussed first. Now, apparently, they are not arranged on any principle. Indeed, they seem to have been grouped together without the least concern to guard against overlapping or cross-division. As a matter of fact, the whole list can easily be reduced to two categories worth the name: means of true knowledge (pramāṇa) and objects of true knowledge or knowables (prameya). How this reduction is possible will be discussed presently.

It is interesting to note that Vātsyāyana himself raises and discusses this question in his own way. Indeed, he lends full support to the view that the list of sixteen categories is reducible to two: means of true knowledge and objects of true knowledge. He puts in the mouth of an imaginary objector the following objection to the list of sixteen categories: 'But the mention of doubt etc. apart is superfluous; for doubt etc., being possibly subsumable under either the means of knowledge or objects of knowledge, cannot be over and above

these.'[1] Vātsyāyana grants this but adds that the fourteen categories beginning with doubt constitute the distinctve subject-matter of the science of Nyāya ( metaphysics or philosophy ),[2] otherwise known as ānvīkṣikī, the fourth of the group of four sciences—the Vedas ( trayī ); the science of agriculture, commerce, cattle-tending, etc. ( vārtā ); the science of polity ( daṇḍa-nīti ); and metaphysics or philosophy ( ānvīkṣikī )[3]—having their own subject-matter, and that, if the fourteen categories in question are not mentioned distinctively, the science of Nyāya will run the risk of being confounded with the spiritual science ( adhyātma-vidyā ), like the Upaniṣads.[4] Uddyotakara adds that the spiritual science like the Upaniṣads is included in the first science, the Vedas.[5]

Methodology comprising epistemology and logic is the feature which serves to distinguish Nyāya from the other scien-

---

1. तत्र संशयादीनां पृथग्वचनमनर्थकम् । संशयादयो यथासम्भवं प्रमाणेषु प्रमेयेषु चान्तर्भवन्तो न व्यतिरिच्यन्त इति । *NBh.* 1.1.1, p. 3.

2. Nyāya is usually regarded as epistemology and logic taken together. But Vātsyāyana's remark, to be quoted presently, that, shorn of the fourteen categories beginning with doubt, it is the spiritual science like the Upaniṣad pure and simple, is bound to give one the impression that it has a wider signification and that its scope must be more or less co-extensive with metaphysics or philosophy. Cp. the very informative and illuminating discussion of the evolution of Ānvīkṣikī in *HIL*, pp. 4-6.

3. The four sciences are enumerated in *MSm*. 7.43 ; *KA* 1.1.2, p. 26; *NV* 1.1.1, p. 12; as also in many other treatises. We have adopted the order given in the last-mentioned treatise. Incidentally, Manu seems to equate Ānvīkṣikī with Ātmavidyā, while Vātsyāyana distinguishes the two. Manu's words are, to give the reading that commends itself to us most :

   त्रैविद्येभ्यस् त्रयीं विद्यां, दण्डनीतिं च तद्विदः ।
   आन्वीक्षिकीं चात्मविद्भ्यो, वार्तारम्भांश् च लोकतः ॥

4. सत्यमेतत् । इमास् तु चतस्रो विद्याः पृथक्प्रस्थानाः प्राणभृतामनुग्रहायोपदिश्यन्ते । यासां चतुर्थीयमान्वीक्षिकी न्यायविद्या । तस्याः पृथक्प्रस्थानाः संशयादयः पदार्थाः । तेषांपृथग्वचनमन्तरेणाध्यात्मविद्यामात्रमियं स्याद्, यथोपनिषदः । तस्मात् संशयादिभिः पदार्थैः पृथक् प्रस्थाप्यते । *NBh.* 1.1.1., p. 3.

5. अध्यात्मविद्यामात्रत्वादुपनिषद्विद्यावत् त्रय्यामेवान्तर्भाव इति चतुष्ट्वं निवर्तते । *NV* 1.1.1., p. 12.

ces. It is on account of this feature that the former is characterized as 'the lamp of all sciences, the clue to all action, the ground of all merit ( dharma ).'[1] Uddyotakara and Vācaspati have it that methodology is beyond the scope of the other sciences. They simply utilize and investigate the matters revealed by the means of knowledge etc. They never investigate the means of knowledge etc. themselves, which fall within the province of Nyāya.[2]

All this is right so far as it goes; but, one feels, it does not go far enough. The Naiyāyikas considered here set out to justify the listing, along with the first two categories, of the fourteen categories beginning with doubt, but, curiously enough, what they have actually done is to show that it was absolutely necessary to list 'means of knowledge etc.' (pramāṇādi . As a matter of fact, means of knowledge are not in question at all. What is in question is the fourteen categories beginning with doubt, as is evident from the treatises under examination themselves. Granted that means of knowledge must needs be recognized as legitimate categories, at any rate as the categories of knowledge, so far as the science of Nyāya is concerned; but what is the justification for the fourteen categories in question finding place in the list of categories ? We shall presently see that on the Naiyāyikas' own showing they are subsumable under the first or the second category, viz. means or objects of knowledge. It can be said without fear of contradiction that the means of knowledge are enough of a differentia of the science of Nyāya and that there is no point in mentioning their subsidiaries separately.

Any way, according to Vātsyāyana as also Uddyotakara, there are only two categories worth the name and that the remaining fourteen categories, reducible to either of the two as they are, have been mentioned by the Sūtra separately

---

1. प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानामुपायः सर्वकर्मणाम् । आश्रयः सर्वधर्माणां, विद्योद्देशे प्रकीर्तिता ॥ *NBh*. 1.1.1, p. 7. This verse is, in all probability, adapted from the verse appearing in *KA* 1.1.2, p. 28.
2. 1.1.1., p. 68.

just to throw into relief the features distinguishing the science of Nyāya from the spiritual science like the Upaniṣads.

In this connexion, it would be pertinent to point out that Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara do not purport to say that the fourteen categories commended by them to be subsumed under either of the remaining ones are sub-categories of the latter. Far from it. The Sūtras have listed the sub-categories of the two basic categories elsewhere,[1] which lists have nothing to do with the fourteen categories. These are thus in the nature of merely subsidiary categories.[2]

Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara place doubt, illustration, theory, and reasoning under the category knowables. Vātsyāyana adds syllogism and decision to this list. Uddyotakara, however, considers decision subsumable under either of the two basic categories. Neither Vātsyāyana nor Uddyotakara has cared to classify the remaining subsidiary categories.[3]

It is noteworthy that the fourteen categories beginning with doubt are not mutually exclusive even among themselves. For example, as Vātsyāyana has observed, fallacies are a particular kind of clinchers, mentioned separately for a special purpose.[4]

**5) The Jaina criticisms of the list** : It would not be out of place to refer to a criticism of the list of sixteen categories in the Jaina work entitled *Syādvādaratnākara*, a commentary on Vādideva Sūri's *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra*. It is contended therein that, when doubt is included in the list and this inclusion is justified on the ground of its being a subsidiary to logic, there is no reason why delusion and

---

1. See, *NS* 1.1.3 and 9.
2. They are described as organs of Nyāya (न्यायस्याङ्गम्) in *NV* 1.1.1, p.12; *NVT* 1.1.1, p. 39 ; and *NNP* 1.1.1, p. 244; and paraphernalia of Nyāya (न्यायपरिकर) in *NVT* 1.1.9, p. 208, and *NVTP* 1.1.1, p. 81 (संशयादीत्यादिपदेन चतुर्दशापि न्यायपरिकरत्वेन संगृहीताः).
3. For the classification of the subsidiary categories, see *NBh.* 1.1.1, pp. 3-7, and *NV* 1.1.1, pp. 12-21.
4. See निग्रहस्थानेभ्यः पृथगुद्दिष्टा हेत्वाभासा वादे चोदनीया भविष्यन्तीति। *NBh.* 1.1.1, p. 6.

uncertainty, which are as much subsidiaries to logic, should not find place therein. The science of logic cannot do without dealing with delusive and uncertain phenomena, which fully qualifies them for inclusion in the list. Illustration is subsumable under inference, hence it should not be mentioned as a separate category. Otherwise, there is no reason why sign (liṅga) etc., which are equally subsumable under inference, should not be mentioned in the list. Theory (siddhānta) is identical with enunciation (pratijñā), hence it should not be mentioned separately. If syllogism is to be mentioned in the list, inference has a better claim for finding place therein. The author of the book pities the unwisdom of mentioning syllogism while ignoring inference of which the former is but a means. Decision, being but the result of the means of knowledge, does not merit separate mention. The fallacies (hetvābhāsa-s) listed under the category 'fallacy' are all inferential ones. Perceptual fallacies (paratyakṣābhāsa-s) have been totally ignored, which is a lacuna of no mean order. Pseudo-rejoinder (jāti), being of the nature of an inferential fault, should be taken to have been included in fallacy and accordingly should not have been mentioned separately.[1]

The subsumption of the fourteen categories beginning with doubt under the second category, objects of knowledge

---

1. पदार्थसंख्यायां संशयपरिगणने च विपर्ययानध्यवसाययोरपि परिगणनप्रसङ्गः। न्याय-प्रवृत्त्यङ्गत्वमप्यनयोः संशयवदनिवार्यं, विपरीतानध्यवसितयोरपि प्रतिपाद्यत्वात्।... दृष्टान्तस्याप्यनुमानान्तर्गतत्वेन पृथक्परिसंख्यानमनुपपन्नम्। अन्यथा लिङ्गादेरपि तत्प्रसङ्गः। सिद्धान्तस् तु प्रतिज्ञातो नार्थान्तरम्। अतोऽस्य पृथग्लक्षणाभिधानमनर्थकम्।... अवयवानां च पदार्थसंख्यायां परिगणनेऽनुमानस्यापि पृथक्परिगणनप्रसङ्गः, तस्य प्रमाणान्तर्गतत्वात्। पृथगपरिगणनेऽवयवानामनुमानात्मकत्वान् न पृथक्परिगणनं स्यात्। प्रधानभूतं चानुमानं प्रमाणान्तर्गतत्वान् न पृथगुपादीयते, तदन्तर्भूतास् त्ववयवाः पृथगुपादीयन्त इति महती प्रेक्षापूर्वकारिता!... निर्णयश् च प्रमाणस्य फलं, तस्य च...नात्र पदार्थतया निर्देशः कर्तुं युक्त इति।...हेत्वाभासानामपि पृथक्पदार्थतया परिगणनं निष्प्रयोजनम्। अन्यथा प्रत्यक्षाद्याभासानामपि तथा परिगणनप्रसङ्गात् षोडशदार्थसंख्याक्षतिप्रसङ्गः।...जातिस् तु दूषणाभासस्वभावा हेत्वाभासैरेव संगृहीते ति किमित्येभ्यः पृथक् कथ्यते? *SR*, verse 8, pp. 976-978.

or knowables, is indeed far from understandable. There is every reason to believe that they belong to the first category rather than to the second. They are simply appendages or subsidiaries to the first category. They can be said to be objects of knowledge only in the sense that all conceivable facts, be they means or objects of knowledge, are objects of knowledge, for the simple reason that they have to be known in some form or other before entering the universe of discourse. Uddyotakara has well said that, when described, 'all facts present themselves as *known* (or objects of knowledge).'[1]

**6) Padārthatve, pramāṇatva, and prameyatva** : The question arises whether 'means of knowledge' and 'objects of knowledge' are mere class-names (upādhi-s) or real universals. If the former, the members of the two groups would be entitled to be called categories; if the latter, they would be only subcategories. Vācaspati suggests that the first category, 'means of knowledge', is an objective universal pervading the members of the respective groups.[2] Taking our cue from this suggestion, we may regard the members of the two groups as subcategories of the two main categories.

We are not in a position to deal with the question whether it is right to say, as Uddyotakara, Vācaspati, and Jayanta do say, that the Nyāya list of categories is not exhaustive enough to include those categories of being and non-being the knowledge of which is not conducive to the attainment of the summun bonum. There can be no doubt that 'means of knowledge' and 'objects of knowledge' as such do exhaust the universe of discourse. This is because they are to be treated as real categories rather than mere names for groups

1. ...सर्वे पदार्था ज्ञेयतयोपचिक्ष्यन्ते । *NV* 1.1.1, p. 11.

2. It would be advisable to quote the full passage for clarity's sake : तदिह प्रमेयलक्षणाय तद्विभागोद्देशसूत्रमवतारयितुं भाष्यकारः पृच्छति स्म—किं पुनरनेन प्रमाणेनेति । जात्यभिप्रायमेकवचनं, प्रकृते प्रमेये यथायथं प्रमाणाना-मुपयोगात् । *NVT* 1.1.9, p. 208.

of categories. We shall, however, see in due course that this is true only so far as the two categories as such are concerned. The Naiyāyikas are inclined to disclaim the exhaustiveness of the list of the objects of knowledge.

One thing further strikes us in respect of the Nyāya concept of category. We have seen that the Nyāya list of categories comprises a category of being (objects of knowledge) as well as a category of knowledge ( means of knowledge ). The question arises, Are the two categories instances of some more ultimate category ? As we have already noted, Vātsyāyana and other Naiyāyikas coming after him call them padārtha. So, if padārtha is a real universal ( jāti ) rather than a mere name ( upādhi ), it is just like the 'primary category' of Paul Weiss, which is at once 'a category of being as well as of knowledge.'[1] In that case, the category of knowledge and of being should be said to be there simply to illustrate and instantiate padārtha. Otherwise, padārtha is but an upādhi, a common name for the two altogether different categories. We suggest that padārtha as conceived in the Nyāya tradition proper cannot be regarded as a real universal, with the result that the two categories in question cannot be treated as sub-categories of a higher, primary category. As a matter of fact, no list of categories purporting to be a classification of reals should include such a category as the means of knowledge, whose inclusion in the Nyāya list, too—if following the commentators and sub-commentators we take it to be a list of the categories of reals at all—would be wholly unjustified were it not for the Naiyāyikas' solicitude for guarding against Nyāya being reduced to the status of the spiritual science or ontology.

Our finding is that the fourteen categories beginning with doubt are a disorderly conglomeration of stray topics forming the subject-matter of the science of Nyāya, or rather *NS*. There is no order in which, no principle on which, they may be said to have been arranged. They cannot be regarded as

1. Paul Weiss, *Modes of Being*, p. 86.

even sub-categories of the means of knowledge. Categories worth the name are only two in number, means of knowledge and objects of knowledge or knowables, of which, too, the former has nothing to do with the classification of reals. Our plan being to study categories of being, even this first of the list of sixteen categories, viz. means of knowledge, cannot occupy us any further. The only category out of the sixteen categories which can be of interest to us and on which the Naiyāyikas' claim that their categories purport to be categories of reals is based, is the second category, objects of knowledge, to which we may now turn.

## 3. CATEGORY AS PRAMEYA

**1) Incompleteness of the list of twelve prameya-s :** Vātsyāyana points out that the list of twelve knowables is not intended to be an exhaustive enumeration of all possible knowables or categories of being. According to him, the Sūtra cares to list only such categories the right knowledge of which is most essential for the attainment of the summum bonum. As a matter of fact, he goes on, there are also a different set of categories—substance, attribute, motion, universal, differential, and inherence ( belonging to the Vaiśeṣika system )—as well as countless others subsumable under these; but the S·tras take no notice of them, for the simple reason that they are irrelevant to the purpose set to them by themselves.[1]

Uddyotakara endorses Vātsyāyana's interpretation by raising and answering an interesting question : Are soul etc.—twelve in number—the only knowables or the soul etc. are knowables only, in the sense of being nothing but knowables ? The soul etc., says the imaginary objector, cannot be said to be the only knowables, since the list of twelve knowables does not mention such knowables as space, universals, differentials, and inherence. Further, the soul etc. cannot be

1. अस्त्यन्यदपि द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाः प्रमेयं, तद्भेदेन चापरिसंख्येयम् । तत्त्वज्ञानादपवर्गो मिथ्याज्ञानात् संसार इत्यत एतदुपदिष्टं विशेषेणेति । *NBh.* 1.1.9, p. 23.

said to be knowables only; because it runs counter to the Sūtra that has it that the means of knowledge are also knowables even as the weighing balance, means of knowledge as it is, is a knowable at the same time. Besides, gold etc. operate both as knowables and means of knowledge. Likewise, there is no reason why the soul etc. should be treated as knowables only.[1]

Uddyotakara replies that the objection betrays ignorance of the intention of the Sūtra enumerating the twelve knowables. According to him, it purports to give only those knowables the knowledge of which leads to the summum bonum. He seems, however, to grant the point of the objection that the soul etc. cannot be said to be knowables only. According to him, the burden of the Sūtra, as a matter of fact, is neither to confirm the knowableness of the soul etc. nor confute the knowableness of other entities. It purports simply to bring home to the seeker after the summum bonum the simple fact that the twelve entities listed by it are nothing but knowables so far as their particular purpose of conducing to the summum bonum is concerned.[2]

Vācaspati, too, is of the opinion that the word 'knowable' occurring in the Sūtra in question signifies not knowables as a whole but knowables which, if known aright, help one attain the summum bonum.[3]

---

1. किमात्माद्येव प्रमेयम्, अथ प्रमेयमेवात्मादीति ? यद्यात्माद्येव प्रमेयं, दिगादीनां सामान्यविशेषसमवायानां सूत्रेऽनभिधानादव्यापकम् । अथ पुनः प्रमेयमेवात्मादि, तथा च 'प्रमेया च तुलाप्रामाण्यवत्' [ *NS* 2.1.16 ] इति व्याघातः । तत्र सुवर्णादि द्रव्यपरिच्छेदसाधनत्वात् परिच्छेद्यत्वाच् च प्रमाणप्रमेयशब्दाभिलाप्यम् । *Nv* 1.1.9, p. 62.

2. न, सूत्रार्थापरिज्ञानात् । आत्माद्येव प्रमेयं यथावत् परिच्छिद्यमानमपवृक्तये भवतीत्ययं सूत्रार्थः, न प्रमेयान्तरनिराकरणार्थः सूत्रारम्भः । प्रमेयमेवात्मादीति न दोषः । किमुक्तं भवतीति ? मुमुक्षुणा प्रमेयमेवात्मादि बोद्धव्यमेव । नास्य प्रमेयत्वं विधीयते नान्यस्य च प्रमेयत्वं निराक्रियते, अपि तु मुमुक्षुणा बोद्धव्यमेवैतदित्यनूद्यते ...। *Ibid.* 1.1.9, pp. 62-63

3. न प्रमेयपदं प्रमेयमात्रे वर्तते, किं तु यत् तत्त्वतो ज्ञायमानमपवर्गसाधनं तस्मिन् । तच् चात्माद्येव, नान्यत् । *NVT* 1. 1.9, p. 208.

Śivāditya also agrees that there are more than twelve knowables but that only these twelve are mentioned because they alone matter for the summum bonum.[1]

Jayanta, following the same line, remarks that the Sūtras purport to cover not all possible knowables but only such of these the false knowledge of which ties the soul to the world-process and the right knowledge of which liberates it and leads it to salvation.[2]

In this connexion it would be interesting to refer to the views of another Nyāya celebrity, Varadarāja. He puts the following question in the mouth of an imaginary objector : 'There are other knowables, such as substance, etc. which are conducive to the attainment of the summum bonum. Why does the author of the Sūtras not refer to them ?'[3] Varadarāja admits that there are other knowables as well but adds that Gautama does not refer to them for the simple reason that they are not directly related to the summun bonum.[4] The implication is that the twelve knowables propounded by *NS* are directly related to the summum bonum, while the categories—substance etc.—propounded by *VS* are only indirectly or remotely concerned with it. Thus, Varadarāja does regard the list of categories given by *VS* as incomplete but at the same time gives the justification for its being so.

Mallinātha Sūri, his commentator, defines the concept 'knowable' ( prameya ) as 'knowable with a view to the attainment of the summum bonum'.[5] He, too, is of the view

1. यद्यपि प्रमेयान्तरमस्ति, तथाप्येतदेवोक्तम्, अपवर्गोपयोगात् । *LM*, p. 48.
2. ज्ञातं सम्यगसम्यग् वा यन् मोक्षाय भवाय वा ।
   तद् प्रमेयमिहाभीष्टं, न प्रमाणार्थमात्रकम् ॥ *NM*, II, p. 2.
3. ननु निःश्रेयसोपयोगीनि द्रव्यादीनि प्रमेयान्ताराणि सन्ति । कुतः सूत्रकारैर् न लक्षितानि ? *TR*, p. 130.
4. मोक्षे साक्षादनङ्गत्वादक्षपादैर् न लक्षितम् । *Loc. cit.* (verse 33). In elaboration of his this verse he says : सत्यम् । द्रव्यादीन्यपि निःश्रेयसोपयोगीनि विद्यन्ते । तानि त्वाहत्य निःश्रेयसानङ्गत्वादक्षपादा न लक्षयाञ्चक्रुः ।
5. प्रमेयमपवर्गार्थं ज्ञेयम् । *TRN*, p. 118.

that the Sūtras do not list all possible knowables but in the particular context only such knowables as ought to be known for the attainment of the summum bonum.[1]

Thus, it is universally acknowledged in the Nyāya tradition that the list of twelve knowables is not an exhaustive enumeration of all possible categories of being.

Incidentally, Th. Stcherbatsky notes that the twelve prameya-s correspond, to a certain extent, to the Buddhist classification into twelve āyatana-s,[2] which are : the five sense-organs, their five objects, the mind, and dharmāyatana.

**2) The Jaina criticism of the list** : *SR* is very critical of the list of twelve knowables. It raises the question of its exhaustiveness or otherwise in a very interesting manner. Does the determination of the number of knowables as twelve depend upon the limit of our knowledge of the reals or upon the limit of our puropose. The first alternative is not tenable, for the simple reason that space, time, etc., too, are given out by our means of knowledge. The Naiyāyika will not, says the book, be justified in arguing that the latter categories are subsumable under the twelve knowables; because the two sets of categories are radically different from each other. If this difference is disregarded, then all the twelve categories can be included in one category, ātman. In the second of the two alternatives mentioned above, the purpose which is salvation is not capable of being served by these twelve only; for initiation (dīkṣā), penance ( tapas ), etc., are also required for it, which are not mentioned in the list.[3]

---

1. न ज्ञानविधिरयं, किं त्वपवर्गार्थं यज् ज्ञेयं तत् प्रमेयम् । *Loc. cit.*
2. See *CBN*, p. 56.
3. ...तन् न द्वशादशविधं प्रमेयमवतिष्ठते । अपि चास्य द्वादशविधत्वावधारणं तावत्येव प्रमाणव्यापारपरिसमाप्तेः प्रयोजनपरिसमाप्तेर् वा स्यात् ? आद्यः पक्षोऽनुपपन्नः, कालाकाशादिप्रपञ्चेऽपि प्रमाणव्यापारप्रतीतेः । न च तत्प्रपञ्चस्यैवात्रान्तर्भाव इत्यभिधातव्यं, ततोऽस्यात्यन्तविलक्षणत्वात् । तथाविधानामप्येषामत्रान्तर्भावे आत्मन्येवाशेषार्थानामन्तर्भावात् । ब्रह्माद्वैतप्रसङ्गतो गता षोडशपदार्थकल्पना । द्वितीयपक्षेऽपि प्रयोजनस्यापवर्गलक्षणस्य नैतेष्वेव परिसमाप्तिः, तत्प्रसाधकानां दीक्षातपोध्यानादीनामत्र सङ्ग्रहाभावात् । *SR*, verse 8, p. 975.

**3) Tha illogical characrer of the list** : The list of knowables has come in for criticism at the hands of Malliṣeṇa, too, who deals with it in a similar vein.[1]

Indeed, from a perusal of the list, it will be found that there is absolutely no principle by which the twelve knowables can be said to have been ordered. Among these, some are psychological entities like understanding and mind, one highly complex physical compound like the body, some inferred states of affairs like rebirth and the summum bonum, a category representing sensible qualities ( artha ), some entities like sense-organs overlapping with the body, some others overlapping with the mind and the body like activity, impurity, suffering, and consequence. The list is really a hotch-potch of entities and facts taken from hybrid sources without the least idea of ordering them on a principle. These entities and facts cannot be said to be even crude elements of being, much less ontological categories thereof. It is strange that none of the commentators of the Sūtras notices the disorderliness of, or tries to reduce to order, the list either of the sixteen padārtha-s or of the twelve prameya-s. Viśvanātha avers that the latter list comprises two groups of categories, one group being comprised of the first six categories and the other, of the remaining six categories. He also remarks that the first group is the cause-group while the second the effect-group, and that the cause-group, being more important, has been mentioned first.[2] This is all that one can hope to find in the Nyāya texts by way of a systematic presentation of the list of knowables. Accordingly, we shall refrain from embarking upon a detailed study of them.

From the foregoing discussion it transpires that the sixteenfold or even the twelvefold scheme of categories under examination does not purport to be a list of categories drawn up as a result of an analysis of the orders of being. These

---

1. See *SM*, verse 10, pp. 57-58.

2. अत्र प्राधान्यात् कारणरूपषट्कमभिधाय कार्यरूपप्रमेयषट्कमभिहितम् । *NSV*, 1.1.9, p. 27.

categories represent mostly loigcal or dialectical topics, for which reason Keith terms them 'dialectical categories.'[1] The intention of Gautama seems to be simply to list the topics—without the least idea of categorization—the knowledge of which he took to be essential for the attainment of the summum bonum. The Naiyāyikas after Gautama, under the spell of Vaiśeṣika systematics, have vainly essayed the task of creating a cosmos out of the chaos and read into them a table of categories of reals, some going to the extent of construing the Nyāya list of sixteen categories to comprehend within its compass even the Vaiśeṣika list of six categories.[2]

## 4. CATEGORY AS ARTHAPADA

**1) The concept of 'arthapada' :** The sixteen categories discussed above are otherwise classified into a fourfold scheme of categories. In his comments on the opening Sūtra of *NS*, Vātsyāyana observes : 'The summum bonum is attained through the right knowledge of the knowables, soul etc. The same idea is expressed in the next Sūtra[3] [ purporting to say that ] through the right knowledge of disvalue and its cause, their absolute destruction, means of their destruction, and the goal—four arthapadāni—does one attain the summum bonum.'[4] It is difficult to translate the expression 'arthapada' used of these four categories by Vātsyayana. He defines 'artha' as 'pleasure and the cause of pleasure, pain and the cause of pain.'[5] So, 'arthapada' would mean the locus of of pleasure, pain, and/or their causes. Vācaspati says that the four categories are designated arthapada on account of their being objects of desire (or aversion) (arthyamānatayā)[6].

1. *ILA.*, Ch. VI.
2. See, for example, *TB*, p. 60.
3. दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः । *NS* 1.1.2.
4. आत्मादेः खलु प्रमेयस्य तत्त्वज्ञानान् निःश्रेयसाधिगमः । तच् चैतदुत्तरसूत्रेणानूद्यत इति । हेयं तस्य निर्वर्तकं, हानमात्यन्तिकं, तस्योपायो, ऽधिगन्तव्य इत्येतानि चत्वार्यर्थपदानि सम्यग् बुद्ध्वा निःश्रेयसमधिगच्छति । *NBh.* 1.1.1, pp. 2-3.
5. अर्थस्तु सुखं सुखहेतुश् च, दुःखं दुःखहेतुश् च । *Ibid.*, p.1.
6. *NVT* 1.1.1, p. 16.

Uddyotakara illustrates the four topics thus : 'Disvalue is suffering, its cause which is ignorance and the will to rebirth, merit and demerit; destruction is right knowledge; its means is scripture; and the goal is salvation.'[1]

2) **Arthapada-s and the sixteen padārtha-s** : Udayana avers that the sixteen categories of Nyāya are nothing but these four topics otherwise described.[2] He relates the two alternative schemes of categories as follows : 'The means of knowledge is...also cognizable as destruction [ of disvalue and its cause ]; otherwise another destruction will have to be resorted to, the means of knowledge would be meaningless, and in the absence of the knowledge of the means of knowledge one cannot achieve the destruction. Doubt etc., being subsidiaries to the means of knowledge,[3] ...are also cognizable as the means of destruction; otherwise another means will have to be resorted to, they will be useless, and without the knowledge of the subsidiaries one cannot achieve the means. The ten categories of body etc. are also cognizable as disvalue ( and its cause ); otherwise they will be non-disvalue, other disvalue will have to be posited, and in default of the knowledge of knowableness its disvalueness will be nowhere. Salvation is also congnizable as the goal; otherwise another goal will have to be resorted to, it will no longer be a desideratum, and in default of the knowledge of its knowableness it will no longer be the destruction ( of disvalue and its cause ).'[4]

---

1. हेयं दुःखं, तस्य निर्वर्तकमविद्यातृष्णे, धर्माधर्माविति; हानं तत्त्वज्ञानं; तस्योपायः शास्त्रम् ; अधिगन्तव्यो मोक्षः । *NV* 1.1.1, p. 12.

2. चतुवर्गस्यैव विवक्षाभेदात् षोडशभेदेनाभिधानात् । *NVTP* 1.1.1, p. 133.

3. The expression in the original is प्रमाणपरिकरत्वात् which has been interpreted by Vardhamāna as न्यायपरिकरत्वेन. See *NNP* 1.1.1, p. 131.

4. ...यथा प्रमाणत्वेन प्रमाणं ज्ञेयं तथा हानत्वेनापि; अन्यथा हानान्तरमनुश्रियेत, निरर्थकं च प्रमाणं स्यात्, प्रमाणत्वे चाज्ञाते हानता न निर्वहेत् । यथा च स्वरूपेण संशयादयो ज्ञेयाः प्रमाणपरिकरत्वात्, तथा हानोपायतयाऽपि; अन्यथोपायान्तरमनुश्रियेत, निरर्थकाश् चैते स्युः, परिकरत्वे चाज्ञाते उपायता न निर्वहेत् । यथा शरीरादयो दश प्रमेयतया ज्ञेयाः, तथा हेयतयाऽपि; अन्यथा अहेयाः स्युः, हेयान्तरं चानु-

**3) Bhāsarvajña's statement of the arthapada-s :** Bhāsarvajña states the four topics slightly differently. According to him they are : disvalue (heya), its cause (tasya nirvartakam), their absolute destruction (hānam ātyantikam), and the means thereof (tasyopāyah).[1] These he terms knowables (prameya),[2] without prejudice to the list of the twelve knowables.

**4) Arthapada-s and the twelve prameya-s :** In his comments on this thesis of Bhāsarvajña Jayasiṁha Sūri, and in his auto-commentary entitled *Nyāya-Bhūṣaṇa* Bhāsarvajña himself, observe that the twelve knowables postulated by *NS* are reducible to these four.[3] In fact, Bhāsarvajña continues, the author of the Sūtra chose to give us the list of twelve knowables instead of that of the four for two reasons : first, he thought that the latter list is well known in that it is subscribed to by others as well, like Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Buddhism; and, second, he wanted to invite our attention to the distinguishing features of Nyāya, such as the belief in the soul which is not shared by the Buddhists.[4] Jayasiṁha Sūri also has it that of the twelve knowables only soul and salvation are desiderata, the remaining ten being disvalue pure and simple.[5]

Incidentally, Bhāsarvajña defines a knowable (prameya) as 'the object of right knowledge'[6] and more elaborately as 'that the knowledge of which is conducive to the attain-

---

श्रियेत, प्रमेयत्वे चाज्ञाते हेयता न निर्वहत् । यथा चापवर्गः प्रमेयतया ज्ञेयस्, तथाऽधिगन्तव्यतयाऽपि; अन्यथाऽधिगन्तव्यान्तरमनुश्रियेत, अनुपादेयश् च स्यात्, प्रमेयतया चाज्ञाते हानता न निर्वहेत् । *NVTP* 1.1.1, pp. 131-132.

1. हेयं, तस्य निर्वर्तकं, हानमात्यन्तिकं, तस्योपाय इति । *NSā.*, p. 34.
2. तच्च चतुर्विधम्—हेयं० [as in the preceding note]. *Loc. cit.*
3. द्वादशविधस्यापि प्रमेयस्य चतुष्ट्वेन भावमानस्य मोक्षाङ्गता भवतीति न विरोधः। *NTD*, p. 251; ...तद् द्वादशविधमपि हेयादिरूपेण चतुर्धा भाव्यमानं निःश्रेयसनिमित्तं भवतीत्यतश् चतुर्विधमुक्तम् । *NBhū.*, p. 441.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 442.
5. तन्मध्ये आद्यन्त्यौ द्वावुपादेयौ, शेषा दश हेयाः । *NTD*, p. 250.
6. प्रमाविषयः प्रमेयमिति । *NSā.*, p. 2.

ment of the summum bonum'[1] independently of other knowledge. He makes it clear that only that knowledge is worth while which is conducive to the attainment of salvation and that such knowledge as that of the number of bacteria is simply useless.[2]

**5) The source and popularity of the arthapada-s :** An emphasis on the aforesaid four topics or knowables is by no means the special feature of the Nyāya tradition. These are already dealt with in *YS*.[3] They are, however, not the speciality of these systems of Hindu thought even. Their origin is usually traced to the four Noble Truths (ariya saccāni or ārya satyāni ) of the Buddha. As a matter of fact, the four topics are common to almost all the schools of Indian philosophy, so that Uddyotakara is right when he says : 'These are the four categories which are dealt with by all teachers and in all systems of metaphysics.'[4] Th. Stcherbatsky goes to the length of asserting that these are 'accepted as such by all Indian systems without exception.'[5]

Incidentally, again, it would be fruitful to give here Stcherbatsky's interpretation of the four Noble Truths of Buddhism, which is perhaps the best statement of the doctrine and throws a flood of light on the spirit of Indian philosophy. He writes :'All Indian philosophical systems profess to be doctrines of Salvation. They therefore start from the conception of a whole (sarvaṁ) which is then split in two halves, phenomenal life and the Absolute (saṁsāra and nirvāṇa). The phenomenal part is further divided into an

---

1. यद्विषयं ज्ञानमन्यज्ञानानुपयोगित्वेन निःश्रेयसाङ्गं भवति तत् प्रमेयम्। *NSā.*, p. 34.
2. *Loc. cit.*
3. See, हेयं दुःखमनागतम्। द्रष्टृदृश्ययोः संयोगो हेयहेतुः। *YS*, 2. 16-17; तदभावात् संयोगाभावो हानं तद् दृशेः कैवल्यम्। विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवा हानोपायः। *Ibid.*, 2. 25-26.
4. एतानि चत्वार्यर्थपदानि सर्वास्वध्यात्मविद्यासु सर्वाचार्यैर् वर्ण्यन्ते। *NV* 1.1.1, p. 12.
5. *CBN.*, p. 55.

analysis of its actual condition (duḥkha), its driving force (duḥkha-samudaya) and their gradual extinction (mārga). When this extinction is reached, life merges into the Absolute about whose essence a variety of constructions exist. These four topics—the four "noble truths", as the term has been very inadequately translated and represented as a fundamental principle of Buddhism—contain, in reality, no doctrine at all. It is only a scheme for philosophical constructions and is accepted as such by all Indian schools without exception. They cover, indeed, the Indian conception of philosophy.'[1]

Udayana likens the fourfold division of knowables to the fourfold division of the science of medicine.[2] In the Sāṅkhya school, Vijñānabhikṣu followss suit.[3] It is, however, Vyāsa, the author of the ancient commentary on *YS*, who seems to be the father of this idea.[4]

However, deeply influenced by Buddhism as he is, Bhāsarvajña does not seem to have been directly inspired by Buddhism in his fourfold classification of knowables. We have seen that at a much earlier date Vāstyāyana posited a similar classification. In this respect, Bhāsarvajña seems to have

---

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55.

2. ...शास्त्रे च हेयो रोगः, चिकित्सा हानं, तदुपायो निदानज्ञानं, अधिगन्तव्यमारोग्यमिति । *NVTP*, 1.1.1, p. 133,

3. तदिदं मोक्षशास्त्रं चिकित्साशास्त्रवच् चतुर्व्यूहम् । यथा हि रोगः, आरोग्यं, रोगनिदानं, भैषज्यमिति चत्वारो व्यूहाः समूहाश् चिकित्साशास्त्रस्य प्रतिपाद्यास्, तथैव हेयं, हानं, हेयहेतुः, हानोपायश् चेति चत्वारो व्यूहा मोक्षशास्त्रस्य प्रतिपाद्या भवन्ति, मुमुक्षुभिर् जिज्ञासितत्वात् । *SPB*, Bhūmikā, p. 7.

4. यथा चिकित्साशास्त्रं चतुर्व्यूहं—रोगः, रोगहेतुः, आरोग्यं, भैषज्यमिति—एवमिदमपि शास्त्रं चतुर्व्यूहमेव; तद् यथा संसारः, संसारहेतुः, मोक्षः, मोक्षोपाय इति । तत्र दुःखबहुलः संसारो हेयः, प्रधानपुरुषयोः संयोगो हेयहेतुः, संयोगस्यात्यन्तिकी निवृत्तिर् हानं, हानोपायः सम्यग्दर्शनम् । *YBh.* 2.15, pp. 185-186. *YS* (2. 16.17 and 25-26) also mentions the four categories : हेय, हेयहेतु, हान, and हानोपाय.

been directly indebted to Vātsyāyana and *YS* for the doctrine,[1] more so the latter whose variation he imitates.

**6) The non-ontological character of the arthapada-s :** Be it all as it may, we are here concerned to determine only how far Bhāsarvajña's classification of knowables can be said to be a classification of ontological categories, with which alone we are supposed to deal in this work. It is obvious from the very nature of the case that his knowables are far from ontological in character. They are simply pragmatistic categories designed to aid the seeker after liberation from the cycle of births and deaths. They are, that is to say, the categories of the science of liberation ( mokṣa-śāstra ) as Vijñānabhikṣu has it.[2] Hence we do not feel called upon to enter upon a detailed delineation of these in the rest of the work.

## 5. CATEGORY AS AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL ORDERING OF EXPERIENCE

**1) Vātsyāyana's fourfold scheme of epistemologico-ontological categories (catur-varga) :** Vātsyāyana prefaces his treatise, inter alia, with a suggestion to order experience into a fourfold scheme of categories apparently of an epistemological charcter .The categories are: the knower (pramātā), the means of knowledge (pramāṇa), the knowable (prameya), and knowledge (pramiti).[3] He claims that these exhaust the realm of reality.[4]

**2) Caturvarga-s and the sixteen padārtha-s :** Udayana avers that the scheme of sixteen categories is reducible to this scheme of four categories as it is to the one discussed in the preceding section.[5] 'The soul is...also cognizable as the

---

1. See Gopi Nath Kaviraj, 'Gleanings from the History and Bibliography of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature', *PWSBS*, III (1924), p. 83.
2. See f. n. 3 overleaf.
3. *NBh.*, p. 1.
4. चतसृषु चैवंविधास्वर्थतत्त्वं परिसमाप्यते । *Loc. cit.*
5. *NVTP* 1.1.1, p. 131.

knower; otherwise another knower will have to be posited, there will be infinite regress, and in default of the knowledge of its knowableness it will no longer be a disvalue and desideratum as conditioned and unconditioned respectively. The intellect is...also cognizable as its variety knowledge; otherwise another knowledge will have to be posited or the means of knowledge would be useless, and in default of the knowledge of its knowableness its disvalve-ness will be nowhere.'[1]

These four categories are, however, by no means the speciality of the Nyāya system. Even the Vaiśeṣika system would subscribe to them.[2] Indeed, they are popular among all schools of Indian philosophy.

---

1. यथा चात्मा प्रमेयतयाऽधिगन्तव्यस्, तथा प्रमातृतयाऽपि; अन्यथा प्रमात्रन्तरमनुश्रियेत, अनवस्था च स्यात्, प्रमेयत्वे चाज्ञाते सोपाधिनिरुपाधितया हेयोपादेयते न निर्वहेयाताम्। यथा बुद्धिर् बुद्धित्वेन तथा तद्भेदः प्रमितितयाऽपि; अन्यथा प्रमित्यन्तरमनुश्रियेत, निष्फलं वा प्रमाणं स्यात्, प्रमेयत्वे चाज्ञाते हेयता न निर्वहेदिति। *Ibid.* 1.1.1, p. 132.
2. See, for example, *PDS*, pp. 553-554.

## CHAPTER IV

# THE VAIŚEṢIKA (OR NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA) CONCEPT OF CATEGORY

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The Vaiśeṣika categoriology was later adopted by the Nyāya school proper, who sought to harmonize, synthetize, and assimilate it with their own, so that it has become as much theirs as the Vaiśeṣikas'. This circumstance fully justifies the caption we have chosen for this chapter.

We have discussed the term 'padārtha' as used in the Nayāya tradition. The same term is used by the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school where the Westerner would use the term category, and in clearly ontological parlance. It will be fruitful to start with a delineation of the concept of 'category' which is much more complex than that of 'padārtha'. Broadly speaking, a category 'is a mode of being, a type or kind of being, a manner of existing, a way of having ontological status, an ultimate demarcation of reality.'[1] Hence the translation of the term 'padārtha' as category is not inappropriate. But for a fuller appreciation of the comparison and contrast between the two terms, we would crave the indulgence of our readers for our excursus into the career of the concept 'category,' which we undertake hence.

## 2. THE ( WESTERN ) CONCEPT OF 'CATEGORY'

**1) The classical origins of the concept** : The Greek word 'katēgoriā', rendered into Latin as 'categoria' (predicament), and into English as 'category', originally meant 'accusation' or 'assertion.' Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) is credited with being the first to use it in its philosophical acceptation, 'mode of predication'. His table of categories, which follows, is a

1. See Donald Walhout, 'On Categories', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, XXXIV, 3 (October, 1961), p. 142.

classification of the most general or ultimate types of predicates assignable to a subject, plus the subject itself: 'Each uncombined word or expression means one of the following things: what (or Substance), how large (that is, Quantity), what sort of thing (that is, Quality), related to what (or Relation), where (or time), in what attitude (Posture, Position), how circumstanced (State or Condition), how active, what doing (or Action), how passive, what suffering (Affection).'[1] This is, obviously, in the nature of a working—indeed even arbitrary, to some extent[2]—classification of the objects of our experience without a rigorous concern, however, to determine their ontological status. Aristotle has one more list of predicates to his credit, the list of five predicables—property, definition (species), genus, and accident propounded by himself[3] and differentia added by his commentator, Porphyry (233-304)—but this list is more or less syntactical or semantical rather than ontological. As regards the Aristotelian table of the ten categories given above, there appears to be much force in Donald Walhout's observation: 'For Aristotle categories appear to have a combined grammatical, logical, psychological, and ontological meaning. Grammatically and logically they mean the most generic kinds of predicates that can be assigned to different subjects. Psychologically they are the most general ways in which the mind, using logic and language, thinks about the different things that exist. Ontologically they are the various ultimate genera of being manifested by the existing things of reality. The ontological meaning is fundamental for Aristotle, since it is the warrant behind the other uses of the concept. That is, we speak, judge, and think as we do because we perform these acts in relation to the ways in which things actually exist.'[4]

---

1. Aristotle, *The Categories* 1 b, p. 17. This work may or may not be Aristotle's, but its ideas are certainly his. Cp. his *Topica* 103 b 23. He sometimes seems to content himself with even smaller lists. See his *Analytica Posteriora* 83 b 15; *Metaphysica* 1017 a 23-27.
2. Almost all his critics—Kant, Mill, Russell, Ryle—complain of it.
3. *Topica* 101 b.
4. Walhout, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-142.

Plato (428/27-347 B.C.) has a table of four ontological and four epistemological categories, without having consciously framed it though:

| Ontological category | Description | Epistemological category |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Being (Father-principle) | 1) The Idea of the Good<br>2) Demiurge<br>3) World-soul and the souls in so far as they are immortal<br>4) Ideas<br>5) Mathematical entities which are intelligible, eternal particulars.[1] | Knowledge |
| 2. Mysterious Being (Mother-principle) | Space | Mysterious knowledge |
| 3. Becoming (Child-principle) | 1) Gods and daimons<br>2) World-soul and the souls in so far as they are mortal<br>3) Time<br>4) Sensible particulars | Opinion |
| 4. Not-being | Images and illusory objects | Illusion |

Here Plato seems to have taken his cue from Parmenides's distinction of the Way of Truth, the Way of Seeming, and the Way of Not-Being—a distinction which comes to the fore when the latter's fragments are collated.[2] Plato himself has no conscious conception of category, however. He sometimes speaks of existence and non-existence, likeness and unlikeness, sameness and difference, unity and plurality, odd and even, rest and motion, 'and all such things', 'as common terms

1. Cp. *Metaphysica* 987 b 15 ff.
2. F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides*, Parmenides's *Way of Truth* and Plato's *Parmenides* translated with an Introduction and a running Commentary, pp. 30-31.

applying to everything'[1] (universalia universalissima); but these are names of common ideas,[2] not categories. Elsewhere Plato singles out five 'kinds' from the multitude of ideas as 'some' of those that are 'most (*or* very) important' : Existence or Being, Rest, Motion, Sameness, and Difference.[3] Plotinus (205-270) is inclined to take these to be the Kinds of Being. They have begun to be called Platonic categories. But this is illegitimate on the very face of it. Plato seems to have had even such notions as substance, quality, quantity, relation, activity, and passivity, but he never connected them into a scheme of categories.[4] We cannot resist the temptation of noting here in passing Plato's thesis that there are five classes of objects through which knowledge about 'everything that exists' must come. These are : 'first, a name, second, a description, third, an image, and fourth, a knowledge of the object,'[5] and fifth, 'the actual object of knowledge which is the true reality', viz. idea or unchanging essence.[6] These categories, if we are permitted to use this term, are more or less akin to the five logical constructs (kalpanā-s) of the Diṅnāga school of Buddhist philosophy, which are : substance, attribute, motion, universal, and name,[7] fashioned after the four kinds of denotation of words (śabdānāṁ pravṛttiḥ) given by Patañjali the grammarian.[8] The Platonic distinction also calls to mind Kant's fourfold scheme of categories to be dealt with in the sequel.

Plotinus postulates the Sensible realm or the realm of Becoming on the one hand and a higher, Intellectual realm

---

1. See *Theaetetus* 185 ce; *Parmenides* 129 d; *Phaedrus* 261 d. There are slight variations, however, in terminology, number, and order of the pairs of the three texts. We have listed these in a very general way.
2. *Parmenides* 129 d.
3. *The Sophist* 254 cd, 255 ce.
4. See W. D. Ross, *Aristotle* p. 23.
5. Plato, Letter VII, 342 ab, p. 1589.
6. *Loc. cit.*
7. *Pramāṇa-Samuccaya*, Pratykṣa-Paricceda 3. Cp. *PDS*, p. 553; *Lakṣmī-Tantra*.
8. *PVM*, Śiva-Sūtra 2, Vārtika 1, Vol. I, p. 49.

or the realm of Being on the other.[1] The aforesaid five kinds belong to the Intellectual realm and are designated as Kinds of Being,[2] where 'Being' is allowed a wider signification. These are not categories, which term he reserves for the classification of reals in the Sensible realm : Matter, Form, Composite, Relation, Quantity, Quality, Motion.[3] Counting the first three as one, he decides that there are only five categories : Substance, Relation, Quantity, Quality, and Motion. He also sees the possibillty of including the last three under Relation, and thereby having only two categories : Substance and Relation. He seems to use the term 'category' in the sense of class.[4]

**2) Categories as pure concepts of the understanding :** Unlike Aristotle's, Kant's (1724-1804) metaphysic is not one of reality, of noumena, of things-in-themselves, of things as they are, but of appearance, of phenomena, of things as represented or experienced, of things as they seem. It is, as Paton has it, a Metaphysic of Experience. Not that Kant denies, or denies the possibility of *thinking*, reality, noumena, things-in-themselves, or things as they are. Far from it.[5] What he does deny is the possibility of its/their being *known* as such.[6] Accordingly, his categories are all phenomenological; they have nothing to do with the realm of noumena.[7]

Kant variously describes his categories as pure concepts of the understanding,[8] pure concepts of synthesis,[9] concepts of an object in general,[10] concepts of forms of judgement,[11]

1. *The Enneads*, pp. 443-444, 471, 492.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 472.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 493-494.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 446, for instance.
5. See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 27.
6. *Loc. cit.*
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 266-275.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 112-113, 143.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 126, 128.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 315.

etc. Let us try to have a peep into the general fabric of his system to be in a position to appreciate his position in the right perspective.

According to Kant, there are two stems of human knowledge : sensibility and understanding. Through the former, objects are sensed, perceived, or intuited; through the latter, they are thought, conceived, or judged. Sensibility yields intuitions, i. e. immediate apprehensions of objects, while understanding yields concepts. Neither intuitions nor concepts can yield knowledge by themselves. They are in fact mere elements of knowledge, which must combine to give birth to knowledge.[1] The mind is passive while receiving impressions through sensibility and active while interpreting these in terms of the concepts yielded by the understanding. Both intuitions and concepts are either pure or empirical. Pure intuition contains only the form under which something is intuited; the pure concept only the form of the thought of an object in general. Empirical intuitions and concepts contain sensation which presupposes the actual presence of the object. Kant terms pure all representation in which there is nothing that belongs to sensation. It is the pure forms of intuition and concepts which are styled pure intuition and pure concepts respectively.

The pure intuition is twofold : space and time. These are the forms into which all our sensible representations are ordered. There are as many pure concepts of the understanding as there are forms of judgment. Kant describes the understanding as the faculty of judgment. Elsewhere,[2] however, he makes a distinction between understanding and judgment, and treats them as separate faculties. Understanding is viewed as 'the faculty of rules', while judgment as 'the faculty of subsuming under rules; that is of distinguishing whether something does or does not stand under a given rule'.[3] Understanding is capable of being instructed. One

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 177-178.
2. See *ibid.*, pp. 177-178.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 177.

can learn abstract rules from others, but one will have to judge for oneself whether the abstract rule does or does not apply to a particular, concrete situation. Judgment cannot be taught; it can only be practised. 'It is the specifi quality of so-called mother-wit; and its lack no school can make good.'[1] There are people who are highly learned but at the same time equally stupid so far as the faculty of judgment is concerned. Any way, according to Kant, forms of judgment are fourfold, each form containing three moments. They are :

I

**Quantity of Judgments**

Universal
Particular
Singular

II

**Quality**

Affirmative
Negative
Infinite

III

**Relation**

Categorical
Hypothetical
Disjunctive

IV

**Modality**

Problematic
Assertoric
Apodeictic

The primary, original, or primitive pure concepts of the understanding corresponding to these judgment-forms are as follows :

1. *Loc. cit.*

| I | | |
|---|---|---|
| | **Quantity** | |
| | Unity | |
| | Plurality | |
| | Totality | |
| II | | III |
| **Quality** | | **Relation** |
| Reality | | Of Inherence and Subsistence |
| Negation | | Of Causality and Dependence |
| Limitation | | Of Community (reciprocity between agent and patient) |
| | IV | |
| | **Modality** | |
| | Possibility—Impossibility | |
| | Existence—Non-existence | |
| | Necessity—Contingency | |

There are also pure derivative concepts which Kant designates *predicables* of the pure understanding in contradistinction to the *predicaments* or categories.

Kant refrains from defining the various categories and gives reasons for leaving these undefined.[1]

The division of categories is developed systematically from a common principle, viz. the faculty of judgment or thought, and not rhapsodically as the result of a haphazard search, the exhaustiveness of which, as based on induction only, could never be guaranteed.[2]

Neither space and time on one hand nor the categories on the other are derived from experience. They are, on the contrary, subjective dispositions or moulds, projected by the mind from its own inner constitution, into which the manifold of experience is ordered. They are accordingly called *a priori* in contradistinction to *a posteriori*. Kant sometimes classes them together as pure *a priori* concepts.[3] He is obviously using the word 'concepts' for space and time only

1. See *ibid.*, pp. 115, 260-261, 263, 586.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
3. See *ibid.*, p. 121.

loosely. Paton has remarked[1] that Kant would have done better to use the expression '*a priori* ideas' instead of '*a priori* concepts' to describe space and time and the categories together.

Object are intuited in spatial and temporal relations; they are thought in terms of the categories. Space and time constitute the forms in which objects present themselves to sensibility; the categories constitute the forms in which they present themselves to the understanding. Conditioned by the former, objects are sensed; conditioned by the latter, they are thought.

Space and time and the categories are necessary and universal. That is to say, it is necessary that objects are sensed in spatial and temporal relations and thought in terms of the categories. There is no exception to this rule, at any rate so far as the human mind is concerned. These elements of necessity and universality testify to their being *a priori*, and also serve to distinguish the categories from ordinary concepts.

According to Kant, universality without necessity is a mere contingency which is so much, as it were, detested by him. In the *Prolegomena* he says : '...I proceeded to the deduction of these concepts, wnich I was now certain were not derived from experience, as Hume had attempted to derive them, but sprang from the pure understanding.'[2]

Kant's categories are the grounds of the possibility of all experience in general.[3] Only through them does experience become possible.[4] They obtain objective reality by being the condition under which all objects of intuition must necessarily stand.[5] On these grounds, Kant asserts that the categories are not purely subjective but have objective validity. Although he does not feel tired of reiterating that categories are far from applicable to the noumena or things-in-them-

1. See Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, Vol. I, p. 317.
2. Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, p. 8.
3. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 174.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 126.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 164.

selves[1]—indeed, even such categories as reality and number—he nevertheless sometimes gives one the impression that only the schematized categories, viz. the categories as modified by the introduction of the factor of time, are so inapplicable[2] and that some of the unschematized, pure categories do apply to them.[3] We have, for example, to think God, who belongs to the realm of the noumena, 'on the analogy of a real substance that...is the cause of all things.'[4] Elsewhere, he considers it legitimate as well as necessary to think God in terms of the categories like substance, causality, etc.[5]—yes, God, of whom it is possible to predicate neither existence nor non-existence, neither reality nor negation, on Kant's own showing.[6]

F. Th. Stcherbatsky notices a close enough correspondence between the Kantian scheme of categories as pure concepts of the understanding and the table of five types of logical construction ( kalpanā-s ) sponsored by the Diṅnāga-school of Buddhism.[7] We need not go into this otherwise highly interesting question.

**3) A hierarchy of categories representing a scale of values**: The usual term used by Hegel ( 1770-1831 ) for his categories is *Denkbestimmungen*, the specific forms of unification which thought is. These forms are not unlike categories, though the term 'category' does not commend itself to Hegel.[8]

---

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 134, 180, 269 ff., 292, 293, 378.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 180, 183-187; A. C. Ewing, *A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 132.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 553, for example. Also see Ewing, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-190.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 553.
5. Kant, *Prolegomena*, p. 107.
6. In the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant demonstrates the impossibility of the proofs of the existenec of God; it was incumbent upon him to demonstrate the impossibility of the proofs of the non-existence of God as well.
7. F. Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 253-254.
8. See, William Wallace, *Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy* and Especially of His Logic, p. 297.

If Kant's categories are in effect only epistemological principles of knowing, Hegel's categories are these plus ontological principles of being. For Hegel, the Absolute is the Idea, the Thought, the Spirit, in which the subjective and the objective, knowledge and being, thought and thing, converge and finally merge.

Hegel's method is to start with the most abstract of universals, Being, and end with the most concrete of them, the Absolute Idea or Spirit, moving gradually form the abstract to the concrete. His dialectic begins with abstract universals, rises gradually to concreter and concreter universals, and ends in *the* concrete universal. The Absolute Idea is the Concrete Universal precisely because unlike abstract universals it is not exclusive but inclusive of particulars.

Hegel chooses to start with Being or rather Pure Being, which is characterized by pure or 'simple immediacy'[1], in the sense that it is impossible to doubt that something 'is', since, as McTaggart has it, the doubt itself 'is'. Nothing is more immediately knowable as Being : '...this simple immediacy is therefore Pure Being. Just as pure knowledge is to mean nothing except purely abstract knowing as such, Pure Being is to mean nothing except Being in general; Being and nothing else, without any further determination or filling.'[1] In starting with Being, Hegel's approach resembles that of the Buddhist Vijñānavāda which also begins with an analysis of the objective and differs from Descartes and Fichte who start with the Ego.

The Hegelian hierarchy of categories represents what some have chosen to call a scale of values. To apply the category of Being to something and thereby to know that it 'is' is, to use W. T. Stace's words, 'the absolute minimum of knowledge'. To know that it becomes is to know somewhat more. And so on till we reach the Absolute Idea. When we have reached the Absolute Idea, we have known everything worth knowing. Thus the march from Being to the Absolute

---

1 .See, G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, Vol. I, p. 81.

Idea is a march upwards, from the lower to the higher, from the less and less to the more and more, from the imperfect to the perfect. In this sense, the Hegelian hierarchy of categories has rightly been described as a scale of values.

The categories of Being are the concepts used by common sense, of Essence those used by science, and of the Notion those used by philosophy.

Hegel's categories possess as much universality as Kant's. Each of his categories applies to every object in the universe. Whatever *is* or has being comes under all the remaining categories.

The gradation of the Hegelian categories has been beautifully summed up by Stace in the following words : 'It is true that the world is composed of quantities and qualities. It is truer that the world is a system of causes and effects, actions and reactions. It is the perfect truth that the world is spiritual self-conscious thought.'[1]

**4) Categories as class-names** : John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) seeks to substitute three sets of categories for Aristotle's tenfold scheme of categories 'considered as a Classification of Existences'.[2] His table of categories is designed to exhaustively subsume all modes of being or classes of nameable things. One of his objections to the Aristotelian scheme of categories is that the latter leaves entirely out of account sensations and other feelings and states of mind, such as hope, joy, fear, sound, smell, taste, pain, pleasure, and the like. Mill has tried to supply this omission. The three basic categories of Mill are : (1) Feelings or States of Consciousness, (2) Substances, and (3) Attributes. Each of these categories has its sub-divisions. The first category has four sub-divisions : (a) Sensations, (b) Thoughts, (c) Emotions, and (d) Volitions. The second category comprises (a) Bodies and (b) Minds. The subdivisions of the third category are : (a) Quality, (b) Quantity, and (c) Relation.

1. W. T. Stace, *The Philosophy of Hegel*, pp. 130-131.
2. See John Stuart Mill, *System of Logic*, Vol. I, p. 69.

**5) Categories as indecomposable elements of the phenomena :** What has been termed by us categoriology has been termed by Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) 'Phenomenology, or the Doctrine of Categories',[1] the purpose of which 'is to unravel the tangled skein [ of ] all that in any sense appears, and wind it into distinct forms; or in other words, to make the ultimate analysis of all experiences the first task to which philosophy has to apply itself.'[2]

Peirce's alternative name for phenomenology is 'phaneroscopy',[3] derived from 'phaneron' which he uses interchangeably with 'phenomenon'. Phaneroscopy 'is that study which, supported by the direct observation of phanerons and generalizing its observations,...proves, beyond question, that a certain very short list comprises all of these broadest categories of phanerons there are; and finally proceeds to the laborious and difficult task of enumerating the principal sub-divisions of those categories.'[4] Elsewhere he states that the science of phaneroscopy 'is occupied with the formal elements of the phaneron.'[5] His concept of the phaneron needs close study. He writes : 'by phaneron I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not.'[6] He adds that 'English philosophers have quite commonly used the word idea in a sense approaching to that which I give to phaneron.'[7]

Peirce's categories are the 'three modes of being'[8], elements of phenomena of the first rank of generality, the inde-

1. See, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,* paragraph 280, p. 135.
2. *Loc. cit.*
3. *Ibid.*, paragraph 284, p. 141.
4. *Ibid.*, paragraph 286, p. 142.
5. Peirce, 'The Principles of Phenomenology', *Philosophical Writings of Peirce*, p. 74
6. *Loc. cit.*
7. *Loc. cit.*
8. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

composable, invariant, and universal elements of the phaneron. He otherwise describes them as 'philosophical arrangements'[1], 'a table of conceptions drawn from the logical analysis of thought and regarded as applicable to being.'[2] This second mode of description, in contradistinction to the first emphasizing the ontological derivation, emphasizes the logical derivation of the categories and thus seems to go directly connter to the latter.

Peirce posits two different but closely related categorial schemes : one phenomenological and one metaphysical. He variously describes his phenomenological categories as 'the being of positive qualitative possibility, the being of actual fact, and the being of law that will govern facts in the future;'[3] quality, fact (or reaction), and law (or representation); monad, dyad, and triad; firstness, secondness, and thirdness; presentness, reaction, law; etc. Corresponding to these are the metaphysical categories of possibility, actuality (or existence), and destiny; which are otherwise designed as chance, law, and habit.

The phenomenological categories are said to be the modes of phenomena; the metaphysical ones, the modes of being. The latter are the ultimate irreducible divisions into which the former fall.

The source of Peirce's phenomenological categories is traceable to the three regulative laws of thought—homogeneity, specification, and continuity of forms—postulated by Kant.[4]

One more feature of Peirce's categories deserves notice. Like Kant's categories, as also Alexander's, his categories are truly universal. He expresses the idea thus : '...we should expect the universal category (to) belong to every phenomenon,

1. *Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce*, Vol. I, paragraph 300, p. 148.
2. *Loc. cit.*
3. Peirce, 'The Principles of Phenomenology', *Philosophical Writings of Peirce*, p. 75.
4. See, Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 542.

one being perhaps more prominent in one aspect of that phenomenon than another but all of them belonging to every phenomenon.'[1] Elsewhere, he brings into focus the universality of the categories thus : 'I hold that we can directly observe them (the categories) in elements of whatever is at any time before the mind in any way.'[2]

**6) Categories as pervasive characters** : Among the characters of empirical existents or finite objects of experience, including mind, Samuel Alexander (1859-1939) distinguishes between those which like red, sweet, fragrant, vary from existent to existent and those which, like identity, diversity, magnitude, belong in some form to all existents whatever. The former he entitles variable or empirical characters or qualities in distinction from the latter which he entitles pervasive or non-empirical characters. It is the pervasive or non-empirical characters which he otherwise calls categories or categorial characters. These are also universal characters in that all existents partake of them. Alexander's list of categories is as follows :

(1) Identity, Diversity, and Existence.
(2) Universal, Particular, and Individual.
(3) Relation.
(4) Order.
(5) Substance, Causality, Reciprocity.
(6) Quantity and Intensity.
(7) Whole and Parts; and Number.
(8) Motion.

There is, to the best of our knowledge, no clear indication in Alexander that his list of categories is exhaustive.

According to Alexander, Space-Time[3] is the simplest

1. Quoted in James Feibleman, *An Introduction to Peirce's Philosophy*, p. 147.
2. Peirce, 'The Principles of Phenomenology,' *Philosophical Writings of Peirce*, p. 75.
3. '...there is no mere Space or mere Time but only Space-Time or Time-Space. Space and Time by themselves are abstractions from Space-Time....' S. Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity*, Being the Gifford Lectures at Glasgow, 1916-18, Vol. 1, p. 48.

being, the fundamental stuff, out of which the objects of experience have all emerged. All empirical things are the configurations, differentiations, or complexes of Space-Time. Categories, too, transpire to be fundamental properties or determinations of Space-Time itself. 'The categories are, as it were, begotten by Time on Space.'[1] They belong to all existents precisely because the latter are, in the last analysis, mere differentiations of Space-Time.

It goes without saying that Space-Time, being the stuff from which and by which categories are made, is itself not a category.

It is significant that Alexander's list of categories omits quality. Indeed, he is not in favour of treating quality as a universal at all. He says : 'We know from experience that there are qualities—red, hard, fragrant, sweet, life. ... But experience does not acquaint us with quality as such : as it does make us acquainted with quantity or substance as such. Quality is to specific qualities as colour is to red, green, and blue. It is a collective name for them but not their universal.'[2] in the sequel we shall see how closely this view resembles Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's denial of the attributeness universal.

However, it will be appreciated that, unlike Kant, Alexander cannot and does not[3] make any hard-and-fast distinction between categories and empirical characters. For him, both categories and empiricel characters have their origin in the Space-Time continuum.

Alexander clothes the description of his categories in apt metaphors. He speaks of them as the prerogative characters of things which run through all the rest as the warp on which the others are woven. They are again described as the grey or neutral coloured canvas on which the bright colours of the universe are embroidered.[4]

———

1. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 326.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 322.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 184.

**7) Categories as primary notions :** Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1943) offers a fourfold scheme of categories :

I. Three Categories of the Ultimate.
II. Eight Categories of Existence.
III. Twenty-seven Categories of Explanation.
IV. Nine Categoreal Obligations.

His scheme is very puzzling. It would hardly be an over-statement to say that one never can be sure whether it is exhaustive and whether the various categories are mutually exclusive. Whitehead does not help us in this regard beyond stating very broadly : 'Every entity should be a specific instance of one category of existence, every explanation should be a specific instance of categories of explanation, and every obligation should be a specific instance of categoreal obligations. The category of the ultimate expresses the general principle presupposed in the three more special categories.'[1] His following statement also merits consideration : 'In order to discover some of the major categories under which we can classify the infinitely various components of experience we must appeal to evidence relating to every variety of occasion. Nothing can be omitted, experience drunk and experience sober, experience sleeping and experience waking, experience drowsy and experience wide-awake, experience self-conscious and experience self-forgetful, experience intellectual and experience physical, experience religious and experience sceptical, experience anxious and experience care-free, experience anticipatory and experience retrospective, experience happy and experience grieving, experience dominated by emotion and experience under self--restraint, experience in the light and experience in the dark, experience normal and experience abnormal.'[2]

Besides, the meaning of the bulk of the categories is hardest to grasp. Indeed, Whitehead hardly takes any pains to explain his notion of categories, beyond remarking casually

1. See, A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* : An Essay in Cosmology, ( Being Gifford Lectures, 1927-28 ), p. 27.
2. A. N. Whitehead, *Adventure of Ideas*, p. 262.

that they are 'primary notions' or 'generic notions inevitably presupposed in our reflective experience—presupposed, but rarely expressed in explicit distinction.'[1] In the circumstances it would be no use listing the bewildering variety of the sub-divisions of the four classes of categories. We list below the Categories of Existence, however, which are the only categories that can interest us in our present venture. These are :

(i) Actual Entities (also termed Occasions) or Final Realities, or Rēs Verae.

(ii) Prehensions, or Concrete Facts of Relatedness.

(iii) Nexūs (plural of Nexus), or Public Matters of Fact.

(iv) Subjective Forms, or Private Matters of Fact.

(v) Eternal Objects, or Pure Potentials for the Specific Determination of Fact, or Forms of Definiteness.

(vi) Propositions, or Matters of Fact in Potential Determination, or pure Potentials for the Specific Determination of Matter of Fact, or Theories.

(vii) Multiplicities, or Pure Disjunction of Diverse Entities.

(viii) Contrasts, or Modes of Synthesis or Entities in one Prehension.

Dorothy Emmet opines that Whitehead is rather nearer, at any rate as regards his Categories of Existence, to the Aristotelian use of the word 'category', to express the ways of being or classification of reality, than to Kant or Alexander.[2] She also finds that the Categoreal Obligations which are conditions to which all possible experience must conform and which are the permanent features of actuality, are akin to Alexander's meaning of 'categories'.[3]

**8) Categories as modes of being and knowledge :** Paul Weiss (born May 19, 1901) posits four distinct, final,

1. See, Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (Gifford Lectures, 1927-28 ), p. 24.
2. Dorothy M. Emmet, *Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism*, pp. 69-70.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

and irreducible realities or modes of being—Actuality, Ideality, Existence, and God. There are, he avers, no more and no less than four modes of being.[1] They are also described as categories of being. A category is an ultimate unifying form.[2]

Weiss also speaks of categories of knowledge.[3] These, presumably, correspond to the categories of being. We have not found in Weiss any direct recognition of this fact nor an enumeration of the categories of knowledge, although the following excerpt from his book does seem to involve such a recognition: 'Knowledge is the mental categorization of what is already objectively categorized; the mind by beginning with the category is able to subjugate in a new way the content which in fact had already subjugated the category....There is a distinction between knowledge and being, between the form of knowledge and the content of knowledge. The category as mere structure functions as a form for itself permeatad by content, mental and otherwise.'[4]

Weiss is of the view that the categories of being and knowledge must illustrate some one category, to be styled the primary category. 'The primary category is a category of being as well as of knowledge.'[5]

He maintains that the primary category is exemplified in the false and the fictional no less than in the true and the factual. He is very emphatic on this point : 'There seems to be a tendency in modern times, however, to use the term "category" only in an honorific fashion, to express what is worth knowing or what should be. But in making it serve only for what is good, the category is forced to assume an unnecessary limited role in knowledge and in being. The

1. See Weiss, *Modes of Being*, p. 518
2. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
3. *Loc. cit.*
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 91-92.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

errors one makes, the appearance one faces are then left in the limbo of unintelligibility and non-being, or are subsumed under some new category which will, together with the category appropriate to the true and the factual, constitute or illustrate the neglected primary category.'[1]

As a matter of fact, Weiss's primary category is all-encompassing. It is applicable to the true as well as to the false, to the contingent as well as to the necessary. Indeed, he has tremendously succeeded in his own way in providing a systematic, integrated account of logic, ethics, ontology, politics, art, history, religion, etc. on the basis of his fourfold scheme of categories of being and knowledge.

**9) The Western concept of category in general :** In the West, the signification of the term 'category' has become very fluid. Nevertheless, we can discern a definite strain of unity in the diversity of the Western concepts of category. Categories are, in the West, generally thought to belong to the class of concepts, with the reservation that, in distinction from the latter, they are necessary and universal and more abstract and fundamental to thought than these. According to S. Alexander, they are pervasive concepts. That is to say, the objects of such concepts ( or rather the characters of which they are the concepts ) pervade the whole realm of reality unlike the ordinary concepts the objects of which pervade only a part of it. Earlier, Kant had expressed the same idea when he attributed necessity and universality to categories. His categories are distinguishable from ordinary concepts by these two characteristics. Peirce's categories are no less universal.

From another point of view, categories are the ways things can be said to be. It is true that Kant denies categories to things and locates them in the understanding; but, all the same, they are made to serve as the ways of experienced or phenomenal being. Indeed, they do operate as the ways of being even when they are held by Kant to be super-

1. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

imposed on the unknown and unknowable things-in-themselves.

System-building has come under fire in recent times. It has come to be associated with intellectual stagnation. According to the dominant temper of our times, knowledge can, seeing the native limitations of the human mind, be had only piecemeal. Categorial systems are today dismissed summarily as metaphysical rubbish.

There are those who feel convinced that it is idle to suppose that, as has been the common presupposition of the categoriologists, there exists a finite catalogue of categories. In a similar vein, Gilbert Ryle has adjudged the presupposition to be pure myth.[1]

It is, however, significant that the bulk of contemporary writers do in fact refer to qualtiy, relation, causality, etc. as veritable categories, but they do so in a casual vein, without caring to attempt a systematic account of them or to render them into a complete list of categories.

### 3. CATEGORIES VERSUS ELEMENTS

The pre-Platonics were theorists of elements or principles of being, not of categories. To Pythagoras, all thing are numbers; to Anaximenes and Diogenes, all things originate from air; to Hippasus and Heraclitus, all things originate from fire; to Thales, from water; to Anaximander, from the infinite (apeiron); to Parmenides, from the One; to Empedocles, from air, fire, water, and earth; to Anaxagoras, the principles are infinite in number; to Hesiod as also Parmenides, it is love or desire which is at the root of things. Pythagoras is also responsible for a table of ten pairs of opposites as the principles of being : Limited and Unlimited, Odd and Even, One and Plurality, Right and Left, Male and Female, Resting and Moving, Straight and Curved, Light and Darkness, Good and Bad, Square and Oblong. These may be taken to be

1. See, Gilbert Ryle, 'Categories', *Logic and Language*, Second Series, p. 75.

elements-cum-categories, or even proto-categories, a neologism, though. Alcmaeon of Croton is said to have postulated contraries in a general way, without specifying them.

Broadly speaking, elements are parts of reality, so to speak, while categories are aspects of reality. The former represent a horizontal division of reality, while the latter represent a vertical division of reality. Elements are facts, things, existents; categories are concepts having objective reference, subsistents. Categories may well be taken to be in the nature of objects of pure objective thoughts, forming the subject-matter of the philosophy of the object, shorn of all empirical content.[1] The components of a thing are either gross, concrete, like wood in a table, or diffuse, abstract, like the colour and shape of the table. Some British philosophers use 'constituent' for the former and 'component' for the latter. In this parlance, we may call elements constituents and categories components of reality.

Again, categories are the outcome of philosophical reasoning ; element, of field work. We just find the elements, as involved or uninvolved with one another ; while categories have to be worked out or constructed conceptually.

Finally, to follow Fowler : 'Category should be used by no-one who is not prepared to state (1) that he does not mean *class*, & (2) that he knows the difference between the two.'[2] Categorization is one thing ; classification, quite another. The one involves empirical survey of a given field ; and the larger the field, the more faultless and perfect the classification. Categorization, on the other hand, involves deeper and deeper probe into the ways and inner strata of being, and, for that matter, even other-than-being, if there is one.

## 4. KAṆĀDA'S NOTION OF CATEGORY

**1) Category as artha :** The term 'padārtha' occurs only

---

1. K. C. Bhattacharyya, 'The Concept of Philosophy', *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 102.
2. H. W. Fowler, *A Dictionary of Modern English Usage* ( 13th reprint, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1952 ), p. 70, 'Category'.

in *VS* (BI/KSS), and there, too, only once, as a common name for the six categories—substance (dravya), attribute (guṇa), motion (karman), universal (sāmānya), differential (viśeṣa), and inherence (samavāya)—listed in that context once for all.[1] It is significant—and the significance will be studied in the sequel—that the Sūtra containing the term and the list of the six categories is absent from the other two more authentic editions of *VS*. Besides, neither in either of these two editions nor in *VS* (BI/KSS) has any attempt been made to define or delimit the concept of padārtha, nor does any of the editions of *VS* mention any common characteristics of the six categories. We are simply left to guess what the author could actually have meant by the term padārtha.

There is a difference of opinion as to whether in the original treatise all the six were recognized as categories at all. Indeed, the very Sūtra in which the six categories are listed together and the term padārtha occurs is held by some—and, I think, rightly—to be a post-Praśastapāda corruption or outright interpolation. The publication of the other two new editions of *VS* should, in our opinion, settle the matter once for all. To this issue we shall recur in Chapter VI, below. Well, if this view is correct, it will have to be agreed that *VS* originally recognized only three categories—substance, attribute, and motion—to which it gives the common name of 'artha' (object).[2] In that case, 'artha' will be the Kaṇādian equivalent for 'category'.

**2) Common characteristics of the categories :** Kaṇāda devotes a Sūtra to a statement of the common characteristics of artha, which can be taken to constitute a description, if

---

1. धर्मविशेषप्रसूताद् द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां पदार्थानां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां तत्त्वज्ञानान् निःश्रेयसाधिगमः । *VS* (BI/KSS) 1.1.4.

2. अर्थ इति द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु । *VS* 8.14. Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra holds, however, that here universal etc. are also implied, so that the term is applicable to all the seven categories : जात्यादीनामुपलक्षणम् । अर्थ इति द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाभावेषु प्रयुज्यते । *VSV* 8.2.1, p. 78.

not a definition, of category. The Sūtra says that the three categories are characterized by existence (sat), non-eternity (anitya), having a substance (dravyavat), being an effect (kārya), being a cause (kāraṇa), and having a universal and differential (sāmānyaviśeṣavat).[1]

Well, the first characteristic of the three categories is existence.[2] By implication, existence does not characterize the other categories recognized as such in the extant redaction of the treatise. That it does not reside in universal and differential has been even expressly acknowledged.[3] *VS* does not state the mode of being of these last three categories. If, being affiliated to existence, the first three are existential categories, the last three are bound to be regarded as non-existential ones. But it would be doing injustice to the treatise to equate their non-existence with mere nothing or non-being. It seems to maintain that the first three categories are objective categories unlike the last three which are in the nature of subjective categories. Indeed, of universal and differential it declares that they are relative to reflection.[4]

The second, third, and fourth common characteristics of the three existential categories, viz. non-eternality, having a substance, and being an effect, do not sppear to be wide enough to comprehend ultimate substances like atoms etc., which, as we shall see in due course, *VS* itself declares eternal, self-subsistent, and uncaused. It appears that Kaṇāda's concern here is not to single out only such characteristics as are common to all the sub-categories of the same category before being common to all the three categories but to mention even those characteristics which, though common to only a limited number of sub-categories of the same category,

1. सद्, अनित्यं, द्रव्यवत्, कार्यं, कारणं, सामान्यविशेषवदिति द्रव्यगुणकर्मणामविशेषः ।
2. The idea has been expressed in *VS* 1. 2. 7 as well.
3. *VS* 8. 5.
4. सामान्यं विशेष इति बुद्ध्यपेक्षम् । *VS* 1. 2. 3. This is a controversial Sūtra which will be examined in Chapter IX.

are common to the other categories as well, in a general manner.

Causality and possession of universal and differential are respectively the fifth and sixth common characteristics of the three categories. Substance, attribute, and motion are one and all endowed with the capacity of functioning as causes and possessed of universal and differential.

This is all that one can hope to gather from *VS* regarding Kaṇāda's concept of category.

## 3. PRAŚASTAPĀDA'S CONCEPTION OF CATEGORY

**1) Category as padārtha** : The first known Vaiśeṣika thinker to define the term 'padārtha' is Praśastapāda, who lists three characteristics of the concept—viz. isness (astitva), namability (abhidheyatva), and knowability (jñeyatva).[1] As would be evident from what follows, the logical order would be : isness, knowability, and namability.

It was Gorgias of Leotini (483-375 B.C.), the sophist, who established the three propositions : '(1) that nothing exists (2) if anything existed it could not be known and (3) if it could be known it could not be communicated to others.'[2] Praśastapāda's position is a veritable antithesis to the sophist's. The former purports to say (1) that things exist, (2) that they can be known, and (3) that they can be communicated to other. Such is the significance of his conception of padārtha.

This gives a clue to the realistic temper of the Vaiśeṣika or Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. The system represents an extreme from of realism. Originally verging on naïve realism, it has gradually evolved into a highly developed form of critical realism. In thoroughness, we suppose, it is next only to Meinong's, S.Alexander's, some ancient Sāṅkhyas', Prabhākara's, and Rāmānuja's what may be termed absolute realism, which, so far as we can see, sets a limit to the length realism can ever hope to go. Its motto is : 'The

---

1. षण्णामपि पदार्थानामस्तित्वाभिधेयत्वज्ञेयत्वानि । *PDS*, p. 114.
2. See Edurd Zeller, *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*, pp. 86-87.

goddess experience alone is our refuge.'[1] Accordingly, it ascribes some sort of reality or isness to everything that is experienced.

Praśastapāda does not care to explain the three characteristics ascribed by him to the six categories. Indeed, he takes leave of the topic immediately after a bare mention of them. His successors, too, do not take us far. Let us see how far we can hope to succeed in interpreting them on the basis of the few strary clues found in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature.

---

1. Śrīvallabhācārya attributes this dictum—quoted in full by Śaṅkara Miśra in *VSU* (7.2.26, p. 194) and Vācaspati Miśra II in *Khaṇḍanoddāra* (p. 103) as संविदेव हि भगवती वस्तूपगमे न: शरणम्, in the *Parimala* commentary on *Mahārthamañjarī* (v. 32, p. 80) as संविदेव भगवती विषयसत्त्वोपगमे न: शरणम्, and Śālikanātha Miśra in *Prakaraṇapañcikā* (p. 77) as संविदेव हि भगवती विषयसत्त्वोपगमे न: शरणम्, to 'Tātparyācārya.' The relevant passage of Śrīvallabha runs thus : तद् इयमाम्नातता भासर्वज्ञस्य यद् अयमाचार्यमप्यवमन्यते। तथा च तदनुयायिनस् तात्पर्याचार्यस्य सिंहनादः—संविदेव भगवती० (*NL*, P. 358). Vindhyeśvarīprasāda Dvivedin (see his introduction to *NK*, p. 28) and Candrakānta Takālaṅkāra (see his introduction to *NKu*. (*Haridāsi*), p. ii) indentified Tātparyācarya with Vācaspati Miśra, the author of *NVT*. Gopi Nath Kaviraj has expressed his disagreement with them in his 'Gleanings', pp. 94-95. Anantalal Thakur criticizes Kaviraj and seeks to re-establish their identity more or less convincingly in 'Tātparyācārya', pp,241-243, on the ground, inter alia, that the dictum in question occurs for the first time in *NVT* (2.1.36, p. 399), verbatim, the reading being संविदेव भगवती वस्तूपगमे न: शरणम् The word 'ācārya' occurring in Śrīvallabha's text quoted above means, according to *HNNM* (p. 58), Praśastapāda and, according to Thakur, Uddyotakara ('Tātparyācārya', pp 241-243, passim, especially p.243). In *HNNM* (p. 58) it has been well established that Śrīvallabha never refers to Udayana by the honorific title of 'ācārya' and that to him Vācaspati Miśra was the 'ācārya' (p. 533), the 'Tātparyācārya' (p. 358), and the 'Paramanyāyācārya' (p. 762). This leaves no doubt that the dictum belongs to Vācaspati and none else.

Incidentally, saṁvit is sometimes denominated pratīti, as in the following observations of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa: यत्किंञ्चिद् यथा प्रतीतिरादिशति भगवती तथा वयमप्युपगच्छाम: (*NM*,I, p.285). For other sources see the afore-quoted paper of Gopi Nath Kaviraj. Also Cp. सर्वं हि वस्तुजातं प्रतीतिव्यवस्थाप्यम्। *Śrī-Bhāṣya* 1. 1. 1, p. 86.

Let us take the first characteristic, viz. isness, first. It appears that isness is something opposed to non-isness or is-not-ness, to coin a new expression. The Sanskrit equivalents for non-isness and is-not-ness are anastiva and nāstitva respectively, which, however, have not been used by Praśastapāda. Isness as used by him appears to be nothing else than what is known as 'being' ( bhāva ) or positivity ( bhāvatva ) in later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature, having 'non being' ( abhāva ) or negativity ( abhāvatva ) as its antonym. Thus, the table of six categories purports to be a table of positive categories, to the exclusion of any negative categories that be.

It must be remembered that Praśastapāda distinguishes isness from existence ( sattā ). The former, as we have seen, characterizes all the six categories, while the latter, as in Kaṇāda, resides in the first three only.[1] Isness is a specific or particularistic concept and a mere characteristic of the six categories, while existence is not a mere characteristic of the first three categories but a full-fledged universal—a different category—and itself *is* ( asti ). Existence *is*, but isness does not *exist*. Isness is a more generic concept than existence.

Praśastapāda describes the last three categories—viz. universal, differantial, and inherence—as characterized by what he calls self-identity, self existence or own-being ( svātma-sattva ),[2] which, however, he does not try to explain. He also does not make it clear whether self-identity is confined to these three categories only or it belongs to all the six. Nor is there any suggestion in him as to whether self-identity is identical with isness or something different from it. It appears that self-identity is identical with isness. The term self-identity is chosen to throw into relief the fact that the three categories said to be characterized by self-identity do not partake of existence and that they have isness alone

---

1. द्रव्यादीनां त्रयाणामपि सत्तासम्बन्धः...। *PDS*, p. 121.

2. सामान्यादीनां त्रयाणां स्वात्मसत्त्वम्...। *PDS*, p. 133. Faddegon translates 'svātma-sattva' as 'a way of existing typical for them.' See *VSF*, p. 137.

which is not a universal but a sort of existence sui generis, a sort of diminutive existence proper to each instance of the three categoies, as opposed to the existence-universal resident in the first three categories. To sum up, all the six categories *are*, but the first three also *exist*. All these issues will be discussed at length in Chapter XIII.

The meaning of the next characteristic, viz. knowability (jñeyatva), though not dicussed by Praśastapāda, is simple: capability of being known or apprehended. It reveals the non-sceptical temper of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. The third characteristic, viz. namability, too, is not difficult to understand. It refers to the fact that the categories are expressible and communicable.

## 4. THE POST-PRAŚASTAPĀDA CONCEPTION OF CATEGORY

**1) Little improvement upon Praśastapāda :** The little interest in defining the concept of padārtha that is in evidence in Praśastapāda is markedly on the decline after him. The few of his successors who care to refer to the concept at all choose, in a most light-hearted manner, either one or two or, as very rarely happens, all the three of the characteristics of padārtha listed by him and swear thereby as a complete definition of the concept.[1] His direct commentators and sub-commentators, too, have not gone beyond defining or redefining the three characteristics in their own ways. Let us study their contribution, however humble it may be.

**2) Blurring of the distinction between isness and existence :** The term 'isness' has been variously interpreted in the post-Praśastapāda Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature. Broadly speaking, the interpretations fall under two main heads.

---

1. See the following definitions : 'All [ categories ] are knowable....' (*DPS*, p.119); प्रमितिविषयाः पदार्थाः (*SP*, p.13); पदस्यार्थः पदार्थ इति व्युत्पत्त्याऽभिधेयत्वं पदार्थसामान्यलक्षणम् (*TD*, p. 2); अभिधेयाः पदार्थाः । (*TK*, p. 1); प्रमितिविषयः पदार्थः ( *PD*, p. 1 ); अभिधेयः पदार्थः । *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, p. 2; etc.

The bulk of these confine isness to the six positive categories propounded by Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda, while some make it comprehend within its compass the seventh, negative category of non-being as well, which was propounded after Praśastapāda. We shall study these definitions in Chapter XII. Therein we shall notice that in the post-Praśastapāda period the difference between isness and existence has been blurred in a most light-hearted manner.

There is little of consequence so far as the other two characteristics of padārtha are concerned, in the post-Praśastapāda period. Praśastapāda's commentators and others do not go beyond giving the literal meaning of the terms.[1]

3) **Exhaustiveness of the list of categories** : Any account of the post-Praśastapāda conception of category will remain incomplete without a reference to two statements as to the notion of category made each by Varadarāja and Mādhava Sarasvatī. In the words of the former, the table of the six categories purports to exhaust the whole realm of existence.[2] Mādhava Sarasvatī goes to the extent of affirming that the Vaiśeṣika table of categories ( not excluding non-being ) takes due cognizance of illusory objects as well.[3] The significance of these statements lies in the fact that they help throw into relief the all-comprehensive charac-

1. See the following : अभिधेयत्वम् अभिधानयोग्यत्वम् ।...ज्ञेयत्वं ज्ञानयोग्यता । (*Kiraṇāvalī*, pp. 137-138); अभिधेयत्वं पदशक्यत्वम् । ( Sūkti, p. 114 ); अभिधेयत्वमिति ।...अभिधानयोग्यता तदर्थः ।...ज्ञेयत्वमिति ।...ज्ञानविषयत्वलक्षणज्ञानयोग्यत्वं विवक्षितम् । भावस्वरूवमेव अवस्थाभेदेन ज्ञेयत्वमभिधेयत्वं चोच्यते । ( *NK*, p. 16. ); ज्ञेयत्वं ज्ञानविषयता । ( *NMu.* 1. 13, p. 101 ); अभिधेयत्वम् अभिधाविषयत्वम् । ( *Dinakarī* 1.13, p 101 ); अभिधेयत्वं वाऽभिधेयप्रत्ययकारणम्... । ( *Vyomavatī*, p. 111 ).

2. एतस्यामेव भावात्मकं विश्वमन्तर्भवति । *TR*, pp. 162-163.

3. नन्वत्रापि भ्रमविषयो व्यावर्त्योऽस्तीति चेन्, न, तस्यापि कदाचित् प्रमेयत्वात् । शुक्तिर् वा रजतं वा, तादात्म्यं वा भ्रमविषयो रजतत्वसंसर्गो वा—एते सर्वे प्रमेया एव । इदानीं प्रमाविषयो न भवतीति चेत्, तर्हि पदार्थानामपि स्मृतिविषयतासमये पदार्थत्वापत्तिः । कदाचित् ते प्रमेया एवेति यदि, भ्रमविषयोऽपि तर्हि तथेति तुल्यम् । *MB*, pp. 13-14.

ter of the Vaiśeṣika table of categories. In the definition of category in terms of the three characteristics of namability, knowability, and isness, it is already implied that the Vaiśeṣika school claims to attempt a complete analysis of reality or a complete classification of kinds, not only elements, of being, and that it purports to take cognizance of everything that is namable ( abhidheya ) or knowable ( jñeya ) or that simply is ( asti )—in short, everything that is the case. The statement of Vardarāja and above all of Mādhava Sarasvatī go to confirm this implication. D. M. Datta seems to be right to a pretty large extent when he asserts : 'As everything whatever subjective or objective, real or unreal, existent or non-existent or subsistent, determinate or indeterminate, conceivable or inconceivable that enters or can enter into philosophical discussion, must be directly expressible or indirectly suggestible ( e. g. by words like "contradictory", "inconceivable", "square-circle", "meaningless" ) by some word or another, it can be at once seen that "Padārtha" is the widest possible term for philosophy.'[1]

However, it is one thing to define a concept in such a comprehensive manner ; it is quite another to be conscious of the comprehensiveness and keep it intact in the actual treatment of the concept. In Chapter XXII, in which the question of the exhaustiveness of the table of categories under examination will be resumed for a critical examination, we shall find that the table does leave something to be desired as an exhaustive table of categories.

## 5. AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLE OF CATEGORIZATION.

**1) Order of the categories** : The categories are usually ordered as substance, attribute, motion, universal,

1. D. M. Datta, 'The Interpretation of Vaiśeṣika Categories', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, XXVIII, No. 4 (January, 1956 ), p. 218. Another equally wide term is 'entity'. 'The notion of "entity" is so general that it may be taken to mean anything that can be thought about. You cannot think of mere nothing; and the something which is an object of thought may be called an entity.' A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, pp. 168-169.

differential, inherence, and non-being. According to Śrīdhara and Mādhava Sarasvatī, the order is not arbitrary but logical. Śrīdhara says that substance heads the list, because, operating as the substratum of all other categories, it is the chief category. Attribute and not motion is mentioned thereafter, because attributes are more in number and are the resultant of motion. Universal follows motion, because it is united with motion ( as also substance and attribute ). Since inherence resides in all the other five categories, it comes after them, preceded by differential.[1] And non-being, which is dependent upon being, can come only last.[2]

Mādhava Sarasvatī's explanation of the order of the categories is rather more lucid. Substance comes first in the list, because, being the substratum of all the categories and the only inherent cause, it happens to be the chief category. Attribute and not motion follows substance, because, unlike motion, it resides in all substances and is closest to substance on account of the fact that it comes into existence and unites with substance immediately after the coming into existence of substance. Motion comes before universal, because it is its abode. Universal must come after substance, attribute, and motion, in which it inheres. Differential follows universal, because the former is a counter-entity to the latter. It comes before inherence, because it is a relatum of inherence. Inherence comes last in the list of positive categories, because it operates as a nexus of all the other five categories. And, since non-being is nothing but in the nature of a negation of all the six positive categories, it is quite in the fitness

---

1. आदौ द्रव्यस्योद्देशः सर्वाश्रयत्वेन प्राधान्यात्। गुणानां च कर्मापेक्षया भूयस्त्वाद् द्रव्यान्तरमभिधानम्। नियमेन गुणानुविधायित्वात् कर्मणां गुणान्तरमुद्देशः। कर्मान्वितत्वात् सामान्यस्य कर्मान्तरमभिधानम्। पञ्चपदार्थवृत्तेः समवायस्य सर्वशेषेणाभिधाने प्राप्ते विशेषाणां मध्ये कथनम्। *NK*, p. 7.

2. The idea is implied in the proposition : अभावस्य पृथगनुपदेशः भावपारतन्त्र्यान्, न त्वभावात्। *Loc cit.*

of things that it is placed at the end of the list of categories.[1]

Mādhava, the author of *SDS*, also refers to a similar explanation of the order of the categories. Substance comes first, because, being the substratum of all the other categories, it is the chief of the categories. Being resident in all the substances through the property of attributeness, attribute comes next. Motion comes next to attribute, which it resembles in having a universal. Universal follows substance, attribute, and motion, in which it resides. Differential and not inherence follows universal, because it is the substratum of inherence. And the remaining category, inherence, comes naturally at the end.[2]

Nāgeśa follows the same line in accounting for the order of the four categories listed by Patañjali in the very beginning of *PVM*. These categories are substance ( dravya ), action ( kriyā ), attribute ( guṇa ), and form ( ākṛti ), the last one being converted into universal ( jāti ) by his scholiasts. Nāgeśa writes that substance has been mentioned first, because it is the substratum of motion etc. Motion and attribute precede universal, because they are the abode of universal. He also has it that in the aforesaid list of categories motion precedes attribute just to bring into focus the fact

---

1. द्रव्यस्य सर्वपदार्थाधारत्वेन समवायिकारणत्वेन च प्राधान्यात् प्रथममुद्देशः । गुणजातीयस्य सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तित्वादुत्पत्त्युत्तरक्षणमेवोत्पन्नत्वेनातिसान्निध्याच् च गुणस्य तदानन्तर्यम् । कर्मजातीयस्य तद्वैपरीत्याज् जत्याधारत्वाच् च तदानन्तर्यम् । सामान्यस्यानुवृत्तत्वेन त्रितयगतत्वेन च बहुविषयत्वात् तदानन्तर्यम् । एतेषां पञ्चानां सम्बन्धत्वेन समवायस्य तदानन्तर्यम् । षण्णां निषेधरूपत्वेनाभावस्य तदानन्तर्यम् । इत्युद्देशक्रमः । *MB*, pp. 14-15.

2. किमत्र क्रमनियमे कारणम् ? उच्यते—समस्तपदार्थायतनत्वेन प्रधानस्य द्रव्यस्य प्रथममुद्देशः । अनन्तरं गुणत्वोपाधिना सकलद्रव्यवृत्तेर् गुणस्य, तदनु सामान्यवत्त्वसाम्यात् कर्मणः, पश्चात् तत्त्रितयाश्रितस्य सामान्यस्य, तदनन्तरं समवायाधिकरणस्य विशेषस्य, अन्तेऽवशिष्टस्य समवायस्येति । *SDS*, p. 213.

that such attributes of the Vaiśeṣikas as number, conjunction, disjunction, etc. are of the nature of motion.[1]

The controversy whether it is substance or any other category which happens to be the chief category finds its echo in the medical literature as well. Suśruta raises the question whether it is the substance, the flavour, the action, or the ripening/heating ( of medicinal matter ) which is the most important.[2] On behalf of those who regard substance as the most important, he lists nine reasons why substance should be treated as such. Firstly, substance is self-identical as compared with flavour etc. Secondly, it is permanent as compared with flavour etc. Thirdly, unlike flavour etc., it retains its indentity and does not tend to change its class. Fourthly, unlike flavour etc., it can be apprehended by all the five sense-organs. Fifthly, it is the receptacle of flavour etc. Sixthly, it is substance which is handled first, has to be begun with, and not flavour etc. Seventhly, substance figures as the most important entity in scriptural injunctions. Eighthly, flavour etc. follow, and are determined by, substance rather than the other way about. Ninthly, and lastly, even a part of substance is capable of curing an ailment.[3] Those

---

1. तत्र द्रव्यस्य क्रियाद्याश्रयत्वात् पूर्वंमुक्तिः। क्रियागुणौ च जात्याश्रयाविति तयोस् ततः पूर्वमुक्तिः। वैशेषिकसिद्धगुणानामपि संख्यासंयोगविभागादीनां क्रियात्वं ध्वनयितुं गुणात् प्राक् क्रियोक्तिरिति ध्येयम्। *MPU*, I, p. 4.

2. See *Suśruta-Saṁhitā*, Sūtra-Sthāna, chapter 40.

3. केचिदाचार्या ब्रुवते–द्रव्यं प्रधानंम्। कस्मात्? व्यवस्थितत्वात्। इह खलु द्रव्यं व्यवस्थितं, न रसादयः, यथा आमे फले ये रसादयस् ते पक्वे न सन्ति। नित्यं हि द्रव्यमनित्या गुणाः, यथा कल्कादिप्रविभागः। स एवं सम्पन्नरसगन्धो वा भवति। स्वजात्यवस्थानाच् च। यथा हि पार्थिवं द्रव्यमन्यभावं न गच्छत्येवं शेषाणि। पञ्चेन्द्रियग्रहणाच् च। पञ्चभिरिन्द्रियैर् गृह्यते द्रव्यं, न रसादयः। आश्रयत्वाच् च। द्रव्यमाश्रिता रसादयो भवन्ति। आरम्भसामर्थ्याच् च। द्रव्याश्रित आरम्भो, यथा 'विदारिगन्धादिमाहृत्य संक्षुद्य विपचेद्' इत्येवमादिषु न रसादिषु आरम्भः। शास्त्रप्रामाण्याच् च। शास्त्रे हि द्रव्यं प्रधानमुपदेशे हि योगानां, यथा 'मातुलुङ्गाग्निमन्थौ च' इत्यादौ न रसादय उपदिश्यन्ते। क्रमापेक्षितत्वाच् च रसादीनाम्। रसादयो हि द्रव्यक्रममपेक्षन्ते, यथा तरुणे तरुणाः संपूर्णे संपूर्णा इति। एकदेशसाध्यत्वाच् च। द्रव्याणामेकदेशेनापि व्याधयः साध्यन्ते, यथा महावृक्षक्षीरेणेति। तस्माद् द्रव्यं प्रधानं, न रसादयः। कस्मात्? निरवयवत्वात्। द्रव्यलक्षणं तु 'क्रियागुणवत् समवायिकारणम्' इति। *Suśruta-Saṁhitā*, Sūtra-Sthāna 40.3, p. 145.

who maintain that flavour etc. are more important than substance have been referred to as arguing inter alia that the primacy of flavour etc. consists in the fact that it is through them that substance is inferred.[1] After stating all sorts of arguments and counter-arguments on the subject, which are not germane to our inquiry, Suśruta rules that, being the substratum of everything else, substance has every title to recognition as the chief category.[2]

It will be observed that, if the issue has been dealt with so methodically in a medical work of the *Suśruta-Saṁhitā's* antiquity, it must have figured in the philosophical tradition much more profusely.

It would be interesting to refer to Aristotle's reason why substance stands foremost amongst the categories. According to him, substance is the first of all the categories 'both in reason, and knowledge, and time, and nature. For no one of the rest of the categories is capable of a separate subsistence, but this alone; and in definition is this first : for in the definition of everything there is a necessity that the definition of substance be inherent. And then we think we know each particular thing, especially, when we know what man is, or fire is, rather than when we know the quality or the quantity or the situation of a thing, since we know what the quantity of them is, or the quality.' Besides, he continues, substance is 'a subject of investigation, and invariably of doubt; namely, what entity is, that is, what substance is; for some say that this is one, but others, that it is more than one; and

---

1. नेत्याहुरन्ये । रसास् तु प्रधानम् । कस्मात्? आगमात्। आगमो हि शास्त्रमुच्यते; शास्त्रे हि रसा अधिकृताः, यथा रसायत्त आहार इति, तस्मिंश् च प्राणाः । उपदेशाच् च । उपदिश्यन्ते हि रसाः, यथा रसा मधुराम्ललवणा वातं शमयन्ति । अनुमानाच् च । रसेन हि अनुमीयते द्रव्यं, यथा मधुरमिति । ऋषिवचनाच् च । ऋषिवचनं वेदो, यथा किञ्चिदिज्यार्थं मधुरमाहरेदिति । तस्माद् रसाः प्रधानं, रसेषु गुणसंज्ञा । *Ibid.* 40.4, p. 145.

2. पाको नास्ति विना वीर्याद्, वीर्यं नास्ति विना रसात्,
रसो नास्ति विना द्रव्याद्; द्रव्यं श्रेष्ठतमं स्मृतम् ॥ *Ibid.* 40.15, p. 147.

some maintain that things which are finite are this entity, but others, things that are infinite.'[1] Elsewhere he remarks : 'For both if the Universe be as one whole, substance constitutes the earliest portion and if things subsist in a consequent order, in this way, likewise, would substance be first, and next quality, then quantity.'[2]

**2) How the categories were obtained** : Udayana appears to have been the first to attack the problem of discovering the principle and the process by which the seven categories were obtained. In this behalf, he proceeds like this. Reality can be dichotomized into being and non-being. There can be no intermediate or other order of reality, for the simple reason that there can be nothing between or over and above a positive and its own negative. The very negation of being implies the position of non-being and the very negation of non-being implies the position of being. Therefore, the possibility of there being an order of reality over and above being and non-being is completely ruled out of account. Being mutually contradictory, they cannot be identical either. Hence, it will have to be acknowledged that reality can be dichotomized into being and non-being. That is to say, being and non-being exhaust the whole realm of reality. And being and non-being constitute the primary categories of the Naiyāyika.[3]

---

1. *The Metapysics of Aristotle*, Rev. John H. M' Mahon, tr., pp. 167-168.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 316.
3. परस्परविरोधे हि न प्रकारान्तरस्थितिः। नैकताऽपि विरुद्धानामुक्तिमात्रविरोधतः ॥ न हि भावाभावाभ्यामन्यः प्रकारः सम्भावनीयः, परस्परविधिनिषेधरूपत्वात्। न भाव इति हि निषेधमात्रेणैवाभावविधिः। ततस् तं विहाय कथं स्ववचनेनैव पुनः सहृदयो निषेधेन्—नाभाव इति? एवं नाभाव इति हि निषेध एव भावविधिः। ततस् तं विहाय स्ववाचैवानुन्मत्तः कथं पुनर् निषेधेन्—न भाव इति? अत एवम्भूतानामेकताऽप्यशक्यप्रतिपत्तिः, प्रतिषेधविध्योरेकत्वासम्भवात्। तस्माद् भावाभावावेव तत्त्वम्। *NKu.*, 3.8. pp. 193-194.

Now, on the same principle of dichotomy outlined above, positive reality is either possessive of attribute (guṇa-vat) or attribute-less (nir-guṇa). The first is substance. Likewise, what is attributeless is either dependent (āśrita) or independent (anāśrita). The second is inherence. If it is said to depend on another inherence, there will be infinite regress. What is dependent is either possessive of universal (sāmānya-vat) or universal-less (niḥ-sāmānya). Of these, the first is either movement (spanda) or immobile (aspanda), designated as motion and attribute respectively. What is universal-less, attributeless, and dependent, is either dependent on one or dependent on many, designated as differential and universal respectively.[1]

This is how the six positive categories and the negative category of non-being are come by.

In the *Kāvya-Prakāśa* also, we find an indication of the process by which the categories were obtained. It speaks of individuals (vyakti) and their properties (upādhi). The individual conceived as apart from properties is substance. Properties are of two kinds : objective properties (vastu-dharma) and arbitrary or imposed properties (vaktṛyadṛcchā-sanniveśita). Objective properties are either accomplished (siddha), enduring, or stationary on one hand or to be accomplished (sādhya), non-enduring, or evanescent, or a process on the other. The second is motion. Accomplished objective properties are either essential, vital, the very life or soul of a thing (prāṇaprada), or merely distinctive (viśeṣā-

---

1. भावत्वेऽपि गुणवन् निर्गुणं वेति द्वयमेव, पूर्ववत् । पूर्वं द्रव्यमेव । उत्तरं चाश्रितमनाश्रितं वेति द्वयमेव, पूर्ववत् । तत्रोत्तरं समवाय एव, अनवास्थाभयात् । आश्रितं तु सामान्यवन् निःसामान्यञ् चेति पूर्ववद् द्वयमेव । तत्र प्रथममपि स्पन्दोऽस्पन्द इति द्वयमेव । एतच् च यथासंख्यं कर्म गुण इति व्यपदिश्यते । निःसामान्यं, निर्गुणं, आश्रितं त्वेकाश्रित-मनेकाश्रितं वेति प्रागिव द्वयमेव । एतदपि यथासंख्यं विशेषस् सामान्यं चेत्यभिधीयते । *Ibid.*, **Stavaka 3, p. 194.**

dhānahetu). The first is universal and the second, attribute[1].

This passage accounts for only four of the categories and leaves the remaining categories, viz. differential, inherence, and non-being, entirely out of account. As a matter of fact, Mammaṭa is concerned with only the four categories propounded by the grammarians, viz. substance, attribute, motion, and universal. He is not a Naiyāyika to worry about the remaining categories.

## 6. VAIŚEṢIKA CATEGORIES VERSUS UNIVERSAL PROPERTIES

It must be noted that the categories of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school apply to all existents *as a whole* and not *individually*. In this respect, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of category has a striking contrast to the concept found in Plato, Plotinus, Samuel Alexander, and Peirce, according to whom categories signify universal properties belonging to each existent.

---

1. उपाधिश् च द्विविध:—वस्तुधर्मो वक्तृयदृच्छासन्निवेशितश् च । वस्तुधर्मोऽपि द्विविध:—सिद्धः साध्यश् च । सिद्धोऽपि द्विविध:—पदार्थस्य प्राणप्रदो विशेषाधानहेतुश् च । तत्राद्यो जातिः।...द्वितीयो गुणः।...साध्यः पूर्वापरीभूतावयवः क्रियारूपः। *Kāvya-Prakāśa*, pp. 33-35.

# PART III

# BEGINNINGS OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA CATEGORIOLOGY



## CHAPTER V

# THE SOURCES OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA CATEGORIOLOGY

### 1. ORIGINS OF CATEGORIOLOGY IN GENERAL

In this chapter it is proposed to study the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categoriology in its rudimentary stages, to which end it is necessary to discuss its origins. But before we discuss its origins, it would be worth while to pass in review the problem of the origin of categoriology in general.

The theories of the origin of categoriology current the world over can, to the best of our knowledge, be grouped under the following three broad heads : (1) The theory of linguistic, syntactical, or semasiological origin of categories—which can be epitomized as linguism, syntacticalism, or semasiologism and which has it that some categories have been suggested by categories of language, syntax, or semasiology and that they are arbitrary linguistic proposals rather than constitutive or structural features of reality or experience. This is what may be called the stipulative conception of category. (2) The theory of intuitive origin of categories—which can be epitomized as rationalism and which has it that some categories might have been suggested by categories of thought or are mere projections of forms of thought and that they refer only to the world as structured by the mind (Kant) or to being as viewed from subjective concern (existentialism). This is what may be called the aprioristic conception of category. (3) The theory of empirical origin of categories—which can be epitomized as empiricism and which has it that some categories might have been abstracted from experience and that they are structures of experience or appearance. This is what may be called the phenomenological conception of category by the rationalist who distinguishes appearances from things-in-themselves and the onto-

logical conception of category by the empiricist who knows no such distinction.

It will be seen that none of the three theories can claim to cover all the categories or categoriologies in the field by itself. Some categories are covered by the first, some others by the second, and the rest by the third. For example, if some of the Aristotelian and Indian categories are of a linguistic origin, the whole of the Kantian categoriology is avowedly of a rationalistic character, and Mill's categories seem to have been abstracted from experience directly. The three theories, therefore, are by no means rival ones, in effect.

We have now to see which of the three theories applies to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categoriology. In our opinion, this categoriology is explained partly by the first and partly by the third theory. While studying the categoriology developed by the grammatical schools, we shall see the part played by grammar or language in the generation of categories and shall therefrom be able to judge the extent of the influence of language in shaping many of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣska categories. On the other hand, the classifications of substances, attributes, and motions can surely be held to have been derived from experience directly. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika table of categories of course includes such non-experiential entities as differential and inherence, but they cannot be said to belong to the domain of the second theory. They do not in fact instantiate or represent projections of forms of thought; they are simply inferred entities postulated just to fill gaps in experience. They are thus either inferred empirical entities or those suggested by linguistic considerations. More will be said on this point while dealing with the particular categories.

## 2. THE ORIGIN OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA CATEGORIOLOGY

**1) Introductory remarks** : The foregoing considerations are not meant to suggest that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categoriology is wholly an independent growth and does not

owe its origin, wholly or partly, to some older categoriology or categoriologies. The question of its being wholly or partly original or derivative has so far been a moot one and will be discussed now.

There are some who imagine that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categoriology has been shaped by such an older categoriology as that of the Jainas.[1] Some hold that it is the categoriologies evolved by the grammatical and medical schools which are at the root of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categoriology.[2] Some go to the length of proclaiming that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categoriology is nothing but a restatement of Aristotle's table of categories.[3] On the other hand, there are those who claim that the categoriologies of the Jainas, the grammarians, and the physicians have been shaped by, rather than have shaped, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categoriology. Greek influence on this categoriology is wholly denied by them.

We should like to touch upon the question of Greek influence and give a brief account of ancient categoriologies with a view to determining how far they have shaped, or been shaped by, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categoriology.

**2) The question of Greek influence** : It is sometimes said that Indians had no idea of universals before their contact with the Greeks. To us this is wholly an unacceptable proposition. While dealing with the evolution of the concept of universal, we hope to be able to show that it is fundamentally an indigenous growth. There is at any rate no categorical proof that *VS*, or the portion of it dealing with universals, came into being after the Greek influence had come into play in India.

**3) Verdict of the Mīmāṁsā tradition** : The *Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra* ascribed to Jaimini is undoubtedly a pretty old treatise. It is assignable to the pre-Christian era but in all

1. See *VPDS*, pp. 19-33, passim.
2. Lakṣmaṇa Śāstrī Jośī, *Vaidika Saṁskṛti kā Vikāsa*, p. 82.
3. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, *Darśana-Digdarśna*, pp. 582-583.

probability is posterior to *VS*, at any rate to its original nucleus. Now, *MS* postulates no categoriology whatever, but yet it uses the terms substance (dravya), attribute (guṇa), and motion (karman or kriyā) profusely, in their categorial acceptation. For example, the following Sūtra uses the word substance and attribute together : 'When substance and attribute serve the same purpose, they have the same function; and hence there should be restriction.'[1] In his comments upon this Sūtra, Śabara makes it clear that 'red' stands for attribute and 'animal' stands for substance.[2] Such Sūtra-s can be multiplied indefinitely.[3] Motion being a common category, it is found everywhere, and no example of it need be given here from *MS*.

But hardly any light is thrown by Jaimini's employment of these categories on the question of their genesis and evolution. He got these categories ready-made and used them the way he liked. Older Mīmāṁsakas never cared to evolve a categoriology of their own. Once Śabara uses substance, attribute, motion, and organ (avayava) together,[4] but he does not seem to be offering a table of categories.

**4) Verdict of the categoriology of the medical schools** : *CS*, the oldest medical treatise in India that has come down to us, posits a categoriology not only akin to but fundamentally identical with that posited in *VS*, and defines and, broadly speaking, subdivides them in the same old Vaiśeṣika manner. It also has its distinguisshing features, many of which seem to be dictated by the requirements of the medical science. Some later developments in it seem to have taken place quite independently of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categoriology, such as the peculiar subdivisions of the category universal referred to in *AD*.[5] We shall have occasion

---

1. अर्थैकत्वे द्रव्यगुणयोरैककर्म्यान् नियमः स्यात् । *MS* 3. *1*. 6. 12.

2. See *MBh*. 3. 1. 6. 12, pp. 673-698 passim.

3. Another good example is : द्रव्येषु गुणश्रुतिरुत्पत्तिसंयोगात् । *MS* 4. 2. 10. 25.

4. यथा द्रव्यं, गुणः, कर्मावयव इत्येवमादीनाम् । *MBh*. 10. 3. 11. 44, p. 1886.

5. See *AD* 1. 1. 45, pp. 19-21.

to refer to all this while dealing with the individual Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories.

But it cannot be seriously maintained tht *VS* borrows from *CS*. The consensus of opinion is that Caraka's date is 78 or 125 A. C., while *VS*, as shown by Dhruva and Dasgupta, belongs to the pre-Christian era. Even the date of Rohagupta, who is responsible for the importation of some Vaiśeṣika categories into Jainism in a more advanced form than those in *VS*, is 18 A. C. However, much store cannot be set by the consensus of opinion about Caraka's date, which has no better evidence to go upon than Sylvain Levi's finding that Caraka's name occurs in the Chinese *Tripiṭaka* as the spiritual guide to the Indo-Scythian king Kaniṣka. The Parthian invader Mittradates ( 171-136 B. C. ) who invaded and annexed the kingdon of Taxila is reputed to have had a certain Crateuas as his court physician who developed materia medica and was known as an author of important works. If one is to go by name alone, Crateuas may be taken to be an outlandish form given to 'Caraka'.[1] Be it as it may, these chronological considerations are of little help to us in view of the fact that *CS* has suffered refashioning after refashioning and that, therefore, the authenticity of the text cannot be taken for granted.[2]

There is one more circumstance vindicating our stand. It is difficult to see how ontology can originate in medical schools. It might have been possible for the ancient physicians to build up their own chemistry and biology. But how on earth could they have happened to invent such concepts as universal, differential, and inherence ?[3] It is by all means more logical to suppose that it is *CS* which borrows from *CS* rather than the other way round.

---

1. For a discussion of the topic see *Caraka-Saṁhitā* ( Jamanagar : Shree Gulabkunverba Ayurvedic Society, 1949 ), Vol. I, pp. 89-95.
2. Cp. *ILA*, p. 13.
3. For the same reason, we find it difficult to give credence to Dasgupta's suggestion ( *HIP*, II, pp. 392-402 ) that in India dialectic and logic originated in the medical schools.

Internal evidence will leave no doubt that *CS* as it exists today is posterior to *VS* and has fully drawn upon it or the now extinct literature grown round it for much of its categoriology.

*CS* fully shares the table of six categories, along with the terminology and definitions, postulated by *VS*.[1] With the latter, the former also shares the table of nine sub-categories of the first category, substance.[2]

The table of sub-categories of the second category, attribute, postulated by *CS*, is larger than the one postulated by *VS*. Caraka's attributes are 41 in number as against 17 of *VS* and 24 of *PDS*. They are : the five sensible qualities,[3] those beginning with heaviness ( gurvādayaḥ ), intelligence ( buddhi ), those ending with effort (prayatnāntāḥ), and those beginning with remoteness ( parādayaḥ ).[4] Cakrapāṇi suggests that by the attributes beginning with heaviness is meant the twenty attributes listed by Caraka in the sequel.[5]

---

1. The six categories are enumerated in the following verses :
महर्षयस् ते ददृशुर् यथावज् ज्ञानचक्षुषा—
सामान्यं च, विशेषं च, गुणान्, द्रव्याणि, कर्म च,
समवायं च । तज् ज्ञात्वा तंत्रोक्तं विधिमास्थिता:
लेभिरे परमं शर्म जीवितं चाप्यनित्वरम् ॥ *CS* 1. 1. 28-29.
Their definitions are :
यत्राश्रिता: कर्मगुणा: कारणं समवायि यत्
तद् द्रव्यम् ; समवायी तु निश्चेष्ट: कारणं गुण: ॥
संयोगे च विभागे च कारणे द्रव्यमाश्रितम् ।
कर्त्तव्यस्य क्रिया कर्म, कर्म नान्यदपेक्षते ॥
सर्वदा सर्वभावानां सामान्यं वृद्धिकारणम्
ह्रासहेतुर् विशेषश् च, प्रवृत्तिरुभयस्य तु ॥
सामान्यमेकत्वकरं, विशेषस् तु पृथक्त्वकृत् ।
तुल्यार्थता हि सामान्यं, विशेषस् तु विपर्यय: ॥
समवायोऽपृथग्भावो भूम्यादीनां गुणैर् मत: ।
स नित्यो; यत्र हि द्रव्यं न तत्रानियतो गुण: ॥ *Ibid.* 1. 1. 51-52, 49, 44, 45, 50.

2. खादीन्यात्मा, मन:, कालो, दिशश् च द्रव्यसंग्रह: । *Ibid* 1. 1. 48.

3. The word used is 'arthāḥ' : अर्था: शब्ददादयो ज्ञेया गोचरा विषया गुणा: । *Ibid* 4. 1. 31.

4. सार्था गुर्वादयो बुद्धि: प्रयत्नान्ता: परादय: गुणा: प्रोक्ता: । *Ibid.* 1. 1. 49.

5. See *AD* 1. 1. 49, p. 24; *CS* 1. 25. 36. The attributes are : स [ आहारो ]... विंशतिगुणो गुरुलघुशीतोष्णस्निग्धरूक्षमन्दतीक्ष्णस्थिरसरमृदुकठिनविशदपिच्छलश्लक्ष्ण-खरसूक्ष्मस्थूलसान्द्रद्रवानुगमात्...।

However, these belong not to substance in general but only to food and drink. According to Cakrapāṇi, by the attributes ending with effort Caraka means desire ( icchā ), aversion ( dveṣa ), pleasure ( sukha ), pain ( duḥkha ), and effort ( prayatna ) out of the list of ten attributes of the soul, which are : the five just enumerated, awareness ( cetanā ), patience ( dhṛti ), intelligence ( buddhi ), memory ( smṛti ), and ego ( ahaṅkāra ).[1] Cakrapāṇi contends that the attribute intelligence represents all the last five attributes of the soul.[2] Further, Cakrapāṇi tells us that by the attributes beginning with remoteness is meant the list of ten attributes enumerated by Caraka as conducive to success in medical science.[3]

Cakrapāṇi classifies the list of attributes into specific ( vaiśeṣika ) attributes, generic ( sāmānya ) attributes, and spiritual attributes (ātma-guṇa-s). The five sensible attributes are specific attributes, belonging each to one of the five elements. The group of twenty attributes beginning with heaviness and ten attributes beginning with remoteness are called generic attributes, belonging each to many substances. Intelligence and the five attributes ending with effort are called spiritual attributes as they all belong to the soul.[4]

It will be seen that *CS* took its present form at a time when Kaṇāda's list of 17 attributes was undergoing expansion, and heaviness, liquidity ( dravatva ), oiliness ( sneha ), elasticity (saṁskāra), merit (dharma), and demerit (adharma) had been included in the list. Incidentally, this also shows that it is not Praśastapāda who was the first to recognize these as attributes. There seem to have been certain works earlier than his which so recognized them.

---

1. इच्छा, द्वेषः, सुखं, दुःखं, प्रयत्नः चेतना, धृतिः,
   बुद्धिः, स्मृतिरहङ्कारो लिङ्गानि परमात्मनः ॥ *CS* 4. 1. 72.
2. See *AD* 1. 1. 49, p. 24.
3. परापरत्वे, युक्तिश् च, संख्या, संयोग एव च,
   विभागश् च, पृथक्त्वं च, परिमाणमथापि च,
   संस्कारोऽभ्यास इत्येते गुणा ज्ञेयाः परादयः।
   सिद्ध्युपायाश् चिकित्साया लक्षणैस् तान् प्रचक्ष्महे ॥ *CS* 1. 26. 29-30.
4. See *AD* 1. 1. 49, pp. 23-24.

In this connexion it must be noted that, though Caraka has used Vaiśeṣika terms for his attributes, he has sought to give them therapeutic connotation, presumably with a view to assimilating them to the medical tradition.

*CS* postulates a list of five motions (karman-s),[1] which are: emesis ( vamana ), purgation ( virecana ), corrective enemata ( āsthāpana or nirūhabasti ), anima ( anuvāsana-basti ), and head-purging ( śīrṣa-virecana )[2]. This is nothing but a classification of therapeutic actions of drugs or physicians. Motion of things ( ceṣṭā ) is divided into expansion, extension, or abduction ( prasāraṇa ), flexion, adduction, or contraction ( ākuñcana ), bending ( vinamana ), rising ( unnamana ), and slanting or horizontal movement (tiryaggamana).[3] An alternative division of motion is general movement (gati), expansion ( prasāraṇa ), upward motion ( utkṣepana ), shutting of the eye ( nimeṣa ), and opening of the eye ( unmeṣa ).[4] While the second list considerably conforms to the Vaiśeṣika list of five motions, the former list is wholly a speciality of the medical science.

Caraka has also altered the conception of universal and differential so that they have become a speciality of the science of medicine. The distinction between the Vaiśeṣika and *CS* concepts of these categories is clearly brought out by Dasgupta.[5] There is of course nothing new in *CS* about inherence.

**5) Verdict of the Jaina categoriology** : Jaina Sūtra-s usually posit two categories : substance ( dravya ) and acci-

---

1. कर्म पञ्चविधमुक्तं वमनादि । *CS* 1. 26. 11.
2. See *Ibid.* 1. 2. 5-16.
3. 'पञ्चधा चेष्टयत्यपि' इति प्रसाराणाकुञ्चनविनमनोन्नमनतिर्यग्गमनानि 'पञ्चचेष्टाः' । *Nibandha-Saṅgraha* on the *Suśruta-Saṁhitā*, Nidāna-Sthāna 1. 18, p. 460.
4. अन्ये तु गतिप्रसारणोत्क्षेपणनिमेषोन्मेषैः पञ्चभिः प्रकारैः पञ्चधेति व्याख्यानयन्ति । *Loc. cit.*
5. See *HIP*, II, p. 371.

dent ( paryāya ).[1] Rarely in the Sūtra-s[2] but regularly in comparatively modern works, the category attribute ( guṇa ) is found added to the list,[3] in which case 'paryāya' would translale as 'mode', to follow Spinoza.[4] To Jacobi, 'this seems to be a later innovation due to the influence which the philosophy and terminology of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika gradually gained over the scientific thoughts of the Hindus.'[5] For, he argues[6]—and Ui agrees,[7] though the latter keeps silent about the former's afore-quoted view—attributes are included in accidents and hence cannot claim the status of an independent category. Thus, according to him, Jainism owes its category attribute to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categoriology. He is generally of the opinion, however, that 'between Vaiśeṣika and Jainism no such connexion existed as could be proved by borrowings of the one system from the other....'[8]

Notwithstanding Bhandarkar who claims a late origin for Jainism for the ideas held by it in common with the Vaiśeṣika system,[9] this much is fairly certain that the Jaina

1. Umāsvāti defines पर्याय as भावान्तरं सञ्ज्ञान्तरं च पर्याय: in explanation of his Sūtra गुणपर्यायवद् द्रव्यम् , *Tattvārthādhigma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya* 5. 37, p. 136.
2. See for example :
   एवं पंचविहं नाणं । दव्वाण य गुणाण य,
   पज्जुवाणं च सव्वेसि नाणं नाणी हि देसियं ॥ *US* 28.5, p 712.
   True to the ancient Jaina tradition in general, Śīlāṅka repudiates attribute as an independent category in his comments on the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 1. 12, p. 482 ( referred to in *SBE*, XLV, p. 153, f. n. )
3. For a succinct historical review of the matter see Sukhalāla Saṅghavī's notes in Hindi ( Bhāṣātippaṇāni ) appended to *Pramāṇa-Mīmāṁsā*, p. 56. Also see *Sanmatiprakaraṇa-Ṭīkā*, p. 631, f. n. 4.
4. Spinoza ( 1632-1677 ) speaks of substance ( substantia ), attribute ( attributum ), and mode ( modus ) or modification ( affectiones ), defining mode as follows : 'By mode ( modus ) I understand the Modification ( affectiones ) of a substance or that which is in something else through which it may be conceived.' Spinoze, *Ethics*, I, Definitions III-V.
5. *SBE*, XLV, p. xxxiv.
6. *Loc. cit.*
7. See *VPDS*, p. 29.
8. *SBE*, XLV, p. xxxvii.
9. See his Report for 1883-84, p. 101 f., quoted in *SBE*, XLV, p. xxxv.

categoriology is older than the Vaiśeṣika categoriology. There is no doubt that, as compared with the Vaiśeṣika, the Jaina table of categories lacks system. It often confuses substances and qualities with each other. Its treatment of merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) as substances with which the soul comes into contact, in contradistinction to the Vaiśeṣikas who treat them as attributes, is a case in point. Says Ui, 'The most important distinction between the Vaiśeṣika on the one hand and Jainism, together with the other schools of the time, on the other is that the former strictly distinguishes substance itself from its quality and quantity, while the latter confuses them with each other.'[1]

There appears to be much force in Ui's view that *VS* cannot be very much older than the time of Rohagupta, the chief teacher in the sixth schism of Jainism (Trairāśika-matam) which took place in 644 A. V. or 18 A. C.; otherwise the Jainas could not have connected him with the origination of the Vaiśeṣika system.[2] Again, as we shall be showing in the sequel, *VS* in its present redaction is later than *PVM*.

There can, therefore, be no doubt that the Jaina categoriology is anterior to the Vaiśeṣika one.

On this ground Ui contends that the Vaiśeṣika categories of substance, attribute, and possibly motion were originally developed out of the Jaina categories.[3] Indeed, he makes out a strong case for tracing the origin of the entire Vaiśeṣika system to the heterodoxies of the times of the Buddha and Mahāvīra.[4]

---

1. *VPDS*, p. 26. For a further treatment of the issue, reference is invited to *SBE*,XLV, Introduction ( by Jacobi ), pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.

2. *VPDS*, p. 38. Keith doubts the antiquity of the reference to the Vaiśeṣika categories in the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-Sūtra*. See *ILA*, p. 14. For the legend of Rohagupta, see the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-Sūtra and Bhāṣya*, verses 2451-2509, pp. 981-1002.

3. *VPDS*, p. 29.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-33.

As against Bhandarkar's and Jacobi's, there is apparently much force in Ui's view. It is difficult to see how Jainism and the Vaiśeṣika system could have afforded to remain uninfluenced by each other, especially when, as shown by Jacobi himself, they are related to each other by a kind of affinity of ideas.[1] And since Jainism is an older system, there is no reason why it should not have been utilized by the founders of the Vaiśeṣika system.

But, then, Ui's view cannot be accepted without an important reservation. He seems to believe that the Vaiśeṣika categories of substance, attribute, and motion were derived from the categories of Jainism directly. This view cannot be accepted in its entirety. Almost co-eval with Jainism and the Vaiśeṣika system there is the philosophy of the grammatical schools, the question of whose contribution to the birth of the Vaiśeṣika categoriology has been entirely left out of account by Ui. Unless it is proved that the categoriology postulated by the grammatical schools has had no bearing on the systematization of the Vaiśeṣika categories, it cannot be seriously maintained that the latter has evolved directly out of Jaina categories. And we shall presently see that the grammarians' categoriology marks an earlier stage than the Vaiśeṣika, and does have something to do with it.

Before taking up the categoriology of the grammatical schools, however, it would be pertinent to point out that, if at all, the origin of only three categories—viz. substance, attribute, and motion—is traceable to Jainism. As for the remaining three categories, they were, far from traceable to Jainism, imported into Jainism by Rohagupta.

**6) Verdict of the categoriology of grammar :** 'Padārtha', the Sanskrit equivalent for the word 'category', seems to have been first used in, and to owe its very existence to, grammatical or linguistic circles. It is compounded of two words : 'pada' and 'artha'. We take the first word

1. See *SBE*, XLV, p. xxxvii.

first, the information concerning which will operate as a background for our study of the categoriology of grammar.

A word (śabda)[1] is either meaningless (nirarthaka) or meaningful (sārthaka)[2]. A meaningful word is either a stem (prakṛti), or a suffix (pratyaya), or a modification (vikṛti), or a part of speech (pada).[3] A stem is either a raw name (prātipadika) or a root (dhātu).[4] Sometimes, there is said to be a third kind of stem called (raw) nickname (lākṣaṇika); for example, the patronymic 'Dākṣi' (son of Dakṣa) without a

1. 'Śabda' is wider than 'word' in that it denotes sound also.

2. See the words prefaced to *SSP* 6, p. 2.

3. Part of speech is stem coalesced into, modified, and turned into a finished form by suffix. Cp. सुप्तिङन्तंपदम् ( *PA* 1. 4. 14 ); विभक्त्यन्तं पदम् (Āpiśali's definition, see Yūdhiṣṭhira Mīmāṁsaka, *Sanskrt Vyākaraṇa-Śāstra kā Itihāsa*, Vol. I, p. 98); ते विभक्त्यन्ताः पदम् (*NS* 2.2.58). Stem and suffix are constituents, components, or part of speech. Such decomposition is not always possible, however, in the case of the underivable raw names generally coming under the uṇādi class. Cp. उणादयोऽव्युत्पन्नानि प्रातिपदिकानि ( *PVM* 7. 1. 2. 5, Vol. I, p. 146 ) and Yāska's classification of words into words of which both accents and formative elements are popularly known ( samarthasvarasaṁskāra ) and words of which these elments are not directly comprehensible (asamarthasvarasasṁskāra). ( *Nirukta*, 2. 1. 1 ) See Prabhat Chandra Chakarvarti, *The Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar*, pp. 138-139.

There is a confusion as regards the concept of pada, as pointed out by S.P. Chaturvedi in his paper entitled 'Technical Terms of the Aṣṭādhyāyī', *Proceedings and Transactions of the Ninth All-India Oriental Conference*, Trivendrum, December 1937, pp. 1191-1198 ( relevant pages are 1196-97 ). It is briefly summarized as follows : Sometimes, the mere stems of certain declensional case-endings, viz.—those covered by *PA* 1. 4. 7 —as well as the finished forms with the declensional endings affixed, e. g. the word 'haribhiḥ' as well as the mere stem 'hari' therein, are also called pada. Similarly, a stem before certain secondary suffixes ( taddhita-pratyaya-s ) and n-ending stems before certain name-root suffixes ( nāmadhātu-pratyaya-s ) are designated as pada. The stem 'rājan' in the form 'rājatvam' is a pada. Hence 'n' is dropped *PA* 8. 2. 7). Similarly, 'n' is dropped in the form 'rājīyati'.

To use the term 'pada' of both stem and the finished form is decidedly confusing.

4. See *SSP* 13, p. 68; *PRM*, p. 18.

declensional case-ending (vibhakti) suffix.[1] Stems and suffixes are not usable (prayogārha) by themselves to convy any meaning beyond themselves as mere words.[2] They are no parts of speech. For being usable, the stem and the suffix must combine into a part of speech.

The division of a part of speech or rather a meaningful word into stem and suffix is virtually an analysis of it. That is to say, stem and suffix are the constituents or components of a word, rather than varieties thereof, which will be stated presently. The division of a word into stem, suffix, and particle (nipāta), however, advocated by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra,[3] is neither a classification of parts of speech nor a division of a word into its constituents or components. It is, as it were, a hotch-potch of the two.

Parts of speech are generally held to be of four kinds: name (nāman),[4] verb (ākhyāta), prefix (upasarga), and particle (nipāta).[5] Some group the last two together and thus have only three parts of speech, while others add gati or/and preposition (karamapravacanīya) to the list to make

---

1. In his commentary on *SSP* 13, Kṛṣṇakānta observes : पाणिनिप्रभृतिभिः प्रतिकृस् त्रिविधा—लाक्षणिक-प्रातिपदिक-धातुभेदाद्—इत्युच्यते । *KKT*, p. 68.
2. अर्थवत्ता नोपपद्यते केवलेनावचनात् । *KV* 1. 2. 45. 7; न वा प्रत्ययेन नित्यसम्बन्धात् केवलस्याप्रयोगः । *Ibid*. 1.2.45. 8; सिद्धं तु अन्वव्यातिरेकाभ्याम् । 1. 2. *Ibid*. 45. 9; न केवलेन वृक्षशब्देनार्थो गम्यते । किं तर्हि ? सप्रत्ययकेन । *PVM* 1.2.45.7, II, p.47; नित्यसम्बन्धावेतावर्थौ—प्रकृतिः प्रत्यय इति । प्रत्ययेन नित्यसम्बन्धात् केवलस्य प्रयोगो न भविष्यति । *Ibid*. 1. 2. 64. 3, II, p. 74; न केवला प्रकृतिः प्रयोक्तव्या न च केवलः प्रत्यय इति । न केवलेन प्रत्ययेनार्थो गम्यते । केन तर्हि ? सप्रकृतिकेनेति । *Ibid*. 5. 1. 22, IV, p. 260.
3. शब्दान्तरमपेक्ष्यैव सार्थकः शब्दबोधकृत् ।
   प्रकृतिः, प्रत्ययश् चैव, निपातश् चेति स त्रिधा ॥
   *SSP* 6. He has it that prefix is either a meaningless word or, if meaningful, subsumable under particle. See प्रादयस् तूपसर्गा न सार्थकाः; सार्थकाश् चेन्, निपाता एव । *Ibid*. under st. 11, p. 56.
4. Name includes pronoun ( sarvanāman ) and adjective ( viśeṣaṇa ).
5. *Nirukta* 1.1.1, p. 5. This classification also occurs in the *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya* 12.8. See Prabhatchandra Chakravarti, *The Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus*, p. 167.

five/six parts of speech.[1] Pāṇini groups prefix and particle under name and thereby has only two parts of speech.[2]

From 'pada' we come to 'artha', which together with the former constitutes 'padārtha'. The English equivalent for 'artha' is 'meaning'. Meaning is broadly of two kinds: sense and reference. When we utter the word cow, for example, we generally mean either the entity cow to which the word refers or merely the knowledge of the cow. We also sometimes mean the word 'cow' itself.[3] But this meaning is of the nature of reference and does not constitute a third kind of meaning.

Now, from the point of view of reference, Patañjali classifies parts of speech into words signifying substance or individual (dravya or yadṛcchā), attribute (guṇa), motion (kriyā), and class (jāti).[4] Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, commenting upon

---

1. See *Nirukta-Vṛtti* 1. 1. 1, p. 10.
2. The definition of parts of speech as 'words having name and verb-suffixes' or as words declensional and conjugational (सुप्तिङन्तं पदम् , *PA* 1. 4. 14 ) does not mean that not all the four but only names and verbs are parts of speech. It is, as pointed out by Vātsyāyana ( शिष्यते च खलु नामिक्या विभक्तेरव्ययाल् लोपः तयोः पदसंज्ञार्थमिति, *NBh.* 2.2.58, p 152 ), just to make the word pada applicable to the two remaining parts of speech that Pāṇini has ruled ( अव्ययादाप् सुपः, *PA* 2. 4. 82 ) that they drop their name-suffixes. That is to say, prefixes and particles are included in names in Pāṇini's definition of pada. Cp. उपसर्गनिपाता नाम्ना संगृहीताः । *NV* 2.2.60 ( Sūtra 58 of *NBh.* edition ); उपसर्ग-निपात-कर्मप्रवचनीयानामपि नामान्तर्भाव-माचक्षते । *NM*, I, p. 271.
3. Cp. *YS* 1. 42 ( शब्दार्थ-ज्ञान-विकल्पैः ); *YBh.* 1.42, p. 109; 3. 17, pp. 328-329 ( गौरिति शब्दो, गौरित्यर्थो, गौरिति ज्ञानम्... ); 3.17 (शब्दार्थप्रत्ययानाम्) and *YBh.* thereunder ( शब्दार्थप्रत्ययानां प्रविभागः, p. 330; अन्यथा शब्दो, ऽन्यथाऽर्थो,ऽन्यथा प्रत्यय इति विभागः, p. 331); *Vyomavatī*, p. 118 (अस्ति चायमस्तिशब्दो ज्ञाने तद्विषये, ऽभिधाने चेति ); *NM*, II, p. 100 (वस्तुतस् तु विविक्ता एवैते शब्दज्ञानार्थाः), Frege ( 1818-1925 ), a German mathematician and logician, makes a similar distinction.
4. चतुष्टयी शब्दानां प्रवृत्तिः--जातिशब्दा,गुणशब्दाः,क्रियाशब्दा, यदृच्छाशब्दाश् चतुर्थाः । *PVM*, Śiva- Sūtra 2, Vārtika 1, Vol. I, p. 49. The four significations of words are comparable to the five Aristotelian predicables, as modified by Porphyry, which are: species—Aristotle had 'definition'—genus, differentia, proprium, and accident.

the classification, observes that it is based on the distinction in regard to things signified by words.[1] These, however, by no means correspond to the fourfold division of parts of speech mentioned above. In a way, they are primarily the meanings of the first two parts of speech, name and verb.

Later, Patañjali limits the classification of parts of speech to three only, excluding the words signifying individuals.[2]

Among the meaningful words, names, verbs, and stems are treated as denotative (vācaka) by all theorists in India. There is a keen controversy in regard to the rest. According to some, they are denotative; according to others, they are merely indicative (dyotaka).[3] What they denote or indicate can, however, be fitted into the fourfold scheme of categories.

One comes across many other categorial concepts in the grammatical literature besides the four mentioned above. We cannot afford to go into the details and ramifications of all these categories, which are very confusing indeed and defy systematization. Laudable as our grammarians' wisdom in relating grammar to ontology is, it is unfortunate that no serious attempt has been made by them to work the significations of words into a well-knit system of categories.

We see that the scheme of categories propounded in *PVM* has much in common with the one propounded in *VS*. It cannot be said that the former borrows from the latter. In our opinion the borrowing has been the other way round. Our reasons are the following :

Firstly, it is generally agreed that Patañjali, the author of *PVM*, was a contemporary of Puṣyamitra and hence

---

1. शब्दानामर्थे या प्रवृत्ति: सा प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदात् प्रकारचतुष्टयवतीत्यर्थः । *MPU*, Śiva Sūtra 2, Vārtika 1, Vol. I, p. 49.

2. त्रयी च शब्दानां प्रवृत्तिर्—जातिशब्दा, गुणशब्दा:, क्रियाशब्दा इति। न सन्ति यदृच्छाशब्दा: । *PVM*, Śiva-Sūtra 2, Vārtika 2, Vol. I, p. 51.

3. See, Prabhat Chandra Chakravarti, *The Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar*, p. 44.

belongs to the second century B. C.[1] On the other hand, we have seen that *VS*, or rather the Vaiśeṣika scheme of six categories, assumed its final shape about a century later.

Secondly, the scheme of categories propouded in *VS* is much more elaborate than the one propounded in *PVM*. The former decidedly marks an advanced stage as compared with the latter. In the first place, *PVM* has no idea of such categories, propounded in *VS*, as differential and inherence. In the second place, as will be shown in the sequel, it has no knowledge of the universal as conceived by the Naiyāyika. It will be shown there that even its fourth category jāti or even the concept ākṛti cannot be identified with the category sāmānya in its final acceptation, and that the latter category owes its birth to the two former categorial concepts. In the third place, the categories propounded in *PVM* are not so well-defined as the ones propounded in *VS*, which, therefore, mark a later stage. For instance, it does not enumerate attributes in a consistent or co-ordinated manner. Its term 'dravya' is not always used in the sense of substance, as is the case with *VS*. All this we are to discuss in the sequel.

From the foregoing considerations, it becomes pretty clear that the scheme of categories propounded in *PVM* is older than the one propounded in *VS* in its final form. From this circumstance, we can safely presume that the former has had much to do with the latter's origin, even though there is no direct evidence to go upon.

---

1. In fact, the possibility of Patañjali's date being pushed further back is by no means ruled out. We learn on good authority that *PVM* was lost and recovered more than once. It was recovered last by Candra. There is every possibility of the text having undergone some reconstruction and revision in the process. See *Vākyapadīya* 2. 489; *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 1. 176; 4. 481-489.

CHAPTER VI

# THE ORIGINAL SYSTEMATIZATION OF CATEGORIES

## 1. ORIGINATION OF THE FIRST TABLE OF THREE CATEGORIES

**1) Substance, attribute, and motion the original categories :** The fourth Sūtra of *VS* (BI/KSS) gives a table of six categories : substance (dravya), attribute (guṇa), motion (karman), universal (sāmānya), differential (viśeṣa), and inherence (samavāya).[1] The list never recurs in the whole body of the text.

But this does not seem to have been the case from the very beginning. We have reason to believe that *VS* has undergone at least three redactions. The original core of the work seems to have propounded a table of only three categories : substance, attribute, and motion. Its second redaction was, in all probability, marked by the addition of existence (sattā or bhāva) to the list of the categories. And the extant text, which constitutes the third redaction, posits universal-particular (sāmānya-viśeṣa) or universal excluding existence as a fifth, differential as a sixth, and inherence as a seventh category. Later writers have usually bracketed existence with universal and thereby obtained six categories.

So, to us the Vaiśeṣika system seems to have begun by postulating only three categories.

**2) Evidence :** There is much internal, even though collateral, evidence for the view that at first *VS* recognized only substance, attribute, and motion as categories. Before we go into it, however, we would do well to examine whether

---

1. धर्मविशेषप्रसूताद् द्रव्य-गुण-कर्म-सामान्य-विशेष-समवायानां पदार्थानां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां तत्त्वज्ञानान् निःश्रेयसम् । *VS* 1. 1. 4 ( BI/KSS ).

or not the Sūtra containing the list of six categories is authentic, for it militates against our view that the extant text of *VS* propounds seven categories, as a matter of fact.

Faddegon and Bodas agree with each other in doubting the authenticity of the Sūtra listing the six categories together. Faddegon holds that it existed in the present form in the time of Praśastapāda. According to him, its original form was something like this : द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मणां पदार्थानां सामान्य-विशेषाभ्यां तत्त्वज्ञानान् निःश्रेयसम् ॥ Bodas treats the Sūtra as a later interpolation on the following grounds. Firstly, unlike other Sūtras, it is inordi nately long and involved and contains distinct propositions that would have sufficed for half a dozen Sūtras. Secondly, it is very awkwardly worded if not positively ungrammatical. Thirdly, it seems to be an adaptation of Praśastapāda's opening passage.[2]

The third ground needs elucidation. Praśastapāda's passage runs thus : द्रव्य-गुण-कर्म-सामान्य-विशेष-समवायानां षण्णां पदार्थानां साधर्म्य-वैधर्म्य-तत्त्वज्ञानं निःश्रेयसहेतुः । तच्च ेश्वरचोदनमित्युक्ताद् ( चोदनाभिव्यक्ताद् ) धर्मादेव,[3] Udayana observes[4] that this passage explains only the first three Sūtras of *VS*, which implies that the fourth Sūtra listing the six categories was unknown to Praśastapāda as well as Udayana. Śrīdhara also shows ignorance of either a part or the whole of this Sūtra. According to him the last sentence of Praśastapāda's passage, viz. तच्च ेश्वरचोदनमित्युक्तात् (or चोदनाभिव्यक्तात् ) is added just to remove the inconsistency between the preceding sentence and the second Sūtra of *VS* : यतोऽभ्युदयनिःश्रेयससिद्धिः स धर्मः[5]. According to Praśastapāda, know-

---

1. See *VSF*, p. 107.
2. Bodas, pp. XXXVII-XXXVIII.
3. *PDS*, pp.20 H and I.
4. एतेन 'अथातो धर्मं व्याख्यास्यामः । यतो ऽभ्युदयनिःश्रेयससिद्धिः स धर्मः । तद्वचनादाम्नायसिद्धेः प्रामाण्यम् ।' इति त्रिसूत्री व्याख्याता । *Kiraṇāvalī*, pp. 78-79.
5. ननु यदि तत्त्वज्ञानं निःश्रेयसहेतुः, तर्हि धर्मो न कारणं, ततः सूत्रविरोधः, 'यतो ऽभ्युदयनिःश्रेयससिद्धिः स धर्मः' इति ? तत आह—तच्च ेश्वरचोदनाभिव्यक्ताद् धर्मादेव भवति, द्रव्यादितत्त्वज्ञानं तस्य कारणत्वेन निःश्रेयससाधनमित्यभिप्रायः । *NK*, p. 7.

ledge of the categories, while according to this Sūtra merit (dharma), is the means to the summum bonum. This inconsistency has been sought to be removed in *PDS* by adding that knowledge of the categories itself is the result of merit. So, according to Śrīdhara, this addition is an innovation of Praśastapāda, and yet it is already summed up in the opening words of the fourth Sūtra, धर्मविशेषप्रसूतात्. If these words had been present before Śrīdhara, he would not have raised the question of inconsistency. Hence, either these words or the whole of the Sūtra is a post-Śrīdhara addition.[1]

Faddegon expresses his disagreement with Bodas where the latter suggests that the fourth S tra listing the six categories is post-Udayana. In Faddegon's opinion, Udayana intends only to say that Praśastapāda's passage, तच् चेश्वरचोदनमित्युक्ताद् धर्मादेव, refers to the first three Sūtras of *VS*, but he does not mean to comment on this passage and the preceding passage together.[2] There is much force in Faddegon's contention. After stating that this explains the group of three Sūtras, Udayana resumes the explanation of one of the Sūtras in the triad, which confirms Faddegon's belief that it is only in respect of तच् चेश्वरचोदनमित्युक्ताद् धर्मादेव that the group of the three Sūtras has been held to have been explained.

But the testimony of Śrīdhara, detailed above, remains unchallenged. As a matter of fact, when Udayana and Śrīdhara are considered together, there will hardly be any scope for disagreement with the explanation of Udayana's position given above. Udayana's contention admits of both the interpretations. But the moment it is realized that even Śrīdhara did not know of the fourth Sūtra of *VS*, at any rate as it stands today, Bodas's interpretation of Udayana will sound quite plausible.

It is significant that MRI and GOS editions of the text of *VS*, which represent a much more authentic version of the Sūtras than the BI/KSS edition,

---

1. Bodas, p. XXXVIII.
2. *VSF*, p. 107.

exclude this Sūtra altogether. This should settle the matter once for all.

So, the only Sūtra in *VS*, which lists the six categories together, has been proved to be a spurious one beyond all doubt. We have now to ransack the text of the treatise to find out any possible clues to the table of categories propounded in the original core of the work.

Firstly, we find that *VS* does not mention any common characteristics of the six categories as it does of the first three categories. Kaṇāda has taken care to collect half a dozen common characteristics of the three categories[1], while he is silent as to the common features of the six categories. Praśastapāda was an uncompromising upholder of the table of six categories and he saw to it that their common features were duly stated, as we have already seen.

Secondly, unlike the other three categories, the first three categories are said to be forming a class by themselves. Indeed, they are deisgnated as entity, 'artha',[2] presumably implying thereby that the remaining categories—universal, differential, and inherence—are non-entities, are no objective realities.

Thirdly, a stronger point in favour of our thesis is that in *VS* darkness (tamas) has been sought to be proved to be of the nature of non-being (abhāva) by arguing that it is produced in a different manner from substance, attribute, and motion. 'Darkness is but non-being, for it is different from substance, attribute, and motion'[3], runs the Sūtra. It seems that, had the author treated universal, differential, and inherence as separate categories, he must have been tempted, before subsuming it under non-being, to consider if darkness could be subsumed under any of these.

Fourthly, the strongest point in favour of our thesis, however, is that in *VS* only substance, attribute, and motion

---

1. See *VS* 1.1.7.
2. अर्थ इति द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मसु । *Ibid.* 8. 14.
3. द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मवैधर्म्याद् भावाभावमात्रं तमः । *Ibid.* 5. 2. 21.

find mention as objects of Yogic perception.[1] The omission of the other three categories in this context cannot be treated as but accidental, more so when, as we shall see in due course, these have much more to do with Yogic perception than the first three categories.

Besides, considerable significance attaches to the following facts, when viewed in this perspective. The treatise contains a detailed analysis of the mutual similarities and dissimilarities of substance, attribute, and motion, to the exclusion of the remaining three categories. Its reticence as to the latter set of categories in this context cannot be without significance for our thesis, especially when, as claimed in the treatise itself, it is the true knowledge of similarities and dissimilarities of categories which is the means of attaining the summum bonum and, as is agreed on all hands, constitutes the principal theme of the treatise.

Over and above the foregoing considerations, some light can be had on the issue from a relatively unsuspected quarter. There is a passing reference in the *Mahābhārata* to the three categories in question together to the utter exclusion of the remaining three categories of universal etc. There it is stated that the hermitage of Kaṇva, the foster father of Śakuntalā, echoed with the speeches, inter alia, of the scholars of substance, motion, and attribute.[2] The non-reference to universal etc. in this connexion can well be construed to imply that these were not known then to be Vaiśeṣika categories. There is in this connexion even other valuable evidence to go upon, which will be adduced while dealing with the remaining categories treated of in *VS*.

---

1. It would be worth while to quote the whole section of Yogic perception found in the treatise : आत्मन्यात्ममनसोः संयोगविशेषादात्मप्रत्यक्षम् । तथा द्रव्यान्तरेषु । आत्मेन्द्रियमनोऽर्थसन्निकर्षाच् च । तत्समवायात् कर्मगुणेषु, आत्मसमवायादात्मगुणेषु । *Ibid.* 9. 13-17 .

2. द्रव्य-कर्म-गुणज्ञैश् च, कार्यकारणवेदिभिः,
पक्षिवानररुतज्ञश् च, व्यासग्रन्थसमाश्रितैः ।। *Mahābhārata*, Ādi-Parvan 70.45.

These facts yield a strong presumption in favour of the thesis that the original Vaiśeṣika table of categories comprised only three categories—substance, attribute, and motion—or, at any rate, that it is these that formed the nucleus of the original Vaiśeṣika categoriology.

## 2. A STATEMENT OF THE THREE CATEGORIES

**1) Definition** : Now, let us give a brief statement of the three original categories as treated of in *VS*.

Substance has nine subdivisions : earth (pṛthivī), water (āpas), fire (tejas), air (vāyu), physical space (ākāśa), time (kāla), mathematical space (dik), soul (ātman), and monad (manas).[1] Attribute has seventeen subdivisions : colour (rūpa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha), touch (sparśa), number (saṅkhyā), magnitude (parimāṇa), difference (pṛthaktva), conjunction (saṁyoga), disjunction (vibhāga), remoteness (paratva), proximity (aparatva), knowledge (buddhi), pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha), desire (icchā), aversion (dveṣa), and volitional effort (prayatna).[2] Motion has five subdivisions : throwing-up (utkṣepaṇa), throwing-down (avakṣepaṇa), contraction (ākuñcana), expansion (prasāraṇa), and locomotion (gamana).[3]

It must be remarked that the Vaiśeṣika classification of substances marks the digression of the Vaiśeṣika from philosophy to physics and cosmogony. This work not being concerned with the Vaiśeṣika physics and cosmogony, we shall refrain from discussing the types of substances enumerated above. It will also not be possible for us to deal with the subdivisions of attribute and motion in the limited space at our disposal. Certainly, as pointed out in the introductory

---

1. पृथिवी, आपः, तेजः, वायुः, आकाशम्, कालः, दिक्, आत्मा, मन इति द्रव्याणि । *VS* 1. 1. 4.
2. रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शाः, संख्याः, परिमाणानि, पृथक्त्वम्, संयोगविभागौ, परत्वापरत्वे, बुद्धयः, सुखदुःखे, इच्छाद्वेषौ, प्रयत्नश् च गुणाः । *Ibid.* 1. 1. 5.
3. उत्क्षेपणम्, अवक्षेपणम्, आकुञ्चनम्, प्रसारणम्, गमनमिति कर्माणि । *Ibid.* 1. 1. 6.

chapter, we have to concentrate upon general questions concerning the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categoriology.

Substance has been defined as something 'possessing motion and attribute and being the inherent (or material or constitutive) cause' of things;[1] attribute as something 'resting in substance, possessing no attributes, and not being an independent cause in conjunction and disjunction';[2] and motion as something 'attached to only one substance, attributeless, and being an independent cause in conjunction and disjunction.'[3]

Substance is the locus, the supportive substratum, of the two other categories as well as the inherent cause of substance, attribute, and motion. That the inherent cause is necessarily a substance is proved by the fact that it is substance alone in which the effect can inhere.[4] It is, for instance, the yarn, a substance, which is the inherent cause of not only cloth but also its own colour and its dropping-down.

Attribute and motion have been defined in such a way as to ward off the risk of confusing them with each other. It has been said about motion, but not about attribute, that it resides in only one substance. It is because there are attributes such as conjunction, disjunction, manyness (dvitvaprabhṛtayaḥ)—a variety of number—, and multilateral difference (dvipṛthaktvādi) which reside in more than one substance.[5]

---

1. क्रियावत्, गुणवत्, समवायिकारणमिति द्रव्यलक्षणम् । *Ibid.* 1.1.14. This also occurs in *Suśruta-Saṁhitā* 1. 40. 3. (द्रव्यलक्षणं तु क्रियागुणवत् समवायिकारणम् इति ) ।
2. द्रव्याश्रयि, अगुणवान्, संयोगविभागेष्वकारणमनपेक्ष इति गुणलक्षणम् । *Ibid.* 1. 1. 15.
3. एकद्रव्यम्, अगुणम्, संयोगविभागेष्वनपेक्षं कारणमिति कर्मलक्षणम् । *Ibid.* 1. 1. 16.
4. कारणमिति द्रव्ये कार्यसमवायात् । *Ibid.* 10. 12.
5. Cp. द्वित्वप्रभृतयश् च संख्याः, पृथक्त्वम्, संयोगविभागाश् च । *Ibid.* 1. 1. 23, with *VSU* thereon. The Sūtra is obviously incomplete. Śaṅkara Miśra completes it by supplying the words 'produced by many substances' (anekadravyārabhyān ). The term 'pṛthaktva' ( difference )

Both attribute and motion are attributeless and motionless.[1] Motion is an independent cause of the attributes conjunction and disjunction,[2] while attribute, though an accessory cause thereof,[3] is not an independent cause of the two attributes. For 'independent cause' the Sūtra has 'anapekṣa-kāraṇa'. Therefore, for 'dependent or accessory cause', it would have 'sāpekṣa-kāraṇa.'

**2) 'Dravya' versus 'substance'** : In this work, we have been using the word substance for 'dravya'. Dr. Karl H. Potter sees difficulties in identifying dravya with substance. Firstly, the list of dravya-s includes not only material things but the internal organ, which is a psychological entity, and soul, which is a spiritual entity, whereas 'substance' suggests 'matter.' Secondly, dravya-s are not concrete, whereas substances, such as chairs, are concrete entities. Thirdly, there is no particular affinity between dravya-s and the subjects of sentences, as there is, in Aristotle, between substances and subjects of sentences. Fourthly, certain dravya-s are no more enduring than other individuals; members of the other

---

occurring therein is also unhappy. It should be or, as held by Śaṅkara Miśra, mean 'anekapṛthaktva' ( multilateral difference ). Praśastapāda is more accurate when he says : संयोगविभागद्वित्वद्विपृथक्त्वादयोऽनेकाश्रिताः । ( *PDS*, p. 431 ) द्वयोर् द्रव्ययोर् द्वित्वं सामान्यं कार्यम् , त्रयाणां त्रित्वमित्यादि । तथैव द्विपृथक्त्वादि । द्वयोर् द्रव्ययोः संयुज्यमानयोः संयोगो विभज्यमानयोर् विभागः । एषामनेकाश्रितत्वात् समानत्वम् । *VSC* 1. 1. 23, p. 7.

1. गुणकर्मसु गुणकर्माभावाद् गुणकर्मापेक्षं न विद्यते । *VS* 8. 8.

2. See संयोगविभागानां कर्म । *Ibid*. 1. 1. 19.; संयोगविभागाः कर्मणाम् । *Ibid*. 1. 1. 28.

3. Cp. अन्यतरकर्मजः, उभयकर्मजः, संयोगजश् च संयोगः । (एतेन विभागो व्याख्यातः ।) *Ibid*. 7. 2. 10-11. Also see *VSU* 1. 1. 16, pp. 22-23. The relevant words are : संयोगविभागादीनां संयोगविभागौ प्रति सापेक्षत्वात् । Cp. Candrānanda : संयोगविभागेष्वकारणमनपेक्ष इति सापेक्षः कारणम् । अङ्गुल्योराकाशसंयोगो द्व्यङ्गुलाकाशसंयोगे कर्तव्ये द्व्यङ्गुलोत्पत्तिमपेक्षते, अङ्गुल्योः परस्परविभागो द्व्यङ्गुलाकाशविभागं प्रति कार्यविनाशमपेक्षते, एवं संयोगविभागलक्षण एव गुणः संयोगविभागेषु सापेक्षः कारणम् । *VSC* 1. 1. 15, p. 5.

categories go into and out of connexion with time as often as or less often than dravya-s.

Dr. Potter regards substances as 'bare particulars.' They have no parts. 'The things we English-speaking people call "substances" the Navya-naiyāyika would call objects. When the Naiyāyika talks within his system of a pot (a favorite example), he is not speaking of an entity which is round and colored and has a bottom and an inside. He is speaking of a something which may be the substratum of all these characters, but is distinct from their sum....' For the Naiyāyika, Dr. Potter continues, 'the whole pot is a distinct individual and not the sum of anything. The pot-halves are the inherence cause of the pot; in order to produce a pot, there must be antecedent contact between pot-halves. But the contact is a third individual besides the pot-halves, and the pot is a fourth individual over and beyond the other three.'[1]

Generally speaking we are not inclined to agree with Dr. Potter. As regards the first difficulty pointed out by him in equating 'dravya' with 'substance', we would draw the attention of our readers to Descartes who designates as substance not only matter but also mind. According to him, the world is divisible into two substances—extended substance (matter) and thinking substance (minds)—characterized and defined by extension and thought respectively.[2] Even John Stuart Mill classes minds under substance.[3] Both Descartes and Spinoza have defined even God as a substance.[4] With few exceptions, the Scholastic Fathers were agreed that soul is a spiritual substance. Indeed, the soul-substance theory of mind, usually associated with faculty psychology, was widely current in, rather dominated, the Middle Ages. In view of these patent facts, the first difficulty pointed out

1. Karl H. Potter, *The Padārthatattvanirūpaṇam of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi*, Introduction, pp. 11-12.
2. See *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, Vol. II, pp. 53-64.
3. See, John Stuart Mill, *System of Logic*, pp. 30-49, passim.
4. Descartes, *op. cit.*, p. 53; Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part I, Definition VI and Proposition XI.

by Dr. Potter in accepting substance as a synonym for dravya disappears altogether.

The second difficulty, too, is far from real. 'The three words *substance* (with *substantive*), and *substratum*, subject are differentiations of the Aristotelian *to hupokeimenon* "the underlying".'[1] Indeed, even in the West, a substance is the subject of properties, and something distinct from all its properties.

The other difficulties, too, pointed out by Dr. Potter, are not very serious, with the exception of course of the third, that there is no particular affinity between dravya-s and subjects of sentences as there appears to have been in the traditional European metaphysics, particularly in Aristotle. Recognition of space and time as substances by Naiyāyikas will surely sound odd to Westerners. But this circumstance is not enough to forfeit the claim of 'substance' to be a rough-and-ready equivalent for 'dravya.'

**3) The unrepeatability theory of attribute :** In the grammatical tradition, as we shall have occasion to notice when we take up Patañjali's conception of attribute, there appears to have once been a strong tendency to regard attributes, at any rate such attributes as white-colour, as one and eternal each. This tendency finds expression in the Mīmāṁsā tradition as well. Kumārila and Rāmakṛṣṇa appear to be strongly inclined in favour of this belief.[2] Among theorists

---

1. Otto Jesperson, *The Philosophy of Grammar*, p. 75, f. n.
2. एतन् मनसि कृत्वाऽऽह नित्ये एवेति भाष्यकृत् ।
एतयैव दिशा वाच्या शुक्लादेरपि नित्यता ॥
क्वचिद् द्रव्येण संसर्गः, क्वचिन् न स्याद् गुणान्तरैः
शुक्लादेस्; तेन भिन्नत्वं सिद्धं भासुरधूसरैः ॥
*MŚV*, 1.1.5, Śabdanityatādhikaraṇa 411, 413. Commenting upon verse 41$_1$, Pārthasārathi Miśra observes : धीकर्मप्रसंङ्गेनेदानीं शुक्लादिगुणानामपि नित्यत्वैकत्वे दर्शयति--एतयेति । *NR*,ad loc. Rāmakṛṣṇa's statement is: एवं शुक्लादिगुणानामपि नित्यत्वैकत्वेऽवगन्तव्ये । भेदबुद्धिस् तु भिन्नाश्रयसंसर्गात् । स्वरूपैकत्वे च तत एव प्रत्यभिज्ञोपपत्तेर् न गुणत्वरूपत्वातिरेकेण शुक्लत्वादिजातिः कल्पनीया।

of literature, too, the belief seems to have been once quite popular. Mammaṭa's predilection in favour of the theory is a case in point.[1] Jainas, on the other hand, appear to treat individual attributes as located in one substance only, as is evident from the fact that the *Uttarādhyayana-Sūtra* describes attributes as attached to one substance (ekadravyāśrita).[2] The theory that qualities or attributes, being one each, are universals, which is also known as the repeatability[3] or identity theory of qualities, is the ruling theory of qualities in the West, although it has of late met with stout opposition at the hands of the unrepeatability or resemblance theory advocated by G. F. Stout, J. R. Jones, and certain others.[4]

---

योऽप्ययमतिशुक्लोऽयमीषच्छुक्ल इति भेदः सोऽपि संसर्गभेदात्। तथा हि—केवलद्रव्यसंसर्गेऽतिशुक्लं नीलादिसंसर्गे त्वीषदिति। यदपि धूसरस्वच्छभासुरपार्थिवाप्यतैजसेषु द्रव्येषु शुक्लस्य वैलक्षण्यं तदपि भिन्नजातीयद्रव्यसंसर्गभेदेनावगन्तव्यम्। *Yuktisnehaprapūraṇī* on *ŚD* 1. 1. 6. 23, p. 426.

1. गुणक्रियायदृच्छानां वस्तुत एकरूपाणामप्याश्रयभेदाद् भेद इव लक्ष्यते, यथैकस्य मुखस्य खड्गमुकुरतैलाद्यालम्बनभेदात्। *Kāvya-Prakāśa*, under Sūtra 10 of ch. II, p. 37.

2. गुणाणमासयो दव्वं, एगदव्वसिया गुणा। *US* 28. 6, p. 713. Jayakīrti Sūri comments : गुणा हि एकद्रव्याश्रिताः, आधारभूते एकस्मिन् द्रव्ये आधेयतया स्थिता गुणा उच्यन्ते। *UT*, ad loc.

3. 'A complex is *repeated* if it occurs with any two individuals of one category. A colour, for example, is repeated if it occurs at two places, even at the same time; and a time is repeated if two qualia of any one kind occur at that time....A complex is universal if repeatable, particular if unrepeatable....Thus all qualia and all sums of several qualia of one kind are universal;all concreta and all sums of concreta are particular....' Nelson Goodman, *The Structure of Appearance*, p. 201. Advocates of the repeatability theory argue like this : 'Something red can be destroyed but red cannot be destroyed and that is why the meaning of the word 'red' is independent of the existence of a red thing. Certainly it makes no sense to say that the colour red is torn up or pounded to bits.' Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 28. Cp. Nicholas Wolterstorff, *On Universals*, pp. 223-234.

4. See G. F. Stout, 'The Nature of Universals and Propositions', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. X (1922-28); 'Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular ?',' *Proceedings af the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Vol.III (1923), pp. 95-128; J.R. Jones, 'Are the Qualities of Particular Things Universal or Particular ?', *The Philo-*

The Naiyāyika, being an enthusiastic advocate of universals of individual attributes, cannot see eye to eye with the advocates of the repeatability or identity theory of attributes. Of course, if, say, white-colour is just one and repeatable, it cannot have a universal of its own. It is significant that, according to Durbala alias Kṛṣṇamitra, the commentator of Nāgeśa, the latter who, as will be shown later, is a believer in the unity or repeatability of individual attributes, does favour the Naiyāyika's postulation of attributeness as a universal.[1] Kumārila appears to hold a similar position.[2] Udayana, Jayanta, Padmanābha Miśra, Viśvanātha refer to the theory just to refute it.[3] Udayana argues that, if white-

---

*sophical Review*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (March, 1949), pp. 152-170; 'Characters and Resemblances', *Ibid.*, Vol. 60, No. 4 (October, 1951), pp. 551-562. Also cp. Virgil C. Aldrich, 'Colours As Universals', *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. LXI, No. 3 (July, 1952), pp. 377-381. Aristotle, too, seems to incline, if at all, to the unrepeatability theory of qualities. See the discussion of his position in Aaron, *The Theory of Universals*, p. 10; Jones, *op. cit.*; W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 25, f. n. William A. Christian remarks that Whitehead holds that 'qualities are not universals though there are universals of quality.' Christian, *An Int rpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics*, p. 231. But see Wolterstorff, *op. cit.*, pp. 223-225. A very fine discussion of the question whether qualities are universals will be found in Brand Blanshard, *Reason and Analysis*, pp. 393-399. S. Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity*, Vol. I, p. 326, also disfavours the view that quality is a universal or category.

1. नैर्मल्यादीति । एतेन रूपादिचतुर्विंशतिसाधारणगुणत्वजातौ मानाभाव इति सूचितम् । *Kuñjikā* on *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhānta-Laghumañjūsā*, p. 455.

2. संसर्गमात्रभेदेन स्यात् तत्रापि हि भेदधीः ।
स्वरूपं तु तदेवेति का जातिं कथयिष्यति ॥ *MŚV* 1. 1. 5, Śabdanityatādhikaraṇa. 412. Pārthasārathi Miśra comments : कथं तर्ह्ययमपि शुक्लोऽयमपि इति भेदबुद्धिः ? भिन्नाश्रयसंसर्गादित्याह—संसर्गेति । स्वरूपाभेदे च तत एव प्रत्यभिज्ञोपपत्तेर् न गुणत्वरूपत्वातिरेकेण शुक्लत्वादिजातिः कल्पनीयेत्याह—स्वरूपमिति । *NR*, ad loc., p. 836.

3. ये पुनराहुः शुक्लत्वादिकमेव सामान्यं नास्ति, कुतस् तदवान्तरतारतम्यम् ? एकैका एव हि शुक्लारुणादिव्यक्तयो नित्याभिर् द्रव्यव्यक्तिभिर् व्यज्यन्ते । तारतम्यममूषामाश्रयमिश्रतया । यथा यथा हि धवले कृष्णद्रव्यानुप्रवेशः, तथा तथा तारतम्यावभास इति । तदयुक्तम् । तेषामाश्रयस्थितावपि पावकसंयोगात् पूर्वरूपनिवृत्तिरुत्तररूपोत्पादश् च न स्यात् । अनेकव्यक्तिसमवेतस्य निरतिशयस्य सामान्यादन्यत्वं नोपपद्यते । अस्तु शुक्लादिकं सामान्यमेवेति चेन्, न, गोत्वादिना परापरभावानुपपत्तौ

colour is one and eternal, no substance will undergo change of colour due to heat. Viśvanātha contends that, if there is only one blue-colour, the destruction of blue-colour in one substance will result in the destruction of blue-colour entire and the world will become destitute of blue-colour for good. The full argumentation cannot be given here, for want of space. The relevant text is quoted in full, however.

**4) Dr. Potter's mistake** : From the foregoing account it is evident that there are two rival theories about guṇa even as there are about quality, with, of course, this difference that the unrepeatability theory is the dominant note of Indian philosophy, while the repeatability theory is that of the Western. Presumably unmindful of this, Dr. Karl H. Potter has expressed the view : 'A "quality", to a Western reader, is a repeatable characteristic, such as the color blue. Lots of things can share the color blue at the same time, and we say they have the same quality. Guṇa's, though, are not repeatable ; they are particular characteristics of particular things.'[1] Elsewhere he says, in the same vein : 'A single guṇa is...an unrepeatable entity, an entity related to exactly one object and no more.'[2] Labouring under this misappre-

---

जातिसङ्करप्रसङ्गादिति । *Kiraṇāvalī*, pp. 207-209; यथा च शुक्लगुणस्य भास्वरधूसरादिवतो नानात्वम्, तथा वर्णस्याप्युदात्तादिभेदवतः । शुक्लगुणोऽप्येक एव, आश्रयभेदात् तु तद्भेद इति चेद्, अहो रससमारूढो भट्टः ।

कर्मैकं, बुद्धिरप्येका, जगत्येकः सितो गुणः ।

तैश् च तन् नित्यमित्येताः स्त्रीगृहे कामुकोक्तयः ॥ *NM*, I, p. 202; न चैकैका एव नीलरूपादिव्यक्तय इत्येकवृत्तिव्यक्तित्वान् नीलत्वादिकं न जातिरिति वाच्यम्, नीलो नष्टो, रक्त उत्पन्नः, इत्यादि प्रतीतेर् नीलादेरुत्पादविनाशशालितया नानात्वात् । अन्यथा एकनीलनाशे जगदनीलतामापद्येत । न च नीलसमवायरक्तसमवाययोरेवोत्पादविनाशविषयकोऽसौ प्रत्यय इति वाच्यम्, प्रतीत्या समवायानुल्लेखात् । न च स एवायं नील इति प्रत्यक्षबलाल् लाघवाच् चैक्यमिति वाच्यम्, प्रत्यक्षस्य तज्जातीयविषयत्वात् सैवेयं गुर्जरीतिवत् । लाघवं तु प्रत्यक्षबाधितम्, अन्यथा घटादीनामप्यैक्यप्रसङ्गात् । उत्पादविनाशबुद्धेः समवायालम्बनत्वापत्तेरिति । *NSM*, under verse 100, p. 445. Viśvanātha adds : एतेन रसादिकमपि व्याख्यातम् । *Loc. cit.*

1. Potter, *The Padārthatattvanirūpaṇam of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi*, p. 13.
2. Potter, 'Are the Vaiśeṣika "Guṇas" Qualities ?', *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. IV, No. 3 ( October, 1954 ), p. 259.

hension, he has, on more than one occasion,[1] called in question the translation of 'guṇa' as 'quality' and come forward with the proposal to translate it alternatively as 'trope, 'abstract particular', or 'particular character',[2] the expres-ions being given in order of preference.

The present writer has discussed the issue elsewhere and tried to establish that 'attribute' is the nearest English equivalent for 'guṇa'.[3]

We do not approve of 'quality' as the English equivalent for 'guṇa' for the following reasons.

First, such guṇa-s as separateness (pṛthaktva), conjunction (saṁyoga), disjunction (vibhāga), remoteness (paratva), proximity (aparatva) the Westerner would prefer to class under relation rather than quality. This being so, the term quality unwarrantably narrows down the scope of 'guṇa'.

Second, the list of guṇa-s includes quantity whereas the Western tradition is, to the best of our knowledge, not unanimous in subsuming quantity under quality. In Aristotle and John Stuart Mill, quantity is a separate category—a category co-ordinate with quality—, whereas the tradition of primary and secondary qualities made classic by the genius of John Locke[4] purports to subsume quantity under

1. See *ibid*, pp. 259-264 ; Dr. Potter's Review of Prof. Ingalls's *Materials for the Study of Navya-nyāya Logic*, *ibid* , pp. 271-273 ; 'More on the Unrepeatability of Guṇas'. *ibid*., Vol. VII, Nos. 1-2 (April-July, 1957), pp. 57-60 ; and *The Padārthatattvanirūpaṇam of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi*, p. 13.

2. Dr. Potter borrows the expression 'trope' from D. C. Williams, 'On the Elements of Being', *Review of Metaphysics*, 7 ( September, 1953 ), p. 7. Williams, in his turn, borrows the term from George Santayana, *The Realm of Matter*, p. 102, but gives a new meaning to it. 'Abstract Particular' is also Williams's. See *op. cit*. 'Particular character' is an adaptation from Stout.

3. See Harsh Narain, 'Finding an English Equivalent for "Guṇa"', *Philosophy East and West*, XI, Nos. 1-2 ( April-July, 1961 ), pp. 45-51.

4. The distinction of primary and secondary qualities was first suggested by Galileo and Descartes. Locke's primary qualities are: solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number. There are determinable qualities like coloured, shaped, etc. as

quality. Hence translating guṇa as quality involves a measure of ambiguity as to the scope of the term.

Thirdly, Locke's list of primary qualities includes even motion which is assigned a place of its own beside guṇa in the list of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories. Bhāsarvajña is the only Naiyāyika to subsume motion under quality, as we shall see in due course.

Thus, on one hand, the term 'quality' is not appplicable to the five relations—difference, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, and proximity—finding place in the list of guṇa-s and, on the other, either it sometimes does not apply to quantity or, when it does so apply, it comprehends within its compass even motion which is by no means a guṇa.

Were it not for these three difficulties in translating 'guṇa' as 'quality', 'quality' was eminently fitted for recognition as the English equivalent for 'guṇa'.

So, we commend the use of the very simple term 'attribute' which, as John Stuart Mill has it, covers quality, quantity, and relation[1] and which is, for the same reason, the nearest English equivalent for 'guṇa', despite the fact that it is used by philospphers in several other senses as well.[2]

---

well as determinate qualities like crimson, triangular, etc. Locke's primary qualities seem to cover both these kinds of qualities. See D. J. O' Connor, *John Locke*, p. 66. Samuel Alexander, while endorsing the tradition of primary and secondary qualities, limits the former to the determinate qualities—'empirical variations of the pervasive characters of things' as he calls them—, styling the determinable ones as 'categories' or 'categorial characters'. See Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity*, Vol. I, pp. 184-185.

1. See John Stuart Mill, *System of Logic*, Vol. I, p. 69.
2. For example, 'An "attribute" is any dimension on which objects and events can differ.' Roger Brown, *Words and Things*, p. 10, which seems to give a wider connotation to the terms. An equally wide coantation is sometimes allowed to the term 'guṇa' in Indian philosophy as well. So, from Kaiyaṭa we learn that the term 'guṇa' is something made by Kātyāyana and Pata˜jali to stand for all that serves to distinguish a thing or abide in it, not excluding universal etc : गुणब्देन यावान् कश्चित् पराश्रयो भेदको जात्यादिरर्थः स सर्व इह गृह्यते । *MP* 5. 1. 119. 5, Vol. IV, p. 295.

The Naiyāyika's position is something like this. Praśastapāda has it that, short of conjunction, disjunction, plurality ( dvitvādayaḥ ), and multilateral separateness ( dviprathaktvādayaḥ ), which are attributes and sub--attributes, having more than one substance as their supportive substrata, the remaining attributes and sub-attributes are all resident in only one substance each.[1] This being so, it is clear that the Naiyāyika is an upholder of the unrepeatability or resemblance theory of attribute in respect of the attributes other than conjunction, disjunction, plurality, and multilateral separateness. In respect of the attributes excepted above, too, he is an upholder of the same unrepeatability or resemblance theory. He should not be mistaken to mean that these attributes are each repeated in more than one individual substance. What he means to say is that they depend for their very being upon more than one substance. They are not pivoted in one substance, so to speak. Pārthasārathi Miśra clarifies the Naiyāyika's position thus : Does one and the same conjunction belong to both its terms or relata or does each possess its own conjunction ? The Naiyāyikas[2] hold only one conjunction to be attached to both the terms. His own view is, however, that each term in the conjunction relation has its own conjunction, even as, according to him, each term in the resemblance relation has its own resemblance.[3] Śrīdhara notes

---

1. संयोग-विभाग-द्वित्व- द्विपृथक्त्वादयो ऽनेकाश्रिताः । शेषास् त्वेकैकद्रव्यवृत्तयः । *PDS*, p. 431

2. अथ संयोगः किमेक एव द्वयोः संयोगिनोः ? उत प्रतिसंयोगि भिन्नावेव संयोगौ ? काश्यपीयास् तावत् संयोगमुभयोर् व्यासक्तमेकं मन्यन्ते । *ŚD* 1. 1. 55, Ākṛtivāda, p. 292.

3. वयं तु यथा 'इदमनेन सदृशमिदमनेन' इति प्रतियोगिनमपेक्ष्येतरत्रेतरस्यावगम्यमानं सादृश्यं प्रतिधर्मि भिन्नं भवति, तथा संयोगस्य तादृशबुद्धि-विषयत्वाद् भेदमेव रोचयामहे । *Loc. cit.* Sudarśanācārya, the commentator of Pārthasārathi Miśra, explains the passage as follows : यथा देवदत्तेन सदृशो यज्ञदत्त इत्यत्रः देवदत्तप्रतियोगिकं यज्ञदत्तेऽन्यदेव सादृश्यम्, यज्ञदत्तेन च देवदत्तः सदृश इत्यत्र यज्ञदत्तप्रतियोगिकं देवदत्ते ऽन्यदेव सादृश्यमिति प्रतियोगिनमपेक्ष्य प्रतियोगिभेदाद् भिन्नमेव प्रतिधर्मि सादृश्यम्, अन्यथा 'देवदत्तेन यज्ञदत्तः सदृशः', 'यज्ञदत्तेन देवदत्त सदृशः' इत्यत्र पौनरुक्त्यं स्याद् एकस्यैव च सादृश्यस्य द्विरवभासः स्यात, अभयत्रैकसादृश्यस्वीकारात्, तस्यात् प्रतिधर्मि भिन्नमेव सादृश्यम् , तथा संयोगोऽपि प्रतियोगिभेदात् प्रतिधर्मि भिन्न एव । यथा 'घटेन पटः संयुक्तः' इत्यत्र घटप्रतियोगिकोऽन्य एव

that another difference between conjunction, plurality, etc. on one hand and a repeated property on the other is that, while the latter generates what is called repetitive or assimilative cognition in its abodes, the former do not.[1]

To consider the Naiyāyika's position from another standpoint : If, say, all the instances or occurrences of the blue-colour as conceived by the upholder of the repeatability theory of attributes, save one, are wiped out of existence, blue-colour will still be there. But,if there is only one individual substance, there will be no conjunction etc. as conceived by the Naiyāyika. As a matter or fact, conjunction, disjunction, separateness, remoteness, and proximity are relations rather than attributes proper.

5) **The unrepeatability theory of motion** : The Mīmāṁsakas countenance the theory of unity and eternality of indvidual types of motion, even as they, as already noted by us, countenance the theory of unity and eternality of individual attributes. Kumārila remarks that we often seem to be having the recognition (prātyabhijñā) of motion. This unquestionably suggests that motion is eternal. That motion is not felt to be eternal, does not constitute a serious difficulty for him. He contends that the non-experience of eternality in motion is not due to its being non-eternal but due to its non-manifestation. What others would take to be the producer of motion he takes to be its manifester or instantiator. Even as sound-ness and other universals are recognized by the

---

पटे संयोगः, 'पटेन घटः संयुक्तः' इत्यत्र च पटप्रतियोगिकोऽन्य एव घटे संयोगः, तादृशबुद्धिविषयत्वात् सादृश्यवत् प्रतिधर्मि भेदज्ञानविषयत्वात् । *Śāstradīpikā-Prakāśa*, ad loc, p. 405.

1. द्वित्वादिकमप्यभिन्नस्वभावमनेकत्र वर्तते, तस्मात् सामान्यस्य विशेषो न लभ्यते । तत्राह—एकद्विबहुष्विति । सामान्यमेकस्मिन् पिण्डे द्वयोः पिण्डयोर् बहुषु वा पिण्डेष्वात्मस्वरूपानुगमप्रत्ययं करोति, एकस्य पिण्डस्य द्वयोर् बहूनां वोपलम्भे सति गौरिति प्रत्ययस्य भावाद् द्वित्वादिकं त्वेवं न भवतीति विशेषः । अनेकवृत्तित्वे सति यदेकद्विबहुष्वात्मस्वरूपानुगम-प्रत्ययकारणं तत्सामान्यमिति लक्षणार्थः । *NK*, p. 313.

Naiyāyika as eternal, notwithstanding the fact that they are not experienced to be so, motion, too, is eternal no matter if it does not appear to be so. Again, even as despite potentiality nothing comes about for want of the cause, there is no manifestation of eternality for want of the sufficient condition. Hence, individual motions are one and eternal each.[1] The Naiyāyika does not agree. According to him, all individual types of motions are attached to but one substance each and are all perishable. Among Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors there is a difference of opinion as to whether an individual motion lives for three, four, five, six, or seven moments.[2]

**6) Non-recognition of qualitative change** : Faddegon notes that there is in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categoriology no clear distinction between the notions 'quality' and 'qualitative change', e. g. the yellow colour af wax and the melting of wax above a fire, that the category motion is limied to physical movement and its causation, that only the fixing of the attention in external preception and reflection is explained in *VS* as a movement of the internal organ ( manas ), and that all other psychical processes and all physical changes

---

1. येन नाम प्रमाणेन ग्रहणं बुद्धिकर्मणोः ।
तेनैव प्रत्यभिज्ञाननित्यत्वं किं न सिध्यति ? ॥
धीकर्मप्रत्यभिज्ञानान् नित्यता त्वानुमानिकी ।
तादृशी नाशिताऽपीति न स्यात् तत्र बलाबलम् ॥
प्रत्यक्षद्रव्यवर्तिन्यो दृश्यन्ते याः पुनः क्रियाः ।
तासां वर्णवदेवेष्टं नित्यत्वं प्रत्यभिज्ञया ॥
व्यञ्जकाभावतश्‌ चासां सन्ततानुपलब्धिता ।
यदेवोत्पादकं वः स्यात् तदेव व्यञ्जकं मम ॥
तव शब्दत्वकर्तृत्वे नित्ये अपि सती यथा ।
न नित्यमुपलभ्येते तथा मे बुद्धिकर्मणी ॥
यथा वा शक्तिसद्‌भावे कुतश्चित् कारणाद् ऋते ।
न कार्याण्युपजायन्ते तथाऽभिव्यक्तिरिष्यताम् ॥
एकत्वाच् चलनादीनां तस्मादेकात्मिका मतिः ।
प्रयत्नाश्रयनानात्वाद् बुद्धिभेदः प्रवर्तते ॥
*MSV* 1.1.5, Śabdanityatādhikaraṇa 386, 392, 395-398, 401.

2. See *Padārtharatnamālā*, p. 42.

withour exception are taken by Kaṇāda as qualities. According to him, this omission in the table of categories and subcategories is at the root of the Naiyāyika's theory of the non-prefiguration of the effect in the cause.[1] Hiriyanna puts the matter thus : '...it accepts only change of place ( parispanda ) and not change of form ( pariṇāma ). That is, things may exhibit movement—as for instance, when a ball is rolling, but they never grow. What is commonly known as "growth" or "development", as when a seed becomes a sprout, is explained as a new creation and not as mere transformation.'[2]

**7) The fundamentum divisionis of the classification of motions**: Kaṇāda's list of the five types of motion is : upward motion, downward motion, contraction, expansion, and going ( gamana ).[3] Praśastapāda remarks that the last type comprehends gyration ( bhramaṇa ), evacuation ( recana ), vibration ( spandana ), flaming up ( ūrdhvajvalana ), slanting motion (tiryak-patana), bending (namana), ascending (unnamana), etc. also.[4] If it is so, why, one may ask, can upward motion etc., too, not be classed under going ? Nīlakaṇṭha has no other answer to the question than to preach that the seer's ( Kaṇāda's ) words must not be questioned.[5] Athalye has, however, discovered a sort of fundamentum divisionis in this apparently arbitrary classification of motions : 'Motion is primarily divided into three kinds according to its directions, namely, vertical, horizontal and slanting or miscellaneous. The vertical motion may be from below upwards ( utkṣepaṇa ), or from above downwards ( apakṣepaṇa ). Horizontal motion also may be twofold, motion nearer to oneself ( ākuñcana )

---

1. See *VSF*, pp. 111-114.
2. M. Hiriyanna, *Popular Essays in Indian Philosophy*, p. 102.
3. उत्क्षेपणमयवक्षेपणमाकुञ्चनं प्रसारणं गमनमिति कर्माणि । *VS* 1.1.6.
4. उत्क्षेपणापक्षेपणाकुञ्चनप्रसारणगमनानि पञ्चैव कर्माणि। गमनग्रहणाद् भ्रमण-रेचनस्पन्दनोर्ध्वज्वलनतिर्यक्पतननमनोन्नमनादयो गमनविशेषा न जात्यन्तराणि । *PDS*, p. 50
5. न चोत्क्षेपणादीनामपि गमनेऽन्तर्भावोऽस्त्विति शंकनीयम् । स्वतन्त्रेच्छस्य नियोगपर्यनुयोगानर्हस्य ऋषेः सम्मतत्वादिति भावः । *TSDP* ( *Nīlakaṇṭhī* ), p. 25.

or motion further from oneself ( prasāraṇa ). All other motions are relegated to the comprehensive class of gamana. It is not of course meant that the above groups exactly corrrespond to the ordinary conceptions of utkṣepaṇa etc., but that some such principle was in the mind of the Sūtrakāra when he made the division seems to be highly probable.'[1]

In the *Madhyamaka-Śāstra*, Nāgārjuna has put forward a masterly refutation of motion ( gati ), which remains to be replied upto date. Nāgārjuna's arguments have inspired some further arguments against motion on the part of Āryadeva and certain other Mādhyamikas. We shall notice them in the next volume.

### 3. GENESIS OF THE THREE CATEGORIES

**1) Introductory** : In the preceding chapter, we have seen that there is reason to believe that the categoriologies—if we can call them categoriologies at all—developed in Prakrit Jainism and the ancient grammatical tradition might have been the precursors of the Vaiśeṣika categoriology. Now we have to see what light, if any, Prakrit Jainism and Sanskrit grammatical thought can throw on the question of the genesis of the three original categories of the Vaiśeṣika system.

**2) Verdict of Prakrit Jainism** : As we have seen in the preceding chapter, the earliest Jaina work in which a table of three categories more or less akin to the original table of three categories propounded by the Vaiśeṣika system has been dealt with is the *Uttarādhyayana-Sūtra*, a Prakrit Sūtra work belonging, in all probability, to the pre-Christian times. It defines substance as the substrate of attributes, attribute as resident in one substance only, and mode as resident in both substance and attribute.[2] It appears that it postulates an identity theory of attributes.

1. Athalya, p. 89.
2. गुणाणमासयो दव्वं, एगदव्वसिया गुणा,
लरकणं पज्जवाणं तु उभउ अस्सिया भवे ।। *US* 28.6, p. 713.
Umāsvāti, however, defines substance as गुण-पर्यायवद् द्रव्यम् । *Tattvārthādhigama-Sūtra* 5.37.

It classifies substances as dharma, adharma, space, time, matter, and soul.[1] It is evident that this classification has nothing to do with the classification of substance in *VS*. We have not found any classification of attributes in the work. Modes are : unity, plurality, number, structure, conjunction, and disjunction .[2]

Even a cursory glance at the table of categories propounded by the text will reveal that it is more primitive than the one propounded by *VS*. Maybe, the former has influenced the latter to some extent or other. Beyond this nothing can be said with any measure of certainty.

**3) Verdict of Sanskrit grammar** : We have seen that the extant text of *VS* is posterior to *PVM*. We are, however, not sure of the position with regard to the original core of the work. There is a close affinity between the categories of *PVM* and *VS* and it is not absurd to suppose that the one might have had its impact on the other. It is, therefore, incumbent on us to give an account of the categories subscribed to by Patañjali and shared by the original core of *VS*, with a view to seeing how far the one might have influenced the other. Accordingly, while we shall examine connected sources as well, we shall concentrate on *PVM*, which is a mine of information on the subject.

In the ancient extra-philosophical literature, as also in the modern, the word 'dravya' is found used in the sense of wealth or thing, generally.[3] In *PA* it occurs thrice, in the

---

1. धम्मो, अधम्मो, आगासं, कालो, पुग्गल, जन्तवो—
एस लोगुत्ति पन्नत्तो जिणेहि वरदंसिहि ॥ *US* 28.7, p. 714.

2. एगत्तं च, पहुत्तं च, संखा, संठाणमेव य,
संजोगा य, विभागा य पज्जवाणं तु लरकणम् ॥ *Ibid*. 28.13, p. 717.
The च's in the first line seem to be erroneous. They should perhaps be य's.

3. See, for example, *Baudhāyana-Dharma-Sūtra* 1.8.48, p. 41; 1.14.19, p. 77 ; 1.21.4 p. 100 ; 2.5.19, p. 148 ; 2.13.13, p. 190. *Āpastamba-Dharma-Sūtra* 2.7.16.23 describes 'dravya' as तत्र द्रव्याणि तिलमाषाः, ब्रीहियवाः, आपो, मूलफलानि । Elsewhere ( 1.1.4.3 ), too, it uses the words in the sense of wealth or things in general : यदन्यानि द्रव्याणि यथालाभमुपहरति दक्षिणा एव ताः ।

sense of wealth[1], noble[2], and substance[3] respectively. It appears that in Pāṇini's time the word had already developed into a categorial concept, however amorphous. From *PA* it appears to derive from 'dru' ( tree ).[4] We know of no anterior work in which the word can be found used in its categorial acceptation.

In *PA*, the concept of substance is also found expressed by the words sattva[5], adhikaraṇa[6], and bandhu[7], once each. Maybe Pāṇini has appropriated some of these words from his predecessors.[8]

In this behalf, Kātyāyana's position is clearer than Pāṇini's. The former uses the word dravya in the sense of both individual and substance. In the section dealing with

---

1. वस्नद्रव्याभ्यां ठन्कनौ ॥ *PA* 5.1.51.
2. द्रव्यं च भव्ये । *Ibid.* 5.3.104.
3. किमेत्तिङव्ययाघादाम्वद्रव्यप्रकर्षे । *Ibid* 5.4.11. On this, *Kāśikā* ( p. 440 ) says : यद्यपि द्रव्यस्य स्वतः प्रकर्षो नास्ति, तथापि गुणक्रियास्थः प्रकर्षो यदा द्रव्य उपचर्यते तदाऽयं प्रतिषेधः । Patañjali does not comment upon this Sūtra.
4. द्रोश् च । *Ibid.* 4.3.159.
5. चादयोऽसत्त्वे । *Ibid.* 1.4.57. On it *PVM* ( II, p. 282. ) comments : अयं सत्त्वशब्दोऽस्त्येव द्रव्यपदार्थकः ।...अस्ति क्रियापदार्थकः, सद्भावः सत्त्वमिति । कस्येदं ग्रहणम् ? द्रव्यपदार्थकस्य । *Kāśikā*, in explanation of the Sūtra, says ( p. 74 ) : सत्त्वमिति द्रव्यमुच्यते । Kaiyaṭa's gloss on Patañjali's passage will also be found interesting. It reads ( *MP*, II, p. 282 ) : अर्थद्वयेऽपि सत्त्वशब्दस्य प्रयोगदर्शनाद् विशेषावगतौ प्रमाणानुपलम्भात् प्रश्नः । तत्र सीदन्त्यस्मिन् जाति-गुण-क्रिया इति सत्त्वं द्रव्यमुच्यते । यदा तु सतो भावः सत्त्वमिति तदा साध्यमानतया क्रियारूपापन्ना सत्ता सत्त्वशब्देनोच्यते ।...द्रव्यशब्देन चात्र सिद्धरूपं वस्त्वभिधीयते ।
6. अधिकरणविचाले च । *PA* 5.3.43. On it, *Kāśikā*, (p.424) says: अधिकरणं द्रव्यम् । Patañajali has not commented upon this Sūtra.
7. अत्यन्ताच् छो बन्धुनि । *Ibid.* 5.4.9. On it *Kāśikā* ( p. 439 ) says : बध्यतेऽस्मिन् जातिरिति बन्धुशब्देन द्रव्यमुच्यते । येन ब्राह्मणत्वादिजातिर् व्यज्यते तद् बन्धु द्रव्यम् । Patañjali does not comment upon this Sūtra as well. Literally, the word 'bandhu' might mean 'bundle' of qualites ( गुणानां बन्धु ). See I. S. Pawate, *The Structure of the Aṣṭādhyāyī*, p. 101.
8. See *ibid.*, p. 100.

the denotation of words, he uses it for individual.[1] Elsewhere, he uses it for substance.[2]

*PVM* follows suit.[3] In it is found a wealth of information on the notion of substance. Before we embark upon the treatment of Patañjali's concept of substance, we feel called upon to study the evolution of the concept of attribute, if any, upto his time.

In this connexion it would be interesting to refer to certain attempts to trace the evolution of the meaning of the word 'guṇa'. Carlton C. Rice[4] has it that originally the word was an adjective, meaning 'bovine', derived from the zero grade of the base 'go-', and formed by the secondary suffix '-na'. According to him the 'ṇ' in it betrays the influence of Prakrit. The successive stages of the evolution of its meaning are as follows :

a) 'bovine' ( adjective )

b) 'bovine sinew' ( substantive )

c) 'sinew'

d) 'bow-string'

e) 'strand', 'cord' ( of rope )

f) 'quality'

g) 'virtue'

The last four meanings are found actually attested in

---

1. See, for example, द्रव्याभिधाने ह्याकृतिसम्प्रत्ययस्, तत्रासर्वद्रव्यगतिः। *KV* 1.2.64.46 ; द्रव्याभिधानं व्याडिः। *Ibid* 1.2.64.48.

2. See, for example, सिद्धं तु यस्य गुणस्य भावाद् द्रव्ये शब्दनिवेशस् तदभिधाने त्वतलौ। *Ibid*. 5.1.119-5. Cp. अत्र द्रव्यशब्देन विशेष्यमुक्तं, गुणशब्देन तु तत्र शब्दस्य प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमात्रमुक्तमिति मन्यते। *Nyāyamañjarī-granthi-bhaṅga*, pp. 60-61.

3. See *PVM* 5.1.119.5, for example. In the sequel, we shall consider the position of Patanjali in a more or less comprehensive manner.

4. See *Language*, vi ( 1930 ), 36-40, discussed in A.B. Keith, 'The Etymology of Guṇa', *K. B. Pathak Commemoration Volume*, pp. 311-314.

Sanskrit.[1] Keith expresses his disagreement with Rice and suggests that 'guṇa' must have the same origin as the Avestan word 'gaono' meaning 'hair', and, 'if this is accepted as the earliest sense of guṇa, it is easy to see how from the practice of plaiting the hair the meaning "strand" might easily come to be that of guṇa.'[2]

The earliest texts in which the word 'guṇa' figures with a clear sense are the *Taittirīya-Saṁhitā* of the *Kṛṣṇa-Yajur-Veda*[3] and *Śaunaka-Saṁhitā* of the *Atharva-Veda*.[4] It is interesting to note that it means 'strand' as a constituent of rope in the one passage and 'constituent' in the other. According to Keith, the Iranian term also assumes the sense

---

1. Kālidāsa uses the word guṇa in *Raghuvaṁśa*, 9.54 and *Kumārasambhava* 4.15,29 in the sense of bow-string. Illustration of guṇa as strand follows. Guṇa as quality needs no illustration. The *Baudhāyana-Dharma-Sūtra* ( 2.3.12, p. 129 ; 2.5.12, p. 146 ; 4.1.12, p. 263 ; 4.1.16, p. 264 ; 4.1.26, p. 226 ) uses the word in the sense of merit, worth, or virtue. At on place ( 4.1.26, p. 266 ), Govindasvāmin interprets it to mean form etc. ( गुणा रूपदय: ) in the *Vivaraṇa-Tīkā* on the work. But there, too, it can be taken to mean merit, worth, or virtue. The original is :
   योगेनावाप्यते ज्ञानं, योगो धर्मस्य लक्षणम्,
   योगमूला गुणास् सर्वे; तस्माद् युक्तस् सदा भवेत् ॥

2. Keith *op. cit.*, p. 313.

3. यथा गुणे गुणमन्वस्यति, एवमेव तल् लोके लोकमन्वस्यति, धृत्या, अशिथिलम्भावाय । *Taittirīya-Kṛṣṇa-Yajuh-Saṁhitā* with Mādhava's *Vedārtha Prakāśa* 7.2.4.2, Vol. VI, p. 247. Mādhava comments upon the passage thus : यथा लोके त्रिवृद् रज्जुं सिसृक्षुः पुरुष एकस्मिन् सूत्रे द्वितीयं सूत्रं योजयति, ततस् तृतीयमपि योजयति, एतमेतेन त्रिरात्रे ण पुनः पुनरभ्यस्तेन एतस्मिंल् लोके प्रथमं समर्थं सति ततो द्वितीयं तृतीयं च लोकं समर्थं करोति। एतच् च सर्वासां प्रजानां धारणाय लोकानामशैथिल्याय च सम्पद्यते । *Ibid.*, p. 249. Keith translates the original thus : 'As a man casts thread on thread [ to make a rope of three strands ] so he ( the Prajāpati ) casts world on world, for firmness, and to avoid looseness.' *The Veda of the Black Yajus School*, Part 2, p.575.

4. पुण्डरीकं नवद्वारं त्रिभिर् गुणेभिरावृतम् ।
   तस्मिन् यद् यक्षमात्मन्वत् तद् वै ब्रह्मविदो विदुः ॥ ( *Śaunakīyā*) *Atharva-Veda-Saṁhitā* 10.8.43.

of 'quality' and 'colour'. According to Walde,[1] both the Avestan word and the Vedic 'gavīnī' (groin) are derived from the root 'geu-' ( Avestan ), 'biegen, krümmen, wölben'.

In the Sāṅkhya system, 'guṇa' retains its original ( or almost original) sense of strand or constituent, whereas in the Vaiśeṣika system it assumes the later sense of quality ( or rather attribute ). This is one reason why the former should lay claim to a greater antiquity than not only the latter but also *PVM*, *KV*, *PA*, and the *Nirukta*, which, as we shall see presently, all use the word 'guṇa' in the Vaiśeṣika or near-Vaiśeṣika sense.

So far as we can see, Yāska is the earliest known author to use the word 'guṇa' in the sense of characteristic or attribute unmistakably. For instance, he speaks of sound being the guṇa of space, sound and touch being the guṇa-s of air, and so on.[2] Pāṇini also uses the word in the sense of characteristic.[3] He uses it in other senses—ordinal number, secondary or ancillary, etc.—as well.[4] In the extant grammatical literature, it is *KV* which uses the word in the clear sense of quality or attribute of a substance.[5] And *PVM* contains a wealth of discussion on the nature of guṇa in this sense. Considering the antiquity of the work, it would be worth while to study Patañjali's dissertations on this concept with a view to seeing what bearing, if any, these can have on the problem of the genesis of the Vaiśeṣika category of guna.

---

1. Keith, *op. cit.*, p. 313.

2. आकाशगुणः शब्दः । आकाशाद् वायुर द्विगुणः स्पर्शेन । वायोर् ज्योतिस् त्रिगुणं रूपेण। ज्योतिष आपश् चतुर्गुणा रसेन । अद्भ्यः पृथिवी पञ्चगुणा गन्धेन । पृथिव्या भूतग्रामस्थावरजङ्गमाः । *Nirukta* 14.4, p. 1008. पार्थिवांस् त्वष्टौ गुणान् विद्यात् । *Loc. cit.*

3. विभाषा गुणेऽस्त्रियाम् । *PA* 2.3.25; वोतो गुणवचनात् । *Ibid.* 4.1.44 ; सर्वं गुणकार्त्स्न्यें । *Ibid.* 6.2.93 ; नञो गुणप्रतिषेधे सम्पाद्यर्हहितालमर्थास् तद्धिताः । *Ibid.* 6.2.155 ; न गुणादयोऽवयवाः । *Ibid.* 6.2.176.

4. संख्याया गुणस्य निमाने मयट् । *PA* 5.2.47 ; अजादी गुणवचनादेव । *Ibid.* 5.3.58.

5. See, for example, संघातार्थवत्त्वाच् चेति चेद्, दृष्टो ह्यतदर्थेन गुणेन गुणिनोऽर्थभावः । *KV* 1.2.45.11.

At one place, Patañjali enumerates the various senses in which 'guṇa' is used.[1] In *PVM*, there is a wealth of material on the concept of guṇa as an attribute of substance. We should like to give the salient features of Patañjali's treatment of the category for facility of comparison with the treatment thereof in *VS*. While listing attributes, Patañjali gives the impression that he believes in only what Locke would call secondary qualities, to the exclusion of primary qualities ( to use Locke's expression again ). He enumerates sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell as attributes.[2] Our readers will recall that *NS* terms them artha.[3] Elsewhere, however, Patañjali lists 'sharp', 'tiny', and 'thick' as attributes.[4] Further, he mentions more attributes here and there. The position is that he has not taken pains to draw up an exhaustive list of attributes and contents himself with mentioning such attributes, in an unsystematic manner, as the occasion demands. It seems that the list of seventeen attributes given in *VS* was not before Patañjali, otherwise he must have made use of it. This suggests the anteriority of Patañjali over the author of *VS*, at any rate in its present form.

---

1. गुणशब्दोऽयं वह्वर्थः । अस्त्येव समेष्ववयवेषु वर्तते । तद् यथा—द्विगुणा रज्जुस्, त्रिगुणा रज्जुरिति । अस्ति द्रव्यपदार्थकः । तद् यथा—गुणवानयं देश इत्युच्यते, यस्मिन् गावः सस्यानि च वर्तन्ते । अस्त्यप्राधान्ये वर्तते । तद् यथा—यो यत्राप्रधानं भवति स आह--गुणभूता वयमत्रे ति । अस्त्याचारे वर्तते । तद् था—-गुणवानयं ब्राह्मण इत्युच्यते यः सम्यगाचारं करोति । अस्ति संस्कारे वर्तते । तद् यथा—संस्कृतमन्नं गुणवदित्युच्यते । *PVM* 5.1.119.5, *IV*, p. 299. Cp. तुरगादेरुत्कृष्टगतिमत्त्वे ब्राह्मणादेश् च दोषाद्यभावेऽपि गुणव्यवहाराच् च । *PTN*, pp. 51-52 ; अन्यत्र हि गुणशब्दो प्रधाने वर्तते । शेषः, अङ्गं, गुण इति समानार्थाः । *Nirvacana-Ṭīkā* on *Nirukta*, Vol. II, p. 85 ; प्रसिद्धो हि गुणशब्दोऽनुग्रहेऽवयवे च । तद् यथा—गुणो मामयं वर्तते इत्युक्ते ऽनुग्रहे वर्तते इति गम्यते । अवयवेऽपि द्विगुणा रज्जुः, त्रिगुणा रज्जुः, इति चोक्ते द्व्यवयवा त्र्यवयवेति गम्यते । *Ibid.*, p. 87.

2. के पुनर् गुणाः ? शब्द-स्पर्श-रूप-रस-गन्धा गुणाः...। *PVM* 5.1.119.5, IV, p. 297. Also see 1.2.64.59, II, p. 98 ; 4.1.3, IV, p. 23.

3. See *NS* 1.1.14.

4. बहवः शस्त्र्यां गुणाः—तीक्ष्णा, सूक्ष्मा, पृथुरिति । *PVM* 2.1.54, II, pp. 396-397.

Patañjali starts with defining substance as the aggregate of attributes.[1] This definition is just a tentative one. He points to its limitation by raising the following objection : Then what will be the fate of such entities as are denoted by primary suffixes ( kṛt ) and secondary suffixes ( taddhita), such as will-to-act ( cikīrṣā ) and cowness ( gotā )?[2] These by no means form an aggregate of attributes. It is obvious that Patañjali's substance includes substantives and and the Naiyāyika's substance-universal as well. The Naiyāyika will of course like to class cowness under universal rather than substance. We find, however, that substantives[3] and universals are treated by him as both substances and attributes. In a different context he raises the question why only adjectives like 'white' etc. are cited as examples of attribute and not treeness etc. also.[4] In reply he suggests that treeness etc. are both substance- and attribute-words ( ubhayavacanāḥ ),[5] whereas 'white' etc. are only attribute-words. So, the reference to treeness would only create confusion. Thus, Patañjali does not consider the aforesaid definition as a comprehensive enough definiton. According to Kaiyaṭa, what Patañjali has said in order to meet the difficultty raised by himself in the said definition of substance, boils down to this, that substance is what is demonstrable by such pronouns as 'this' and 'that'.[6]

Incidentally, certain Western writers, too, have raised the same problem as raised above by Patañjali. Says Jepserson :

---

1. द्रव्ये च भवत: क: सम्प्रत्यय: ? यदि तावद् गुणसमुदायो द्रव्यम् । *Ib:d.* 4.1.3.7, IV, pp. 29-30. Cp. अयुतसिद्धावयवभेदानुगत: समूहो द्रव्यमिति पतञ्जलि: । *YBh.* 3.44, p. 367. This Patañjali appears to be different from the author (s) of *PVM* and *YS*.
2. का गतिर् य एते भावा: कृदभिहितास् तद्धिताभिहिताश् च—चिकीर्षा, गोतेति ? *PVM* 4.13.7, IV, p. 30.
3. कृदभिहितो भावो द्रव्यवद् भवतीति । *Ibid* 5.4.19 (एकस्य सकृच् च), IV, pp. 410, 411.
4. किं पुन: कारणं शुक्लादय एवोदाह्रियन्ते, न पुनर् वृक्षादयोऽपि—वृक्षत्वम् , वृक्षतेति ? *Ibid.* 5.1,119.5, p. 300.
5. अस्त्यत्र विशेष: । उभयवचना ह्येते, द्रव्यं चाहुर् गुणं च । *Loc. cit.*
6. इदं, तद् , इति सर्वनामप्रत्यवमर्शयोग्यं वस्तु द्रव्यमित्यर्थ: । *MP* 4.1.3.7, IV, p. 30. Cp. इदं, तद्, इति सर्वनामप्रत्यवमर्शयोग्यं द्रव्यम् । Helārāja on *Vākyapadīya* 3.3.4.

'Those who define substantives as names of substances or things encounter difficulties with such words as *beauty, wisdom, whiteness,* which evidently are substantives and in all languages are treated as such. On the strengh of this consideration it is habitual to distinguish two classes of substantives, concrete and abstract.'[1] According to J. N. Keynes, a concrete name is the name of a thing while an abstract name is the name of an attribute.[2] But in 'unpunctuality is irritating', unpunctuality, which is primarily an attribute, is the subject of the attribute 'irritating'.[3] This is very irritating to him. He offers two ways of avoiding this difficulty. The first way is to define an abstract name as the name of something which can be regarded as an attribute of something else. The second way, which he prefers to the first, is to substitute a distinction between concrete and abstract uses of names for concrete and abstract names.[4] W. Hazlitt avers that a substantive 'is not the name of a thing really subsisting by itself ... but a thing considered as subsisting by itself.'[5] Jesperson writes, '...when I speak of a young girl's *beauty* or of an old man's *wisdom,* I do not think of these qualities as "things" or "real objects"; these are to me only other ways of expressing the thought that *she is beautiful* and *he is wise.*'[6]

Patañjali also defines substance as 'guṇa-sandrāva.'[7] Kaiyaṭa interprets the expression to mean 'abode of attributes' ( guṇānām āśrayaḥ ).[8] It can, however, also mean a confluence, conglomeration, aggregation, combination, assemblage, or concretion of attributes.

1. Otto Jerperson, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
2. J.N. Keynes, *Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic*, quoted in Jesperson, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
3. *Loc. cit.*
4. *Loc. cit.*
5. W. Hazlitt, *New and Imporved Grammar* (1810), preface, p. viii, quoted in Jesperson, *op. cit.*, p. 134.
6. Jesperson, *op. cit.*, p. 135.
7. अन्वर्थं खलु निर्वचनम्—गुणसन्द्रावो द्रव्यम् । *PVM* 5.1.119.5, IV, p. 299.
8. गुणसन्द्राव इति । सन्द्रूयते, सङ्गम्यते, आश्रीयते इति सन्द्रावः । 'समि युद्रुदुवः' इति घञ् । गुणानामाश्रयो द्रव्यमित्यर्थः । *MP*, ad loc.

Patañjali also mentions the popular notion of substance as substratum of attributes explicitly.[1] For substance, he also uses the expression 'guṇin' consistently with this conception and observes that attributes sleep in substance.[2]

He defines substance alternatively as follows : 'Or that the essence of which is not destroyed even by the production of other attributes, is substance. What is essence ? The being of a thing is essence. In fruits like emblic myrobalan, redness and yellowness are produced, but even then they remain emblic myrobalan, plum, etc.'[3]

We noticed that Patañjali conceives substance, inter alia, as a permanent subject of change, as an entity that endures through change. This very important aspect of substance is found almost ignored by the Naiyāyikas. It is really a pity that the Naiyāyikas have seldom thought of drawing upon the rich harvest of ideas in *PVM* pertaining to substance, as also, as we shall see in due course, attribute. Had they done so, they would have enriched their categoriology much more than happens to be the case.

According to Patañjali, substance is something different from attributes.[4] In interpretation of a certain Vārtika of Kātyāyana[5] he reads the same idea into it.[6] In this connexion he raises a doubt : Nothing like substance is perceived behind the attributes even when one tries to discover it by, say, cutting an animal into hundreds of parts. Were there a substance, it might be perceived; but one perceives only the attributes of the animal even after so cutting it. This fact,

1. द्रव्यं हि लोके अधिकरणमित्युपचर्यते । *PVM* 2.1.1.22, II, p. 344.
2. इह यो यत्न भवति शेतेऽसौ, तत्न गुणाश् च गुणिनि शेरते । *Ibid.* 5.3.55, IV, p. 381.
3. अथवा यस्य गुणान्तरेष्वपि प्रादुर्भवत्सु तत्त्वं न विहन्यते तद् द्रव्यम् । किं पुनस् तत्त्वम् ? तद्भावस् तत्त्वम् । तद् यथा—आमलकादीनां फलानां रक्तादयः पीतादयश् च गुणाः प्रादुर्भवन्ति, आमलकं बदरमित्येव भवति । *Ibid.* 5.1.119.5, IV, p. 298.
4. ततो [= गुणाद् ] अन्यद् द्रव्यम् । *Ibid.* 5.1.119.5, IV, p. 297.
5. सिद्धं तु यस्य गुणस्य भावाद् द्रव्ये शब्दनिवेशस् तदभिधाने त्वतलौ । *KV* 5.1.119.5.
6. गुणस्यायं भावाद् द्रव्ये शब्दनिवेशं कुर्वन् ख्यापयति—अन्यच् छब्दादिभ्यो द्रव्यमिति । *PVM* 5.1.119.5, IV, p. 297.

therefore, gives one the impression that substance is nothing different from attributes.[1] To this Patañjali suggests the reply that substance is an object of not perception but inference, like the growth and decay of plants and the motion of stars.[2] Next he proceeds to state the inference leading to the conclusion that substance is something other than attributes. The rise and fall of the pair of scales in the case of iron is different from that in the case of cotton of an equal quantity. Nothing but substance can account for this difference. Likewise, a sword cuts just by touch, while cotton does not do so. Again, there are things which are capable of cutting with only one stroke, while there are others which fail to cut even with two strokes. It is difficult to account for these facts without assuming a substance.[3]

In the very opening pages of his work, Patañjali mentions that the individual ( known as 'cow' ) having dewlap, tail, hunch, hoofs, and horns is the example of a substance.[4] This reminds one of the primary substance of Aristotle. When, however, as we shall see in the sequel, he includes universals like treeness in substance, his substance becomes a common name for primary substance and substance-universal. Aristotle's secondary substance is excluded from Patañjali's substance, however. For it, the latter uses the term 'jāti' or species.

Another point worth mentioning in this connexion is this that Patañjali conceives of substance as a nucleus that endures

---

1. अनन्यच् छब्दादिभ्यो द्रव्यम्, न ह्यन्यदुपलभ्यते । पशोः खल्वपि विशसितस्य पर्णशते न्यस्तस्य नान्यच् छब्दादिभ्य उपलभ्यते । *Loc. cit.*

2. अन्यच् छब्दादिभ्यो द्रव्यम्, तत् त्वनुमानगम्यम् । तद् यथा—ओषधिवनस्पतीनां वृद्धिह्रासौ, ज्योतिषां गतिरिति । *Loc. cit.*

3. कोऽसावनुमानः ? इह समाने वर्ष्मणि परिणाहे च अन्यत् तुलाग्रं भवति लोहस्य, अन्यत् कार्पासानाम् । यत्कृतो विशेषस् तद् द्रव्यम् । तथा कश्चित् स्पृशन्नेव छिनत्ति, कश्चिल् लम्बमानोऽपि छिनत्ति । यत्कृतो विशेषस् तद् द्रव्यम् । तथा कश्चिदेकेनैव प्रहारेण व्यपवर्गं करोति, कश्चिद् द्वाभ्यामपि न करोति । यत्कृतो विशेषस् तद् द्रव्यम् । *Ibid.*, pp. 297-298.

4. किं यत् तत् सास्नालाङ्गूलककुदखुरविषाण्यर्थरूपं स शब्दः ? नेत्याह । द्रव्यं नाम तत् । *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 4.

through change of forms and attributes.[1] True to this notion of substance, he treats it to be eternal. He explains that there are two kinds of eternality. That is eternal which is permanent and changeless. This is one kind of eternality. That is also eternal the essence of which endures through change and is constant. This is the other kind of eternality. And it is this second kind of eternality which belongs to substance.[2]

It is interesting to find that, according to Patañjali, sub-tance is not perceived but inferred. Our readers will see that, in contradistinction to this view, *VS* posits the perceptibility of many substances. Our interpretation of Patañjali here is certainly different from that of Kaiyaṭa according to whom Patañjali does not purport to deny the perception of substance but takes recourse to inference just to satisfy those who do not believe in perception as a means of valid knowledge.[3] We feel that Kaiyaṭa assumes too much about the intention of Patañjali.

Incidentally, the 'avayavin' of Patañjali is different from his 'guṇin' or substance. The latter is something different

---

1. द्रव्यं हि नित्यम्, आकृतिरनित्या । कथं ज्ञायते ? एवं हि दृश्यते लोके—मृत् कयाचिदाकृत्या युक्तापिण्डो भवति, पिण्डाकृतिमुपमृद्य घटिकाः क्रियन्ते, घटिकाकृतिमुपमृद्य कुण्डिकाः क्रियन्ते । यथा सुवर्णं कयाचिदाकृत्या युक्तं पिण्डो भवति, पिण्डाकृतिमुपमृद्य रुचकाः क्रियन्ते, रुचकाकृतिमुपमृद्य कटकाः क्रियन्ते, कटकाकृतिमुपमृद्य स्वस्तिकाः क्रियन्ते । पुनरावृत्तः सुवर्णपिण्डः पुनरपरयाऽऽकृत्या युक्तः खदिराङ्गारसवर्णे कुण्डले भवतः । आकृतिरन्या चान्या च भवति, द्रव्यं पुनस् तदेव । आकृत्युपमर्देन द्रव्यमेवावशिष्यते । *Ibid.*, I, p. 21. Cp. *Suśruta-Saṁhitā* 1..40.3, p. 145 (नित्यं हि द्रव्यमनित्या गुणाः ) ।

2. अथवा नेदमेव नित्यलक्षणम्--ध्रुवं कूटस्थमविचाल्यनपायोपजनविकार्यनुत्पत्त्यवृद्ध्यव्यययोगि यत् तन् नित्यमिति । तदपि नित्यं यस्मिंस् तत्त्वं न विहन्यते । किं पुनस् तत्त्वम् ? तद्भावस् तत्त्वम् । *PVM*, p. 21. Cp. द्वयी चेयं नित्यता—कूटस्थनित्यता परिणामिनित्यता च ।...यस्मिन् परिणम्यमाने तत्त्वं न विहन्यते तन् नित्यम् । *YBh*. 4.33, p. 451.

3. अनुमानगम्यमिति । यद्यपि गुणव्यतिरिक्तद्रव्यवादिभिः प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणग्राह्यं द्रव्यमभ्युपगतं, रूपाद्यालम्बनप्रत्ययविलक्षणपदार्थालम्बनप्रत्ययोत्पादात्, तथाऽपि प्रत्यक्षे विप्रतिपन्नं प्रति साक्षिस्थानीयानुमानोपन्यासः । प्रत्यक्षापलापिनं प्रति प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकानुमानासंभवात् सामान्यतो दृष्टमनुमानमुपन्यस्यते—ओषधिवनस्पतीनामिति । *MP* 5.1.119.5, IV, p. 298.

from, and over and above, attributes, whereas the former is just an aggregate of avayava-s or parts.[1] Here, too, he differs with the Naiyāyika whose avayavin is not an aggregate but a whole.[2]

Vyāsa, the commentator of *YS*, quotes a Patañjali who defines substance as the aggregate of organically related parts, such as the body or the tree.[3] This Patañjali is certainly different from the author of *PVM* or of *YS*. Vyāsa's own definition of substance is 'the aggregate of sāmānya and viśeṣa',[4] the two technical terms used being defined as the elements and their properties respectively.[5] One thing is clear : Vyāsa is an advocate of the unity or identity of substance and attribute. That is why, while mentioning earth etc., he has not forgotten to mention the attributes.[6]

Both Kātyāyana and Patañjali define attribute as something which serves to distinguish one substance from ano-

---

1. अवयावात्मकः समुदायः। अभ्यन्तरो हि समुदायेऽवयवः। तद् यथा—वृक्षः प्रचलन् सहावयवैः प्रचलति। *PVM* 6.1.1.13, V, p. 6. Cp. अवयवविधाने अवयविनि प्रत्ययः। *KV* 5.2.42.1, p. 322. Patañjali's commentary on this Vārtika runs thus : अथ अवयविनीत्युच्यमानेऽवयवस्वामिनि कस्मान् न भवति—पञ्चपश्ववयवा देवदत्तस्येति ? अवयवशब्दोऽयं गुणशब्दः, अस्येति च वर्तते। तेन यं प्रत्यवयवो गुणः, तस्मिन्नवयविनि प्रत्ययेन भवितव्यम्। कं च प्रत्यवयवो गुणः ? समुदायम्। *PVM*, ad loc. Nāgeśa comments :'...कं च प्रत्यवयवो गुणः ? समुदायम्' इति भाष्येणायुतसिद्धावयवानुगतस् तत्समूह एवावयवीति ध्वनितम्। 'स्त्रियां च' (७.१.४६) इति सूत्रे स्पष्टमेवैतदुक्तम्। *MPU*, ad loc., p. 323.
2. ...अस्ति द्रव्यान्तरभूतोऽवयवीति। *NBh.* 2.1.35, p. 100.
3. अयुतसिद्धावयवः सङ्घातः शरीरं, वृक्षः, परमाणुरिति। अयुतसिद्धावयवभेदानुगतः समूहो द्रव्यमिति पतञ्जलिः। *YBh.* 3.44, p. 367.
4. सामान्यविशेषसमुदायोऽत्र द्रव्यम्। *Ibid.*, pp. 365-366.
5. तत्र पार्थिवाद्याः शब्दादयो विशेषाः...। *Ibid.*, p. 363. मूर्तिर् भूमिः, स्नेहो जलम्, वह्निरुष्णता, वायुः प्रणामी, सर्वतो गतिराकाश इत्येतत् स्वरूपशब्देनोच्यते, अस्य सामान्यस्य शब्दादयो विशेषाः। *Ibid.*, p. 365. पार्थिवादिशिब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धा विशेषाः। *Bhāsvatī* 3.44, p.365. सामान्यं धर्मी, विशेषो धर्माः; तेषां समुदायो द्रव्यम्। *Loc. cit.*
6. सर्वं चैतद् धर्मधर्मिणोरभेदविवक्षयाऽभिधानम्। *Tattvavaiśāradī* 3.44, p. 365 ; न तु ताभ्यां तत्समुदायाच् च तदाधारमपरं द्रव्यमुपलभामहे। *Ibid.*, p. 366.

ther.[1] The latter illustrates the definition by citing the example of one and the same water becoming two kinds of water, viz. cold water and hot water, thanks to the difference between the attributes.[2] He adds, however, that sometimes attributes are found to be non-distinctive as well. For example, Devadatta retains his name even when he becomes shaven--headed or long-haired, or wears a śikhā ( pigtail ). Likewise, a bull remains a bull whether it is young, grown-up, old, a calf, or a bull yet to be trained or tamed ( damya ).[3]

Patañjali has it that sometimes attributes serve to qualify a substance ( guṇin ), as in the case of 'white cloth', and sometimes attributes are qualified by the substance, as in the case of 'the white of the cloth.'[4]

The most comprehensive and precise definition of attribute is found in two verses of *PVM* which read thus : 'Attribute is what abides in substance, perishes, is found in different classes, is a superstratum, is not produced by action, and is essentially different from substance.[5] Attribute is

---

1. भेदकत्वाद् गुणस्य । *KV* 1.1.1.17, I, p. 108 ; भेदकत्वाद् गुणस्य । भेदका गुणाः । *PVM* 1.1.1.17, I, p. 108.
2. कथं पुनर् ज्ञायते, भेदका गुणा इति ? एवं हि दृश्यते लोको, एकोऽयमात्मा उदकं नाम, तस्य गुणभेदादन्यत्वं भवति—अन्यदिदं शीतम्, अन्यदिदं उष्णमिति । *Loc. cit.*
3. ननु च, भो, अभेदका अपि गुणा दृश्यन्ते । तद् यथा—देवदत्तो मुण्ड्यपि, जट्यपि, शिख्यपि स्वामाख्यां न जहातिः ; तथा बालः, युवा, वृद्धः, वत्सः, बलीवर्द इति [स्वामाख्यां न जहातीति शेषः] । उभयमिदं गुणेषूक्तम्—भेदका अभेदका इति । किं पुनरत्र न्याय्यम् ? अभेदका गुणा इत्येव न्याय्यम् । कुत एतत् ? यदयम् 'अस्थिदधिसक्थ्यक्ष्णामनङ् दात्तः' इत्युदात्तग्रहणं करोति तज् ज्ञापयत्याचार्यो,ऽभेदका गुणा इति । यदि हि भेदका गुणाः स्युः, उदात्तमेवोच्चारयेत् । यदि तर्ह्यभेदका गुणा अनुदात्तादेरन्तोदात्ताच् च यदुच्यते तत् स्वरितादेः स्वरितान्ताच् च प्राप्नोति । नैष दोषः । आश्रीयमाणो गुणो भेदको भवति । तद् यथा—'शुक्लमालभेत', 'कृष्णमालभेत ।' *Ibid.*, pp. 108-110. It is difficult to be sure about the meaning of Patañjali here, but it seems that he allows both the definitions of attribute and tries vaguely to delimit their spheres.
4. इह कदाचिद् गुणो गुणिविशेषको भवति । तद् यथा—पटः शुक्ल इति । कदाचिच् च गुणिना गुणो व्यपदिश्यते—पटस्य शुक्ल इति । *Ibid.* 1.4.21, II, p. 236 ; 5.1.119.4, IV, pp. 273-274.
5. सत्त्वे निविशते,ऽपैति, पृथग् जातिषु दृश्यते,
आधेयश् चाक्रियाजश् च, सोऽसत्त्वप्रकृतिर् गुणः ॥ *Ibid.*, 4.1.44, IV, p. 62.

traditioned to be holding to one, parting with a nother, seen in other substances also, denoting all genders, and being other than substance.[1] Patañjali describes attributes as non-eternal.[2] But he makes it clear in another context that substance never can remain without attribute.[3] We shall see in due course that this view is contray to the view of the later Naiyāyikas who hold that substance remains attributeless in its first moment of production.

The question, already referred to in connexion with the statement of the Naiyāyika's concept of attribute, whether an individual attribute, say blue-colour, is one and eternal or otherwise, seems to have interested our grammarians much but not the Naiyāyikas (including the ancient Vaiśeṣikas). Patañjali discusses the question whether such a guṇa as white-colour is one or many, without taking sides, in the context of the question whether it is dravya (substance) or jāti (class) or guṇa that has degrees (or gradations), to which his reply is that it is guṇa that has degrees.[4] Let us enjoy the discussion : The question is raised whether white-colour is one or many. The author offers a suggestion, 'Let white-colour be one but complex. What sort of complexity ? That relating to lessness and moreness.' The author offers an alternative suggestion, Or let white-colour be one but simple.

---

In *Bālamanoramā* and *Tattvabodhinī* on Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita's *Sidlhān akaumudī*, Strīpratyaya-Prakaraṇa 15, under the Sūtra वोतो गुणवचनात् (*PA* 4.1.44), pp. 559-560, Vāsudeva Dīkṣita and Jñanendra Sarasvatī respectivey explain the verse in detail.

1. उपैत्यन्यज्, जहात्यन्यद्, दृष्टो द्रव्यान्तरेष्वपि, वाचकः सर्वलिङ्गानां, द्रव्यादन्यो गुणः स्मृतः ॥ *PVM* 4.1.44, IV, p. 63.
2. अनित्या गुणा, अपायिन, उपायिनश् च । *Ibid.* 1.2.64.56, II, p. 96.
3. न गुणो गुणिनं व्यभिचरति । *Ibid.* 5.2.94.3, IV, p. 34 9
4. गुणस्य चैव प्रकर्षो, न द्रव्यस्य । *Ibid.* 5.3.55, IV, p. 376. Cp. 'No substance, it seems, has degrees or admits of a more and a less.' Aristotle, *The Categories, Organon*, p. 31 ; 'Qualities admit of degrees.' *Ibid.*, p. 75. The problems of degrees vis-á-vis dravya and guṇa on one hand and substance and quality on the other has been dealt with at length by Patañjali and Aristotle respectively and the reader cannot fail to notice the striking parallelism between them.

But, then, says the imaginary objector, 'It cannot admit of degrees ( or shades ); for it cannot shade off into itself.' The author replies, It is possible for degrees to subsist on account of white-colour's being obscured by another guṇa. The author offers a third suggestion, Or let white-colour be many. But, then, the objector rejoins, 'We ought to compare only similar guṇa-s : there can be no comparison of black with white.' The author's reply is, 'It is not necessary to do so.' Only between similar guṇa-s does rivalry exist. There is no rivalry between "rich" and "beautiful".'[1]

Thus, it is evident that Patañjali pointedly poses the problem of one and many in regard to white-colour and offers us three alternative theses without committing himself to any. Nāgeśa, a sub-commentator of Patañjali, tries, in an independent work, to explain the non-committal attitude of the latter by maintaining that, by referring to the conflicting truths about the same reality, Patañjali seeks to show up the unreality of empirical objects.[2]

Nāgeśa keeps the problem alive and makes important contribution to it. He is categorically of the opinion that attributes like white-colour etc. are not many but one and eternal each. The experience of diversity of, say, white-colour, is due to the diversity of its substrata.[3]

---

1. किं पुनरेकं शौक्ल्यम्, आहोस्विन् नाना ? किं चातः ? यद्येकं, प्रकर्षो नोपपद्यते ; न हि तेनैव तस्य प्रकर्षो भवति। अथ नाना, समानगुणग्रहणं कर्तव्यम्—शुक्लात् कृष्णे मा भूदिति।

अस्त्वेकं शौक्ल्यम्, तत् तु विशेषवत्। किङ्कृतो विशेषः ? अल्पत्वमहत्त्वकृतः। अथवा पुनरस्त्वेकं निर्विशेषं च। ननु चोक्तम्, 'प्रकर्षो नोपपद्यते ; न हि तेनैव तस्य प्रकर्षो भवति' इति। गुणान्तरेण प्रच्छादनात् प्रकर्षो भविष्यति।

अथवा पुनरस्तु नाना। ननु चोक्तम्, 'समानगुणग्रहणं कर्तव्यम्। शुक्लात् कृष्णे मा भूत्' इति। न कर्तव्यम्। 'समानगुण एव स्पर्धा भवति। न ह्याढ्याभिरूपौ स्पर्धेते। *PVM* 5.3.55, IV, p. 378.

2. अथवा 'नाना शौक्ल्यादि' इति भाष्ये उक्तम्। अनेनैकत्र वस्तुन्यनेकपक्षोपन्यासेन व्यवहारोपपादकपदार्थानामवास्तवत्वं सूचितम्। Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, *Vaiyākaraṇa-siddhāntalaghumañjūṣā*, p. 455.

3. न चानन्त्यं शुक्लादिगुणानाम्, एकत्वनित्यत्वस्वीकारात्। भेदौपाधिकस् तु भेद-व्यवहारः। एकोऽपि सावयवः, अत एवाल्पत्वमहत्त्वकृतो भेदः। *Ibid.*, p. 1125.

Any account of Patañjali's conception of attribute will remain incomplete without a refereece to the fact that his 'attribute' is much more comprehensive than the Naiyāyika's. Kātyāyana has ruled that such attributes on the basis of which substance is named are to be expressed by the use of the suffixes '-tva' and 'tal',[1] their English equivalents being '-ness', '-hood', generally speaking. Treeness (vṛkṣatva or vṛkṣatā) is a case in point. Patañjali has it, as we have seen, that such words are substance-words as well as attribute-words.[2] If they are attribute-words, attribute as conceived by Kātyāyana and Patañjali comprehends within its compass the Naiyāyika's universal as well, for the latter will unhesitatingly call such words universals. As a matter of fact, as pointed out by Kaiyaṭa, the word attribute as used by Kātyāyana and Patañjali includes everything, including universal, that characterizes, or subsists in, a substance.[3] Indeed, this tradition has been well maintained by Bhartṛhari[4] and other writers on the philosophy of grammar.

Thus, we see that the categories substance and attribute subscribed to by Kaṇāda are also subscribed to by Patañjali. We shall now see that the former's category motion (karman) has its counterpart in the latter's category action ( kriyā ).

Patañjali describes action in terms of activity ( īhā ), movement ( ceṣṭā ), and operation ( vyāpāra ).[5] Later, he contends that action is wholly imperceptible, not only minimal or atomic activities but the entire procession of activities

1. सिद्धं तु यस्य गुणस्य भावाद् द्रव्ये शब्दनिवेशस् तदभिधाने त्वतलौ । *KV* 5.1.119.5, IV, p. 295.
2. उभयवचना ह्येते, द्रव्यं चाहुर् गुणं च । *PVM* 5.1.119.5, IV, p. 300.
3. गुणशब्देन यावान् कश्चित् पराश्रयो भेदको जात्यादिरर्थः स सर्व इह गृह्यते । *MP* 5.1.119.5, IV, p. 295.
4. संसर्गिभेदकं यद् यत् सव्यापारं प्रतीयते । गुणत्वं परतंत्रत्वात् तस्य शास्त्र उदाहृतम् ॥ *VP* 3.5.1, p. 145. Helārāja comments thereon : जातेरपि पारतन्त्र्याद् द्रव्ये समवायाद् गुणत्वमुक्तम् । Ad loc.
5. का पुनः क्रिया ? ईहा । का पुनरीहा ? चेष्टा । का पुनश् चेष्टा ? व्यापारः । *PVM* 1.3.1.4, II, p. 114.

forming one action.[1] Indeed, he declares action to be an object of inference, [2] in contradistinction to others who treat it as an object of perception.

Patañjali states the inference leading to the reality of action thus : Where everything is ready for cooking, we sometimes say that cooking is being done and sometimes that cooking is not being done. What makes us say that cooking is being done ( or that cooking is not being done ), is action.[3] Patañjali mentions one more mode of inference in this behalf, which is this: That by which, say, Devadatta who was here is found in Pāṭaliputra, is called action.[4]

In the next chapter, we shall see that there was a time when all things or existents were regarded as mere modifications of action for which the term used was bhāva. We need not try to anticpate the whole discussion of the topic here.

We see that in *PVM* substance and action are not so well defined as in *VS* and that attribute, though in certain respects more thoroughy defined than in *VS*, has not been so exhaustively classified. *VS* enumerates seventeen attributes, whereas *PVM* only five, and at places suggests certain other attributes as well without expanding the list. All this goes to show that the treatment of the three categories in *PVM* is, on the whole, more primitive than in the extant text of *VS*. We are, however, not in a position to hazard any conclusion about the antiquity of the original core of the work. This being the case, we cannot say whether, originally, it was *VS* which took over these categories from *PVM* or the other way round.

---

1. क्रियानामेयमत्यन्तापरिदृष्टाऽशक्या पिण्डीभूता निदर्शयितुम्। *Ibid.*. p. 115 ; 3.2.115, III, p. 190 (with the substitution of अपरदृष्टा for अपरदृष्टा and addition of अनुमानगम्या before अशक्या ).
2. सासावनुमानगम्या ।...*Ibid.* 1.3.1.4, II, p. 115 ; ...अनुमानगम्या...। *Ibid.* 3.2.115, III, p. 190.
3. कोऽसावनुमानः ? इह सर्वेषु साधनेषु सन्निहितेषु कदाचित् पचतीत्येतद् भवति कदाचिन् न भवति। यस्मिन् सन्निहिते पचतीत्येद् भवति सा नूनं क्रिया। *Ibid.* 1.3.1.4, II, p. 115.
4. अथ वा यया देवत्त इह भूत्वा पाटलिपुत्रे भवति सा नूनं क्रिया। *Loc. cit.*

Apparently, the treatment in the one treatise is independent of that in the other.

**4) Rèsumè of the foregoing discussion** : The foregoing discussion leaves us with the impression that originally the whole of an individual, be it an individual being or a piece of matter, was called substance. Then the word substance was synonymous with 'thing' or 'a being'. Gradually, distinction began to be made within the individual itself and it transpired that it consisted of a number of attributes supported by a substratum. Thenceforth, in philosophic parlance, the term substance was pinned down to this supportive substratum, and the superstratum came to be termed attribute.

Motion appears to have all along been treated as something over and above the complex of substratum and superstratum called 'thing' or 'individual'. It was not a component part of the thing or the individul. It was wholly external to them. As we shall have occasion to see, it was quite at a later stage that thinkers began to compare motion with attribute and some of them came to the conclusion that they were essentially non-different from each other.

## CHAPTER VII

# RECOGNITION OF EXISTENCE AS A CATEGORY

### 1. INTRODUCTORY

We have seen that the three existential categories were the first to be postulated. They are existential because they all *exist* or are affiliated to existence, as we shall see presently. The catgories which we are going to discuss now are not so affiliated. They *are* but do not *exist*. In order to distinguish them from the existential categories, we have chosen to term them subsistential categories. In the West, existence is distinguished from subsistence in a more or less similar manner, broadly speaking. This point will be resumed in Chapter XIII.

We do not agree with Bodas and others who claim that the popular list of six categories was for the first time introduced by Praśastapāda. The six categories were ascribed to Kaṇāda not only by Praśastapāda himself, though implicitly, but also by the *Āvaśyaka-Sūtra* of the Jainas of high antiquity, *CS*, and certain Buddhist writers—all of whom cannot be placed after Praśastapāda. It appears that people began to read the table of six categories in *VS* itself even before the time of Praśastapāda. However, their identification of the six categories differs in some measure, which circumstance is an additional ground for supposing that the fourth Sūtra of *VS* giving the list of six categories did not exist then. All this we shall dilate upon on the proper occasion in the sequel.

### 2. EXISTENCE AS A NEW CATEGORY

It appears that among the later categories existence ( sattā or bhāva ) was the first to be recognized as a category.

## 3. EVIDENCE

*VS* expressly declares that existence is something different from substance, attribute, and motion.[1] The treatise is not so categorical as regards the other universals—substancehood, attribute-ness, and motion-ness—which, however, it does mention.[2] In due course, we shall see how existence has been accorded an independent place in the list of categories postulated by Candra, a Vaiśeṣika writer of sufficient antiquity, possibly belonging to 554-640. He must have taken his cue from the ancient tradition of so treating existence.

Khwēi-ci, a disciple of Yuan Chwang ( 648 ) and propagator of Buddhist idealism (vijñānavāda) in China, mentions substance, attribute, motion, existence, universal-particular, and inherence as the six categories in which, he claims, Ulūka, the father of the Vaiśeṣika system according to him, instructed his disciple Pañcaśikhī.[3] He says that the master could explain the category existence to the disciple with much greater difficulty than the other categories which the latter accepted without any questioning.[4] So, when Candra, not far removed from Praśastapāda who did not postulate existence as a separate category, and Khwēi-ci, only slightly later than Candra, postulate existence as a separate category, the latter going as far as to attribute its original postulation to the very founder of the Vaiśeiṣka system, its origin must be anterior to Praśastapāda.

Well, though there is little evidence to establish conclusively that the recognition of existence as an independent category precedes the recognition of universal-particular or universal as an independent category, Kaṇāda's solicitude for making it plain that existence is a category different from substance, attribute, and motion, does create an impression that the recognition of existence is anterior to the recogni-

1. द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मभ्योऽर्थान्तरं सत्ता । *VS* 1.2.8.
2. See *Ibid.*, 1.2.12,14, and 16.
3. See *VPDS*, p. 7.
4. See *ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

tion of universal-particular as a category. Certainly, Kaṇāda does not evince the same concern for distinguishing the category universal-particular from the three existential categories.

### 4. A STATEMENT OF THE CATEGORY

In *VS*, not much has been said on existence as a category. It is said to be a pure, absolute universal ( sāmānyam eva ),[1] incapable of behaving as a particular, in contradistinction to other universals. It is the ground of the notion 'existent' arising from substance, attribute, and motion.[2] It is said to be an entity different from substance, attribute, and motion.[3] Being resident in attribute and motion, it is neither the one nor the other.[4] Why has Kaṇāda not cared to explain that it is not identical with substance as well ? Śaṅkara Miśra has it that it is implied in the Sūtra that existence is not identical with even substance in which, too, it does reside.[5] Candrānanda and Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra, the two older commentators on *VS* whose commentaries have come down to us, are silent on the point. Faddegon's explanation of the omission of substance in this context is rather more appealing: '...the Sūtrakṛt did not expect a confusion between existence and *dravyatva*, but only between existence and the other two categories; for we see in language the participle *sat* used in the same way as e. g. the adjective *Śukla* and the verbum finitum *bhavati* as *gacchati*.'[6] That existence is identical with none of substance, attribute, and motion is also borne out by the fact that it possesses neither a universal nor a differential,

---

1. भावः सामान्यमेव । *VS* 1.2.4. Śrīdhara says : यद्यप्येषा सामान्यादिभ्यो व्यावर्तते, तथापि न तेभ्यः स्वाश्रयं व्यावर्तयितुं शक्नोति, तेषामपि स्वरूपसंत्तासबुद्धिसंवेद्यत्वात् । वस्त्वपेक्षया चानुवृत्तिहेतुत्वं विवक्षितं, तेनाभावाद् व्यावृत्तिहेतुत्वेऽपि न दोषः । *NK*, p. 12.
2. सदिति यतो द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मसु । *VS* 1.2.7.
3. द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मभ्योऽर्थान्तरं सत्ता । *Ibid.* 1.2.8.
4. गुणकर्मसु च भावान् न कर्म न गुणः । *Ibid.* 1.2.10.
5. न गुणो न कर्मेति वक्तव्ये व्यत्ययेनाभिधानं न द्रव्यमित्यपि सूचयति । *VSU* 1.2.9, p. 40
6. *VSF*, p. 118.

which, otherwise, it must.[1] Existence is one, is a unity; for the notion 'existent' is unitary and uniform and lacks variety.[2]

It is significant that existence is said to reside in substance, attribute, and motion only. It means that universal. differential, and inherence are not endowed with existence. Nothing whatsoever has been said in *VS* as regards the status of these categories vis-*à*-vis existence. We shall see in due course how the problem has been sought to be tackled by Praśastapāda and others.

The second lesson ( āhnika ) of the opening chapter of *VS* in all contains 18 Sūtras, which, barring two opening Sūtras dealing with causality and thereby, logically, belonging to the first lesson, are all devoted to existence, universals, and ultimate paticulars. Sūtra 3 declares that universal and viśeṣa are relative to reflection ( buddhyapekṣa ). We relegate the interpretation of this Sūtra to a later occasion. Sūtra 4 says that existence is pure universal ( for it is responsible for assimilative cognition only ). Unlike existence, Sūtra 5 describes substancehood, attributeness, and motion-ness as both universal and particular or universal-particular. Sūtra 6 purports to say that ultimate particulars are not universal--particulars but particulars only. The correct import of this Sūtra will be discussed fully while considering the evolution of differential as a category. Sūtras 7 to 11 deal with existence. Sūtras 12 to 17 deal with substanceness, attributeness, and motionness. In the concluding, 18th Sūtra, however, the topic of existence has been resumed. With a slight manipulation of the context, the whole section on universals is susceptible of an interpretation radically different from the one offered by us in the preceding paragraph. It is just to outline this possible interpretation that we have thought it fit to summarize the whole lesson on the subject.

That interpretation may be something like this. Substancehood, attribute-ness, and motion-ness are not different from

1. सामान्यविशेषाभावाच् च । *VS* 1.2.11.
2. सल्लिङ्गाविशेषाद् विशेषलिङ्गाभावाच् चैको भाव इति । *Ibid.* 1.2.18.

existence. Existence itself is described as substancehood, attribute-ness, and motion-ness as limited to its respective loci.[1] Possibly, the word 'uktam' in Sūtras 12,[2] 14,[3] and 16[4] of the lesson under examination is a misreading of the word 'ukta'. If tne Sūtras are so read, they will certainly mean that existence itself is called substancehood, attribute-ness, and motion-ness, after its respective loci. In that case, these Sūtras will be reduced to the status of mere predications of existence. The justification for this interpretation is threefold. Firstly, as we have already noticed, existence is described as something different from substance, attribute, and motion. A similar statement is wanting in respect of substancehood etc. This cannot be without signficance in the present context. Secondly, existence has been distinguished from substance, attribute, and motion only, and not from substancehood etc. as well. Thirdly, after dealing with existence in Sūtras 7 to 11 and with substancehood etc. in Sūtras 11 to 17, the topic of existence is resumed in Sūtra 18, which is the concluding Sūtra of the lesson. This implies that substancehood etc. are treated only as subordinate to and derivative of existence, and that they do not constitute a category different from existence. If this interpretation is correct, ultimate particulars will also be reducible to existence as limited to infima species. This point will be discussed fully in connexion with the treatment of the category differential.

In this connexion one may invoke the fact that *VS* has passed through several redactions and that therefore there might

---

1. Cp. सम्बन्धिभेदात् सत्तैव भिद्यमाना गवादिषु
जातिरित्युच्यते, तस्यां सर्वे शब्दाः व्यवस्थिताः ॥ *VP* 3.1.33.
Vyomaśivācārya refers to and refutes this view of universal thus : अथैकमेव सामान्यं सत्तालक्षणमुपाधिभेदाद् भिन्नप्रत्ययसम्पादकमित्येतस्य निरासार्थमाह—द्रव्यादिषु वृत्तिनियमात् प्रत्ययभेदाच् च परस्परतश् चान्यत्वम् इति। *Vyomavatī*, p. 689.

2. एकद्रव्यवत्त्वेन द्रव्यत्वमुक्तम्। *VS* 1.2.12.

3. गुणेषु भावाद् गुणत्वमुक्तम्। *Ibid.* 1.2.14.

4. कर्मणि भावात् कर्मत्वमुक्तम्। *Ibid.* 1.2.16.

have been confusion in the order of the Sūtras. Might it not be that, in the confusion that ensued following the redactions and tamperings, the word 'uktam' came somehow to replace 'ukta'?

The only fault that one can find with this interpretation of substancehood etc. is that to make it sound plausible one has to assume without sufficient reason that the three Sūtras containing the word 'uktam' are corrupt ones.

To us both the interpretations seem plausible in their own ways and we have no better means to decide between them than pure speculation. However, the hypothesis that the Sūtras in question are corrupt ones would lend support as much to the opponents of the second interpretation as to its protagonists,

## 5. GENESIS OF THE CATEGORY

**1) The Vedic-Upaniṣadic sources of the notion of 'sat' :** In the last analysis, and only in the last analysis, the evolution of the category existence can be traced to the notion of 'sat' found opposed to 'a-sat' in the Vedic and Upaniṣadic literature. *RV* says that God produced the world 'with blast and smelting, like a smith' and that 'in the former age of the gods, "sat" was born of "a-sat"?'[1] The birth of sat from a-sat is reiterated in the next verse as well.[2] A third *RV* verse seems to speak of a still earlier age in which there was neither sat, nor a-sat, nor rajas etc.[3] But it adds that then there was the One existing by its own power, other than which there was nothing whatever.[4] A Brāhmaṇa text identi-

---

1. ब्रह्मणस्पतिरेता सं कर्मार इवाधमत् । देवानां पूर्व्ये युगेऽसतः सदजायत ।। *RV* 10.72.2.
2. देवानां युगे प्रथमेऽसतः सदजायत । तदाशा अन्वजायन्त, तदुत्तानपदस् परि ।। *Ibid.* 3.
3. नासदासीन्, नो सदासीत् तदानीं, नासीद् रजो, नो व्योमा परो यत् ।
   किमावरीवः ? कुह ? कस्य शर्मन् ? नम्भः किमासीद् गहनं गभीरम् ?।। *Ibid.* 10.129.1.
4. न मृत्युरासीदमृतं न तर्हि, न रात्र्या अह्न आसीत् प्रकेतः ।
   आनीदवातं स्वधया तदेकं, तस्माद् धान्यन् न परः किञ्चनास ।। *Ibid.* 2

fies the a-sat of this verse with intelligence ( manas ).[1] Another Brāhmaṇa text seems to identify a-sat with seers (ṛṣayaḥ) or vital breaths ( prāṇāḥ ).[2] It appears that, though the words 'sat' and 'a-sat' do seem to bear some relation to 'existence' and 'non-existence' respectively, their meaning is by no means exhausted thereby. Sāyaṇa construes them to mean 'manifest' and 'unmanifest' respectively.[3] Whatever might have been the case, there is every reason to believe that it is 'sat' and 'a-sat' which came gradually to develop into the categorial notons of existence and non-existence.

This development seems to have taken place in the Saṁhitā texts themselves. *RV* itself uses the word sattā in the sense of existence.[4] In the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* the question is raised, How can existence (sat) come out of non-existence (a-sat)?[5] It seems to belong to a time when the meaning of the terms 'sat' and 'a-sat' had been pinned down to 'existence' and 'non-existence' respectively.

The Vaiśeṣikas were also led, in course of time, to postulate non-existence or non-being ( abhāva ) as an independent category.

**2) Existence and the ancient notion of becoming (bhāva):** Yāska quotes a thinker named Vārṣyāyaṇi as preaching that 'bhāva' has six modifications which can be expressed as 'comes into being' (jāyate), 'exists' or 'subsists' (asti), 'changes'

---

1. नेव वा इदमग्रेऽसदासीत् । आसीदिव वा इदमग्रे नेवासीत्, तद्ध तन् मन एवास । तस्मादेतद् ऋषिणाऽभ्यनूक्तम्—'नासदासीन्, नो सदासीत् तदानीम्'— इति । नेव हि सन् मनो नेवासीत । *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* 10.5.3 1-2, part IV, pp. 155-156.
2. असद् वा इदमग्र आसीत् ।...ऋषयो वाव ते अग्रेऽसदासीत् ।...प्राणा वा ऋषयः । *Ibid.* 6.1.1.1, Part III, p. 1.
3. असतः नामरूपवर्जितत्वेनासत्समानाद् ब्रह्मणः सकाशात् सत् नामरूपविशिष्टं देवादिकम् अजायत प्रादुरभूत् । *Sāyaṇa* on *RV* 10.72.2, IV, p. 538 ; असदव्यक्त-नामरूपम् । Sāyaṇa on *Śtapatha-Brāhmaṇa* 6.1.1.1, Part III, p. 1.
4. यस् त्वद्धोता पूर्वो अग्ने ? यजीयान् द्विता च सत्ता स्वधया च शंभुः
तस्यानु धर्म प्र यजा चिकित्वोऽथा नो धा अध्वरं देववीतौ ॥
(*Śākalā-Śaiśirīyā*) *Ṛg-Veda-Saṁhitā* 3.17.5.
5. कथमसतः सज् जायेत ? *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 6.2.1.

( vipariṇamate ), 'grows' ( vardhate ), 'decays' ( apakṣīyate ), and 'perishes' (vinaśyati).[1] In interpretation of Vārṣyāyaṇi's view as quoted by Patañjali,[2] Kaiyaṭa observes that that '"bhāva" has six modifications ( vikāra-s )' means either that action ( bhāva or *kriyā* ) is of six kinds ( prakāra-s ) or that existence ( bhāva or *sattā* ) is of six kinds.[3] Taking 'bhāva' in the sense of action, Yāska defines verb ( ākhyāta ) as denotative principally of bhāva.[4] He contrasts verb with noun ( nāman ), which he defines as denotative chiefly of 'thing" or 'existent' ( sattva ).[5] He next divides bhāva into two categories—successive ( pūrvāparībhūta ) and frozen, concreted, or thingified ( mūrta, sattvabhūta ) and adds that the first is expressed in language by verb and the second by noun.[6] This shows that things or existents ( sattva ) are nothing but modifications of action. We have seen that Pāṇini uses the word in the sense of substance. Maybe, he has taken his cue from Vārṣyāyaṇi and Yāska.

According to Durgācārya, Vārṣyāyaṇi held bhāva to be the first cause of all that is, the ultimate reality which manifests itself as substance, attribute, and motion—all.[7]

---

1. षड् भावविकारा भवन्तीति वार्ष्यायणिः—जायते, अस्ति, विपरिणमते, वर्धते, अपक्षीयते, विनश्यतीति । *Nirukta* 1.1.2, p. 19.
2. षड् भावविकारा इति ह स्माह वार्ष्यायणिः—जायते, अस्ति, विपरिणमते, वर्धते, अपक्षीयते, विनश्यतीति । *PVM* 1.3.1 (भूवादयो धातवः). 16. II, p. 124.
3. "षड् भावविकारा" इति । भावस्य क्रियायाः षट् प्रकारा इत्यर्थः । तेषु चास्तिः पठित इति तस्यापि क्रियात्वमित्यर्थः । अथ वा भावस्य सत्ताया एते प्रकाराः । सत्तैवानेकक्रियात्मिका साधनसम्बन्धादवसीयमानसाध्यरूपा जन्मादिरूपतयाऽवभासते । *MP* 1.3.1.16, II, p. 124.
4. भावप्रधानमाख्यातम् । *Nirukta* 1.1.1. p. 5.
5. सत्त्वप्रधानानि नामानि । *Loc. cit.*
6. तद् यत्रोभे, भावप्रधाने भवतः । पूर्वापरीभूतं भावमाख्यातेनाचष्टे—व्रजति, पचतीति । उपक्रमप्रभृत्यपवर्गपर्यन्तं मूर्तं सत्त्वभूतं सत्त्वनामभिः—व्रज्या पक्तिरित्यद इति । सत्त्वानामुपदेशो गौरश्वः, पुरुषो, हस्तीति भवतीति ; भावस्यास्ते, शेते, व्रजति, तिष्ठतीति । *Loc. cit.*
7. इदानीं कारणात्मा भावो निरूप्यते । क्रियाद्रव्ययोः स्वात्मस्थो विशेषः कार्यात्मप्रध्वस्तयोः पुरुषोपयोगसन्तानोपक्षये कार्यात्मभावातीतो येनात्मभावेन भवनमात्राभिसन्धिना प्रलय-

**3) Existence as a predicate—a corollary from the above:** Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, and Patañjali use the word bhāva primarily in the sense of action (kriyā).[1] Kātyāyana observes that a root (dhātu) denotes kriyā[2] or bhāva.[3] Patañjali interprets 'bhāva' as becoming or the become.[4] According to both, 'is', 'becomes', and 'exists', too, denote action and are hence classed under roots.[5] Thus, 'isness', 'being', and 'existence' become mere forms of action and lose their status as a category different from motion. Patañjali raises the question how 'is' and 'exists' can denote action and decides that they do denote action.[6] Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita

---

कालेऽवतिष्ठते सोऽत्यन्ताविनाशधर्मा आत्मा भाव इत्युच्यते।...तद्विकारा एव हि द्रव्यगुणकर्मभावेनावस्थिताः सन्तो नामाख्यातोपसर्गनिपातैरभिधीयन्ते स्थितिकाले। Durgācārya, *Nirukta-Vṛtti*, pp. 26-27.

1. See *PA* 2.3.37 ; *KV* 1.3.1.12 ; 2.3.37.1 ; *PVM* 1.3.1.12, II, pp. 119-12 ; 2.3.37.1, II, p. 510.
2. क्रियावचनो धातुः। *KV* 1.3.1.4.
3. भावचनो धातुः। *Ibid.* 1.3.1.12.
4. कः पुनर् भावः ? भवतेः स्वपदार्थो भवनं भाव इति।...अस्त्वयं कर्तृसाधनः—भवतीति भाव इति।...कर्मसाधनो भविष्यति—भाव्यते यः स भाव इति। क्रिया चैव हि भाव्यते। स्वभावसिद्धं तु द्रव्यम्। *PVM* 1.3.1.12, II, pp. 119-121.
5. See अस्तिभवतिविद्यतीनां च धातुत्वम्। *KV* 1.3.1.7 and *PVM* thereunder.
6. अस्ति-भवति-विद्यतीनां च धातुसंज्ञा वक्तव्या। यथा हि भवता करोतिना पचादीनां सामानाधिकरण्यं दर्शितम्, तथा ऽस्त्यादीनां निदर्श्यते। न हि भवति—किं करोति ?, अस्तीति। *PVM* 1.3.1.7, II, p. 116. कां पुनः क्रियां भवान् मत्वाऽऽह—अस्ति-भवति-विद्यतीनां धातुसंज्ञा न प्राप्नोतीति ? किं यत् तद् देवदत्तः कंसपात्र्यां पाणिनौदनं भुंक्ते इति ? न ब्रूमः कारकाणि क्रियेति। किं तर्हि ? कारकाणां प्रवृत्तिविशेषः क्रिया। अन्यथा च कारकाणि शुष्कौदने प्रवर्तन्ते, अन्यथा च मांसौदने। यद्येवम्, सिद्धाऽस्तिभवतिविद्यतीनां धातुसंज्ञा। अन्यथा हि कारकाणि अस्तौ प्रवर्तन्ते, अन्यथा हि भ्रियतौ।...क्रियायाः क्रिया निर्वर्तिका भवति, द्रव्यं द्रव्यस्य निवर्तकम्। एवं हि कश्चित् कंचित् पृच्छति, 'किमवस्थो देवदत्तस्य व्याधिः ?' इति। स आह, 'वर्धते' इति ; अपर आह, 'अपचीयते' इति ; अपर आह, 'स्थित' इति। स्थित इत्युक्ते वर्धतेश् चापचीयतेश् च निवृत्तिर् भवति। अथवा नान्तरेण क्रियां भूत-भविष्यद्-वर्तमानाः कालाः व्यज्यन्ते।...अथवा नान्यत् पृष्टे नान्यदाख्येयम्। तेन न भविष्यति—किं करोति ?, अस्तीति। *Ibid.* 1.3.1.16, II, pp. 123-124. In explanation of the last sentence Kaiyaṭa remarks : निर्ज्ञातायां सत्तायां किं करोतीति प्रश्नासम्भवादस्तीति प्रतिवचनाभावः। ...यदा तु प्रत्यासन्नविनाशशङ्कया देवदत्तः किं करोतीति प्रश्नः, तदाऽस्ति तावदिति प्रतिवचनं भवत्येव। *MP*, p. 124.

has it that they denote action in that they mean 'does its sustenance' ( ātmadhāraṇaṁ karoti ) or 'sustains itself'[1], performs the act of existing, so to speak. Patañjali has already ruled that apposition ( sāmānādhikaraṇya ) with the verb 'does' ( karoti ) is the sign of action,[2]

Incidentally, even Vātsyāyana seems to use 'is' (asti) once as a predicate of a pitcher, in which passage the word 'dharmāḥ' seems to mean 'predicates'.[3]

4) **The modern criticism of existence as a genuine predicate** :This view of our grammarians is in striking contrast with that of Aristotle, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Russell, Moore, and several contemporaries in the West, according to whom existence is not a genuine predicate of things. Aristotle holds that, 'since being is not a genus, it is not the essence of anything'.[4] But why should it not be regarded as a genus of things ? Because 'the differentiae of any genus must each of them both have being..., but it is not possible for the genus taken apart from its species (any more than for the species of the genus) to be predicated of its proper differentiae; so that if...being is a genus, no differentia will... have being....'[5] Berkeley contends that ther is no 'abstract general idea' of existence. Try to think away all features of a given object excepting existence. What remains ? Nothing, nothing like

---

1. It would be interesting to quote Bhaṭṭoji fully : का पुनः क्रिया ? उच्यते—करोत्यर्थभूता, उत्पादनपर्याया, उत्पत्त्यनुकूलव्यापाररूपा भावनैव क्रिया। सा च सकलधातूनां वाच्या। *Śabdakaustubha* 1 3.1, Vol. II, p. 51. स्यादेतत्—अस्ति-भवति-विद्यतिषु क्रियावाचित्वमव्याप्तम्।...अतएव किं करोतीति प्रश्ने 'पचति' इत्यादिवत् 'अस्ति' इति चेत्, उच्यते—'अस्ति' इत्यादेः स्वरूपधारणं 'करोति' इत्यर्थः। धारणं चोत्तरकालसम्बन्ध :। *Ibid.*, p. 52. Cp. अस्तीति उत्पन्नस्य सत्त्वस्यावधारणम्। *Nirkukta* 1.1.2, p. 19.
2. कथं पुनर् ज्ञायते—क्रियावचनाः पचादय इति ? यदेतेषां करोतिना सामानाधिकरण्यम्। 'किं करोति ?', 'पचति'...इति। *PVM* 1.3.1.4. II, p. 116.
3. गृह्यन्ते तु कुम्भोऽयं श्याम, एको, महान्, संयुक्तः, स्पन्दते, अस्ति, मृण्मयश् चेति। सन्ति चेमे गुणादयो धर्मा इति। *NBh.* 2.1.35, p. 100.
4. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 92 b 13-14.
5. Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 998 b 22-27.

'existence'.[1] Since existence is not a colour, smell, taste, sound, or feeling, it is not a particular idea either. Hence existence is not a quality, not a predicate, of things. Hume writes, 'To reflect on anything simply and to reflect on it as existent, are nothing different from each other. The idea, when conjoined with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it'.[2] Kant regards existence or being as a logical (or grammatical) predicate, not a real predicate. 'Being is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment.'[3] Illustrating the point he goes on, 'The proposition "God is omnipotent", contains two concepts, each of which has its object—God and omnipotence. The small word "is" adds no new predicate, but only serves to posit the predicate *in its relation* to the subject.'[4]

Bertrand Russell says, 'Existence is essentially a property of a propositional function.'[5] A little later he adds that 'existence is a predicate of a propositonal function, or derivatively of a class.'[6] A propositional function is defined as 'any expression containing an undetermined constituent, or several undetermined constituents, and becoming a proposition as soon as the undetermined constituents are determined.'[7] To illustrate the point, he continues, '$x$ is a man' or '$n$ is a number' is a propositional function;'so is any formula of algebra, say $(x+y)(x-y)=x^2-y^2$'.[8] If we substitute, say, 'Socrates' and 'Two'

1. George Berkeley, *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, 81 ; *Philosophical Commentaries*, 671.
2. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, pp. 66-67.
3. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 504.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 504-505.
5. Bertrand Russell, 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', *Logic and Knowledge*, p. 232.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 233.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 230. Italics in the original have been ignored.
8. *Loc. cit.*

for '*x*' and '*n*' respectivly, we obtain the propositions 'Socrates is a man' and 'Two is a number'.3 Now, when you assert of a propositional function 'that it is possible, that it is sometimes true, that gives you the fundamental meanning of "existence"....Take "*x* is a man," there is at least one value of *x* for which it is true. That is what one means by saying that "There are men", or that "Men exist."'[6] J. L. Austin writes, '"Exist", of course, is itself extremely tricky. The word is a verb, but it does not describe something that things do all the time, like breathing,only quieter —ticking over, as it were, in a metaphysical sort of way.'[7]

Contrary views are also met with in the West sometimes. So, John Laird criticizes Hume, saying, 'When we think of an angel and judge that an angel exists, the angel has the same characteristics in both cases. The only difference is that we judge that it exists in the second case and not in the first. This difference, however, is all-important. Indeed, it is so important that it refutes Hume's argument. Anyone can think of an angel stirring the waters, but not everyone is constrained to believe that a real angel really stirred them.'[8]

It is a very fine argument, indeed. The difference between real and ideal/unreal is fundamental, to be sure. It is only by courtesy that we can say that we can imagine, for example, a horse and then the *same* horse as existing. The two horses are not the same but radically different, in so far as the one is ideal/unreal and the other, real. Kant seems to make too much of, and take too literally, 'the same' used in such circumstances as illustrated above, contending that the addition of the grammatical predicate 'as existing' or 'existence' does not make the least addition to the thing and that 'Otherwise, it would not be exactly the same thing that exists, but something more than we had thought in the con-

6. *Ibid.*, p. 232.
7. J. L. Austin, *Sense and Sensibilia*, p. 68, f.n.
8. John Laird, *A Study in Realisn*, p. 118.

cept ; and we could not, therefore, say that the exact object of my concept exists.'[1] He adds that 'If we think in a thing every feature of reality except one, the missing reality is not added by my saying that this defective thing exists.'[2] But Kant seems to forget that reality is a unique feature of things unanalyzable into their other features.

Again, pure, determinate existence is also thinkable. J. N. Findlay writes; 'There is such a thing as the mere singling out, or the taking account, or the mere "hailing" of something which is presupposed by any act of classification or characterization. This is the sort of singling out that might be expressed by such words as "Lo and behold this !" or "Good heavens, that !", or simply by the use of a demonstrative word or phrase.'[3] Another author, Richard Taylor, brings a useful consideration to bear upon the Kantian denial of the status of a real predicate to existence. The substance of Kant's contention is that, if we predicate existence of something grammatically, we predicate nothing of it really, ontologically : that we do not make the least addition to the thing if we declare that a thing of such and such description also exists. Taylor recalls St. Anselm's distinction between two kinds of existence, existence *in intellectu* and existence *in re*, namely ideal existence and real existence. Kant rules out the possibility of transition from the former to the latter. But, Taylor contends, everybody is 'accustomed to making this transition when it comes to *denying* the existence *in re* of certain things.' Take the example of the existence in intellectu of a plane four-sided figure, all of whose points are equidistant from the centre. From this, one is irresistibly led to conclude that no such thing exists in re. Nobody questions the propriety of doing so, and yet it is a clear case of transition from the first kind of existence to the other kind of existence or non-existence in re.[4]

---

1. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 505
2. *Loc cit.*
3. J. N. Findlay, *Hegel : A Re-examination*, p. 155.
4. Richard Taylor, *The Ontological Argument*, introduction, p. xv.

Indeed, predicative meaningfulness of existence will be undeniable if we analyze the proposition, say, 'God exists'. The proposition means that there is a concept, that it is named 'God', and that there is something which is believed to answer to the concept. Here, 'exists' does add something significant to the concept, without at the same time distorting it.

Another contemporary author, Milton K. Munitz, points out that, when we say that so-and-so does exist, in the event of our wishing to challenge the claim that so-and-so is only imaginary, we make what is called a status-claim, the claim that so-and-so has the status of belonging to the world. Here we do predicate existence of the so-and-so.[1] Munitz also underscores the status of 'exist' as a verb, more or less in the vein of our grammarians. 'To say', says he, 'that Socrates existed, is to say that Socrates *lived*, or that he persisted in some particular state, and to say that the moon exists, is to say that the moon occupies space and endures in time, that it behave as a physical object.'[2] Here, too, it is clear, 'exist' is found to function as a genuine predicate of things. And it is this sense of 'exist' which is highlighted by our grammari ans.

So far as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is concerned, they, as we shall see in the sequel, institute a fine distinction between 'existence' (sattā) and 'isness' (astitva). Existence is a real universal and hence a real predicate of its substrata ipso facto. And what the grammarians have proposed about their 'existence' (bhāva) applies substantially to the former's 'isness' as well.

**5) Emergence of 'bhāva' as synonymous with 'sattā' :** Now, Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, and Patañjali use 'bhāva' synonymously with sattā ( existence ) as well.[3] Patañjali also

1. Milton K. Munitz, *The Myst‹ry of Ex stence*, p. 90.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 92-93.
3. तस्य भावस् त्वतलौ । *PA* 5.1.119 ; यद् वा सर्वे भावाः स्वेन भावेन भवन्ति स तेषां भावस्, तदभिधाने (त्वतलाविति शेषः) । *KV* 5.1.119.6; *PVM* 1.1.61.9, I, p.41 ; 2.1.1.6, II, p. 335 ; 3.3.133, III ; 5.2.94, IV, p. 341.

uses the word sattā to denote existence. He has his own conception of existence, which does not seem to be so well developed as the conception of existence found in *VS*. He observes that there can be no entity without existence (sattā).[1] Bhartṛhari maintains that existence is the one reality. When it is seen through the glasses of sequence or succession it is called action (kriyā); when sequence or succession is sublated, it is called substance ( sattva ). It is existence itself which assumes the six modes spoken of by Vārṣyāyaṇi.[2]

It appears that in the age of the ancient Nairuktas and Vaiyākaraṇas action or movement was believed to be at the root of all things and that substance, attribute, and motion were all regarded as mere modifications of it. The word bhāva denoting action soon acquired the sense of existence ( sattā ) as a category more abstract and fundamental than action. The Vaiśeṣika concept of existence ( bhāva or sattā ) seems to have been inspired by this later sense developed in the etymological and grammatical traditions. We do not mean to suggest, however, that outside the circle of the Nairuktas and Vaiyākaraṇas there was no notion of existence whatsoever. Far from it. The concept as such is prior to both, and there is little difficulty in supposing that both might have drawn upon the amorphous concept of existence pre-existing in the Vedic and Upaniṣadic literature. What we do mean to suggest is that, so far as our knowledge goes, the Nairuktas and Vaiyākaraṇas can claim the credit of deriving the notion of existence from that of action or movement. And there is reason to suppose that this derivation took place before the introduction of the concept of existence into the Vaiśeṣika system or rather *VS*.

---

1. न सत्तां पदार्थो व्यभिचरति । *PVM* 5.2.94, II, p. 341. This sentence also occurs in *YBh*. 3.17, p. 329.

2. प्राप्तक्रमा विशेषेषु क्रिया सैवाभिधीयते ।
क्रमरूपस्य संहारे तत् सत्त्वमिति कथ्यते ॥
सैव भावविकारेषु षडवस्थाः प्रपद्यते ।
क्रमेण शक्तिभिः स्वाभिरेवं प्रत्यवभासते ॥ *VP* 3.1 (Jāti-Samuddeśa). 35-36.

## CHAPTER VIII

# EVOLUTION OF THE CATEGORY UNIVERSAL

## 1. INTRODUCTORY

**1) The concept of universal—Western approach :** In the West, there are two senses in which the term universal is used. There are substantive-universals, such as 'man', table,' and 'book' on the one hand and qualities and relations, such as 'red' and 'to the left of' respectively, on the other.[1] With the Naiyāyika, the position is different. While he does recognize substantive-universals, he will be the last to accord to qualities and relations the status of a universal. According to him, qualities are not universals though there are universals of qualities. According to Helārāja, a commentator of the great grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari, the difference between quality or attribute and universal is this : Both attribute and universal reside in each of their substrata wholly; yet attributes differ from substance to substance while universal is one in all the substances.[2] This will be clear as we proceed.

Respecting universal, it is possible to have three major positions which, in the West, have emerged out of the controversy that raged regarding the concept in Europe in the Middle Ages. Those positions are: universalia ante res or rem (universals before things), in rebus or re (in things), and post res or rem ( after things ). These are styled realism, conceptualism, and nominalism respectively. Plato and St. Augustine believe that universals exist before things; Aristo-

---

1. An interesting statement of the distinction will be found in R. I. Aaron, 'Two Senses of the Word *Universal*', *Mind*, New Series, XLVIII, No. 90 (April, 1939), pp. 168-185.
2. प्रत्याश्रयपरिसमाप्ता अपि च गुणाः प्रतिद्रव्यं भिन्नाः, जातिस् त्वेकैव । *Vākyapadīya-Prakīrṇoprakāśa* 3.1 ( Jāti-Samuddeśa). 14, p. 45.

tle and St. Thomas, that they exist in things ; and William of Okham and Hobbes, that they exist after things. Nominalism has been restated in certain branches of logical positivism in our day. Bertrand Russell has remained faithful to realism all along.[1]

Accorning to nominalism, individuals—individual things in nature and individual ideas in the mind—alone are real and have nothing in common but the name or sign given to them for the sake of reference, the generality of the name or sign consisting in the representative function of the word. Thus, according to this extremist theory, universal is neither real nor conceptual but merely nominal ; there is no universal but the name. According to conceptualism, individual things are the only reals in nature, but there are also general ideas or concepts in the mind which are based on reality and not on mere fiction. It regards universal as the idea or concept, a purely mental entity. That is to say, according to it, universal is not in nature but in the mind. According to realism, there are not only general names and general ideas or concepts expressed by them but also universals in nature to which general names and general ideas and concepts correspond and which, existing outside time and space, pervade in and inform the things in time and space. J. N. Sinha sums up the three theories of universal thus : 'according to nominalism, there is no universal at all either in natute or in the mind; accordiag to conceptualism, the universal exists only in the mind; according to realism, the universal exists both in nature and in the mind.'[2] Of course, there are intermediate positions as well held by eminent philosophers.

Some treat conceptualism as just a technical subdivision,

---

1. In his *Problems of Philosophy* and other early writings, Russell was an out-and-out realist. In a recent work he says : 'The fact that we need the work "similar" indicates some fact about the world, and not only about language. What fact it indicates about the world, I do not know.' Russell, *Human Knowledge,* quoted in Alan Wood, *Bertrand Russell : The Passionate Scepiic,* p. 225.
2. J.N. Sinha, *Indian Psychology : Perception,* p. 163.

a qualified form, of nominalism.[1] 'Under Abelard, the Nominalists came to be called Conceptualists, because, whilst maintaining that Universals are but concepts of the mind, they rejected that extravagant negation of the reality of all that which serves as a foundation for such concepts, in short they insisted that such concepts were based on reality and not on mere fiction.'[2]

Some list the solutions of the problem of universal slightly differently. The chief solutions of this problem are :—

'( 1 ) *Nominalism*, which denies the abstract and universal character of our ideas and, by allowing only their concrete character, finds an easy method of making them exactly correspond with the concrete realities they represent.

'( 2 ) *Exaggerated Realism*, which goes to the other extreme and attributes to things-in-themselves the abstract and universal attributes of the ideas which represent them.

'( 3 ) *Conceptualism*, which admits the fundamental difference between the character of the idea and that of the thing but maintains that an idea does not apply to a thing.

'( 4 ) *Moderate Realism*, known also as Aristotelian or Thomistic Realism, according to which our ideas faithfully represent concrete things without being entirely commensurate with them, the ideas and things corresponding exactly in nature but not in the manner of being.'[3]

**2) The concept of universal—Indian approach** : The bulk of the Inandihil posophers of the past believe in the theory of universal in some form or other.[4] Judged in terms of the aforesaid Western 'isms', the Buddhist is an out and

1. See Meyrick H. Carre, *Realists and Nominalists*, p. 61.
2. See, for example, Crewdson Thomas, *History of the Schoolmen*, p. 121.
3. Cardinal Mercier and Professors of the Higher Institute of Philosophy, Louvain, *a Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, p. 379.
4. Cp. सामान्यं तच् च पिण्डानामेकबुद्धिनिबन्धनम् ॥
तन्निमित्तं च यत्किञ्चित् सामान्यं शब्दगोचरम् ।
सर्वं एवेच्छतीत्येवमविरोधोऽत्र वादिनाम् ॥ *MŚV* 1.1.5.5.13 (Ākrtivāda). 3-4.

out nominalist or rather nominalist-cum-conceptualist. Kaṇāda, or rather the author of the original core of *VS*, is a conceptualist, as we shall see before long. The Jaina is a conceptualist tending towards realism. His universal, though real, is not one for each class of individuals, eternal, and ubiquitous, but is multiform, non-eternal, and non-ubiquitous or limited. It is rather the name of the common character possessed by the individuals belonging to the same class. There is no universal over and above the common character.[1] Rāmānuja, *YS*, and Vārṣagaṇya, a Sāṅkhya teacher of hoary antiquity, can, broadly speaking, be said to approximate to a similar position. They seem to identify universal with structural identity or configuration ( saṁsthāna ).[2] The Bhāṭṭa is a realist with a marked degree of nominalist or conceptualist bias. According to him, universal subsists in individual by the relation of identity-in-difference ( bhedābheda ).[3] As against the Naiyāyika, the Bhāṭṭa holds that existence resides in the lower universals.[4] Kumārila is not very serious about his

---

1. See *AVD* 4, with *SVM*, pp. 10-12.

2. See *Śrī-Bhāṣya* 1.1.1, p. 32 ; *Nyāya-Kuliśa*, pp. 153-160 passim ; *YS* 3.53 with *YBh.* and *Tattvavaiśāradī* ; Vārṣagaṇya's Sūtra quoted in *YBh.* 3.53, p. 387.

3. See *TV* 1.3.9.33, p. 312 ; *MŚV* (Ākṛtivāda). 5.11.47, 54-63 (तेन नात्यन्तभेदोऽपि स्यात् सामान्यविशेषयोः ॥ *Ibid.*, 11) ; तस्मात् प्रमाणबलेन भिन्नाभिन्नत्वमेव युक्तम् । *ŚD*, p. 285. For the Bhāṭṭa conception of universal in general, see *TV* 1.3.9.30-35 (Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa, pp. 282-320 and *MŚV* 1.1.5.5.13,15 (Ākṛtivāda, Apohavāda, and Vanavāda), pp. 1-108 ; *ŚD*, pp. 276-300.

4. Kamārila writes :

वस्तुशब्दो हि रूढित्वाद् व्यक्तिजात्यन्तराश्रितम् ।
सामान्यं यद् ब्रवीत्येतद् गम्यतेऽर्थैर् गवादिभिः ॥ *TV* 1.3.9.30 ( 26 of *NSud.* ed. ), p. 298. Commenting upon it, Someśavara Bhaṭṭa (1100) says : वस्तुशब्दो हीति ।...जातेर् जात्याश्रितत्वाभावाद् वस्तुशब्दस्य जातिवाचित्वे जातौ प्रयोगानुपपत्तिमाशङ्क्य निःसामान्यानि सामान्यादीनोति वैशेषिकपरिभाषायाः प्रतीतिविरोधेनायुक्तत्वाज्जातेरपि जात्याश्रयत्वं सम्भवतीति दर्शायितुं जात्यन्तराश्रितत्वमुक्तम् । *NSud.* 1.3.9.26 (31 of *TV* ed.), p. 351. Also see *MMeyo.*, pp. 236-237.

position, however, in regard to such topics.[1] He opines that universal subsists in its individuals only,[2] but immediately proceeds to defend the theory of its ubiquity as well.[3] This may be cited as his lack of interest in the niceties of the issue. The Prābhākara, *Sāṅkhya-Pravacana-Sūtra*, and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school are out and out realists.[4] The Prābhākara denies the reality of the existence-universal.[5] Sāṅkhyas hold universal to be non-eternal.[6] They are also believed to hold that Prakṛti itself is a universal non-different from individuals which are its own effects.[7]

It is difficult to say what the position of the Lokāyatas in general might have been. The only Lokāyata treatise that has come down to us, viz. Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa's *Tattvopaplavasiṁha*, refutes the reality of universal on Buddhist lines in the first instance[8] but proceeds to show up the invalidity of the argument against universal in the second,[9] with a view to illustrating its general thesis that the real is the irrational, so to say. In all probability, this work represents only one branch of the Lokāyata system. No other reference to the Lokāyata's attitude to the problem has come down to us, to the best of our knowledge. Śrīni-

---

1. He concludes the Vanavāda section of *MŚV* (1.1.5.5.15) with the following verse (verse 97) :
इति निगदितमेतल् लोकसिद्धैः पदार्थैर् व्यवहृतिरिह शास्त्रे, न स्वतन्त्राभ्युपेतैः ।
भवति च जनदृष्ट्या जातिपङ्क्त्यादिभेदो, यदि च न घटतेऽसौ नैव बाधोऽस्ति कश्चित् ॥
2. *Ibid.* 1.1.5.5.13 (Ākṛtivāda2). 5.
3. *Ibid.*, 26-30
4. For the Prābhākara view, see *Bṛhatī* and *Ṛjuvimalā*, pp. 163-173; *Prakaraṇa-Pañcikā*, pp. 17-32.
5. See *Ṛjuvimalā* 1.1.5.5, pp. 159-160. Also see : तस्मात् स्वरूपसत्तोपाधिक एव सच्छब्दो न पुनरेक आकारः सत्ता नाम द्रव्यगुणकर्मणाम् । अपि च काश्यपीयानां जातिसमवायविशेषेषु स्वरूपसत्तोपाधिक एव सच्छब्दः इत्यभ्युपगमः । *Prakaraṇa-Pañcikā*, p. 29.
6. For the view of *SPS* see *SPS* 5.91-93. सांख्यैस् तु...त्रैगुण्यरूपस्य सामान्यस्याभ्युपगमात् । *Nyāya-Praveśa-Vṛtti-Pañjikā*, p. 74.
7. व्यतिरिक्तमिति वैशेषिकदर्शनेन, अव्यतिरिक्तं सांख्यदर्शनेन । *PVSVT* 3.94, p. 194.
8. See *TUS*, pp. 4-7.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 46-53.

vāsa, a modern Naiyāyika, does refer to the criticism of universal by 'Cārvāka etc.'[1] but, the criticism being based on the well-known Buddhist theory of negation of negation ( apoha ), there is nothing Cārvākian about it.

Among Advaitins, Bhartṛhari posits universal and considers all the lower universals, indeed even all the particulars, to be forms of the highest, existence-universal ( sattā ).[2] He holds that universals reside in universals.[3] Maṇḍana Miśra, the author of the *Brahmasiddhi*, also maintains the reality of the existence-universal ( sattā ) and considers everything else as its own forms.[4] Śaṅkara appears to grant the reality of universals as well as their enternality, at one place. He avers that it is only the individual substances, attributes, and motions which are born ( and die ) and not their ākṛti-s which are eternal.[5] Here he seems to have used the term ākṛti in the sense of the category universal following Kumārila and later Mīmāṁsakas. Elsewhere, however, he contends that attribute, motion, universal ( sāmānya ), differential, and inherence are non-different from, and entitatively identical with, substance ( dravyātmaka )[6], which means that universal cannot be treated as a category apart form substance. It appears that he

1. *NST,* p. 47.
2. सम्बन्धिभेदात् सत्तैव भिद्यमाना गवादिषु
जातिरित्युच्यते, तस्मिन् सर्वे शब्दा व्यस्थिताः ॥ *VP* 3.1 ( Jāti-Samuddeśa). 33.
3. सामान्येष्वपि सामान्यं, विशेषेषु विशिष्टता ।
संख्यासु संख्या, लिङ्गेषु लिङ्गमेवं प्रकल्पते ॥ *VP* 3.11 (Saṅkhyā-Samuddeśa). 11. Cp. *PVM* 1.2.6, II, p. 101, with *MP* (सामान्येष्वपि सामान्यमस्ति—*MP*). For full information regarding Bhartṛhari's view, See *VP* 3.1 ( Jāti-Samuddeśa).
4. See *Brahma-Siddhi*, pp. 86-97 and *Vyākhyā* thereon, pp. 199-218.
5. गवादिशब्दार्थसम्बन्धनित्यत्वदर्शनात् । न हि गवादिव्यक्तीनामुत्पत्तिमत्त्वे तदाकृतीनामप्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वं स्यात् । द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मणां हि व्यक्तय एवोत्पद्यन्ते, नाकृतयः । आकृतिभिश् च शब्दानां सम्बन्धः, न व्यक्तिभिः । व्यक्तीनामानन्त्यात् सम्बन्धग्रहणानुपपत्तेः । व्यक्तिषूत्पद्यमानास्वप्याकृतीनां नित्यत्वान् न गवादिशब्देषु कश्चिद् विरोधो दृश्यते । *ŚBh.* 1.3.28, pp. 251-252.
6. तस्माद् द्रव्यात्मकता गुणस्य । एतेन कर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां द्रव्यात्मकता व्याख्याता । *Ibid.* 2.2.17, p. 444.

grants the reality and eternality of universals—not only the highest universal but also lower ones—in the phenomenal world only. Brahman being the transcendental reality, there is neither any universal nor anything else than Brahman in the noumenal world. Śaṅkarītes like Śrīharṣa, Citsukha, Ānandajñāna, Sadānanda, Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa, and a host of others, have unequivocally repudiated the concept.

Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa seems to group the various theses about universal under the following three broad heads : (1) the theory that universal is non-different (abhinna) from individuals, (2) the theory that it is different (bhinna) from them, and (3) the theory that it is different-nondifferent (bhinnābhinna) from them.[1]

Śālikanātha sums up the dispute regarding universal in the Indian tradition thus : Some say that universal is purely imaginary; some others maintain that it is real but is non-different from its substratum; still others contend that universal is different from its substratum but can only be inferred; still others hold that it is both different and non-different from its substratum.[2]

## 2. UNIVERSAL AS A LATER CATEGORY THAN EXISTENCE

It appears that, not long after the emergence of existence as a category, there was in the Vaiśeṣika school the birth of such universals as substancehood, attributeness, and motionness, which were ultimately recognized as belonging to the category of universal or rather universal-particular.

## 3. EVIDENCE

There are more or less clear indications in *VS* that the word sāmānya, by which the category has come to be designated, was, originally, a synonym for 'sādharmya',

1. See *TUS*, p. 4.
2. केचिदाचक्षते—जातिरिति विकल्पविलसितमिति। एके तु सतीमपि जातिमाश्रयेभ्योऽभिन्नामनुमन्यन्ते। अन्ये तु भिन्नामप्यनुमेयामाहुः। अपरे तु भिन्नाभिन्नामिच्छन्ति। *Prakaraṇa-Pañcikā*, p. 17.

meaning resemblance or similarity. Indeed, the treatise still preserves strata in which the word is found used in its original acceptation.[1] As a matter of fact, the word sāmānya did not originally, nor does it in the extant text of *VS*, have the fixed, technical meaning of universal. It is found used in the work in the sense of now the category universal[2], now mere similarity.[3] This circumstance goes to show that the concept developed into a cut and dried category much later than substance, attribute, and motion on the one hand and existence on the other. It is significant, not only for the study of the evolution of the concept of universal but also or rather much more for the study of the evolution of the concept of differential, that the word 'viśeṣa' too, as used in *VS*, means now the category differential[4], now particularity[5], and now dissimilarity.[6]

The foregoing considerations leave no douht that in *VS* the word 'sāmānya', as also the word 'viśeṣa', has not been pinned down to its categorial meaning, which serves to suggest that the category universal is a later development of the original notion of similarity. What other factors have gone into the making of the category universal, will be considered in the sequel, before long.

Here we reserve our opinion on the vexed question of the correct import of the Sūtra declaring sāmānya and viśeṣa as relative to reflection ( buddhyapekṣa ). We shall consider this Sūtra in due course. But, whatever be the correct import

---

1, The following Sūtras are instances in point : द्रव्यगुणयोः सजातीयारम्भकत्वं साधर्म्यम् । *VS* (BI/KSS) 1.1.9 ; द्रव्यगुणकर्मणां द्रव्यं कारणं सामान्यम् । *VS* 1.1.17 ; संयोगविभागानां कर्म समानम् । *VS* (BI/KSS) 1.1.20 ; द्रव्याणां द्रव्यं कार्यं सामान्यम् । *VS* 1.1.22 ; सर्पिर्जतुमधूच्छिष्टानां पार्थिवानामग्निसंयोगाद् द्रवताऽद्भिः सामान्यम् । *Ibid.* 2.1.16.

2. See *VS* (BI/KSS) 1.1.4,7 ; 1.2.11,13,15,17 ; 8.5,6.

3. See *VS* 1.1.17,22,29 ; 2.1.6,7,16 ; 2.2.19,43.

4. See *ibid.* 1.1.7 ; 1.2.11,13,15,17 ; 8.5.6.

5. See *ibid.* 1.2.18 ; 2.1.16 ; *VS* (BI/KSS) 2.1.30 ; *VS* 2.2.15 ; 3.21.4 ; 4.1.9 ; 4.2.5 ; 5.1.9,10,16 ; 5.2.2 ; 6.2.16 ; 7.1.18 ; 7.2.20 ; 9.13 ; 9.22 ; 10.2,11.

6. See *ibid*, 2.2.19 ; 2.2.26 ; *VS* (BI/KSS) 3.2.18.

of this epigram, there can be no gainsaying the fact that the category universal does occur in *VS* here and there, as pointed out above.

## 4. A STATEMENT OF THE CATEGORY

Universals have been compared in *VS* with the category existence and the conclusion has been reached that existence is a pure universal whereas substancehood, attributeness, and motion-ness are not only universals but particulars as well—[1] of course different from ultimate particulars or differentials.[2] Substancehood universal is different from substances which possess it in common.[3] Its difference from substances is further confirmed by the fact that it is devoid of universals and differentials in its own turn.[4] Likewise, attribute-ness is also different from attributes.[5] It is also devoid of universals and differentials.[6] The same argument applies to motion.[7]

The sbove statement, however, is subject to the ambiguity pointed out in the preceding chapter, where it has been sought to be shown how practically the whole lesson dealing with universals admits of a double interpretation—one suggesting that substancehood and other universals are different from existence and the other, that existence itself is called substancehood etc. in appropriate contexts.

Well, barring *VS* ( BI/KSS ) I.1.4 which we have shown to be spurious and I.2.3.5, and 6, the term 'sāmānya' occurring wherein will be interpreted in the sequel differently, the term 'sāmānya' occurs in *VS* in its categorial acceptation always in double-member compounds, the other member being

---

1. द्रव्यत्वं, गुणत्वं, कर्मत्वं च सामान्यानि विशेषाश् च । *VS* 1.2.15.
2. अन्यत्रान्त्येभ्यो विशेषेभ्यः । *Ibid.* 1.2.6.
3. एकद्रव्यवत्त्वेन द्रव्यत्वमुक्तम् । *Ibid.* 1.2.12.
4. सामान्यविशेषाभावेन च । *Ibid.* 1.2.13.
5. गुणेषु भावाद् गुणत्वमुक्तम् । *Ibid.* 1.2.14.
6. सामान्यविशेषाभावेन च । *Ibid* 1.2.15.
7. कर्मणि भावात् कर्मत्वमुक्तम् । सामान्यविशेषाभावेन च । *Ibid.* 1.2. 16-17.

'viśeṣa' ( differential ). We find quite a few such compounds in the treatise.[1] Universal is said to be resident in substance, attribute, and motion, along with the category differential.[2] Later, it is said to be absent from existence,[3] substancehood,[4] attribute-ness[5], and motion-ness[6], along with differential again. In the penultimate chapter of the treatise, it is said that the cognition of substance, attribute, and motion arises through, and in relation to, the universal and differential,[7] while that of universal and differential themselves arises directly, for the simple reason that they are devoid of universal and differential.[8]

This is all that one can hope to glean with regard to the category universal from the whole treatise.

## 5. GENESIS OF THE CATEGORY

1) **Introductory** : As indicated in Chaper II, the category universal is not in very much accord with the particularistic temper of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system and, hence, prima facie, it could not have been an integral part of the system from the first. The following researches will show that the doctrine of universal is a later growth in the system.

2) **'Sāmānya', 'jāti', and 'ākṛti'** : The category has two names in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature, sāmānya and jāti, Mīmāṁsakas use a third term for it, ākṛti. Sometimes, however, especially in the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, 'sāmānya' is distinguished from 'jāti', given a wider signification, and made to comprehend both 'jāti' ( universal ) and 'upādhi' ( imposed property )[9]. In that case, 'sāmānya' no longer remains translatable as 'universal'; it can then best

1. See *ibid.* 1.1.7 ; 1.2.11,13,15,17 ; 8.5,6.
2. *Ibid.* 1.1.7.
3. *Ibid.* 1.2.11.
4. *Ibid.* 1.2.13.
5. *Ibid.* 1.2.15.
6. *Ibid.* 1.2.17.
7. सामान्यविशेषापेक्षं द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु । *Ibid.* 8.6.
8. सामान्यविशेषेषु सामान्यविशेषाभावात् तत एव ज्ञानम् । *Ibid.* 8.5.
9. This concept will be discussed in Chapter XVI.

be translated as 'generality'. We shall have occasion to consider all this in due course.

It appears that 'sāmānya', 'jāti', and 'ākṛti' have not been synonymous from the first. In the following subsections, an attempt is being made to set out the considerations that have led the present writer to this conclusion.

**3) The positions of** *VS* : We note that 'sāmānya' is the only word which is used in *VS* in the sense of the category universal. The word 'jāti', which is used therein only twice, once in the compound 'jātiviśeṣa'[1] and once in its derivative 'jātīya'[2], means a species in the first expression and a class in in the second.

**4) The position of** *NS* : In *NS*, too, the word 'jāti' has been used in other senses than universal. It appears that the word had not developed any categorial connotation when *VS* and *NS* were composed.

That *NS* nowhers uses the term 'jāti' in the sense of universal will sound strange to many. It will, therefore, be advisable to discuss the issue threadbare, and we proceed accordingly.

The concluding Sūtras (58-69) of lesson 2 of chapter 2 of *NS* are devoted to the determination of denotation of words. The question is raised whether it is the vyakti ( individual ), the ākṛti ( form or configuration ), or the jāti that constitutes the denotation of words and replied that all the three constitute the denotation together.[3] The definition of vyakti runs thus : 'Vyakti is the organism as a receptacle af distinctive attributes.'[4] Explaining the idea, Vātsyāyana observes: 'Vyakti is what is manifested and is thereby perceptible by the sense-organs. Thus, not all substance is vyakti. That

---

1. जातिविशेषाच् च रागविशेषः । *VS* 6.2.16.
2. तुल्यजातीयेष्वर्थान्तरभूतेषु च विशेषस्योभयथा दृष्टत्वात् *Ibid.* 2.2.26.
3. In the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature, ākṛti is dropped altogether and the controversy centres round vyakti and jāti only.
4. व्यक्तिर् गुणविशेषाश्रयो मूर्तिः । *NS* 2.2.67.

substance is an organism which is the receptacle of distinctive attributes the last of which is touch [that is to say, smell, taste, colour, and touch, enumerated elsewhere[1] ], as also gravity, solidity, fluidity, and faculty, and the non-pervasive dimension. It is called organism on account of its composition by organs.'[2] The definitions of ākṛti and jāti run thus : Ākṛti is that which is the mark of jāti[3]. Jāti is procreative of the similar.'[4]

It has been the practice ever since the time or Vātsyāyana to take the word jāti occurring in the Sūtra just quoted to be a synonym for 'sāmānya', meaning the category universal, and on this basis to construe the Sūtra to mean, 'The universal is the cause of similar cognition.' But to us it seems to be a far-fetched interpretation. To construe the word 'samāna' ( similar ) occurring in the Sūtra to mean 'samānā buddhi'[5] (similar cognition) seems to be a clear case of far-fetchedness. What is there in the very Sūtra to warrant this interpretation by addition of the word buddhi ? Nothing whatsoever, can be the only reply.[6]

Radically speaking, 'jāti' means 'birth' or 'what is born.'[7] Pāṇini uses the word in the sense of 'natural class'[8] or 'species', not always in the biological sense, however,[9] such as

---

1. See *NBh.* 3.1.61.
2. व्यज्यत इति व्यक्तिरिन्द्रियग्राह्येति। न सर्वं द्रव्यं व्यक्तिः; यो गुणविशेषाणां स्पर्शान्तानां गुरुत्वघनत्वद्रवत्वसंस्काराणामव्यापिनः परिमाणस्याश्रयो यथासम्भवं तद् द्रव्यं मूर्तिः, मूर्च्छितावयवत्वाद् इति। *NBh.* 2.2.67, p. 155
3. आकृतिर् जातिलिङ्गाख्या। *NS* 2.2.68.
4. सामानप्रसवात्मिका जातिः। *Ibid.* 2.2.69.
5. See *NBh.* 2.2.69, p. 156.
6. It is interesting to find Abhayadeva Sūri read the Sūtra as समानप्रत्ययप्रसवात्मिका जातिः। See his *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī*, Vol. II, p. 178.
7. Cp. the word 'jāti' as used in :
   आचार्यस् त्वस्य यां जातिं विधिवद् वेदपारगः
   उत्पादयति सावित्र्या सा सत्या साऽजराऽमरा ॥ *MSm.* 2. 148 ;
   जननेन या प्राप्यते सा जातिः। *PVM* 5.3.55, IV, p.377.
8. An expression suggested by Randle for Gautama's jāti. See *ILES*, p.133.
9. Cp. जातिरप्राणिनाम्। *PA* 2.4.6.

elephant[1], man[2], herb[3], stone[4], iron[5], lake[6], cart[7], the fruit coriander[8], grass[9], etc. Nowhere does he use the word in the sense of the universal of the Vaiśeṣika system, which is simply unknown to him.[10]

*NS* seems to use the word jāti in the biological sense of 'species'[11], for which another Sanskrit word is 'yoni.' Jāti is marked by form ( ākṛti ), it says.[12] Evidence is not far to seek. Firstly, jāti is said to manifest itself through vyakti and ākṛti[13]. If jāti mean universal, it would not require ākṛti to manifest itself in each case; for there are universals of incorporeal and formless substances, attributes, and motions as well. In explanation of the Sūtra defining ākṛti, Vātsyāyana does seek to supply the suspected omission of universals not requiring ākṛti to manifest themselves.[14] But there is nothing to warrant the proposition that jāti can, according to *NS*, in certain cases manifest itself without ākṭṛi. Secondly, jāti has been defined in *NS* as 'procreative of the like'[15], which cannot in terms apply to anything but species in the biological sense of the term. It appears that according to Gautama a species is known by its procreation of the like. Commentators, led astray by the Vaiśeṣika concept of universal, have missed the entire import of the term 'jāti' and distorted its meaning by trying to read their

1. हस्ताज् जातौ । *Ibid.* 5.2.133.
2. इतो मनुष्यजातेः । *Ibid.* 4.1.65.
3. ओषधेरजातौ । *Ibid.* 5.4.37.
4. अनोऽश्मायस्सरसां जातिसंज्ञयोः । *Ibid.* 5.4.94.
8. कुस्तुम्बुरुणि जातिः । *Ibid.* 6.1.140.
9. तृणे च जातौ । *Ibid.* 6.3.103.
10. See Theodore Goldstücker, *Pāṇini*, p. 118.
11. Randle uses the term 'natural class' for jāti. See *ILES*, p. 133. We think his term is too wide.
12. आकृतिर् जातिलिङ्गाख्या । *NS* 2.2.68.
13. न, आकृतिव्यक्त्यपेक्षत्वाज् जात्यभिव्यक्तेः । *Ibid.* 2.2.65.
14. अनाकृतिव्यङ्ग्यायां जातौ मृत्सुवर्णरजतमित्येवमादिष्वाकृतिर् निवर्तते, जहाति पदार्थत्वमिति । *NBh.* 2.2.68, p. 156.
15. समानप्रसवात्मिका जातिः । *NS* 2.2.69.

own prejudice into it. That is why they have had to strain it overmuch by unwarrantably reading 'samānā buddhi'[1] or 'samānākāra-budhi'[2] for 'samāna' occurring in the Sūtra.

So, however much the commentators might echo the terminology of the Vaiśeṣika system in commenting upon the section in *NS* dealing with the denotation of words, it remains a patent fact that the section shows absolutely no trace of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of universal. The only author known to us, who has succeeded in approximating more than others to the correct import of the what may be called jāti Sūtras in the section under examination, is Randle, who translates 'jāti' as 'natural class'[3]. As we have already remarked, however, this expression, too, is not as appropriate as the term species suggested by us. Goldstücker's interpretation of 'ākṛti' and 'jāti' as 'species' and 'genus' respectively[4] seems to us to be wholly without foundation.

However, from the foregoing discussions of Gautama's position, one must not carry away the impression that he had no idea of the category universal at all. He does show awareness of the category in two places[5], but for it he uses the term sāmānya in both the places. Besides, he has once used the word cowhood ( gotva ) possibly in the sense of a universal.[6] The section on denotation of words in *NS* seems, if our interpretation of it is correct, to be much older than the bulk of the rest of the work.

Incidentally, Gautama uses the word jāti for pseudo-rejoinder based on mere similarity and dissimilarity[7] to the exclusion of the consideration of invariable concomitance

1. See *NBh.* 2.2.69, p. 156.
2. See *NSV* 2.2.69, p. 188,
3. See *ILES*, p. 7, f. n.
4. See Godstücker, *op. cit.*, p. 117.
5. न, घटाभावसामान्यनित्यत्वान् नित्येष्वत्यनित्यवदुपचाराच् च । *NS* 2.2.14.
   सामान्यदृष्टान्तयोरैन्द्रियकत्वे समाने नित्यानित्यसाधर्म्यात् संशयः । *Ibid.* 5.1.14.
6. गोत्वाद् गोसिद्धवत् तत्सिद्धिः । *Ibid.* 5.1.3.
7. साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं जातिः । *Ibid.* 1.2.18.

( vyāpti ), in a different context. Randle has offered his own explanation of the concept, in distinction from Vātsyāyana's explanation that jāti is the objection that takes birth on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity.[1] Says Randle : 'Possibly the word jāti, general nature, comes to have the meaning of a merely dialectical argument because such arguments arise from appeal to *mere* generality, which "give forth directions too much at large" to constitute a determinate reason ( *viśeṣa-hetu* ) capable of leading to a determinate conclusion.'[2] Randle's explanation sounds quite plausible and significant. This suggests that the word jāti had acquired a sense more or less akin to generality in the time of Gautama.

**5. 'Jāti' in ancient grammar** : Kātyāyana also seems to have used the word jāti in the sense of class or species ( not always in the biological sense ).[3] It is significant that he uses the word ākṛti in the same sense in which it is used in *NS*.[4]

Patañjali uses the word jāti in the sense of species and class[5] but never in the sense of universal. He means species pure and simple when he defines 'jāti' as what subsists by procreation.[6] This, as also his definition of the term as 'known by ākṛti', quite agrees with the one offered by *NS*. The full text of the second definition reads thus : 'Jāti is known by ākṛti. It does not possess all genders. Once determined, it is easily recognized ( elsewhere ). It is also ( used of ) a family with its [ Vedic ] schools.'[7]

---

1. प्रयुक्ते हि हेतौ यः प्रसङ्गो जायते स जातिः । *NBh*. 1.2.18, p. 71.
2. *ILES*, p. 342, f. n.
3. समासकृत्तद्धिताव्ययसर्वनामासर्वलिङ्गा जातिः । *KV* 1.4.1.40.
4. न वा समानायामाकृतौ भावितपुंस्कविज्ञानात् । *Ibid*. 7.1.145.
5. See, for example, *PVM* 5.3,55, IV, p. 376, passim, and also कृष्णसर्पो नाम सर्पजातिः । *Ibid*. 2.1.68.5, II, p. 411.
6. जननेन या प्राप्यते सा जातिः । *Ibid*. 5.3.55, IV, p. 377.
7. आकृतिग्रहणा जातिर्, लिङ्गानां न च सर्वभाक्,
   सकृदाख्यातनिर्ग्राह्या, गोत्रं च चरणैः सह ॥ *Ibid*. 4.1.63, IV, p. 79.
   Kaiyaṭa explains it as under : आकृतिर् ग्रहणं यस्याः साऽऽकृतिग्रहणा, अवयवसन्निवेशविशेषव्यङ्ग्येत्यर्थः । एतेन गोत्वादिजातिर् लक्षिता, ब्राह्मणत्वादिस् तु न सङ-

Here Patañjali quotes an alternative definition : 'What appears and disappears with the appearance and disappearance of an entity ( sattva ) simultaneously with attributes, does not admit of all genders, and includes many individuals, is called jāti by the learned.'[1] This definition a class is quite compatible with our interpretation of jāti to mean or species.

One thing remains to be noted, however, in connexion with this definition of jāti. Herein Patañjali speaks of prādurbhāva and vināśa of jāti, which terms, literally speaking, mean birth and death but which we have chosen to translate as appearance and disappearance. In another connexion, too, Patañjali writes in the same vein and uses the terms utpatti and vināśa for prādurbhāva and vināśa.[2] Of this, one possible explanation is this that here he actually means the birth and death of the members of the class or species. Indeed, this explanation is actually suggested in *PVM* twice.[3] But a more plausible and significant explanation would be that Patañjali does not hold jāti to be unchangeably eternal. He seems to hold it to be changeably and

---

गृहीता, ब्राह्मणक्षत्रियादीनां संस्थानस्य सदृशत्वाद्, इति तत्संग्रहायाह...लिङ्गानामिति ।...सकृदिति । अयं गौरिति सकृदुपदिष्टा जातिर् निर्गृहीतुं निश्चेतुं पिण्डान्तरे शक्येत्यर्थः । गोत्रमिति, अपत्यमित्यर्थः । चरणशब्देन शाखाध्यायिनो गृह्यन्ते । गोत्रस्य सर्वालिङ्गगत्वात् पृथगुपादानम् । नाडायनं नपुंसकमिति दर्शनात् । *MP* 4.1.63, IV, p. 80.

1. प्रादुर्भावविनाशाभ्यां सत्त्वस्य युगपद् गुणैः,
   असर्वलिङ्गा बह्वर्था, तां जातिं कवयो विदुः ॥ *PVM* 4.1.63, IV, p. 80.

   Kaiyaṭa explains it thus : सत्त्वस्य द्रव्यस्य प्रादुर्भावविनाशाभ्यां या आविर्भावतिरोभावौ प्राप्नोति । यावद्द्रव्यभाविनीत्यर्थः । गुणैर् युगपद् द्रव्येण सम्बध्यते, यथा निर्गुणस्य द्रव्यस्योपलम्भो न भवति एवं जातिरहितस्यापीत्यर्थः । बह्वर्थामिति सर्वव्यक्तिव्यापिनीमित्यर्थः । अर्थशब्दोऽत्र विषयवाची । *MP* 4.1.63, IV, p. 80.

2. आविष्टलिङ्गा जातिर्यल्लिङ्गमुपादाय वर्तते, उत्पत्तिप्रभृत्याविनाशान् न तल् लिङ्गं जहाति । *PVM* 1.2.2.52, II, p. 64.

3. आकृतावारम्भणादीनां सम्भवो नास्तीति कृत्वा, आकृतिसहचरिते द्रव्ये आरम्भणादीनि भविष्यन्ति । *Ibid.* 1.2.64.61 II, p. 99; 4.1.92.3, IV, p. 119 (containing the reading आरम्भणलम्भनविशसनादीनि क्रियन्ते । आरम्भणादीनि भविष्यन्ति in the preceding reference).

successively eternal ( pravāha-nitya ). That is to say, jāti, according to him, is not one simple eternal entity; it is as a matter of fact an aggregate or class of individuals, nothing over and above them. The individuals are perishable, but the class which they together comprise is relatively lasting. Individuals come and individuals go, but the class goes on for ever, so to say. So, in one way it is quite proper to take jāti to be subject to birth and death, while in another one can as well declare it to be comparatively everlasting. We shall see before long that Patañjali himself has made a similar remark as regards the question of eternity versus perishability of ākṛti.

It is pertinent to point out that Patañjali broaches the same problem vis-â-vis denotation of words as Gautama does, with this difference that he compares only two proposals—viz. whether words denote dravya (his term for vyakti) or ākṛti[1]—in distinction from Gautama who compares three proposals, viz. whether words denote vyakti, ākṛti, or jāti.[2]

To sum up the foregoing considerations of the word 'jati', in *PA, KV*, and *PVM* jāti means a natural class, whereas in *NS* it unmistakably signifies a biological species. This being so, Gautama's jāti is narrower in scope than the three grammarians'.

**6) 'Sāmānya' in ancient grammar** : As we have already seen, 'sāmānya' was originally synonymous with, 'sādharmya' ( similarity, commonness, or resemblance ), at any rate in *VS*, and that in this sense it used to be, and, still is, commonly opposed to 'viśeṣa' ( dissimilarity, specialty uncommonness, or difference ). We have seen this in *VS* ; we can see it in *KV* as well as *PVM*.[3]

---

1. किं पुनराकृतिः पदार्थः, आहोस्विद् द्रव्यम् ? *Ibid.* 1.1, Patañjali's intro., I, p. 17.
2. *NS* 2.2.59.
3. See *KV* 2.4.3.53-4 and *PVM* thereon. In *Nirukta*, too, the word सामान्य occurs in the sense of resemblance, as for instance in the expressions 'वृत्तिसामान्येन' and अविद्यमाने सामान्येऽप्यक्षरवर्णसामान्यान् निर्ब्रूयात् । *Nirukta* 2.1.1, p. 120.

In *PVM*, sometimes 'sāmānya' and 'viseśa' occur in the sense of 'substantive' and 'adjective', respectively. For example, Patañjali raises the question, 'What is sāmānya and what is viśeṣa ?'[1], and replies, 'The cow is sāmānya and black viśesa.'[2] In explanation of this passage, Kaiyaṭa observes that what is substantive and primary is called sāmānāya and what is used adjectivally and secondarily is called viśeṣa.[3] Patañjali adds, however, that this distinction between sāmānya and viśeṣa is far from a rigid one, since sometimes the adjective becomes sāmānya and the substantive viśeṣa. According to him, it all depends upon the intention of the speaker ( vivakṣā ).[4] The reader cannot fail to notice the close parallel between the 'intention' ( vivakṣā ) of Patañjali and 'notionality' ( buddhyapekṣatā )[5] of Kaṇāda. Maybe, *PVM* or the grammatical tradition in general for that matter has influenced Kaṇāda on this point. It is pertinent to point out that the expression 'ultimate particular' ( antya-viśeṣa ) occurring in *VS*[6] has its counterpart in the 'ultimate adjective' ( antya-viśeṣaṇa ) occurring in *PVM*.[7] These topics will be resumed in the sequel.

---

1. किं पुन: समान्यं । को विशेष: ? *PVM* 1.1.66, I, p. 431.
2. गौ: सासान्यं, कृष्णो विशेष: । *Loc. cit.*
3. यद् विशेष्यं प्रधानं तत् सामान्यम् । यत् तु विशेषणत्वेन परोपकारितया निर्दिश्यते स विशेष इति तात्पर्यम् । 1.1.66, I, p. 431.
4. न तर्हीदानीं कृष्ण: सामान्यं, गौर् विशेषो भवति ? भवति च । यदि तर्हि सामान्यमपि विशेषो, विशेषोऽपि सामान्यं, सामान्यविशेषौ न प्रकल्पेते ? प्रकल्पेते च । कथम् ? विवक्षात: । यदा ऽ स्य गौ: सामान्येन विवक्षितो भवति, कृष्णो विशेषत्वेन, तदा गौ: सामान्यं, कृष्णो विशेष: । यदा ऽ स्य कृष्ण: सामान्येन विवक्षितो भवति, गौ: विशेषत्वेन, तदा कृष्ण: सामान्यं, गौर् विशेष: । अपर आह—'प्रकल्पेते च' । कथम् ? पितापुत्रवत् । तद् यथा स एव कञ्चित्प्रति पिता भवति, कञ्चित्प्रति पुत्रो भवति । एवमिहापि स एव कंचित्प्रति, सामान्यं कञ्चित्प्रति विशेष: । *PVM* 1.1.66, I, p. 432.
5. Occurring in सामान्यं विशेष इति बुद्ध्यपेक्षम् । *VS* 1.2.3.
6. Occurring in अन्यत्रान्त्येभ्यो विशेषेभ्य: । *Ibid* 1.2.6.
7. Sec *PVM* 1.1.51, p. 430 ; 1.1.64, I, p. 426. Cp. अन्त्यशेष occurring 1.1.3.2, I, p. 117 .

At one place in *PVM*, the word sāmānya has been very significantly used in the sense of commonness in connexion with the definition of the concept ākṛti ( form or configuration ). There it has been said that ākṛti is what is non-different amongst the different and non-destroyed amongst the destroyed, and is a common property.[1]

In *KV* and *PVM*, the word 'sāmānya' has once been used very significantly for our purpose. Says Kātāyana : 'In expressing jāti, the singular number is used, for ( in that case ) sāmānya has to be stated.[2] Here 'jāti' and 'sāmānya' have been used together. Patañjali's comments on this Vārtika are particularly interesting. He says that the paddiness of paddy, the barleyness of barley, and the Gārgya-hood of Gārgya are one each, and that, on account of their one-ness, only the singular number is resorted to.[3] A little later he concludes that, where in expressing jāti dravya or individual is intended, there will be the plural number ; but, where sāmānya is intended, the number will be singular.[4] Here sāmānya means commonness or rather generality and approximates very closely to universal. However, there is nothing to show that it ever struck Patañjali to look upon sāmānya as an entity over and above its substrata, as is the case with the sāmānya postulated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and other schools.

In another connexion, Patañjali speaks of kriyā-sāmānya and saṅkhyā-sāmānya.[5] This all suggests that the process

1. यत् तर्हि तद् भिन्नेष्वभिन्नं छिन्नेष्वच्छिन्नं सामान्यभूतं, स शब्दः ? नेत्याह—आकृतिर् नाम सा । *Ibid.*, introductory, I, p. 4.

2. जात्याख्यायां सामान्याभिधानादैकार्थ्यम् । *KV* 1.2.58.1. II, p. 65.

3. जात्याख्यायां सामान्याभिधानादैकार्थ्यं भविष्यति । यत् तद् व्रीहौ व्रीहित्वं, यवे यवत्वं, गार्ग्ये गार्ग्यत्वं, तदेकं, तच् च विवक्षितम् । तस्यैकत्वादेकवचनमेव प्राप्नोति । *PVM* 1.2.58.1, II, p. 65.

4. तद् यदा द्रव्याभिधानं तदा बहुवचनं भविष्यति । यदा सामान्याभिधानं, तदैकवचनं भविष्यति । *Ibid.* 1.2.58.7, II, p. 67.

5. विभिन्नार्थेषु च सामान्यात् सिद्धम् । सर्वत्र अश्नोतेरक्षः, पद्यतेः पादः, मिमीतेर् माषः । तत्र क्रियासामान्यात् सिद्धम् । अपरस् त्वाह—पुराकल्प एतदासीत्—षोडशमाषाः कार्षापणं, षोडशपलाश् च माषशंवव्यः । *Ibid.* 1.2.64.64, II, p. 101.

of abstraction which results in the birth of nniversal was nearing completion in the age of Patañjali, though the concept had not yet crystallized enough to claim the status of an ontological category.

We have found one very strong point in favour of the view that Kātyāyana shows little awareness of universal as a distinct category. The suffix 'ness' or 'hood' ( tva or ta ) is ordinarily treated as a sign of universal. But, according to Kātyāyana, it is used to denote the attribute after which the substance or individual is named.[1] Thus, chowhood is, according to Kātyāyana, not a universal but an attribute. His next observation that the suffix 'ness' or 'hood' in the alternative denotes the being or essence of things[2], also suggests that he had no conception of universal. As a matter of fact, this grammatical formula, which was originally enunciated by Pāṇini[3], rules out the possibility of recognizing universals altogether.

It appears that the idea of sāmānya as an ontological concept or category was unknown to Patañjali. Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa are wrong in interpreting the term sāmānya as used by Patañjali to mean the category universal. We

---

1. सिद्धं तु यस्य गुणस्य भावाद् द्रव्ये शब्दनिवेशस् तदभिधाने त्वतलौ । *KV* 5.1.119.5.
2. यद् वा सर्वे भावा स्वेन भावेन भवन्ति स तेषां भावस्, तदभिधाने (त्वतलौ) । *Ibid.* 5.1.119.6. Patañjali i terprets the Vārtika differently, According to him the first bhāva occurring therein means 'word' and second and the third, 'meaning' (artha). See किमेभिस् त्रिभि: 'भाव' ग्रहणै: क्रियते ? एकेन शब्द: प्रतिनिर्दिश्यते, द्वाभ्यामित्यर्थ: । यद् वा सर्वे शब्दा: स्वेनार्थेन भवन्ति स तेषामर्थ: इति, तदभिधाने वा त्वतलौ भवत इति वक्तव्यम् । *PVM* 5.1.119.6, IV, p. 301. Kaiyaṭa's explanation of Patañjali's passage is : भवन्ति भावा: शब्दा: ।... द्वाभ्यामिति । स च द्विविध:—वाच्य-प्रवृत्तिनिमित्त रूप: । स्वार्थेनेति । शब्दानां स्वार्थ: वाच्य:, तेन भवन्ति तत्र वाचकत्वेन प्रवर्तन्त इत्यर्थ: । वाच्योऽर्थ: शब्दभवने करणत्वेन विवक्षित: । *MP* 5.1.119.6, IV, p. 301. Nāgeśa's remark भवन्तीति उच्चारणविषया भवन्तीत्यर्थ: (*MPU* 5.1.119.6, IV, p. 302,) is also relevant. To us this interpretation appears to be arbitrary. Indeed, Patañjali does not interpret on the same lines Pāṇini's Sūtra (तस्य भावस् त्वतलौ, *PA* 5.1.119) on which the vārtika is a commentary.
3. तस्य भावस् त्वतलौ । *PA* 5.1.119.

dare say that there is not the slightest indication in *PVM* to vindicate their interpretation.

The fact that the category universal is unknown to Patañjali constitutes a very strong reason for the view that *PVM* is anterior to *VS* in its present form.

**7) 'Ākṛti' in ancient grammar** : We have considered the word 'jāti'. Let us now consider the word 'ākṛti'. The word 'vyakti' is simply irrelevant to our problem, which is to trace the genesis of the category universal. It will, therefore, not occupy us in this context.

There can be no doubt about the meaning of the word 'ākṛti' so far as *NS* is concerned. Therein it means form or configuration. The word does not occur in *PA*. Kātyāyana and Patañjali have, used it profusely, however, and it will pay us to study their concept of ākṛti. Our procedure will be to begin with and concentrate on Patañjali. The study of Kātyāyana will be fully achieved in course of the study of Patañjali.

Patañjali describes ākṛti as 'the non-different amongst the different, the non-destroyed amongst the destroyed, and a common property'[1]. This suggests that ākṛti is something which the individuals partake of in common, and which is, for the same reason, not destroyed with the destruction of particular individuals. Sometimes, Patañjali gives the impression that 'ākṛti' is synonymous with 'jāti' as, for example, when he contends that Pāṇini's Sūtra, 'In expressing jāti, the plural number is used optionally in the same sense ( as in the case of the singular )',[2] deals with ākṛti as the denotation of words.[3] The Sūtra does not contain the word 'ākṛti', while

1. यत् तर्हि तद् भिन्नेष्वभिन्नं छिन्नेष्वच्छिन्नं सामान्यभूतं, स शब्दः ? नेत्याह । आकृतिर् नाम सा । *PVM*, author's introduction, I, p. 4.

2. जात्याख्यायामेकस्मिन् बहुवचनमन्यतरस्याम् । *PA* 1.2.58.

3. आकृतिं पदार्थं मत्वा 'जात्याख्यायामेकस्मिन् बहुवनमन्यतरस्याम्' इत्युच्यते । *PVM*, author's introduction, I, p. 17. The word 'jāti' occurring in कः पुनरेतयोर् जातिचोदनयोर् विशेषः ? ( *Ibid.* 1.2.64.47, II, p. 94 ), too, appears to have been used synonymously with ākṛti, for this passage occurs in the context of ākṛti.

it does contain the word 'jāti' which is its exclusive subject-matter. This being the case, when Patañjali says it deals with ākṛti, the conclusion is irresistible that he identifies ākṛti with jāti. Though we are not in agreement with the general attitude of Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa in identifying the 'jāti' of *PVM* with the category universal, no fault can be found with Nāgeśa when he expresses the opinion that ākṛti, jāti, and saṁsthāna are synonymous.[1]

Patañjali's dissertations on the question of eternity or non-eternity of ākṛti is very instructive. To us it is decisive of the issue whether ākṛti can or cannot be identified with the category universal, According to one view ākṛti is eternal while dravya ( individual or substance ) is non-eternal.[2] An alternative opinion is that ākṛti is non-eternal while dravya is eternal.[3] It is a matter of everyday experience that earth, gold, and other substances become different types of things by assuming different forms ( ākṛti ). That is to say, it is ākṛti or form that changes; the substance remains the same; it endures through the change of forms.[4] Patañjali is not impressed by this view, however. He contends that in point of fact ākṛti is eternal. Though it does disappear from one substance, it does not disappear from all substances of a like form; it remains in existence in other substances. So, the disappearance of ākṛti from certain subances does not mean that ākṛti is non-eternal.[5] Here Patañ-

---

1. भाष्ये आकृतिर् जातिः संस्थानं च । *MPU*, intro., I, p. 4.
2. आकृतिर् हि नित्या, द्रव्यमनित्यम् । *PVM*, author's intro., I, p. 21.
3. द्रव्यं हि नित्यम्, आकृतिरनित्या । *Loc. cit.*
4. कथं ज्ञायते ? एवं हि दृश्यते लोके मृत् कयाचिदाकृत्या युक्ता पिण्डो भवति, पिण्डाकृतिमुपमृद्य घटिकाः क्रियन्ते, घटिकाकृतिमुपमृद्य कुण्डिकाः क्रियन्ते । तथा सुवर्णं कयाचिदाकृत्या युक्तं पिण्डो भवति, पिण्डाकृतिमुपमृद्य रुचकाः क्रियन्ते, रुचकाकृतिमुपमृद्य कटकाः क्रियन्ते, कटकाकृतिमुपमृद्य स्वस्तिकाः क्रियन्ते । पुनरावृत्तः सुवर्णपिण्डः पुनरपरयाऽऽकृत्या युक्तः खदिरांगारसवर्णे कुण्डले भवतः । आकृतिरन्या चान्या च भवति, द्रव्यं पुनस् तदेव । आकृत्युपमर्देन द्रव्यमेवावशिष्यते । *Loc. cit.*
5. ननु चोक्तम्, 'आकृतिर नित्या' इति । नैतदस्ति । नित्याऽऽकृतिः । कथम् ? न क्वचिदुपरतेति कृत्वा सर्वत्रोपरता भवति, द्रव्यान्तरस्था तूपलभ्यते । *Loc. cit.*

jali raises a subtle point. If eternity means unchangeableness, then ākṛti can certainly not be said to be eternal. But there is one more meaning of the word eternal. That is also eternal the essence of which does not perish. And, in the case of ākṛti, too, the essence is not destroyed. Hence, there is no reason why it should not be said to be eternal in the second sense of the word.[1]

Kātyāyana also observes that ākṛti does not perish, because it does not depend upon particular individuals.[2] It is supported by many substrata, which all cannot perish simultaneously. Hence ākṛti as such cannot perish with the perishing of some of its many substrata.[3] Patañjali and Kaiyaṭa elucidate the idea thus : Even as the creeper on the tree does not undergo destruction with the destruction of the tree for it does not wholly depend upon the tree for its existence, so ākṛti, not being wholly dependent upon a particular individual for its subsistence, cannot be destroyed with the destruction of the particular individual.[4] Pantañjali also holds that ākṛti is not born, it is the individuals that are born.[5]

From the foregoing considerations, it will be evident that, though Patañjali is sometimes tempted to identify ākṛti with

---

1. अथवा नेदमेव नित्यलक्षणं—ध्रुवं कुटस्थमविचाल्यनपायोपजनविकार्यनुत्पत्त्यवृद्ध्यव्यययोगि यत् तन् नित्यमिति । तदपि नित्यं यस्मिंस् तत्त्वं न विहन्यते । किं पुनस् तत्त्वम् ? तद्भावस् तत्त्वम् । आकृतावपि तत्त्वं न विहन्यते । *Ibid.*, author's introduction, I, p. 21. On it Nāgeśa observes : प्रवाहनित्यता चानेनोक्ता । *MP*, I, p. 22.

2. अविनाशोऽनाश्रितत्वात् । *KV* 1.2.64.62, II, p. 100.

3. अविनाशोऽनैकात्म्यात् । *Ibid.* 1.2.64.62, II, p. 100.

4. द्रव्यविनाशे आकृतेरविनाशः । कुतः ? अनैकात्म्यात् । अनेक आत्मा आकृतेर् द्रव्यस्य च । तद् यथा-वृक्षस्थोऽवतानो छिन्नेऽपि न विनश्यति । *PVM* 1.2.64, II, p. 100; यथा वृक्षस्योपरि द्राक्षादिलतावतानः स्थितो न वृक्षविनाशमनु विनश्यति, तथा जातिरपीत्यर्थः । *MP*, ad loc.

5. आकृतावारम्भणादीनां सम्भवो नास्तीति कृत्वा आकृतिसहचरिते द्रव्ये आरम्भणादीनि भविष्यन्ति । *PVM* 1.2.64.61, II, p. 99. The idea also occurs almost verbatim in 2.1.50, II, p. 386 ; 4.1.92, IV, p. 119.

jāti, yet, when he adjudges it changeful and eternal only in the sense that its essence is not destroyed, he unmistakably means by it form or configuration.

Kātyāyana and Patañjali cite Vājapyāyana's view that ākṛti is one[1], because, when the word cow is mentioned, there is no representation of the specific characteristics of the individual cows, what is represented by the word is the features common to all the cow-individuals.[2] We suggest that according to Vājapyāyana the word cow without qualification denotes the form or configuration of cows in general, which is one in the sense that all individual cows partake of it. In the text we do not find anything that militates against this construction.

According to Vājapyāyana, ākṛti is one but resides in many substrata simultaneously.[3] Patañjali illustrates the idea by referring to the sun, which, according to him, is one but visible in many places.[4] He adds, however, that this example does in fact not apply, since the same person does not find the sun in many places, while one and the same person finds ākṛti in many substrata simultaneously.[5] Kātyāyana himself has suggested the idea in some passages.[6]

We find that Kātyāyana, too, sometimes uses the words jāti and ākṛti interchangeably, as, for example, when he discusses the views that even jāti-words can denote the individual ( dravya )[7] and dravya-words ākṛti,[8]

---

1. *KV* and *PVM* 1.2.64,38, II, p. 90.
2. प्रख्या ऽ विशेषात् । *KV* 1.2.64.39, II, p. 90.
3. अस्ति चैकमनेकाधिकरणस्थं युगपत् । *Ibid.* 1.2.64,43, II, p. 92.
4. अस्ति खल्वप्येकमनेकाधिकरणस्थं युगपल् लभ्यते । किम् ? आदित्यः । तद् यथा—एक आदित्योऽनेकाधिकरणस्थो युगपदुपलभ्यते । *PVM*. *ad ibid.*
5. विषम उपन्यासः । नैको द्रष्टा आदित्यमनेकाधिकरणस्थं युगपदुपलभते । *Loc. cit.*
6. See for example *KV* 1.2.64.62, II, p. 100.
7. जातिशब्देन हि द्रव्याभिधानम् । *Ibid.* 1.2.58.7, II, p. 67. Also cp. the word जाति used in जात्याख्यायां सामान्याभिधानादैकार्थ्यम् । *Ibid.* 1.2.58.1, II, p. 65.
8. द्रव्याभिधाने ह्याकृतिसम्प्रत्ययः (तत्रासर्वद्रव्यगतिः) । *Ibid.* 1.2.64.46, p. 93.

The upshot of the foregoing deliberation is that the word ākṛti occurs in *KV* and *PVM* primarily in the sense of form or configuration and secondarily in the sense of jāti. Ākṛti is non-eternal in the sense that it changes while the substance possesing it remains constant; it is eternal in the sense that it is never destroyed wholly with the destruction of the individuals possessing it but survives the destruction of particular individuals in the surviving ones. The position of *VS* is simpler. According to it, āktṛi is nothing but form or configuration.

In the two works on grammar under examination, we can find the germs of the category universal without doubt. And the germs are represented by the concepts of jāti and ākṛti. We suggest that the category universal has evolved out of these two concepts. Jāti without ākṛti and ākṛti without jāti are simply inconceivable; hence the contribution of both to the birth of the concept of universal.

**8) Verdict of the Mīmāṁsā tradition :** To the best of our knowledge, Jaimini does not seem to be aware of the category universal. He does use the words sāmānya, jāti, and ākṛti, but he uses them in senses different from universal. His 'sāmānya' means 'similarity' or 'similar thing'.[1] By 'jāti' he means a biological species[2] or caste.[3] Kumārila's interpretation of it as universal notwithstanding, he uses the word ākṛti in the same sense as in the afore-examined grammatical literature and *VS*. The whole tone of the 9th, Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa of Pāda 3 of the opening chapter of

---

1. See for example : सामान्यं, तच्चिकीर्षा हि । *MS* 6.3.11.27, the translation of which is : *Something similar* (should be substituted), for there is a desire to do so.

2. See for example : जातिः । *MS* 1.4.12-2.23-2: जातिं तु बादरायणोऽविशेषात् ; तस्मात् स्त्र्यपि प्रतीयेज् , जात्यर्थस्याविशिष्टत्वात् । 6.1.3.8 ; रूपत्वान्यत्वान् न जातिशब्दः स्यात् । 6.8.10.40 ; जात्यन्तरेषु भेदः स्यात्, पक्तिवैषम्यात् । 11.4.10.37.

3. See for example : जातिः । *Ibid.* 1.4.12, p. 361 (12 is the Adhikaraṇa no. In the Anandashrama ed., the Stūra is not numbered).

*MS* as well as *MBh.* resounds with the idea that ākṛti means form or configuration and nothing else. We should like to substantiate our view by examining the crucial, Siddhānta-Sūtra of that section.

The Sūtra under reference reads thus : 'In fact, it is ākṛti ( that is denoted by words ), for it alone serves the purpose of action.'[1] Śabara's following comments upon the Sūtra will be found interesting : 'Ākṛti is the denotations of words. Why ? Because it alone serves the purpose of action. The injunction "Erect the alter like a hawk" can apply only to ākṛti, ( namely, ) if the word hawk denotes ākṛti.'[2] Śabara's words are clear. The alter is to be erected after the image of a hawk, hence the word ākṛti must be taken to mean form, configuration, shape, or image. If it is construed to mean a universal, the whole passage will lose its meaning. Ganga Nath Jha, the translator of *MBh.*, was also inclined to the view that in this context 'ākṛti' means form or configuration, though he translated it as 'class' (in the sense of universal ) in deference to the interpretation of Kumārila. 'In this context, the term "ākṛti" could best be rendered as "*configuration*" and as this also is a factor that is common to all individuals, we would have adoptad it; but the *Tantravārtika* having declared ( Translation, pp. 330 and 331 ) that "*akṛti*" does not stand for the *shape*, it has been thought advisable to stick to the one uniform rendering "class".'[3]

On the other hand, Kumārila has no doubt that the word ākṛti used by Jaimini and Śabara means nothing but universal.[4] Indeed, he is convinced that it is just to throw into relief the fact that ākṛti, at bottom, means universal and to ward

---

1. आकृतिस् तु क्रियार्थत्वात् । *Ibid.* 1.3.9.33.

2. आकृतिः शब्दार्थः । कुतः ? क्रियार्थत्वात् । 'श्येनचितं चिन्वीत' [*Taittirīya-Kṛṣṇa-Yajuḥ-Saṁhitā* 5.4.11] इति वचनमाकृतौ संभवति, यद्याकृत्यर्थः श्येनशब्दः । *MBh.* 1.3.9.33, p. 302.

3. *Śabara-Bhāṣya*, Ganga Nath Jha, tr., p. 120.

4. जातिमेवाकृतिं प्राह, व्यक्तिराक्रियतेऽनया ।
सामान्यं तच् च पिण्डानामेकबुद्धिनिबन्धम् ॥ *MŚV*, Ākrtivāda, 3.

off the danger of confusing it with configuration that Śabara, after introducing the topic of ākṛti as an object of perception in the opening Pāda ( Tarka-Pāda ) of his work, has resumed it here.[1] In this connexion, Kumārila adduces various logical reasons against equating configuration with the universal.[2]

If we look into the passage in Tarka-Pāda referred to by Kumārila, we shall find that there, too, the word ākṛti is used in the sense of configuration. Śabara describes the ākṛti, say, of a cow as characterized by dew-lap and other features.[3] This leaves no doubt about the fact that ākṛti is nothing else than configuration. It is established beyond a shadow of doubt that what is meant here is the shape or figure of things.

Elsewhere in the same Pāda, Śabara observes that the body of the cow is the receptacle of many ākṛti-s,[4] which is bound to prove meaningless if ākṛti does not convey the sense of configuration.

---

1. द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मणां सामान्यमात्रमाकृतिरिति । *MBh.* 1.3.9.30, pp. 294-295.
एवं प्रपञ्चितं सर्वमर्थसामान्यमाकृतिः ।
न संस्थानम् । कुतो ह्येतदात्मादिगुणकर्मसु ? *TV, ad loc.*
तेन प्रथमपादे रुचकस्वस्तिकवर्धमानकोदाहरणात् संस्थानाकृत्यभिधानाशंकाक्षयादर्शन ( शंकाऽक्षपाददर्शन ? ) वदासीदित्येताभ्यां प्रश्नोत्तराभ्यां व्यावर्तते । अतश् च द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मणां यावत्किञ्चित् प्राग्व्यक्तिभ्यः सामान्यं तत् सर्वमाकृतिरेवेत्यभिप्रेत्य मात्र-शब्दः प्रयुक्तः । *Ibid.*, p. 296.

2. सर्वेषु हि पार्थिवेषु गवादिघटादिषु संस्थानं भवेत् । अग्नितोयवाय्वाकाशादीनां तु पार्थिवद्रव्यपरिग्रहवशादाकारानुवृत्तिः कल्प्येत न स्वातंत्र्येण, दिक्कालात्ममनसां तु गुणकर्मणां च न संस्थानं सम्भवति । सामान्यमात्रं तु सर्वस्वविशेषानुवृत्तिरूपं संभाव्यते । तस्मादेतदेवाभिधेयाकृतिलक्षणं नावयवरचनासंस्थानाकृतित्वमवकल्पते ।

संस्थानस्य च नाशित्वात्, प्रतिव्यक्ति च भेदतः,
सामान्यव्यवहारित्वं नाकृतित्वेऽवकल्पते ॥
अथ संस्थानसामान्यमाकृतित्वेन गृह्यते,
अश्वादिष्वपि तुल्यत्वाद् भवेदाकृतिसङ्करः ॥

*Ibid.* 1.3.9.30, p. 295. Also see *MŚV*, Vanavāda, 16-20.

3. सास्नादिविशिष्टा आकृतिरिति ब्रूमः । *MBh.* 1.1.5.5, p. 50.

4. गोपिण्डे च बहूनामाकृतीनां सद्भावाच् छब्दमन्तरेण गोशब्दवाच्यां विभक्तामाकृतिं केन प्रकारेणोपदेक्ष्यति ? *Ibid.* 1.1.6.19, pp. 86-87.

Śabara defines ākṛti and vyakti in the following words: 'Among substances, attributes, and motions, the factor only common [to several individuals] is ākṛti and that which has uncommon (specific) characteristics is vyakti.'[1] This definition, too, does not suggest that ākṛti is regarded by Śabara as something additional to substances, attributes, and motions and constituting a category by itself akin to the universal of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. It simply means configuration which is common to all individuals belonging to the same class.

Śabara uses the word sāmānya frequently, but he uses it in the sense of 'common', 'commonness', 'generality', or 'similarity'. So far as we are aware, he never uses it in the sense of universal. In his afore-quoted definition of ākṛti, he has used it in the sense of 'common'. At one place, he has remarked that sāmānya and viśeṣa are different concepts and that a part of speech (pada) denotes sāmāny whereas a sentence, viśeṣa.[2] Here, by the words 'sāmānya' and 'viśeṣa' he seems to mean general (or generality) and particular (or patricularity). Elsewhere, he cites 'cow' 'horse', etc. as examples of sāmānya and 'white', 'black', etc. as examples of viśeṣaka-s (particularisers) or factors responsible for turning the sāmānya into a viśeṣa.[3] This goes to confirm out interpretation of the words sāmānya and viśeṣa in the preceding example as general and particular.

Incidentally, on one occasion on which he lists the largest number of categories without, however, offering a complete table thereof, Śabara mentions substance, attribute, motion, and organ only.[4] If universal were a category of such a

---

1. द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मणां सामान्यमात्रमाकृतिः, असाधारणविशेषा व्यक्तिः। *Ibid.* 1.3.9.30, pp. 294-295.

2. सामान्ये हि पदं वर्तते, विशेषे वाक्यम्। अन्यच् च सामान्यं, अन्यो विशेषः। *Ibid.* 1.1.7.24, p. 93. Cp. पदानां सामन्ये वर्तमानानां यद् विशेषेऽवस्थानं स वाक्यार्थः। *PVM* 1.2.4.45, II, p. 45.

3. गौरिति वाऽश्व इति वा सामान्यवाचिनः पदात्…शुक्ल इत्यादेर् विशेषवचनस्य…। *MBh.* 1.1.7.24, pp. 94-95.

4. यथा द्रव्यं, गुणः, कर्मावयव इत्येवमादीनाम्। *Ibid.* 10.3.11.44, p. 1836.

vital importance in the eye of Śabara as Kumārila and others make it out to be, he would surely mention it, at any rate in preference to organ.

So, we find that the two oldest extant treatises of the Mīmāṁsā system, viz. *MS* and *MBh.*, evince no knowledge of the category universal.

Kumārila appears to be the first to equate ākṛti with universel in the Mīmāṁsā tradition in such categorical terms. Prabhākara, a Mīmāṁsaka almost contemporneous with if not older than Kumārila, is not as categorical as Kumārila in this behalf. He has not raised the issue whether ākṛti means universal or configuration. On one occasion he uses the word sāmānya[1] as a synonym for ākṛti presumably in the sense of universal rather than mere similarity or generality. The term 'jāti' used by him in this context[2] also suggests that he equates 'ākṛti' with universal.

Ever since Kumārila, the word ākṛti has all along been used in the sense of universal, in the Mīmāṁsā tradition. Śaṅkara, the great teacher of Advaitism, seems to follow this tradition when he observes that ākṛti is eternal.[3]

There is a discussion of the nature and existence of ākṛti in *MBh.* which demands special notice in this connexion. The question has been raised whether ākṛti is a logical construction ( sādhya ) and answered that being an object of ( valid ) perception it cannot be so and that it is as much an objective fact as a necklace, road-crossing, and dish—various ornaments—which are all objects of perception. Ākṛti cannot be said to be a mere illusion, for it is not negatived by further experience. It cannot be said that it is an illusory object like a series, group, or forest which appear to be single, objective entities though in fact they are nothing apart from the component individuals; for, merely because the

---

1. यदि शब्दस्य व्यक्तिरर्थः, अथापि सामान्यं, सम्बन्धे को विशेषः ? *Bṛhatī* 1.1.5.5, p. 164.
2. See *ibid*, p. 165.
3. See *ŚBh.* 1.3.8.28, pp. 251-252.

forest is not perceived apart from the trees, it does not follow that the forest does not exist. Unless there is a notion sublative of the notion of the existence of the forest, it cannot be asserted that the forest does not exist. However, there may or may not be such a sublative notion in regard to the forest, but in regard to the ākṛti of cow and the like we do not find our notion being sublated. That is to say, ākṛti is an objective fact rather than a mere logical construction.[1]

This indicates that, though universal had not developed into a full-fledged category in Śabara's time, the concept of ākṛti had certainly begun to individualize itself in such a way as to grow into the category before long. This shows that Śabara should be earlier than the recognition of universal as category in *VS*.

**9) Dharmakīrti's explanation of the concept :** Dharmakīrti traces the origin of the concept of universal to our peculiar use of language. Our word-based cognition ( śabdāśraya buddhiḥ ) tends to establish identity among discrete individuals thanks to the force of our eternal instinct ( anādivāsanāsāmarthyāt ), thereby giving birth to the concept of universal.[2]

---

1. ननु आकृतिः साध्याऽस्ति वा न वा इति । न प्रत्यक्षा सती साध्या भवितुमर्हति, रुचकः, स्वस्तिकः, वर्धमानक, इति हि प्रत्यक्षं दृश्यते । व्यामोह इति चेन्, न, न असति प्रत्ययविपर्यासे व्यामोह इति शक्यते वक्तुम् । असत्यप्यर्थान्तर एवंजातीयको भवति प्रत्ययः—पंक्तिः, यूथम्, वनम् इति यथा—इति चेन्, न । असम्बद्धमिदं वचनमुपन्यस्तम् । किमसति वने वनप्रत्ययो भवति इति प्रत्यक्षमेवाक्षिप्यते--वृक्षा अपि न सन्तीति ? यद्येवम्, प्रत्युक्तः स माहायानिकः पक्षः ।...न च वृक्षव्यतिरिक्तं वनं यस्मान् नोपलभ्यते, ततो वनं नास्ति इत्यवगम्यते । यदि वने अन्येन हेतुना सद्भावविपरीतः प्रत्यय उत्पद्यते, मिथ्यैव वनप्रत्यय इति, ततो वनं नास्ति इत्यवगच्छामः । न च गवादिषु प्रत्ययो विपर्येति, अतो वैषम्यम् । अथ वनादिषु नैव विपर्येति, न ते न सन्तीति । तस्मादसम्बद्धः पंक्तिवनोपन्यास : । *MBh.* 1.1.5.5, pp. 50-52.

2. न वै किञ्चित् सामान्यम् । शब्दाश्रया बुद्धिरनादिवासनासामर्थ्यात् धर्मानसंसृष्टानपि संसृजन्ती जायते । असदर्थाकारप्रतिभासवशेन सामान्यं सामानधिकरणं (sic) च व्यवस्थाप्यते । *PVSV* 3.66, p. 154.

Universal is nothing more than a mental fiction, an illusion ( bhrānti ), which we mistake for a fact. This mistake is occasioned by a peculiar habit of viewing things cultivated by man from time immemorial.[1] The undue ontological importance assigned to the possessive case, the 'of,' is at the root of most of the cases of hypostatization of abstractions like universals and their alienation, objective in appearance but subjective in fact, from individuals which alone are real. Cowhood and whiteness, for example, are nothing over and above the individual cows, but the 'of' in the expression 'the cowhood of the cow' and 'the whiteness of the cow' make us think as if cowhood and whiteness are something other than the cow by which they are possessed, Hence, words do not necessarily denote objective facts.[2] As a matter of fact, they depend upon our intentions (vivakṣāśrayāḥ )[3], rather than upon objective facts (vastuvaśāḥ).[4] Words carry only such meaning as the speaker chooses to give to them, irrespective of whether there are any objective entities corresponding to these or not. In Sanskrit, a plural word, dārāḥ ( wives ), is used to denote even one wife, and a singular word, ṣaṇṇagarī ( six towns ) is used to denote many towns. Is there in such instances any relation between the word and the fact at all ? Even the Naiyāyika will agree that the spaceness ( khatva ) of space ( kha ) is nothing but the latter's own intrinsic nature ( svabhāva ) and not a universal, for the simple reason that space is a unity, not a plurality of individual spaces for the universal to assi-

---

1. तस्यां रूपावभासोऽयं तत्त्वेनार्थस्य वा ग्रह: ।
भ्रान्तिः साऽनादिकालीनदर्शनाभ्यासनिर्मिता ।। *PV* 2.29.

2. ननु च धर्मधर्मिणोरभेदे भेदे च षष्ठ्यादिर् विभक्तिर् दृष्टा । तत्र बहुषु धर्मेषु दृष्टो वचनभेद एकस्मित् धर्मिणि न युक्त: । उक्तमत्र—न वै शब्दानां स्वभावायत्ततेति । *PVSV* 3.67, p.157. Karṇakagomin says स्वभावायत्तता विषयस्वभावायत्ता वृत्तिः ।

3. विवक्षैव पर: प्रधानमाश्रयो यासां वाचान्ता विवक्षापराश्रया: । *PVSVT*, *sub voce ad ibid.*

4. येषां वस्तुवशा वाचो न विवक्षापराश्रया: ।
षष्ठीवचनभेदादि चोद्यं तान् प्रति युक्तिमत् ।। *PV* 3.67.

milate. But one who labours under the false notion that each word owns a counterpart in the realm of reality may be deluded into the belief that spaceness is a universal and is other than space.[1] This all goes to show that speakers use words the way they like; they do not feel bound to use only such words as correspond with the things in the outside world. Hence, one need not take words too seriously while philosophizing.

The position, according to Dharmakīrti, is that the assimilative cognition born of age-old instinct and the deceptivity of words serves to veil the intrinsic discreteness of things. That is why such cognition is termed veiling ( saṁvṛti ) cognition. It is on account of this that things, which are intrinsically dissimilar, look similar to us. It is with reference to this that universal can be said to be real ( sat ); otherwise, from the standpoint of absolute truth, it is unreal and subjective. Neither individuals assimilate one another nor is any other entity like universal found to assimilate them. As a matter of fact, universal is a mental entity, which cannot be transformed into an objective entity. Hence the cognition of generality or unity in things is a false cognition, which is due to the pragmatic need of assimilating things which are essentially exclusive.[2] For facility of reference,

---

1. यद् यथा वाचकत्वेन वक्तृभिर् विनियम्यते
अपनेक्षितबाह्यार्थं तत् तथा वाचकं वचः ॥
दाराः षण्णगरीत्यादौ भेदाभेदव्यवस्थितेः
खस्य स्वभावः खत्वं चेत्यत्र वा किन्निबंधनः ?॥ *PV* 3.68-69.

2. पररूपं स्वरूपेण यया संव्रियते धिया
एकार्थप्रतिभासिन्या भावानाश्रित्य भेदिनः ॥
तया संवृतनानार्थाः संवृत्या भेदिनः स्वयम्
अभेदिन इवाभान्ति भावा रूपेण केनचित् ॥
तस्या अभिप्रायवशात् सामान्यं सत् प्रकीर्तितम् ।
तदसत् परमार्थेन यथा संकल्पितं तथा ॥
व्यक्तयो नानुयन्त्यन्यदनुयायि न भासते ।
ज्ञानादव्यतिरिक्तं च कथमर्थान्तरं व्रजेत् ?
तस्मान् मिथ्याविकल्पोऽयमर्थेष्वेकात्मताग्रहः,
इतरेतरभेदोऽस्य बीजं संज्ञा यदर्थिका ॥ *Ibid.* 3.70-74.

things performing the same function—such as giving milk etc. in the case of cows—need to be given a common name. It is physically impossible to give one name to each individual. Even if it were possible, it would be unmanageable and useless. So, the wise chose to give a common name to the individuals performing the same function with a view to distinguishing them from individuals performing different functions.[1]

Dharmakīrti explains the notion of universal on the basis of his theory of negation of the other ( anyāpoha or atad-vyāvṛtti ).[2] When it is said of an individual that it is a cow, it is actually distinguished from the non-cow. The cowhood of the cow consists in its distinction from all that is not a cow. The human mind constructs as many universals as the things it distinguishes an individual from.[3] A cow is called a cow when it is distinguished from a non-cow, an animal when it is distinguished from a non-animal, a substance when it is distinguisthed from a non-substance, for example.

This is Dharmakīrti's explanation of the genesis of the category universal, which, according to him, is nothing more than a concept of the mind.

**10) Rèsumè :** The upshot of the foregoing researches is that the category universal is a development of the concepts of species, genus, and form. In *NS*, *KV*, *PVM*, and *MS* the word ākṛti means form or configuration. In *PVM* and *MBh.*, too, the word is used primarily in the sense of form or configuration, but there is reason to believe that it had therein begun to undergo some change and that form had started extricating

---

1. एककार्येषु भेदेषु तत्कार्यपरिचोदने ॥
गौरवाशक्तिवैफल्याद् भेदाख्यायाः समा श्रुतिः ।
कृता वृद्धैरतत्कार्यव्यावृत्तिविनिबन्धना ॥ *Ibid.* 3.139-140.

2. तेनान्यापोहविषयाः शब्दाः सामान्यगोचराः ॥ *Ibid.* 3.136.

3. तस्माद् यतो यतोऽर्थानां व्यावृत्तिस् तन्निबन्धनाः ।
जातिभेदाः प्रकल्प्यन्ते तद्विशेषावगाहिनः ॥ *Ibid.* 3.43.

itself from the individals which it characterized, although we do not find therein such a clear declaration of independence of ākṛti from individuals as in later literature.

As regards Dharmakīrti's explanation of the birth of the concept, there appears to be much force in it. One may or may not share with him the view that universals are mere mental constructions and that they can have no place in the inventory of the world, but it is difficult to find fault with the process of getting at the notion of universal outlined by him. If one believes in the reality of universal, there is nothing to prevent one from appropriating the explanation with this modification that the process explained by Dharmakīrti is also the process of *discovering* universal.

CHAPTER IX

# EVOLUTION OF DIFFERENTIAL AND INHERENCE AS CATEGORIES

## 1. EVOLUTION OF DIFFERENTIAL AS A CATEGORY

**1) Differential a youngest category is** *VS* : Differential and inherence appear to have been the last to attain the status of categories. That is presumably why they are the least spoken of in *VS*. Here we propose to concentrate on differential, deferring the discussion of inherence to the next section of this chapter.

**2) Evidence** : It is really significant that no attempt has been made in *VS* to define and delimit the concept of differential—as has been meticulously done in the case of substance, attribute, motion, and existence—beyond more or less casual and in a way dubious references to the category here and there. Barring *VS* 1. 1. 4 which we have shown to be spurious and 1. 2. 3, 5, and 6, the term viśeṣa ( 'antyā viśeṣāḥ' in the case of the latter ) occurring wherein will be interpreted in the sequel differently, the term viśeṣa occurs in *VS* in its categorial acceptation always in double-member compounds, the other member being 'sāmānya'. We find quite a few such compounds in the treatise.[1] There is only one Sūtra in the whole treatise which is exclusively devoted to 'antyā viśeṣāḥ'.[2] There are some whose contention is that these antyā viśeṣāḥ (ultimate viśeṣa-s) are nothing but differentials, some going to the extent of claiming that only 'antyāḥ' ( singular raw form 'antya-viśeṣa' ) is the term used in *VS* for the category differential and that, therefore, the viśeṣa of *VS* is

---

1. *VS* 1.1.7 ; 1.2.11, 13,15,17 ; 8.5,6.
2. *Ibid.* 1.2.6.

radically and invariably different from the viśeṣa of the later Vaiśeṣika thought which has its counterpart in the antya-viśeṣa category of *VS*. But we have it that the term 'viśeṣa' or 'antyā viśeṣāḥ' in the context under reference admits of a different and more plausible interpretation. It will be worth while to consider this point before proceeding further.

Translated literally, the Sūtra containing the term 'antyā viśeṣāḥ' reads thus : 'Elsewhere than ultimate ( antyāḥ ) viśeṣa-s.'[1] It is unintelligible without an idea of the context in which it occurs. Let us, therefore, pause to consider the context first. An added advantage in considering the context is that in course of it we shall have a good opportunity of determining according to our lights the meaning of perhaps the most controversial Sūtra (other than the one already under consideration) in the whole treatise, without taking a position in regard to which any account of the category differential will remain incomplete.

As remarked in an earlier chapter, the opening two Sūtras of lesson 2 of chapter 1 of *VS* dealing with causality belong logically to lesson 1. Sūtra 3 opens the context we propose to consider here. This is the Sūtra we had in mind when we spoke of the most controversial Sūtra in the whole treatise. We should like to do fuller justice to it than done so far.

The Sūtra reads thus: [ That this is ] sāmānya and [ this is ] viśeṣa, is buddhyapekṣa'.[2] What does the expression 'buddhyapekṣa' mean ? In *VS* it occurs thrice : in the instant Sūtra, in 8. 2. 1, and in 9. 2. 5 ( in the last Sūtra as 'buddhya-pekṣitatva' ). Let us see what the expression means in the other two Sūtras. Of these two, the first Sūtra reads thus : 'This, that, done by you, feed him—these are buddhyapekṣa.'[3]

1. अन्यत्रान्त्येभ्यो विशेषेभ्यः । *Ibid.* 1.2.6. Has the expression 'antyāḥ viśeṣāḥ', been suggested by the expressions 'antya-śeṣa' and 'antya-viśeṣaṇa' of *PVM* 1.1.3.2, I, p. 177, on one hand and 1.1.51, I, pp. 340 and 426, on the other, respectively ?

2. सामान्यं विशेष इति बुद्ध्यपेक्षम् । *VS* 1.2.3.

3. अयमेष, कृतं त्वया, भोजय एनम्—इति बुद्ध्यपेक्षम् । *Ibid.* 8.12.

Whatever be the import of this Sūtra, which we confess is quite obscure to us and for which, therefore, we have no alternative but to depend entirely upon *VS*U, the expression 'buddhyapekṣa' can well be understood in the sense of 'relative to or dependent upon understanding.' The second Sūtra reads thus: 'Because of asyedam iti buddhyapekṣitatva.'[1] Here the term buddhyapekṣitatva cannot but be taken to mean 'being relative to or dependent upon understanding', so that a proper translation of the Sūtra would be: 'Because of the relativity to or dependence upon the cognition ( or understanding ) "It is its".'

If the term 'buddhyapekṣa' or 'buddhyapekṣitatva' occurring elsewhere in the treatise means 'dependent' or 'being dependent upon understanding or cognition', there is no reason why the term 'buddhyapekṣa' occurring in the other main Sūtra under consideration should not convey the same meaning. Thus this Sūtra can be translated as under: '[That this is] sāmānya and [this is] viśeṣa is dependent upon understanding.'

To sāmānya and viśeṣa, as also to inherence, Praśastapāda ascribes the characteristic buddhilakṣaṇatva,[2] 'having notion as their mark', apparently as a synonym for buddhyapekṣitatva. Commentators seem to be right in interpreting Praśastapāda's expression to mean that his sāmānya, which is undoubtedly the category universal, is marked by the notion of repeatedness, assimilation, inclusion, or subsumption ( anuvṛtti ) and viśeṣa, which is undoubtedly the category differential, is marked by the notion of unrepeatedness, dissimilation, exclusion, or discrimination ( vyāvṛtti ). Barring Vyomaśiva whom we are quoting presently and Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra, whom we shall have occasion to discuss at the proper place, all traditional commentators and writers of the Vaiśeṣika school interpret Kaṇāda's 'buddhyapekṣa' on the

---

1. अस्येदमिति बुद्ध्यपेक्षत्वात् । *Ibid.* 9.21.
2. समान्यादीनां त्रयाणां... बुद्धिलक्षणत्वम्... । *PDS*, p. 133.

line.[1] In another connexion, stating that remoteness and proximity are 'buddhyapekṣa',[2] Vyomaśiva explains that the term 'apekṣa' here signifies cause ( kāraṇa )[3]. That is say, according to him the notions of universal and particular are caused by reflection. Among moderns, opinion is divided as to the real import of this expression. The traditional interpretation has been called in question by some competent orientalists like M. R. Bodas. According to him, Kaṇāda means to say that the categories sāmānya and viśeṣa are essentially subjective and depend for their very being upon thought.[4] Sadanada Bhaduri does not agree with this interpretation and puts forth a new interpretation. He contends that there is a difference between the terms 'viśeṣa' and 'antya-viśeṣa' as used in *VS*. The term 'viśeṣa' in the Sūtra under consideration stands for a class-character viewed as a differentia, whereas antya-viśeṣa is the term used by Kaṇāda to denote the category of differential ( particularity, as he calls it ).[5]

We come across an interesting parallel to the Sūtra under consideration in *PVM*. Patañjali raises the question, 'What is sāmānya, what viśeṣa ?',[6] and, having a black cow in mind, replies, 'Cow is sāmānya, black viśeṣa.'[7] Next he raises an objection, 'Now, is not black sāmānya, and cow viśeṣa ?'[8], and confirms it.[9] Then he considers the objection, 'If, then,

1. See, for example, भिन्नेषु पिण्डेष्वनुवर्तमानां 'गौर्, गौः' इति बुद्धिमपेक्ष्य एभ्य एव च परस्परतो व्यावर्तमानाम् 'अयमस्मादन्यः' इति तदनुवृत्तिबुद्ध्यपेक्षं सामान्यं, व्यावृत्तिबुद्ध्यपेक्षो विशेष इति। *VSC* 1.2.3, p.8 ; तत्र सामान्यस्य तद्विशेषस्य च लक्षणं बुद्धिरेव। अनुवृत्तिबुद्धिः सामान्यस्य, व्यावृत्तिबुद्धिर् विशेषस्य।...वृत्तिकारस् तु ।... बुद्धिरपेक्षा, लिङ्गं, लक्षणं वा यस्य तद् बुद्ध्यपेक्षम्। *VS* 1.2.3, p. 34.
2. परमपरं चेति बुद्ध्यपेक्षमिति...। *Vyomavatī*, p. 517.
3. अपेक्षाशब्दश् चात्र कारणे वर्तत इति। *Loc. cit.*
4. Bodas, p. XXXIX.
5. Bhaduri, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20, f.n. 45.
6. किं पुनः सामान्यम् ? को विशेषः ? *PVM* 1.1.66, I, p. 431.
7. गौः सामान्यं, कृष्णो विशेषः। *Loc. cit.*
8. न तर्हीदानीं कृष्णः सामान्यं, गौर् विशेषो भवति ? *Ibid.*, p. 432.
9. भवति च। *Loc. cit.*

sāmānya is also viśeṣa, viśeṣa is also sāmānya, sāmānya and viśeṣa are not conceived of [as different]',[1] and asserts that they are certainly conceivable as different.[2] 'How ?',[3] crops up the question. 'Through vivakṣā (intention)',[4] comes the reply. 'When one intends to speak of cow by way of sāmānya and black by way of viśeṣa, cow is sāmānya and black viśeṣa. When one intends to speak of black by way of sāmānya and cow by way of viśeṣa, black is sāmānya and cow viśeṣa.'[5] To this Patañjali adds another illustration, of father and son, presumably from some other work.[6] 'The same man is father of one and son of another. Likewise, here, too, the same thing is sāmānya in relation to one and viśeṣa in relation to another.'[7]

It needs no saying that Patañjali's concept of vivakṣā as postulated here is in effect synonymous with the concept of buddyapekṣa found in *VS*. Indeed, the non-ontological character of Patañjali's sāmānya and viśeṣa postulated here is bound to suggest a non-ontological view of the same concepts used by Kaṇāda.

Now consider another aspect of the Sūtra. It does not say, 'sāmānya and viśeṣa are dependent upon understanding'; it says, as is evident from the word 'iti' occurring therein, 'That this is sāmānya and this is viśeṣa, is dependent upon understanding'. This circumstance suggests that the author of this Sūtra declares the *distinction* between sāmānya and

1. यदि तर्हि सामान्यमपि विशेषः, विशेषोऽपि सामान्यं, सामान्यविशेषौ न प्रकल्पेते । *Loc. cit.*
2. प्रकल्पेते च । *Loc. cit.*
3. कथम् ? *Loc. cit.*
4. विवक्षातः । *Loc. cit.*
5. यदाऽस्य गौः सामान्येन विवक्षितो भवति, कृष्णो विशेषत्वेन, तदा गौः सामान्यं कृष्णो विशेषः । यदाऽस्य कृष्णः सामान्येन विवक्षितो भवति, गौर् विशेषत्वेन, तदा कृष्णः सामान्यं, गौर् विशेषः । *Loc. cit.*
6. अपर आह—'प्रकल्पेते च' कथम् ? पितापुत्रवत् । *Loc. cit.*
7. तद् यथा—स एव कश्चित्प्रति पिता भवति, कश्चित्प्रत्ति पुत्रो भवति । एवमिहापि स एव कश्चित्प्रति सामान्यं, कश्चित्प्रति विशेषः । *Loc. cit.*

viśeṣa rather than sāmānya and viśeṣa themselves to be dependent upon understanding. Here he does not seem to be interested in deciding the status of sāmānya and viśeṣa themselves. If, therefore, these two expressions are taken to stand for the categories universal and differential, these categories cannot be taken on the authority of this Sūtra to be dependent upon our thought for their very being. In that case, it can be contended that they are subjective not in reality but in appearance. From another point of view, it can also be argued that the category universal alone is describable as now universal and now particular according as it is viewed against the background of or in relation or reference to its substrata (individuals) and lower universals on the one hand and higher universals on the other respectively. Even as one and the same thing can be called big and small in relation to a smaller and a bigger thing respectively, one and the same universal can be called universal and particular in relation to individuals and subsuming universals respectively. We shall see presently, however, that these interpretations are far from valid.

To us it appears that the correct import of the Sūtra under consideration is something like this. The notions sāmānya and viśeṣa are relative notions and represent notional or logical categories rather than ontological ones. Sāmānya and viśeṣa are nothing absolute, are not two independent categories at all, and are not, with the two exceptions to be mentioned presently, predicable of two different orders of being. They are relative terms like 'big' and 'small', which in themselves mean nothing but which become meaningful when used in relation to each other. One and the same predicate or character may be viewed both as a sāmānya and as a viśeṣa. Whether it is viewed as the one or the other depends entirely on how we conceive the character. Potness, for example, is a sāmānya when viewed as assimilating all pots; it is a viśeṣa when viewed as a character distinctive of pots alone. For the same reason, as runs Sūtra 5, 'Substancehood, attribute-ness, and motion-ness are sāmānya-s as

well as viśeṣa-s.'[1] The case is, however, different with two facts, which are exceptions to the general rule, propounded in Sūtra 3, that the notions sāmānya and viśeṣa are relative to reflection. Sūtra 4 states that 'On account of [its] exclusively assimilative character, existence is a sāmānya alone.'[2] The second exception is given in Sūtra 6 to explain which we have given here the entire context in which it occurs. This Sūtra should be read with Sūtra 5. Well, Sūtra 5 says that substancehood, attribute-ness, and motionness are both sāmānya-s and viseṣa-s. The next Sūtra adds, 'Elsewhere than ultimate viśeṣa-s' ; that is to say, the statement in the preceding Sūtra does not apply to ultimate viśeṣa-s, which should be viewed as viśeṣa-s alone and not sāmānya-s and viśeṣa-s both.

To sum up the foregoing discussion : existence is an absolute sāmānya; substancehood, attribute-ness, and motion–ness are both sāmānya-s and viśeṣa-s; and ultimate viśeṣa-s are absolute viśeṣa-s.

It appears that the terms 'sāmānaya' and 'viśeṣa' used in this context do not stand for the categories universal and differential; otherwise describing substancehood etc. as both sāmānya and viseṣa will have no meaning. We are inclined to suppose that they correspond to the terms genus and species of Western logic, If this view is correct, substancehood etc. are genera, existence is the summum genus, and ultimate viseṣa-s (or antyā viseṣāḥ) infima species or individuals.

In arriving at this view, we have benefited much by the forthright statement of his position by Faddegon, with regard to the correct import of the Sūtras under examination. Writes Faddegon : 'Returning to the sūtra [ *VS* 1.2.6 ] itself we cannot fail to notice that the Indian interpretation to this

1. द्रव्यत्वं गुणत्वं, कर्मत्वं च सामान्यानि विशेषाश् च । *VS* 1.2.5.
2. भावोऽनुवृत्तेरेव हेतुत्वात् सामान्यमेव । *VS* (BI/KSS) 1.2.4. Cp. 'Thus every so-called 'universal' is particular in the sense of being just what it is, diverse from every thing else ; and every so called particular is universal in the sense of entering into the constitution of other actual entities'. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. 66.

sūtra, as bearing on atomism, is not the only one possible. ...We may continue the series [ of Summum Genus, genera-species, lower genera-species, still lower...and the Infima Species ] until we arrive at the ultimate species, i. e...the individuals.

'It is clear that the traditional interpretation is based on a logical fault ; instead of distinguishing the notion of containing which applies to genus and species from the notion of containing which applies to part and whole, the Vaiśeṣikas, confusing these two notions, did not consider the individual things, with their individual arrangements of qualities and relations to the surrounding world, as the terminus in the series genus-species ; but conceived the qualities of the atoms as such.

'We are not sure whether the Sūtrakṛt has already made this logical mistake ; at all events, even if he has done so, these vaiśeṣika-guṇas of the atoms would have been brought in so parenthetically that when comparing characterization ( vaidharmya or viśeṣa-nirūpaṇa ) we can no longer doubt the origin of the name Vaiśeṣika Darśana.'[1]

Certainly, 'viśeṣa' and 'antya-viśeṣa' used by Kaṇāda in the context under consideration do not appear to denote two orders of being or rather two radically different notions. The antyā viśeṣāḥ are only one species of viśeṣa-s, which is why he has had to hasten to make an exception to the general rule that sāmānya and viśeṣa are dependent upon or relative to understanding. The antyā viśeṣāḥ never can be sāmānya-s : hence they are easily identifiable with infima species. Thus it is wrong to suppose, as people sometimes do, that antyā viśeṣāḥ are identical with the category differential.

It is significant that Khwēi-ci's list of Vaiśeṣika categories altogether omits differential, though it does include inherence. Does this not suggest that by his time the category differential had not acquired that populrity which it enjoyed in later times ? At any rate, it does show that there

1. *VSF*, p. 118.

were in those days authors who did not include differential in the list of the Vaiśeṣika categories.

**2 ) A statement of the category** : Although the antyā viseṣāḥ or ultimate particulars cannot be identified with the category differential, *VS*, as we have remarked earlier, does recognize the category under the name viśeṣa wherever it uses the word in double-member compounds with the word 'sāmānya'. In one of the opening Sūtras of the treatise, differential has been enumerated as a category forming part of a list of six categories—substance etc.[1] In a subsequent Sūtra, it is said to be resident in substance, attribute, and motion alike along with the category universal.[2] Later, it is said to be absent from existence,[3] substancehood,[4] attribute-ness,[5] and motion-ness.[6] In the penultimate chapter of the treatise, it is said that the cognition of substance, attribute, and motion arises through, and in relation to, the universal and differential,[7] while that of the universal and diferential arises directly, for the simple reason that they are devoid of universal and differential.[8]

This is all that one can hope to find with regard to the category differential in the whole treatise.

**4 ) Genesis of the category** : We take it that the origin of the category differential is traceable to the concept of antya-viśeṣa discussed earlier. At any rate, those responsible for the formulation of the category must have taken their cue from this concept. The process of the deduction of the category might have been something like this. Even as there is a summum genus like existence, there might be an atomic, infima species or individual responsible for our notion

1. *VS* (BI/KSS) 1.1.4.
2. *VS* 1.1.7.
3. *Ibid.* 1.2.11.
4. *Ibid.* 1.2.13.
5. *Ibid.* 1.2.15.
6. *Ibid.* 1.2.17.
7. सामान्यविशेषापेक्षं द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मसु । *Ibid.* 8.6.
8. सामान्यविशेषेषु सामान्यविशेषाभावात् तत एव ज्ञानम् । *Ibid.* 8.5.

of distinctness or difference. This individual must be something subtler or rather more abstract than atoms which too it serves to distinguish from one another. This is the category differential. It is difficult to say, however, what must have been the case.

One also wonders whether the concepts antya-śeṣa[1] and antya-viśeṣaṇa[2] employed in *PVM* have something to do with Kaṇāda's concept ef antya-viśeṣa and consequently with the category differential.

Randle notes the kinship between differential and the Buddhist concept of negation of negation called 'apoha' or atad-vyāvṛtti. 'The category [ of differential ] suggests, and perhaps has, some relation to the Buddhist conception of apoha.'[3] Apoha means distinguishing something from all other things. It is a process of knowledge by elimination. Might not this concept have been responsible for the birth of the category differential ? It is far from possible to say anything categorically.

An alternative, and perhaps better, suggestion that we have to offer is that the category differential might well have been born as a result of a process of carrying the attribute separateness ( paṛthaktva ) to its logical extreme.

The theory of differential appears to be a sequel to the theory of universal. In its initial stages, it might have been more or less identical with individuality. When we see two cows, two questions might arise in our mind : (1) Why are they two *cows* ? and (2) Why are they *two* cows ? In answer to question (1), the Vaiśeṣika chose to posit universal ; in reply to question (2), we suppose, he might have posited individuality. To account for the similarity between the two cows causing them to be given a common name, cow, the genius of the Vaśeṣika hit upon the idea of universal. There is no reason why, to account for

1. See *PVM*, 1.1.3. I, p. 117.
2. See *ib d.* 1.1.51, I, p. 340, where the expression occurs thrice ; 1.1.64, I, p. 426.
3. *ILES*, p. 136, f. n.

the uniqueness of each of the cows, he should not have hit upon the idea of individuality. Indeed, if a cow is a cow because of its universal, it is *this* cows because of its individuality. This individuality grew into the category differential and by some fiat of the imagination it ceased to be conceived of as abiding in composite entities and was confined to their ultimate constituents, to wit, atoms alone. We suggest that the postulation of the concept of viśeṣa as individuality in the Madhva school of the Vedānta marks a recrudescence of the idea.

## 2. EVOLUTION OF INHERENCE AS A CATEGORY

**1) Recognition of inherence in *VS*:** There is in *VS* only one Sūtra exclusively devoted to samavāya. That samavāya is a very young category is indicated by the fact that it has not been treated in the opening chapter of *VS* along with the other catgories, beyond a bare mention of it in a spurious Sūtra.[1]

Now, in the single Sūtra in which it has been independently treated, it is defined as a causal nexus. 'That from which proceeds the notion 'This is here' vis-á-vis cause and effect, is samavāya'[2], reads the Sūtra. This samavāya is certainly different from the samavāya of the later Vaiśeṣika writers. The former is conceived of as relating only cause and effect and is, therefore, translatable as 'causal nexus', whereas the latter is conceived of as relating many other entities as well, and is usually translated as inherence, though not very aptly. However, one must not carry away the impression that *VS* is unaware of samavāya as inherence. References to samavāya occur in the work throughout,[3] and many of these references relate to inherence.

Let us see what Kaṇāda has to say about samavāya over and above the definition of the concept given above. Samavāya

1. *VS* (BS/KSS) 1.1.4.
2. इहेति यतः कार्यकारणायोः स समवायः । *VS* 7.2 29.
3. See *ibid.* 1.1.4 (BI/KSS), 14,24; 2.1.25; 3.1.8; 4.1.9,12; 5.2.25,26; 7.2.20,29; 9.16,17; 10.12, 14-18; 10.10; 8.9.

is said to be forming part of the well known table of six categories.[1] It plays an important role in the Vaiśeṣika theory of causality. Kaṇāda seems to recognize a samavāyī (inherent) cause[2] and an asamavāyi (non-inherent) cause.[3] Incidentally, he shows no awareness of the nimitta or sādhāraṇa (instrumental) cause, the oldest available reference to which is found in *PDS*.[4]

He speaks of the inherence of attributes and motions in substances[5], though he denies the inherence of a single motion in many substances.[6] He is also aware of the concepts of co-inherence (ekārtha-samavāya),[7] viz. inherence of many entities in one and the same subject, and inherence in the conjunct (saṁyukta-samavāya).[8] He clearly distinguishes between conjunction (saṁyoga) and inherence (samavāya), saying that the cognition of conjuncts arises from, say, the staff in the case of a man carrying a staff, while the cognition of inherent entities arises from a particular character.[9]

This is all about Kaṇāda's concept of inherence as a category.

**2) Genesis of the category** : The term 'samavāya' is, in ancient non-Viśeṣika literature, usually found employed in the sense of aggregation.[10] In *PVM* it once occurs in juxtaposition to vyavāya. There 'vyavāya' is apparently used in the sense of discreteness, separateness, or separation and samavāya, in the sense of coming together. It is said that a pot is of itself capable of holding its content but is dependent on other things so far as its cleansing etc. is concerned. Likewise, it is added, the pot is independent of other

1. See *VS* (BIKSS) 1.1.4.
2. See *VS* 1.1.14 ; 10.10. Also cp. 10.12,14,16,17.
3. See *ibid.* 5.2.26.
4. See *PDS*, p. 437.
5. See *VS* 5.2.26. Cp. 2.1.25 ; 4.1 9,12 ; 9.16,17.
6. See *ibid.* 1.1.24.
7. See *ibid.* 10 15 ; 3.1.8.
8. See *ibid.* 10 18.
9. See *ibid.* 7.2.20.
10. See, for example, *MS* 1.4.12.23 ; *PA* 4.4.43 ; 6.1.134.

things in respect of vyavāya, viz. its *own* operation, while it is dependent upon other things so far as its samavāya or aggregation with other things is concerned.[1] Patañjali cites another example. Ministers are not free so far as their samavāya or association with the king is concerned, while they are free so far as their vyavāya or isolation with him is concerned.[2]

There is in *PVM* another very, and indeed more, significant use of the samavāya in the same context. It is suggested there that, in the proper name Gārgya Devadatta, Gārgyahood and Devadatta-hood are samavāyin-s in one and the same substance (ekadravya-samavāyitva), viz. the person of Devadatta.[3] The expression 'samavāyin-s' in the same substance (ekadravya-samavāyin-s) reminds one of the expression 'co-inherence in the same subject' (ekārtha-samavāya) noted by us above in *VS*. It is, difficult to say, however, that here Patañjali uses the expression samavāya in the categorial sense given to it in the Vaiśeṣika system. 'Samavāyin-s in the same substance' does not necessarily mean *co-inherence* in the same substance ; it may as well mean mere *co-existence* in the same subject.

It appears that the common concept of aggregation as well as causation are responsible for the birth of the category inherence. Aggregation is both external, i. e. caused by external pressure, and internal, i. e. caused by internal necessity. The phenomenon of external aggregation gave rise to the concept of conjunction as an attribute, while that of internal aggregation, to the concept of inherence. Causation always persupposes some sort of internal necessity. That is why the causal nexus was the first to be recognized as an internal relation in *VS*. That the treatise defines the category samavāya, where it cares to deal with it independently at all, as causal nexus, cannot be without significance.

---

1. यथा पुनरिदं भवता स्थाल्याः कर्तृत्वं निदर्शित—संभवनक्रियां च धारणक्रियां च कुर्वती स्थाली स्वतंत्रेति—क्वेदानीं परतंत्रा स्यात् ? यत् तत्प्रक्षालनं परिवर्तनं वा...,एवं तर्हि प्रधानेन समवाये स्थाली परतंत्रा, व्यवाये स्वतंत्रा । *PVM* 1.4.23.15, II, p. 245.

2. तद् यथा-अमात्यानां राज्ञा सह समवाये पारतंत्र्यं, व्यवाये स्वातन्त्र्यम् । *Loc. cit.*

3. तद् यथा—गार्ग्यो देवदत्त इति । नहि गार्ग्य इत्यनेन देवदत्तत्वमुक्तं, देवदत्त इत्यनेन वा गार्ग्यत्वम् । उभौ चान्योन्यविशेषकौ भवतः, एकद्रव्यसमवायित्वात् । *Loc. cit.*

CHAPTER X

# FINALIZATION OF THE TABLE OF SIX CATEGORIES

## 1. THE PROCESS OF FINALIZATION

**1) The number of categories in** *VS* : From the foregoing inquiry, it is evident that in *VS* as it is found to-day one can find seven categories in all : substance, attribute, motion, existence (summum genus), universal (genus-differential), differential (infima species ?), and nexus or inherence. There is one more category, non-being, which is dealt with in the work at considerable length but the reference to which we have purposely avoided so far. We propose to consider it in a later chapter. Thus, there can be said to be at least eight categories dealt with in *VS*.

**2) Ascription of six categories to** *VS* : On the other hand, we find that *VS* has all along, with certain exceptions, been known to propound a table of only six categories. Such authorities of high antiquity as Caraka, Āryadeva, *Āvaśyaka-Sūtra*, and Praśastapāda all agree in holding that the Vaiśeṣika list consists of only six categories. Another noteworthy fact is that, while they agree that the number of the categories is six, there is no unanimity as to the actul categories on the list. Thus the *Āvaśyaka*, Caraka, Arydeva, and Praśastapāda mention substance, attribute, motion, universal (including existence), differential, and inherence as constituting the Vaiśeṣika table of categories, whereas Khwēi-ci represents Kaṇāda as propounding a table of substance, attribute, motion, existence, universal-particular, and inherence. The omission of differential from Khwēi-ci's list is significant. One more writer, Candra, agrees with Khwēi-ci in mentioning existence and universal-particular separately. Candra goes further, however, and includes non-being in the list. Śivāditya, Vyomaśiva, Śrīdhara, and Udayana follow suit.

Candra does not stop here. He goes still further and adds potentiality (śakti) and non-potentiality (aśakti) to the list, making it consist of ten categories. All this we have noted in passing and shall consider in later chapters.

What is the reason of this difference of opinion as regards the Vaiśeṣika table of categories ? We suggest the following explanation. All authorities older than Candra are found to agree in omitting non-being from the lisɟ of categories. This fact need not compel us to suppose that the discussion of non-being in *VS* is a later interpolation. It is rather more reasonable to suppose that the authorities in question did not take the negative category of non-being to be a category worth the name. Now remains the question of differences as to the actual categories on the list. It appears that these categories propounded in *VS* were variously understood and classified by various hands, both Vaiśeṣika and non-Vaiśeṣika, in ancient times. There being in *VS* no specification as to the exact number of categories subscribed to by its author,[1] later writers were free to construe the list any way they liked. In the treatise, ontological and logical categories are often found confused with each other. This circumstance might have added to the confusion ragarding the actual list of categories.

**3) Subsumption of existence under universal** : One thing that deserves particular notice in this process of finalization of the table of six categories is the merger of the category existence with the category universal. Though, as we have seen, existence seems originally to have been separated from, or rather to have pre-existed the birth of, the category universal, it soon came to be subsumed under it as the highest universal. This phenomenon has served to conduce to the limiting of the list of categories to six.

## 2. UNORTHODOX INTERPRETATIONS OF THE TABLE OF CATEGORIES

**1) Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra on Kaṇāda's position** : Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra, a modern author of an unortho-

1. *VS* (BI/KSS) 1.1.4. containing the list of six categories has already been shown to be spurious.

dox Sanskrit commentary on *VS*, has, more ingeniously than convincingly, essayed the task of demonstrating that the author of the extant text of *VS* purports to postulate only the first three of the group of six categories and that the last three are subsumable under the former but, with a particular object in view mentioned as if they were separate categories. They have been mentioned separately with a view to throwing into relief the speciality of the Vaiśeṣika system. Even as the fourteen categories beginning with doubt find mention in *NS* as separate categories despite their being subsumable under its first and second categories, viz. means of knowledge and objects of knowledge, just to distinguish the science of Nyāya from the Upaniṣads etc.,[1] in the same way universal etc. are mentioned in *VS* separately just to underline the distinguishing features of the system.[2] According to *NS*, doubt and delusion are occasioned by the knowledge of generality unaccompanied by the knowledge of particularity. Generality is responsible for delusion; particularity, for true knowledge. This is, in Tarkālaṅkara's view, the importance of the two categories, sāmānya and viśeṣa, which are mere generality and particularity as he seems to make out. That is why, according to him, they find mention separately from substance etc.[3] Otherwise,

---

1. See Chapter III.
2. ...एतावन्तो विद्यमानार्थाः। तत्र सामान्यादीनां पृथग्वचनमनर्थकम्, अन्यतिरेकात्। सामान्यादयो हि द्रव्यादिष्वन्तर्भवन्तो न व्यतिरिच्यन्त इति। प्रस्थानभेदोपपत्तेस् तु पृथग्वचनम्। पृथक्प्रस्थानानि वै तंत्राणि प्राणभृद्भेदानामनुग्रहायोपदिश्यन्ते। तदिदं वैशेषिकं नाम तंत्रं, यस्य पृथक्प्रस्थानाः सामान्यादयः पदार्थाः। यथा तंत्रान्तरे प्रमाणप्रमेययोर् यथायथमन्तर्भवन्तोऽपिसंशयादयः। तस्मात् सामान्यादिभिः पदार्थैः पृथक् प्रस्थाप्यते। तचा च शास्त्रमिदं वैशेषिकं भवति; अन्यथा त्वध्यात्मविद्यामात्रमुपनिषद इवैतत् स्यात्। *VBh.* 1.1.4, p. 16
3. सामान्याद् धि विशेषाविवेकाद् यथास्वं संशयविपर्ययौ भवतः।...विपर्ययः खल्वपि सामान्यमेव धर्ममुपलभ्य दोषाद् विपर्यस्यति—स्थाणौ पुरुष इति...। मिथ्याबुद्धिस् तु दुःखभूमिः। तदिदं सामान्यं द्रव्यादिष्वन्तर्भवदेवमर्थं पृथगुच्यते।...सामान्येन या मिथ्याबुद्धिरुदेति सेयं विशेषविवेकेनापोद्यते। तत एव यथार्थबुद्धिर् भवति, या तत्त्वज्ञानमित्याख्यायते।...सोऽयं विशेषो द्रव्यादिष्वन्तर्भवन् नेवमर्थं पृथगभिधीयते...। *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

sāmānya does not mean anything more than sādharmya (resemblance or agreement), and viśeṣa, vaidharmya (dissimilitude or disagreement).[1] Samavāya means complete combination (samyag-avāpti) or unification (ekībhāva).[2] In this connection, Tarkālaṅkāra invokes the authority of Caraka who defines samavāya as non-separateness or indiscreteness (apṛthagbhāva).[3] He takes this concept to be in the nature of an attribute, for, according to him, it resides in substances, does not possess an attribute, and is other than motion—characteristics which it shares with all other attributes.[4] It is an opposite of separateness (pṛthaktva).[5] A particular type of conjunction of the soul with apūrva, body, sense-organs, and feeling is known as birth, in consequence of which the soul considers itself non-different from body etc. The cessation of this state of affairs constitutes the summum bonum (apavarga). This particular type of combination of entities, which is termed samavāya, is most important for a science of emancipation from saṁsāra like the Vaiśeṣika, and hence it, though an attribute, is accorded an independent status in the table of categories.[6] But, if this argumentation has any force, why has separateness (pṛthaktva) not been accorded the status of an independent category? Tarkālaṅkāra has nowhere raised this very perti-

---

1. साधर्म्यं सामान्यं, वैधर्म्यं विशेषः। *Ibid.*, p. 17.
2. समवायस् तु सम्यगवाप्तिरेकीभावः। *Loc. cit.*
3. अथाप्येतदुक्तं 'समवायोऽपृथग्भाव' इति। *Loc. cit.* The quotation is from *CS* 1.1.50.
4. सोऽयं पृथक्त्वप्रतिद्वन्द्वी गुण इति। यथा खलु संयोगप्रतिद्वन्द्वी विभागः, पृथक्त्वं चायोगो नाम गुणान्तरं, तथैव वैलक्षण्यलक्षणस्यानेकत्वलक्षणस्य वा पृथक्त्वस्य प्रतिद्वन्द्वी गुणः समवायो नाम। द्रव्यं खल्वयमाश्रयति, न चासौ गुणवान्, न खल्वपि कर्मेति। *VBh.* 1.1.4, p. 17.
5. सोऽयं पृथक्त्वप्रतिद्वन्द्वी गुण इति। *Loc. cit.*,... समवायः खलु पृथक्त्वप्रतिद्वन्द्वी गुणविशेष उपश्लेषो वा। *Ibid.* 1.1.6, p. 22.
6. यश् च अपूर्वशरीरेन्द्रियवेदनाभिः संयोगविशेषो जन्म, ततः शरीरादिभिरपृथग्भावमात्मनोऽभिमन्यते। यतः खल्वयं पुरुषः संसरन् दुःखराशिमनुभवति, तदुपरमे च प्रहीणदुःखसन्तानोऽपवृज्यते, सोऽयं समवाय एवमर्थं पृथगुच्यते गुणान्तर्भूतोऽपि। *Ibid.* 1.1.4, p. 17.

nent question. Indeed, for the reason adduced by Tarkālaṅkāra himself for the recognition of samavāya as an independent category despite the fact that it is at bottom subsumable under the category attribute, pṛthaktva has an equal claim for recognition as an independent category. It would of course have been quite in the fitness of things if he had recognized both as categories even as he has done in the case of sāmānya and viśeṣa.

According to Tarkālaṅkāra, *VS* purports to posit sāmānya, viśeṣa, and samavāya as logical rather than ontological entities. But how can one account for Kaṇāda's observation that existence is an 'artha' (entity) other than substance, attribute, and motion ?[1] Tarkālaṅkāra interprets the term artha here to stand for the three categories, on the authority of the Sūtra defining the term.[2] From this he argues that, since the existence-universal is also called artha, it must come under the three categories termed artha. Once it is taken for granted that existence is an artha in the technical sense, one is bound to give some credence to Tarkālaṅkāra when he claims that, when Kaṇāda treats existence as another artha than substance etc., he only means to say that it is different from and unidentifiable with particular substances etc., though it is quite subsumable under the three categories.[3] The next Sūtra[4] he explains in the same vein, thus : Existence resides in both attribute and motion; hence it is neither the one nor the other, entirely. That it is not wholly a substance for the same reason, is implied in the Sūtra.[5] Into *VS* he reads the thought that existence is the

---

1. द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मभ्योऽर्थान्तरं सत्ता । *VS* 1.2.8.
2. अर्थ इति द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मसु । *Ibid.* 8.14.
3. अन्योऽर्थोऽर्थान्तरम् । कश् चार्थः ? 'अर्थ इति द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु' इति वक्ष्यति । सोऽयमर्थः । तस्मादियमेष्वेवान्तर्भवति । अर्थः खलु इतरथा न स्यादिति । द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मणामेव काचिद् भवन्ती सत्ता न खल्वपि निर्दिष्टेषु द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मस्वन्तर्भवतीति तेभ्योऽर्थान्तरम् । *VBh.* 1.2.8, p. 57.
4. गुणकर्मसु च भावान् न कर्म न गुणः । *VS* 1.2.10.
5. सत्ता खल्वियं गुणेषु भवति कर्मसु च । तस्मान् नासौ कर्म न खल्वपि गुणः । एतेन द्रव्यं व्याख्यातम् । *VBh.* 1.2.9, p. 57.

only reality taking the form of substance, attribute, and motion under limiting conditions (upādhi).[1]

With Śivāditya and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, whom we shall study in due course, Tarkālaṅkāra shares the view that physical space (ākāśa), mathematical space (dik), and time (kālā) are synonymous terms, used of one and the same substance. The three names are given to the single substance just to distinguish three functions performed by it.[2] He also reads into *VS* the theory that upward motion (utkṣepaṇa) etc. are all subsumable under generic motion (gamana) and are distinguished for the same reason as indicated in respect of mathematical space etc.[3]

Tarkālaṅkāra has introduced many more startling innovations into his commentary, which are not noticed here for want of space. Particularly interesting is his zeal for synthetizing and harmonizing the Vaiśeṣika standpoint with that of the Vedānta,[4] which, too, we cannot afford to discuss here. Indeed, he does not stop at the table of three categories even. These categories he takes to be eternal and ultimate only from the empirical (vyāvahārika) standpoint. He appears to hold that, at the transcendental (pāramārthika) level, there is only one category, viz. existence or rather Brahman, which manifests itself in the form of substance, attribute, and motion.[5] He is given to reading not so much the lines as between the lines of the text, which renders him proof against any onslaughts from an opponent.

---

1. सेयं स्वरूपसती प्रदीपवत् । यथा खल्वन्येऽर्थाः प्रदीपप्रभयोपलभ्यन्ते, प्रदीपस् तूपलब्धौ न प्रदीपान्तरमपेक्षते, स्वयैव प्रभयाऽन्यानपि प्रकाशयति स्वयं चोपलभ्यते, तथा सत्ताऽपि स्वरूपेणैव सती न सत्तान्तरमपेक्षते । स्वयमेव खल्वसौ भावो, न तत्र भावान्तरापेक्षेति । *Ibid.* 1.2.10, p. 58.

2. कालदिशोः पृथग्वचनं कार्यभेदाद् व्यपदेशभेदज्ञापनाय । आकाशः खल्वेकोपि कार्यभेदाद् व्यपदेशभेदं भजते । न त्वर्थान्तरमाकशात् तत्त्वतः कालो दिक् चेति । *Ibid.* 1.1,5, p.19. Also see p. 395 thereof.

3. गमनेऽन्तर्भूतानामेवोत्क्षेपणादीनां पूर्ववत् पृथगभिधानम् इति । *Ibid.* 1.1.7, p. 24.

4. See *ibid.* 1.1.8 ; 1.2.3,10 ; 2.1.29.

5. See *ibid.* 1.1.8, p. 26 ; 1.2.3, p. 52. Also see *ibid.*, p. 396.

**2) Madhusūdana Vidyāvācaspati on *VS*: Tarkālaṅkāra's** innovations find support and reinforcement from the reinterpretation of the Vaiśeṣika categoriology which Madhusūdana Vidyāvācaspti has set out with greater ingenuity and wisdom and from a profounder perspective. Also, Madhusūdana is more outspoken and direct in giving Vedāntic orientation to *VS* than Takālaṅkāra.[1] He states it categorically and unequivocally that, when Kaṇāda avers that existence is one and ubiquitous in substance, attribute, and motion, he means to say that substance etc. are rooted in and differentiations of, the one Existence called Brahman.[2]

According to Madhusūdana, *VS* postulates only three categories—substance, attribute, and motion[3]—,which are identifiable with individual (vyakti), form (ākṛti), and natural class or species (jāti), the three padārtha-s, of *NS*[4] on one hand and 'mā', 'pra-mā', and 'prati-mā' of the Yajur-Veda[5] on the other, respectively.[6] It also seems to be significant that the Brāhmaṇa texts sometimes equate 'mā', 'pra-mā' and 'prati-mā' with the earth, firmament, and the solar region.[7]

---

1. See Madhusūdana Vidyāvācaspati, *Chandaḥ-Samīkṣā*, otherwise known as *Chando-Nirukti*, published as an introduction entitled 'Chandaḥśāstrasya Bhūmikā' to *Chandaḥ-Śāstra*, pp. 10-11,50-51 ; *Sadasad-Vāda* 17-20.
2. एवमेकैकस्मिन् सत्ये ब्रह्मणि विश्वकर्मकृतानेकभङ्गिरेखावच्छेदमाहात्म्यादेव गौरश्वः, पुरुषो, हस्तीत्येवमादयोऽनेकभावाः प्रादुर्भूय पृथक्त्वेन प्रतिपद्यन्ते, न ते सत्याद् ब्रह्मणोऽतिरिच्यन्ते। तथा च भगवान् कणादः (वै.द. १.२.७,१७), 'सदिति यतो द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मसु सा सत्ता। सदिति लिङ्गविशेषाद् विशेषलिङ्गाभावाच् चैको भावः' इत्येवमाद्याख्यायैकस्मादेव भावात् सत्तापदप्रतिपन्नाद् ब्रह्मणश् छन्दोभेदेन सर्वेषां द्रव्यादीनामुत्पत्तिमभिप्रैति। *Chandaḥ-Samīkṣā*, p. 50 ;
   एकैव सत्ता बहुभिर् विशेषैः पृथक्कृता, तेन विशेष-दृष्टिः।
   सत्ता बहुष्वेकतया प्रतीतिर्, विशेष एकत्र बहुत्वबुद्धिः॥ *Sadasad-Vāda, p.* 17.
3. *Chandaḥ-Samīkṣā*, p. 11.
4. तस्माद् द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मणां समवाय एव प्रकारान्तरविवक्षायां व्यक्त्याकृतिजातीनां [*NS* 2.2.66] समवाय आख्यायते। *Loc. cit.*
5. मा च्छन्दः, प्रमा च्छन्दः, प्रतिमा च्छन्दः…। (*Vājasaneyi-Mādhyandina-Śukla-*) *Yajur-Veda-Saṁhitā* 14.18; *Taittirīya-Kṛṣṇa-Yaju-Vedar-Saṁhitā* 4.3.7,1;5.3.2.4
6. *Chandaḥ-Samīkṣā*, pp. 12,14.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

Much as we are impressed by Madhusūdana's thesis as conductive to the rethinking of the problems of Indian philosophical historiography, as well as to the birth of what may be called a substantive Indian philosophical outlook integrating as well as outgrowing the genuine insights of the various schools of Indian philosophy, further discussion of it will take us beyond the scope of this work. We are, therefore, constrained to cry a halt here.

**3) Refutation of Tarkālaṅāra's view by Kailāsacandra Śiromaṇi :** Kailāśacandra Śiromṇi (1752-1830 Śākā) has written a monograph entitled *Praśastapādabhāṣya-Samālocana,*[1] of which the section entitled *Tarkalaṅkārabhāsya-Parīkṣaṇa* only has, so far as our knowledge goes, come to light. Since the guiding priniciple of Tarkālaṅkāra is not so much the scanning of the text as imagination fostered and fed by his commitment to a particular tradition indicated at the end of this chapter and eluding the grasp of his critic, they are at cross purposes, and it would be futile to deal with the polemics here.

**4) Concluding remarks :** An examination of the unconventional interpretation of *VS* by Tarkālaṅkāra and Madhusūdana will need a whole chapter for which there is no room in this work. In fact so far as the wording of the text is concerned, the bulk of the foregoing pages constitute a veritable refutation of their standpoint. From what we have had to say about the position of *VS* in these pages it will be evident that their interpretation is far-fetched and cannot command credence. In the present redaction of *VS*, many more than the three categories of substance, attribute, and motion are recognized and there is absolutely nothing in the treatise itself to warrant the aforesaid two writers' deviation from the accepted interpretation.

Nevertheless, the importance of their work is not impaired thereby. They represent a tradition according to which, in

1. The author's name is not indicated in the work, but, from the catalogue of CSS, we learn that it was written by Kailāśacandra Śiromaṇi.

their pristine purity, the various schools of Indian philosophy were not exclusivistic, pugnacious, and mutually destructive as they turned out later to be. The well-received philosophical traditions purported originally to represent different facets of one and the same corpus of thought, part of which is preserved in the extant Vedic texts. This thesis has not yet received its due from competent critics and scholars, and this work is not a proper place for its examination.

## 3. COGNITION OF THE CATEGORIES

1) **Preliminary remarks :** In this section, we are giving a bird's-eye view of the Nyāya-Vaiseṣika position in general in regard to the cognition of the categories. While we shall try to be concise but clear and thorough, we cannot afford to go into fine details. Our interest in this work is ontological, not epistemological; hence we can take up epistemological issues here only in so far as they add to our appreciation of the categories.

2) **Sources of knowledge** : Kaṇāda seems to postulate perception ( pratyakṣa ), the probans-regarding (laiṅgika) that is inference ( anumāna ), scriptural authority ( āgama ),[1] and possibly residue ( pariśeṣa ) as well.[2] He also mentions sagic perception (ārṣa, siddha-darśana) separately.[3] Praśastapāda lists perception ( pratyakṣa ), the probans-regarding ( laiṅgika ), memory (smṛti ), sagic perception ( ārṣa ) as four means of knowledge ( vidyā ).[4] According to him, scriptural authority etc. are subsumable under inference ( anumāna ).[5] According to Gautama, there are four sources of valid knowledge : perception, inference, authority ( śabda ), and analogy (upamāna).[6] Vyomaśiva believes in three sources of knowledge:

1. Perception, *VS* 3.1.13 ; 9.13.17 ; 10.4,5 ; inference, 9.18 ; 10.4.19 ; scrīptural authority, 1.1.3 ; 2.1.17-19 ; 3.2.8.
2. *VS* (BI/KSS) 2.1.27.
3. *VS* 9.28.
4. विद्या चतुर्विधा—प्रत्यक्ष-लैङ्गिक-स्मृत्यार्ष-लक्षणा । *PDS*, p. 552.
5. *PDS*, pp. 576-577.
6. प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानि । *NS* 1.1.3.

perception, inference, and authority.[1] Bhāsarvajña and Rākhāladāsa follow suit.[2]

Perception is either normal or supernormal. Normal perception is external (sensuous) or internal (mental). Supernormal perception is sagic (ārṣa),[3] yogic,[4] or intuitive (prātibha).[5]

With this background, we may attack the problem of cognition of the categories.

**3) Cognition of substance** : Atom, dyad/binary atomic compound, soul, physical space, mathematical space, time, and monad are normally imperceptible[6] but perceptible supernormally.[7] Similar is the case with air,[8] but Navya-Nyāya strikes a note of dissent, adjudging it perceptible through the tactual sense-organ[9]. Otherwise, earth, fire, and water are perceptible externally through the visual and tactual sense-organs by way of conjunction (saṁyoga-sannikarṣa) of the sense-organ with the object.[10] The other three sense-organs are incapable of perceiving magnitude or quantity (parimāṇa), which is perceptible only through the visual and tactual sense-organs; hence odour, taste, and hearing are incapable of perceiving substance. Soul is inferrable,[11] according to some even

---

1. *Voymavatī*, pp. 538-587 ; *Tarkarahasya-Dīpikā*, pp. 281-282 ; *Pramāṇa-Mīmāṁsā*, p. 7.
2. तत् त्रिविधं प्रमाणम्—प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाश् चेति । *NSā.*, p. 2.
3. *VS* 9.28 ; *PDS*, pp. 621-623.
4. *VS* 9.13-17 ; *VS* (BI/KSS) 9.13 ; *NS* and *NBh.* 4.2.42 ; *NBh.* 1.1.3, p. 11 ; *PDS*, p. 553.
5. *PDS*, pp. 621-622.
6. Manifest colour (and touch) are a necessary precondition of the preception of substances. See *VS* 4.1.6-11 ; *VS* (BI/KSS) 4.1.7 ; (with *NBh.*) ; *NS* 3.1.67 But see Potter, *The Padārthatattvanirūpaṇam of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi*, p. 35, for a different interpretation.
7. अस्मद्विष्टानां तु योगिनां युक्तानां योगजधर्मानुगृहीतेन मनसा स्वात्मान्तराकाशदिक्-कालपरमाणुवायुमनस्सु तत्समवेतगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषेषु समवाये चावितथं स्वरूप-दर्शनमुत्पद्यते । *PDS*, p. 553.
8. *Loc. cit.* ; वायुरिति सति सन्निकर्षे प्रत्यक्षाभावाद् दृष्टं लिङ्गं न विद्यते । *VS* 2.1.15 ; तस्याप्रत्यक्षस्यापि नानात्वं संमूर्छनेनानुमीयते । *PDS*, p. 259.
9. *PTN*, pp. 41-44.
10. *VS* 4.1.6-11 ; *NS* 3.1.67.
11. *NS* 1.1.10 ; *NBh.* 1.1.3, p. 11 ; 1.1.10, p. 23 ; *NV* 3.1.1, p. 342.

internally/mentally perceptible,[1] and according to others even supernoramally perceptible.[2]

*VS* does not mention God at all; but *NS*, *NBh.*, and *PDS* do mention Him.[3] He is held to be inferrable.

4) **Cognition of attribute** : Among attributes, gravity, faculty, and elasticity are only supernormally perceptible;[4] pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, knowledge, and volition are perceptible through the one internal sense-organ called monad; sound,[5] touch, colour, taste, and odour are perceptible thorough the auditory, tactual, visual, gustatory, and olfactory, sense-organs respectively.[6] Number, quantity, difference, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, liquidity, oiliness, and velocity are perceptible through both the visual and the tactual sense-organs.[7]

5) **Cognition of motion** : Motion resides in earth, water, fire, air, and monad.[8] Motion inhering in monad and the atoms of earth, fire, water, and air is only supernormally perceptible,[9] whereas it is perceptible elsewhere, by way of conjoined-inherence (saṁyukta-samavāya-sannikarṣa)[10] visually as well as tactually.[11]

6) **Cognition of universal** : The universals inherent in perceptible substances are perceptible through the sense-organs set over the former, by way of conjoined-inherence.[12] The universals inherent in perceptible attributes and perceptible motions are perceptible through the sense-organs set over the former, by way of conjoined-inherent-inherence (saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya-sannikarṣa).[13] The universals

1. *NV* 3.1.1, p. 342.
2. *NBh.* 1.1.3, p. 11 ; *VS* 9.13 ; *PDS*, p. 553.
3. *NS* and *NBh.* 4.1.19-21, pp. 250-253.
4. *PDS*, (KSS, No. 3), p.39 ; *Vyomavatī*, p. 433.
5. *PDS*, p. 433.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 432,553.
7. *PDS*, pp. 433,553. Cp. *VS* 4.1.12.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 652 ; *Vyomavātī*, p. 675.
9. *VS* 4.1.13 ; *PDS*, p. 558.
10. *VS* 4.1.12.
11. *VSU* 4.1.11, p. 123.
12. *Ibid.* 8.1.5, p. 201.
13. *Loc. cit.*

inherent in soul, physical space, mathematical space, time, atom, air, and monad are perceptible supernormally.[1] Existence and attributeness are perceptible through all the sense-organs.[2]

**7) Cognition of differential** : Differentials are supersensible, perceptible only supernormally.[3]

**8) Cognition of inherence** : According to Praśastapāda, inherence is supernormally perceptible.[4] According to some, it is perceptible through sight and touch by way of qualification-qualificand contact ( viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyatā-sannikarṣa).[5]

**9) General** : Attributes and motions are perceived through the perception of their supportive substances.[6] Substance, attribute,and motion are cognized by the aid of the universal and differential.[7] But universal and differential are cognized trough themselves, for they have no universal and differenial.[8] Substance is cognized by the aid of substance, attribute, and motion.[9] But this is not the case with attribute and motion, for they have no attribute and motion.[10] In the case of substance, cognitions are not causes of one another.[11]

**THE END OF VOLUME ONE**

---

1. *PDS*, p. 553.
2. *VS* 4.1.14.
3. *PDS*, p. 553.
4. *Loc. cit* ; *ibid.* ,p. 697.
5. *NSM* 55,62.
6. गुणकर्मस्वसन्निकृष्टेषु ज्ञाननिष्पत्तेर द्रव्यं कारणं कारणकारणं च। *VS* 8.4; गुणकर्मणां यतो द्रव्यं समवायिकारणं ततस् तेषु साक्षादिन्द्रियेणासन्निकृष्टेषु विज्ञाननिष्पत्तेः कारणस्य सन्निकर्षस्य तदेव द्रव्यं कारणं, न गुणकर्माणि, तस्माद् गुणकर्मसु संयुक्तसमवायाज् ज्ञानम्। 'च'-शब्दो हेतौ ? *Ibid.* 8.4, p. 62.
7. सामान्यविशेषापेक्षं द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मसु। *VS* 8.6.
8. सामान्यविशेषेषु सामान्यविशेषाभावात् तत एव ज्ञानम्। *Ibid.* 8.5.
9. द्रव्ये द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मापेक्षम्। *Ibid.* 8.7.
10. गुणकर्मसु गुणकर्माभावाद् गुणकर्मापेक्षं न विद्यते। *Ibid.* 8.8.
11. द्रव्येष्वनितरेतरकारणात् कारणायौगपद्यात्। *Ibid.* 8.10; अणुत्वान् मनसो यौगपद्याभावात् सत्यपि क्रमे घटपटज्ञानयोर् न कार्यकारणभावः, विशेष्यत्वायोगात्। *VSC* 8.10, p. 63.

## ABBREVIATIONS-cum-BIBLIOGRAPHY

*( Literature referred to in this work )*

1. Abbreviations
2. Literature not covered by the Abbreviations
    1) Primary sources of Indian Philosophy
    2) Secondary sources of Indian Philosophy
    3) Sources of Western Philosophy

# 1. ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| *AD* | *Āyurveda-Dīpikā* by Cakrapāṇi, *CS* ed. |
| *ADS* | *Āpastamba-Dharma-Sūtra,* ed. George Buhler, BSPS, Nos. XLIV and L, 1932. |
| *AM* | *Āpta-Mīmāṁsā* by Samantabhadra, ed. Gajadharalal Jain (Varanasi: Chandraprabha Press, 1914). |
| ASG | Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Ganthāvalī, Ānandāśrama, Poona. |
| *ATV* | *Ātmatattva-Viveka* by Udayana, ed. Dhundhiraja Shastri, CSS, 1940. |
| *AV* | *Atharva-Veda ( Śaunaka-Saṁhitā ),* ed. S.D. Satavalekara, ( Oundh: Svadhyaya Mandala, 1943 ). |
| *AVD* | *Anyayoga-vyavaccheda-Dvātriṁśikā* by Hemacandra, *SM* ed. |
| *BC* | *Bhāṣyacandra* by Raghūttama, eds. Ganga Nath Jha and Dhundhiraja Shastri, CSS, 1925. |
| *BDS* | *Baudhāyana-Dharma-Sūtra,* ed. A. Chinnaswami Shastri, with *VT*, CSS, 1954. |
| BI | Bibliotheca Indica ( Calcutta : Asiatic Society of Bengal, Baptist Mission Press ). |
| BSPS | Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series ( Poona : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute ). |
| *CBN* | F. Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa* ( Leningrad : Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1927 ). |
| *CMNV* | Umesh Mishra, *Conception of Matter According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics,* BORI, 1947. |
| *CS* | *Caraka-Saṁhitā,* with *AD* and Jajjaṭa's *Nirantarapadavyākhyā,* ed. Haradatta Shastri, Vol. I ( Lahore : Motilal Banarsidass, 1940 ). |

CSS Varanasi (formerly Benares and Banaras): Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series/Pustakalaya.

*DPS* *Daśapadārtha-Śāstra* by Candra, *VPDS* ed.

'Gleanings' Gopi Nath Kaviraj, 'Gleanings from the History and Bibliography of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature', *PWSBS*, III, 1924, pp. 79-157.

GOS Gaekwad's Oriental Series (Baroda : Oriental Institute)

*HIL* Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, *A History of Indian Logic* (Calcutta University, 1921).

*HIP* S.N. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol I (Combridy University Press, 1922).

*HNNN* Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya, *History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithila*, MRI, 1958.

*ILA* A. B. Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1921).

*ILES* H. N. Randle, *Indian Logic in the Early Schools* (London etc. : Oxford University Press, 1930).

*IP* S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* (London : Geroge Allen and Unwin, Indian ed., 1940).

*KA* *Kauṭilīya-Artha-Śāstra*, ed. R. Shama Shastri, (Mysore : Govt. Branch Press, 1924).

*KKT* *Kṛṣṇakānta-Ṭīkā* by Kṛṣṇakānta, *SSP* ed.

KSS Kashi Sanskrit Series, Varanasi.

*KV* *Kātyāyana-Vārtika*, *PA* and *PVM* ed.

*LM* *Lakṣaṇa-Mālā* by Śivāditya, ed. S. Subrahmanya Shastri, *JOR*, XIX, No. 1 (1949-50), pp. 44-52.

*MB* *Mitabhāṣiṇī* by Mādhava Sarasvatī, *SP* ed.

*MBh.* *Mīmāṁsā-Bhāṣya* by Śabarasvāmin, with *MS*, *TV*, and *Ṭup-Ṭīkā*, ed. Subba Shastri, ASG, No. 97, 1929-34.

*MBh.* (tr.) *Mīmāṁsā-Bhāṣya*, tr. Ganga Nath Jha, under the title *Śābara-Bhāṣya*, GOS, 1933-36.

*MKBh.* *Māṇḍūkyakārikā-Bhāṣya* by Śaṅkara (5th impression, Gorakhpur: Gita Press, 2009 Vikramī).

*MMeyo.* *Mānameyodaya* by Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa ( 'Māna' part ) and Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita ( 'Meya' part ), eds. C. Kunhan Raja and S.S. Suryanarayana Shastri ( Adyar: TPH, 1933 ).

*MP* *Mahābhāṣya-Pradīpa* by Kaiyaṭa, *PVM* ed.

*MPU* *Mahābhāṣyapradīpoddyota* by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, *PVM* ed.

MRI Darbhanga: Mithila Research Institute.

*MS* *Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra*, *MBh.* ed.

*MSm.* *Manu-Smṛti*, with Kullkūka Bhaṭṭa's *Manvartha-Muktāvalī*, ed. Gopal Shastri Nene, CSS, No. 114, 1935.

*MŚV* *Mīmāṁsā-Śloka-Vārtika* by Kumārila, with *NR*, ed. Rama Shastri Tailanga Manavalli, CSS, No. 3, 1898 ( complete ) ; ditto ( incomplete ; upto Śūnyavāda, verse 144 only ; and with a different pagination ) ; with Jaya Miśra's *Śarkarikā*, ed. Kunhan Raja, Madras University Sanskrit Series, No. 17, 1946.

*NBh.* *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* by Vātsyāyana, with *NS* etc., ed. Ganga Nath Jha, Poona Oriential Series, 58 ( Poona : Oriental Book Agency, 1939 ).

*NBh.* ( tr. ) *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*, tr., Ganga Nath Jha, ditto.

*NBhū.* *Nyāya-Bhūṣaṇa* by Bhāsarvajña, ed. Swami Yogindrananda, Ṣaḍdarśana-Prakāśana-Granthamālā, No. 1 (Varanasi : Ṣaḍdatśana-Prakāśana-Pratiṣṭhāna, 1968).

*NK* *Nyāya-Kandalī* by Śrīdhara, ed. Vindhyeshvariprasada Dvivedi, Vizianagarm Sanskrit Series ( Varanasi : E.J. Lazarus & Co., 1895 ).

*NKu.* *Nyāya-Kusumāñjali* by Udayana, ed. T. Vira Raghavacharya (Tiruvadi : Srinivasa Press, 1941).

*NKu.* (*Hāridāsī*) *Nyāya-Kusumāñjali*, with Haridāsa's commentary, ed. Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra ( Calcutta : Baptist Mission Press, Śākā 1809 ).

*NL* — *Nyāya-Līlāvatī* by Śrī-Vallabha, ed. Harihara Shastri, CSS, 1927.

*NLK* — *Nyāyalīlāvatī-Kaṇṭhābharaṇa* by Śaṅkara Miśra, *NL* ed.

*NM* — *Nyāya-Mañjarī* by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, ed. Suryanarayana Shukla, CSS, 1936.

*NMu.* — *Nyāya-Muktāvalī*, same as *NSM*.

*NNP* — *Nyāyanibandha-Prakāśa* by Vardhamāna, *NVTP* ed.

*NR* — *Nyāya-Ratnākara* by Pārthasārathi Miśra, *MŚV* ed.

*NS* — *Nyāya-Sūtra*, *NBh.* ed.

*NSā.* — *Nyāya-Sāra* by Bhāsarvajña, with *NTD*, ed. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, BI, 1910.

*NSM* — *Nyāyasiddhnāta-Muktāvalī* by Viśvanātha, with his *Kārikāvalī*, Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa and Dinakara Bhaṭṭa's *Dinakarī* and Rāmarudra Bhaṭṭa's *Rāmarudrī*, ed. Atma Ram Narayana Jere ( 3rd ed., CSS, 1933 ).

*NST* — *Nyāyasiddhānta-Tattvāmṛta* by Śrīnivāsa, ed. S. Subrabhmaṇya Shastri ( Madras: Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, 1950 ).

*NSud.* — *Nyāya-Sudhā* by Someśvara Bhaṭṭa, ed. Mukunda Shastri, CSS, 1901-2.

*NSV* — *Nyāysūtra-Vṛtti* by Viśvanātha, ed. V. G. Apte, ASG, 1922.

*NT* — *Nirvacana-Ṭīkā* by Devarāja Yajvan, with *Nirukta*, eds. Satyavrata Sāmaśramī and Hitavrata Sāmakaṇṭha ( 2nd ed., BI, 1911 ).

*NTD* — *Nyayatātparya-Dīpikā* by Jayasiṁha Sūri, *NSā.* ed.

*NV* — *Nyāya-Vārtika* by Uddyotakara,ed. Vindhyeshvriprasada Dvivedi, with an Introduction, CSS, 1916.

*NVT* *Nyāyavārtika-Tātpryaṭīkā* by Vācaspati Miśra, ed. Rajeshvara Shastri Dravida, CSS, 1925.

*NVTP* *Nyāyavārtikatātparya-Priśuddhi* by Udayana, eds. Vindhyeshvariprasada Dvivedi and Lakshmana Shastri Dravid, with *NNP*, BI, Work No. 205, Fasc. VIII, Issue No. 1467, NS, 1924.

*PA* *Pāṇinīya-Aṣṭādhyāyī*, with *KV*, eds. Shridhara Shastri Pathaka and Siddheshvara Shastri Chitrao, in the *Word Index to Pāṇini-Sūtra-Pāṭha and Pariśiṣṭas*, BORI, 1935, pp. 461-649.

*PC* *Padārtha-Candrikā* by Śeṣānanta, *SP* ed.

*PD* *Padārtha-Dīpika* by Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, ed. Tatya-Shastri Patavardhana ( Varanasi : Raj-Rajeshwari Press, 1900 ).

*PDS* *Padārthadharma-Saṅgraha*, with Jagadīśa Tarkalaṅkāra's *Sūkti*, Padmanābha Miśra's *Setu*, and Vyomaśiva's *Vyomavatī*, eds. Gopinath Kaviraj and Dhundhiraj Shastri, CSS, 1924-31.

*PDS*(KSS,No.3) *Ditto*, ed. Dhundhiraja Shastri, CSS, 1923.

*PIL* Kuppuswami Shastri, *A Primer of Indian Logic According to Annambhaṭṭa's Tarkasaṅgraha* ( 2nd ed., Mylapore: Kuppuswami Shastri Research Institute, 1941 ).

*PRM* *Padārtharatnamālā* by Raghunātha, ed. Nageshvara Pant Dharmadhikari, *The Paṇḍita*, Varanasi, 1906.

*PSAH* B.N. Seal, *The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus* (London etc. : Longman's, Green & Co., 1915).

*PTN* *Padārthatattvanirupaṇa* by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, ed. Vindhyeshvariprasada Dvivedi, *The Paṇḍita*, 1915.

*PTNRS* Karl H. Potter, *The Padārthatattvanirūpaṇam of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi*, Harvard-Yenching Institute Studies, XVII ( Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957 ).

PV — *Pramāṇa-Vārtika* by Dharmakīrti, ed. Rahula Sahkrityayana, with *PVSV* and *PVSVT* (Allahabad : Kitab Mahal, n.d. ).
*Ditto*, with *PVV* ( Patna: Bihar and Orissa Research Society, n.d. ).
Note.—We have followed the order of *PVV* chapters in all references to *PV* and its scholia and glosses.

PVM — *Pāṇinīya-Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya* by Patañjali, Chapters I-VI, with *KV*, *MP*, *MPU*, Vol. I, NSP, 1908; Vol. II, 1912; Vol. III, 1937; Vol. IV, 1942; Vol. V, 1945; Parts of Chapters VI and VII, ASG, 1938.

PVSV — *Pramāṇavārtika-Svavṛtti*, *PV* ed.

PVSVT — *Pramāṇavārtika-Svavṛtti-Ṭīkā* by Karṇakagomin, *PV* ed.

PVV — *Pramāṇavārtika-Vṛtti* by Manorathandin, *PV* ed.

PWSBS — *Princes of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Studies* ( Benares: Government Sanskrit College Library ).

RV — *Ṛg-Veda* ( *Śākala-Saṁhitā* ), ed. S.D. Satavalekara ( 2nd ed., Oundh: Svadhyaya Mandala, 1940 ).

ŚD — *Śāstra-Dīpikā* ( *Tarka-Pāda* ) by Pārthasārathi Miśra, with Rāmakṛṣṇa's *Yuktisnehaprapūraṇī*, ed. Laxman Shastri Dravida, CSS, 1916 ).

ŚBh. — *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya*, eds. Mahadeva Shastri Bakre and Wasudeva Laxman Shastri Panashikara (3rd ed., Bombay : Nirṇaya Sagar Press, 1914.

SDS — *Sarvadarśana-Saṅgraha* by Mādhava, ed. Vasudeva Shastri Abhyankara, BORI, 1924.

SM, SVM — *Syādvāda-Mañjarī* by Mallinātha, with *AVD*, ed. A. B. Dhruva, BSPS, 1933.

*SNVM* — Sadanand Bhaduri, *Studies in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, BORI,1947.

*SP* — *Sapta-Padārthī* by Śivāditya, with Mādhava Sarasvatī's *Mitabhāṣiṇī*, Śeṣānanta's *Padārtha-Candrikā*, and Balabhadra's *Sandarbha*, eds. Amarendra Mohan and Narendra Chandra, Calcutta Sanskrit Series, No. VIII ( Calcutta : Metropolitan Printing & Publishing House, 1934 ).

*SPBh.* — *Sāṅkhyapravacana-Bhāṣya* by Vijñānabhikṣu, with *SPS*, eds. Asubodha and Nityabodha ( 3rd ed., Calcutta: Vacaspatya Press, 1936 ).

*SPG* — *Sapta-Padārthī*, ed. D. Gurumurti ( Adyar: TPH, 1932 ).

*SPS* — *Sāṅkhyapravacana-Sūtra*, *SPBh.* ed.

*SR, SVR* — *Syādvāda-Ratnākāra* by Vādideva Sūri, ed. Motilal Oswal, with *Pramāṇa-Naya-Tattvālokālaṅkāra* ( Vīra Saṁvat 2454 ).

*SSP* — *Śabdaśakti-Prakāśikā* by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra, with *KKT*, ed. Dhundhiraja Shastri, CSS, 1934.

*SVM* — See *SM*.

*SVR* — See *SR*.

*TB* — *Tarka-Bhāṣā* by Keśava Miśra, ed. Vishveshvara, CSS, 1953.

*TD* — *Tarka-Dīpikā* by Annambhaṭṭa, *Tarka-Saṅgraha* ed.

*TK* — *Tarka-Kaumudī* by Laugākṣi Bhāskara, ed. M. N. Dvivedi, Bombay Sanskrit Series, No. XXXII ( Bombay: Goverment Central Book Depot, 1886 ).

*TR* — *Tārkika-Rakṣā* by Varadarāja, ed. Vindhyeshvariprasada Dvivedi, *Paṇḍita*, 1903.

| | |
|---|---|
| *TRN* | *Tārkaikrakṣā-Niṣkaṇṭakā* by Mallinātha, *TR* ed. |
| *TSDP* | *Tarkasaṅgraha-Dīpikā-Prakāśa* ( *Nīlakaṇṭhī* ) by Nīlakaṇṭha, ed. Mukunda Jha, NSP, 1933. |
| *TUS* | *Tattvopaplava-Siṁha* by Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, eds. Sukhlal Sanghavi and Rasiklal C. Parikh, GOS, 1940. |
| *TV* | *Tantra-Vārtika* by Kumārila, *MBh.* ed. |
| *US* | *Uttarādhyayana-Sūtra*, with *UT*, ed. Hiralal Hansraj ( Jamanagar: Jaina Bhaskrodaya Press, 1909 ). |
| *UT* | *Uttarādhyayana-Ṭīkā* by Jayakīrti Sūri, *US* ed. |
| *VBh.* | *Vaiśeṣika-Bhāṣya* by Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra, with *VP* etc., ed. Mahadeva Gangadhra Bakre ( Bombay: Gujrati Printing Press, 1913 ). |
| *VP* | *Vākyapadīya*, by Bhartṛhari, ( Brahma-Kāṇḍa ) ed. Dravyeśa Jhā ( Vrindhavana: Brajendra Press, 1983 Vikrami ); Third Kāṇḍa, with *Prakīrṇa-Prakāśa* of Helārāja, Part I, ed. Samba Shiva Shastri ( Trivendrum: Government Press, n.d. ), and Part II, ed. L. A. Ravi Varma ( Trivendrum: Govt. Press, 1942 ). |
| *VPDS* | H. Ui. *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy According to Daśapadārtha-Śāstra*, Oriental Translation Fund, N. S., Vol. XXIV ( London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1917 ). |
| *VS* | *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*, with *VSC*, ed. Muni Shri Jambuvijayaji, GOS, 1961. |
| *VSC* | *Vaiśeṣikasūtra-Vṛtti* by Candrānanda, *VS* ed. |
| *VSF* | B. Faddegon, *Vaiśeṣika System* ( Amsterdam : Johannes Muller, 1918 ). |
| *VSU* | *Vaiśeṣikasutropaskāra* by Śaṅkara Miśra, *VS* (BI/KSS) ed. |
| *VSV*, *VS Vyākhyā* | *Vaiśeṣikasūtra-Vyākhyā*, ed. Anantalal Thakur, MRI, 1957. |

*VS* (BI/KSS) *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*, ed. Dhundhiraja Shastri, with *VSU*, KSS, 1923.

*VS* (MRI) *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*, with *Vaiśeṣikasūtra-Vyākhyā*, ed. Anantalal Thakur, MRI, 1957.

*VT* *Vivaraṇa-Ṭīkā* on *BDS*, by Govindasvāmin, *BDS* ed.

*YBh.* *Yoga-Bhāṣya* by Vyāsa, with *YS* etc., ed. Damodara Shastri, CSS, 1935.

*YS* *Yoga-Sūtra* by Patañjali, *YBh.* ed.

## 2. LITERATURE NOT COVERED BY THE ABBREVIATIONS

### 1) Primary Sources of Indian Philosophy

*Bālamanoramā* by Vāsudeva Dīkṣita, with *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhānta-Kaumudī* of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita and *Tattvabodhinī* of Jñānendra Sarasvatī, eds. Giridhara Sharma Chaturvedi and Parameshvarananda Sharma (Lahore : Motilal Banarsidas, 1940).

*Bhāsvatī* by Hariharānanda Āraṇya, *YBh.* ed.

*Brahma-Siddhi* by Maṇḍana Miśra, with *Brahmasiddhi-Vyākhyā* by Śaṅkhapāṇi, ed. Kuppuswami Sastri (Madras : Government Press, 1937).

*Brahmasiddhi-Vyākhyā* by Śaṅkhapāṇi, *Brahama Siddhi* ed.

*Bṛhatī* by Prabhākara, with *Ṛjuvimalā-Pañcikā* of Śālikanātha Miśra, ed. S.K. Ramanatha Sastri, Madras University Sanskrit Series, No. 3 (Madras: The University of Madras, 1934).

*Chandaḥ-Samīkṣā* by Madhusūdana Vidyāvācaspati, in the Introduction to *Chandaḥ-Śāstra* by *Piṅgala*, ed. Kedaranth (3rd ed., NSP, 1938).

*Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* (2nd impression, Gorakhpur : Gita Press, Vikrami 2011).

*Dinakarī* (or *Muktāvalī-Prakāśa*) by Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa and Dinakara Bhaṭṭa, *NSM* ed.

*Kāśikā* by Vāmana Jayāditya, ed. Shobhita Mishra (3rd ed., CSS, 1952).

*Kāvya-Prakāśa* by Mammaṭa, ed. Raghunath Damodar Karmarkar (6th ed., BORI, 1950).

*Khaṇḍanoddhāra* by Vācaspati Miśra II, eds. Vindhyeshvariprasada Dvivedi and Vamacharana Bhattacharya, *The Pandit*, XXV-XXX (1905-8).

*Kiraṇāvalī* by Udayana, upto p. 288 with *KP* and Rucidatta's *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa-Vivṛti*, ed. Śivacandra Sārvabhauma (BI, 1911) and the rest of the work, with *KP*, *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa-Vivṛti*, and Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra's *Dravyakiraṇāvalī-Ṭīkā*, ed. Narendra Chandra Vedantatirtha (BI, 1956).

*Kumārasambhava* by Kālidāsa, ed. Narayana Rama Acharya, (14th ed., NSP, 1955).

*Kuñjikā* by Durbala alias Kṛṣṇamitra, *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhānta-Laghumañjūṣā* ed.

*Lakṣaṇāvalī*, with *Muktāvalī* of Śeṣaśaṅgadhara, *The Pandit*, XXI-XXII (1899).

*Lakṣmī-Tantra*, ed. V. Krishnamacharya, Adyar Library Series, Vol.87 (Adyar: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1959).

*Madhyamaka-Śāstra* by Nāgārjuna, ed. Louis de la Vallée-Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica, Vol. IV (St.-Petersbourg: Imprimerie de L' Academie Imperiale des Sciences, 1913).

*Mahābhārata* (Gorakhpur : Gita Press).

*Mahārtha-Mañjarī* by Maheśvarānanda, ed. Mukunda Rama Shastri with *Primala*, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, No. XI (Bombay: Tattvavivechaka Press, 1918).

*Nibandha-Saṅgraha* (on *Suśruta-Saṁhitā*) by Dalhaṇa, ed. Jivananda Vidyasagar (Calcutta : Sarasvati Press, 1891).

*Nirkuta* by Yāska, with *Nirkuta-Vṛtti* of Durgācārya, ed. V.K. Rajavade (Poona : Anandasrama, 1921,1926).

*Nirukta-Vṛtti* by Durgācārya, *Nirukta* ed.

*Nyāya-Kuliśa* by Ātreya Rāmānuja, eds. R. Ramanujachari and K. Srinivasacharya, Annamalai University Philosophy Series I (Annamalai University, 1938).

*Nyāyamañjarī-Granthibhaṅga* by Cakradhara, ed. Nagin J. Shah, L. D. Series 35 ( Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology, 1972 ).

*Nyāyapraveśavṛtti-Pañjikā* by Pārśvadeva-Gaṇi, ed. A.B. Dhruva, with *Nyāya-Praveśa* and Haribhadra-Sūri's *Nyāyapraveśa-Vṛtti*, GOS, No. XXXVII, 1930.

*Padārtharatnamālā*, see *PRM*.

*Parimala* by Maheśvarānanda, *Mahāratha-Mañjarī* ed.

*Prakaraṇa-Pañcikā* by Śālikanātha, ed. Mukunda Sastri Adakara (CSS, 1904).

*Prakīrṇa-Prakāśa* by Helārāja, *VP* ed.

*Raghuvaṁśa* by Kālidāsa (Lucknow : Nawal Kishore Press, 1896).

*Rājataraṅgiṇī* by Kalhaṇa, ed. Raghunatha Singh ( Varanasi: Pracharaka Saṁsthāna, 1969 ).

*Ṛjuvimalā-Pañcikā* by Śālikanātha, *Bṛhatī* ed.

*Śabara-Bhāṣya*, see *Mīmāṁsā-Bhāṣya*.

*Śabda-Kaustubha* by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, eds. Gopal Shastri Nene and Mukund Sastri Puntamkar (CSS, 1933, 1929, 1917).

*Sadasad-Vāda* by Madhusūdana Vidyāvācaspati, ed. Adyadatta Thakkura (Lucknow : Nawalkishore Press, 1926).

*Sāhitya-Darpaṇa* By Viśvanātha, Part I, ed. Krishnamohana Shastri (CSS, 1947).

*Sanmatiprakaraṇa-Ṭīkā* by Abhayadeva Sūri, eds. Sukhlal Sanghavi and Becharadas ( Ahmedabad : Gujrat Vidyapith ). See '*Tattvabodhavidhāyinī*'.

*Śāstradīpikā-Prakāśa* by Sudarśanācārya (Varanasi : Vidyavilas Press, 1964 Anno Vikramī).

*Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, with *Vedārtha-Prakāśa* of Sāyaṇa, ed. Satyavrata Sāmaśramī (BI, 1903).

*Setu* by Padmanābha Miśra, *PDS* ed.

*Śrī-Bhāṣya* by Rāmānuja, ed. Vasudeva Sastri Abhyankara, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series (Bombay : Department of Public Instruction, 1914).

*Sūkti* by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra, *PDS* ed.

*Suśruta-Saṁhitā* with *Nibandha-Saṅgraha* of Dalhaṇa, ed. Jadavji Trikumji Acharya (NSP, 1915).

*Taittirīya-Kṛṣṇa-Yajuḥ-Saṁhitā*, ed. Satyavrata Sāmaśramī, with Mādhava's *Vedārtha-Prakāśa* (BI, 1899).

*Taittirīya-Kṛṣṇa-Yajuḥ-Saṁhitā*, tr. A B. Keith under the title *The Veda of the Black Yajus School*, Harvard Oriental Series (Cambridge: Massachusetts: The Harvard University Press, 1914).

*Tarkarahasya-Dīpikā* by Guṇaratna, ed. L. Suali (Calcutta : Asiatic Society, 1905).

*Tarka-Saṅgraha* by Annambhaṭṭa, referred to as 'Annambhaṭṭa', with *TD* and *Nyāya-Bodhinī*, ed. (with notes) Y.S. Athalye, together with introduction and translation by M.R. Bodas (2nd ed., re-impression, BORI, 1930).

*Tattvabodhavidhāyinī* by Abhayadeva Sūri, Vol. I (Varanasi : C.P. Press, Vīra-Sṁvat 2436); Vol. II, ed. Sukhlal Sanghavi and Bechardas Dosi (Ahmedabad: Gujrat Oriental Institute, Vikra., 1982).

*Tattvabodhinī* by Jñānendra Sarasvatī, *Bālamanoramā* ed.

*Tattvārthadhigama-Sūtra* by Umāsvāti, ed. Kesava Lal, with the author's own *Bhāṣya* (Calcutta : Asiatic Society, 1903).

*Tattvarthādhigama-Bhāṣya* by Umāsvāti, *Tattvārthādhigama-Sūtra* ed.

*Tattvavaiśāradī* by Vācaspati Miśra, *YBh.* ed.

*Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakaumudī* by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, *Bālamanoramā* ed.

*Vaiyākaraṇasiddhānta-Laghumañjūṣā* by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, with *Kuñjikā* of Durbala alias Kṛṣṇamitra and *Kalā* of Bālambhaṭṭa, ed. Madhava Sastri Bhandari (CSS, 1925).

*Vedārtha-Prakāśa* on *Taittirīya-Kṛṣṇa-Yajuḥ-Saṁhitā* (*Taittirīya-Kṛṣṇa-Yajuḥ-Saṁhitā* ed.).

*Vedārtha-Prakāśa* on *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, by Sāyaṇa, *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* ed.

*Viśeṣāvaśyaka-Bhāṣya* by Jinabhadra Gaṇi, with *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-Sūtra* and Hemacandra Sūri's *Śiṣyahitā*, ed. Haragovindadasa (Benares: Chandraprabha Press, A.V. 2440).

*Viśeṣāvaśyaka-Sūtra* (or *Āvaśyaka-Sūtra*), *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-Bhāṣya* ed.

*Vivaraṇa-Ṭīkā* (*VT*) by Govindasvāmin, *BDS* ed.

*Vyomavatī* by Vyomaśiva, *PDS* ed.

*Yuktisnehaprapūraṇī* by Rāmakṛṣṇa, *SD* ed.

## 2) Secondary Sources of Indian Philosophy

Athalye, Y.S. : 'Notes' to *Tarka-Saṅgraha* by Annambhaṭṭa. See *Tarka-Saṅgraha*.

Bhattacharyya, K.C. : 'The Concept of Philosophy', *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. II, ed. Gopinath Bhattacharyya (Calcutta : Progressive Publishers, 1958 ).

Bodas, M.R. : 'Introduction' to *Tarka-Saṅgraha* by Annambhaṭṭa. See '*Tarka-Saṅgraha*'.

Chakravarti, Prabhatchandra : *The Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus* (Calcutta: The University of Calcutta, 1933).

——*The Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar* (Calcutta University, 1933).

Chaturvedi, S.P. : 'Technical Terms of the Aṣṭādhyāyī', *Proceedings and Transactions of the Ninth All India Oriental Conference, Trivendrum, December 1937* (Trivendrum : Government Press, 1940) , pp. 1191-98.

Datta, D.M. : 'The Interpretation of Vaiśeṣika Categories', *The Philosophical Quarterly* (Amalner), XXVIII, No. 4 (January, 1956), 217-25.

Goldstücker, Theodore : *Pāṇini : His Place in Sanskrit Literature* (reprinted, Allahabad : Panini Office, 1914).

Gulabkunverba, Shree: Introduction to *Caraka-Saṁhitā*, ed. himself (Jamanagar : Ayurvedic Society, 1949).

Hiriyanna, M. : *Popular Essays in Indian Philosophy* (Mysore : Wesley Press and Publishing House, 1952).

Jacobi, H. : *The Jaina Sūtras II*, *SBE*, XIV.

Joshi, Lakshmana Shastri : *Vaidika Saṁskṛti Kā Vikāsa*, tr. from Marathi to Hindi by Moresvara Dinakara Paradakara (Bombay; Hindi Grantha Ratnakar on behalf of the Sahitya Akademi, 1957).

Kaviraj, Gopi Nath : 'Gleanings from the History and Bibliography of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature', *PWSBS*, III, 1924, pp. 79-157.

Keith, A. B. : 'The Etymology of "Guṇa"', *Commemorative Essays Presented to Professor Kashinath Bapuji Pathak*, generally cited as *K.B. Pathak Commemoration Volume*, Govt. Oriental Series, Class B, No. 7, ed. S.K. Belvalkar (BORI, 1934), pp. 311-14.

Mīmāṁsaka, Yudhiṣṭhira : *Sanskrit Vyākaraṇa-Śāstra Kā Itihāsa*, Vol. I (Dehra Dun :Vaidika Sadhana Ashram, Vikramī 2007 ).

Narain, Harsh : 'Finding an English Equivalent for "Guṇa"', *Philosophy East and West*, XI, Nos. 1-2 (April, July, 1961), 45-51.

Pawate, I.S. : *The Structure of the Aṣṭādhyāyī* (Hubli : Vagvilas Power Press; Dharwar : Karnatak Printing Works, n.d.).

Potter, Karl H. : 'Are the Vaiśeṣika Guṇa's Qualites ?', *Philosophy East and West*, IV, No. 3 (October, 1954), 259-64.

——Review of Ingalls's *Materials for the Study of Navya-nyāya Logic*, *ibid.*, 271-73.

——'More on the Unrepeatability of Guṇa's', *ibid.*, VII, Nos. 1-2 (April, July, 1957), 57-60.

Sanghavi, Sukhlal: Bhāṣātippaṇāni to *Pramāṇa-Mīmāṁsā* by Hemacandra, ed. Sanghavi himself & others, Singhi Jaina Series, No. 9 (Bombay : Bharatiya Vidya Bhavana, 1939).

Sānkṛtyāyana Rāhula: *Darśana-Digdarśana* (2nd ed., Allahabad : Kitab Mahal, 1947).

Sinha, J. N. : *Indian Psychology* : *Perception* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1934).

Thakur, Anantalal : 'Tātparyācārya', *JAS*, Letters, XVII, No. 3 (1951), pp. 241-43.

### 3) Sources of Western Philosophy

Aaron, R.I. : *The Theory of Universals* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952 ).

——'Two Senses of the Word *Universal*', *Mind*, New Series, XLVIII, 190 (April, 1939), 169-85.

Aldrich, Virgil C. : 'Colours As Universals', *The Philosophical Review*, LXI, 3 ( July, 1952), 377-81.

Alexander, S. : *Space, Time, and Deity*, Vol. I (London : Macmillan & Co., 1920).

Aristotle : *The Categories*, in *Organon*, Vol. I, Harold P. Cooke, ed. (reprinted, London: William Heinemann Ltd.; Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1949).

——*Metaphysics*, Rev. John H.M. 'Mahon, tr. under the title *The Metaphysics of Aristotle* (London : Henry G. Bohn, 1857).

——*Metaphysica*, W. D. Ross, tr.-ed., *The Work of Aristotle*, Vol. III (6th reprint, 2nd ed., Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1966).

——*Analytica Posteriora*, Richard Mckeon, ed., *Introduction to Aristotle* (New York : Modern Lilbrary, 1947).

——*Topics*, *Organon*, Vol. II, Octavius Freire Owen, ed. ( London : George Bell and Sons, 1887 ).

Austin, J.L. : *Sense and Sensibilia*, G.J. Warnock, reconstructor from the manuscript notes (Ist paperback ed., Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1964).

Berkeley, George : *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, Colin M. Turbayne, ed., Library of Liberal Arts (New York : Indianapolis, 1957).

——*Philosophical Commentaries*, generally called the Commonplace Book, A.A. Luce, ed. (London etc. : Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1944).

Blanshard, Brand : *Reason and Analysis* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1962).

Brown, Roger. : *Words and Things* (Glencoe, Illinois : The Free Press, 1958).

Carre, Meyrick H. : *Realists and Nomin lists* (reprinted, London etc. : Oxford University Press, 1946).

Christian, William A. : *An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959).

Cornford, F. M. : Parmenides's *Way* of *Truth* and Plato's *Parmenides* translated with an introduction and a running commentary, International Library of Psychology Philosophy and Scientific Method (5th impression, London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957).

——*Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (3rd impression, London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1947).

Descartes, René : *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross,trs., Vol. II (Cambridge: The University Press, 1912).

Emmet, Dorothy : *Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1932).

Ewing, A.C. : *A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* ( London : Methuen and Co., 1938 ).

Feibleman, James : *An Introduction to Peirce's Philosophy* (New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1946).

Findlay, J.N. : *Hegel : A Re-examination* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958).

——*Meinong's Theory of Objects* (London: Oxford University Press, 1933).

Fowler, H. W. : *A Dictionary of Modern English Usage* ( 13th reprint, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1252 ).

Goodman, Nelson: : *The Structure of Appearance* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951).

Hartshorne, Charles, and Weiss, Paul (eds.) : *The Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce*, Vol, I (Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 1931).

Hegel, G.W.F. : *Science of Logic*, W.H Johnston and L. G. Struthers, trs. (2nd impression: George Allen & Unwin; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), in two vols.

Holt, E.B. ; Montague, W.P. ; and others : *The New Realism*, (2nd impression, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925).

Hume, David : *A Treatise of Human Nature* (6th reprint, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1949).

Jesperson, Otto : *The Philosophy of Grammar* (4th reprint, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1948).

Jones, J.R. : 'Are the Qualities of Particular Things Universal or Particular ?', *The Philosophical Review*, LVIII, 2 (March, 1949), 152-70.

——'Characters and Resemblances,' *ibid.*, LX, 4 (Oct., 1951), 551-62.

Kant, Immanuel : *Critique of Pure Reason*, Norman Kemp Smith, tr. (reprinted, London: Macmillan & Co.; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956).

——*Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, L. W. Beck, tr. and ed., A Liberal Arts Press Book ( New York : Indianapolis, 1950).

Laird, John : *A Study in Realism* (Cambridge University Press, 1929 ).

Mercier, Cardinal, and others : *A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, T.L. Parker and S.A. Parker, trs., Vol. I ( 5th impression, London : Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1938 ).

Mill, John Stuart : *System of Logic* (London: Long man's, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1875).

Munitz, Milton K. : *The Mystery of Existence* ( New York : Meredith Publishing Company, 1965 ).

Natansan, Maurice : 'H.B. Alexander's Projection of a Categoriology', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, X, No. 2 (Dec., 1949), 244-50.

O' Connor, D.J. : *John Locke* (London: Penguin Books, 1952).

Parmenides : *The Way of Truth*. See 'Cornford'.

Paton, H.J. : *Kants' Metaphysic of Experience*, Vol. I (2nd impression, London : George Allen & Unwin; New York : The Macmillan Company, 1951).

Peirce, C. S. : 'The Principles of Phenomenology', *The Philosophical Writings of Peirce*, Justus Buchler, ed. (New Dover ed., New York : Dover Publications, 1955).

Plato, Letter VII, *The Collected Dialogues of Plato* Including the Letters, Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, eds. Bolingen Series LXXI (5th printing, New York : Bolingen Foundation, 1969).

——*Parmenides, The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. II, B. Jowett, tr. (4th ed., Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1953).

——*Parmenides*, F.M. Cornford, ed. See 'Cornford'.

——*Phaedrus, The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. III, B. Jowett, tr. ( 4th ed., Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1953 ).

——*The Republic*, H.D.P. Lee, tr. ( London : Penguin Books, 1955).

——*Theaetetus, The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. I, B. Jowett, tr. (4th ed., Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1953).

——*The Sophist, The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. III, B. Jowett, tr. ( 4th ed., London : Clarendon Press, 1953 ).

——*The Sophist*, F.M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* ( 3rd impression, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949 ).

Plotinus : *The Enneads*, Stephen Mackenna, tr., B. S. Page, rev. ( revised ed., London : Faber & Faber, 1956).

Ross, W.D. : *Aristotle* (5th ed., London: Methuen & Co., 1949).

Russell, Bertrand : *History of Western Philosophy* (2nd impression, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1947).

——'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', *Logic and Knowledge* (Essays 1901-1950), R.C. Marsh, ed. (George Allen & Unwin, 1956).

——*The Problems of Philosophy* (17th reprint, Oxford, etc. : Home University Library, 1945).

Ryle, Gilbert : 'Categories', *Logic and Language*, Second Series, Antony Flew, ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953).

Santayana, George : *The Realm of Matter* (London : Constable & Co., 1930).

Spinoza, Benedict de : *Ethics*, A. Boyle, tr., Everyman's Library (reprinted, London: J. M. Dent & Sons; New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1948).

Stace, W.T. : *The Philosophy of Hegel* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1924).

——*The Theory of Knowledge and Existence* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1932).

Stcherbatsky, F. Th. : *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I ( New York : Dover Publications, n. d. ).

Stout, G. F. : 'Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular ?', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume III (1923), 95-123.

——'The Nature of Universals and Propositions', *Proceedings of British Academy*, Vol. X, 1922-23.

Taylor, Richard : *The Ontological Argument*, Alvin Plantinga, ed. ( London : Macmillan, 1968 ).

Thomas, Crewdson : *History of the Schoolmen* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1941).

Walhout, Donald : 'On Categories', *The Philosophical Quarterly* (Amalner), XXXIV, 3 (October, 1961), 141-54.

Wallace, William : *Prolegmena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy* and Especially His Logic (2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894).

Weiss, Paul : *Modes of Being* (Carbondale, Southern Illinois: University Press, 1958).

Weiss, Paul, and Hartshorne, Charles : *The Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce*, Vol. I. See Hartshorne, Charles.

Whitehead, A.N. : *Adventure of Ideas* (5th reprint, London: Penguin Books, 1948).

——*Process and Reality : An Essay in Cosmology* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1929).

——*Science and the Modern World* (7th reprint, London: Penguin Books, 1938).

Williams, D. C. : 'On the Elements of Being', *Review of Metaphysics*, No. 1 (September, 1953), 3-11.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig : *Philosophical Investigations*, G.E.M. Anscombe, tr. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953).

Wolterstorff, Nicholas : *On Universals* ( Chicago and London : University of Chicago Press, 1970 ).

Wood, Alan : *Bertrand Russell : The Passionate Sceptic* ( 2nd impression, London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1957 ).

Zeller, Eduard : *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*, L. R. Palmer, tr. ( reprint of 13th ed., London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948 ).

# NAME-INDEX

( *Other indices will appear in Vol. II* )

## ERRATA

On the top of p. 145, for 'Sources of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Categoriology' read 'The Original Systematization of Categories'.

On p. 8, line 5, for 'acknowledg' read 'acknowledge'.
,, 76, ,, 13, ,, 'indentity' ,, 'identity'.
,, 131, ,, 12, ,, 'We-s' ,, 'Wes-'.
,, 174, ,, 27, ,, 'Inandihil posophers' read 'Indian philosophers'.
,, 177, ,, f.n.2, ,, 'तस्मिन्', read 'तस्यां'.

On p. 187, transpose 'a class' from line 5 to the beginning of line 7.

On p. 209, line 1, add 'same' in the beginning.

Contents of Volume II
(in press)

**DEVELOPMENT OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA CATEGORIOLOGY**